Gender inequality in India Seema Jayachandran Northwestern - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Gender inequality in India

Seema Jayachandran Northwestern University

February 12, 2019

Gender equality, economic development, & cultural norms

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Gender gaps tend to be larger in poor countries

China India

1 2 3 4 Ratio of male to female tertiary enrollment rate 1000 4000 16000 64000 GDP per capita (log scale)

Americas Asia & Oceania Europe Middle East & N. Africa Sub-Saharan Africa

R2=0.435

Source: Jayachandran (2015)

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Economic development and gender equality

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Deep-rooted cultural norms matter too

◮ Some gender gaps aren’t narrowing with economic progress ◮ Example: Preference for having sons

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Male-skewed sex ratio at birth

China India

1 1.05 1.1 1.15 Male to female sex ratio at birth 1000 4000 16000 64000 GDP per capita (log scale)

Americas Asia & Oceania Europe Middle East & N. Africa Sub-Saharan Africa

R2=0.055

Source: Jayachandran (2015)

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Desire for eldest son versus desire for sons in general

◮ Strong desire for an eldest son in India, not to have all sons ◮ Suggests that dowry is not driving sex selection

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Cultural roots of eldest son preference

◮ Patrilocality ◮ Patrilineality ◮ Religious rites

Coresidence and the Sex Ratio of Children, IPUMS and DHS Samples

Armenia 01 China 90 India 04 Nepal 01 Pakistan 98 Vietnam 09 Israel 95 Turkey 00 Belarus 99 USA 05 Ghana 00 Malawi 08 South Africa 07 Armenia 10 Azerbaijan 06 India 05 Uzbekistan 02 Turkey 03 Malawi 10 Mozambique 11 Uganda 11 Zimbabwe 10

90 100 110 120 Sex Ratio of Children .2 .4 .6 Fraction of Elderly Men Coresiding with Son

Asia

• N. Africa/Middle East

Sub-Saharan Africa South/Central America OECD IPUMS DHS



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India’s other exceptionalism: Low female employment rate

Source: The Economist (2018)

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Consequences of the strong desire for an eldest son

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Desire for sons versus more resources for sons

◮ Both types of favoritism for sons are seen in India ◮ Gender gap in children’s human capital is seen in most societies at low levels of development, but desire for sons isn’t ◮ India is more exceptional in its desire for sons

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How desire for eldest son affects fertility choices

After daughter’s birth, try again for a son Have sex-selective abortion

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After daughter’s birth, try again for a son

◮ Affects spacing between births due to hurrying to have another child ◮ Family size is larger than originally planned → Negative consequences for child health

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Girls are breastfed for a shorter duration than boys in India

Source: Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011)

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After birth of girl, want to get pregnant quickly to try for a son

◮ Quicker next pregnancies after girls → Earlier weaning

◮ If know that breastfeeding lowers fecundity, will wean girl sooner

◮ Subsequent pregnancy is often what triggers weaning

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After birth of girl, want to get pregnant quickly to try for a son

◮ Quicker next pregnancies after girls → Earlier weaning

◮ If know that breastfeeding lowers fecundity, will wean girl sooner

◮ Subsequent pregnancy is often what triggers weaning

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Largest gender gap when family would have stopped having children, but for wanting more sons

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Largest gender gap when family would have stopped having children, but for wanting more sons

18 18.5 19 19.5 20

Months breastfed (censored)

• 2
• 1

1 2

Distance from ideal family size (Birth order - ideal # of children)

Male Female

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Gender gap in breastfeeding peaks at typical completed family size

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India’s height disadvantage is concentrated at higher birth order

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India’s height disadvantage is concentrated at higher birth order

−1.30 −1.29 −1.30 −1.42 −1.38 −1.75 −1.8 −1.6 −1.4 −1.2

Mean height-for-age z-score

Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3+

Africa India

Source: Jayachandran and Pande (2017)

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Eldest son preference → Child health inputs drop off with birth order

◮ Among boys, parents provide more resources to their eldest son than to his younger brothers ◮ What explains the birth order gradient among girls?

◮ Birth of a later-born girl prompts a couple to revise upward their

intended family size ◮ Household income needs to be spread among more children, and newborn daughter bears the brunt of that

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Eldest son preference → Child health inputs drop off with birth order

◮ Among boys, parents provide more resources to their eldest son than to his younger brothers ◮ What explains the birth order gradient among girls?

◮ Birth of a later-born girl prompts a couple to revise upward their

intended family size ◮ Household income needs to be spread among more children, and newborn daughter bears the brunt of that

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Eldest son preference → Child health inputs drop off with birth order

◮ Among boys, parents provide more resources to their eldest son than to his younger brothers ◮ What explains the birth order gradient among girls?

◮ Birth of a later-born girl prompts a couple to revise upward their

intended family size ◮ Household income needs to be spread among more children, and newborn daughter bears the brunt of that

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Eldest son preference → Child health inputs drop off with birth order

◮ Among boys, parents provide more resources to their eldest son than to his younger brothers ◮ What explains the birth order gradient among girls?

◮ Birth of a later-born girl prompts a couple to revise upward their

intended family size ◮ Household income needs to be spread among more children, and newborn daughter bears the brunt of that

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Who’s disadvantaged in India? Children other than eldest sons

KE & NE IND −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5

Mean height-for-age z-score

6 7 8 9

Panel A. Girls

KE & NE IND 6 7 8 9

Panel B. Non-eldest sons

KE & NE IND 6 7 8 9

Panel C. Eldest sons ln(GDP per capita in birth year)

Source: Jayachandran and Pande (2017)

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Desire for eldest son → Sex-selective abortions → Skewed sex ratio

China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India India

1.06 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.18 Male to female sex ratio at birth 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Source: World Bank

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Desire for smaller families has increased sex-selection in India

◮ Family with 5 kids has 3% chance of all girls; with 2 kids, chance is 24% ◮ Greater “need” to sex-select as desired family size falls ◮ “Fertility Decline and Missing Women” (Jayachandran, 2017) elicits desired sex composition at a specified fertility level

◮ At family size of 1, almost everyone wants son; at family size≥4, desired sex ratio is >50% female ◮ Decline in desired family size explains an estimated 30-50% of India’s worsening sex ratio since 1980

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Desire for smaller families has increased sex-selection in India

◮ Family with 5 kids has 3% chance of all girls; with 2 kids, chance is 24% ◮ Greater “need” to sex-select as desired family size falls ◮ “Fertility Decline and Missing Women” (Jayachandran, 2017) elicits desired sex composition at a specified fertility level

◮ At family size of 1, almost everyone wants son; at family size≥4, desired sex ratio is >50% female ◮ Decline in desired family size explains an estimated 30-50% of India’s worsening sex ratio since 1980

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Desire for smaller families has increased sex-selection in India

◮ Family with 5 kids has 3% chance of all girls; with 2 kids, chance is 24% ◮ Greater “need” to sex-select as desired family size falls ◮ “Fertility Decline and Missing Women” (Jayachandran, 2017) elicits desired sex composition at a specified fertility level

◮ At family size of 1, almost everyone wants son; at family size≥4, desired sex ratio is >50% female ◮ Decline in desired family size explains an estimated 30-50% of India’s worsening sex ratio since 1980

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Desire for smaller families has increased sex-selection in India

◮ Family with 5 kids has 3% chance of all girls; with 2 kids, chance is 24% ◮ Greater “need” to sex-select as desired family size falls ◮ “Fertility Decline and Missing Women” (Jayachandran, 2017) elicits desired sex composition at a specified fertility level

◮ At family size of 1, almost everyone wants son; at family size≥4, desired sex ratio is >50% female ◮ Decline in desired family size explains an estimated 30-50% of India’s worsening sex ratio since 1980

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Desire for smaller families has increased sex-selection in India

◮ Family with 5 kids has 3% chance of all girls; with 2 kids, chance is 24% ◮ Greater “need” to sex-select as desired family size falls ◮ “Fertility Decline and Missing Women” (Jayachandran, 2017) elicits desired sex composition at a specified fertility level

◮ At family size of 1, almost everyone wants son; at family size≥4, desired sex ratio is >50% female ◮ Decline in desired family size explains an estimated 30-50% of India’s worsening sex ratio since 1980

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“Missing girls” as an unintended consequence of progress

◮ Economic development seems to have worsened sex ratio ◮ Technology (e.g., ultrasound) ◮ Demographic transition ◮ Bitter irony: Progress on women’s rights has worsened sex ratio ◮ Women’s ability to have smaller families ◮ Access to safe and affordable abortion ◮ Increasing women’s agency, e.g., via education, may not improve sex ratio ◮ Female education → Women fewer sons at any given fertility level ◮ Female education → Women want smaller family ◮ First force improves sex ratio, while second one worsens it

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“Missing girls” as an unintended consequence of progress

◮ Economic development seems to have worsened sex ratio ◮ Technology (e.g., ultrasound) ◮ Demographic transition ◮ Bitter irony: Progress on women’s rights has worsened sex ratio ◮ Women’s ability to have smaller families ◮ Access to safe and affordable abortion ◮ Increasing women’s agency, e.g., via education, may not improve sex ratio ◮ Female education → Women fewer sons at any given fertility level ◮ Female education → Women want smaller family ◮ First force improves sex ratio, while second one worsens it

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“Missing girls” as an unintended consequence of progress

◮ Economic development seems to have worsened sex ratio ◮ Technology (e.g., ultrasound) ◮ Demographic transition ◮ Bitter irony: Progress on women’s rights has worsened sex ratio ◮ Women’s ability to have smaller families ◮ Access to safe and affordable abortion ◮ Increasing women’s agency, e.g., via education, may not improve sex ratio ◮ Female education → Women fewer sons at any given fertility level ◮ Female education → Women want smaller family ◮ First force improves sex ratio, while second one worsens it

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Policy responses to son preference

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Government is paying attention to the problem

“Today, let us pledge to create an atmosphere of equality for the girl child.”

• Narendra Modi, Prime Minister

“We have no right to call ourselves 21st century citizens as long as we have an 18th century mindset.”

• Narendra Modi, Prime Minister

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How to address desire for sons?

◮ Ban sex-selective abortions ◮ Offer financial incentives to have daughters

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Reshaping adolescents’ gender attitudes

◮ Joint work with Diva Dhar and Tarun Jain ◮ Hypothesis: Thinking about and discussing the human rights and economic arguments for gender equality will change adolescents’ attitudes and behavior

◮ Participants were boys and girls in grade 7 to 10 ◮ In-class discussion every 3 weeks for 2.5 years

◮ Study designed to follow sample for many years

◮ Test for impacts on girls’ completed schooling, age of marriage, female employment, sex ratio, etc.

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Reshaping adolescents’ gender attitudes

◮ Joint work with Diva Dhar and Tarun Jain ◮ Hypothesis: Thinking about and discussing the human rights and economic arguments for gender equality will change adolescents’ attitudes and behavior

◮ Participants were boys and girls in grade 7 to 10 ◮ In-class discussion every 3 weeks for 2.5 years

◮ Study designed to follow sample for many years

◮ Test for impacts on girls’ completed schooling, age of marriage, female employment, sex ratio, etc.

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Reshaping adolescents’ gender attitudes

◮ Joint work with Diva Dhar and Tarun Jain ◮ Hypothesis: Thinking about and discussing the human rights and economic arguments for gender equality will change adolescents’ attitudes and behavior

◮ Participants were boys and girls in grade 7 to 10 ◮ In-class discussion every 3 weeks for 2.5 years

◮ Study designed to follow sample for many years

◮ Test for impacts on girls’ completed schooling, age of marriage, female employment, sex ratio, etc.

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Why run the program with adolescents and in schools?

◮ Young enough to have malleable views ◮ Schools are a vehicle for the state to counterbalance messages children get at home and in the community ◮ Cost-effective to scale up if wrapped into standard curriculum (taught by schoolteachers, embedded in textbooks)

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Intervention

School-based sessions

◮ Designed and implemented by Breakthrough, a gender human rights NGO in India ◮ 27 classroom sessions, led by Breakthrough facilitators ◮ Session topics: Gender related attitudes; Gender related aspirations; Division of work/Attitude towards work; Tolerance of discrimination; Communication and leadership skills

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Intervention

School-based sessions

◮ Designed and implemented by Breakthrough, a gender human rights NGO in India ◮ 27 classroom sessions, led by Breakthrough facilitators ◮ Session topics: Gender related attitudes; Gender related aspirations; Division of work/Attitude towards work; Tolerance of discrimination; Communication and leadership skills

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Classroom discussions about gender norms and gender equality

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Example: Discussion of household chores

◮ Students are asked to identify who does various chores in their household, e.g., cooking, laundry ◮ Students share their answers and notice commonality that women/girls do more chores ◮ Discuss why that is and whether it is fair ◮ If students say that women are better as these tasks, facilitator asks who does similar tasks outside the home ◮ Students discuss why men are cooks in restaurants but women cook at home, and whether society values both contributions equally

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Setting: Government secondary schools in Haryana, India

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Research design

◮ Randomized controlled trial with school-level intervention ◮ Worked in 314 govt secondary schools (215 co-ed, 99 single-sex) ◮ Baseline survey in winter 2013-14: 14,809 students ◮ Intervention from 2014-2016, while cohorts in grades 7-9 and 8-10 ◮ Endline survey in winter 2016-17; re-surveyed 13,988 (94.5% of students)

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Low support for gender equality at baseline

Proportion of respondents agreeing with statement

0.770 0.567

.2 .4 .6 .8 Proportion in agreement A woman's most important role is being a good homemaker Boys Girls

0.784 0.528

.2 .4 .6 .8 Proportion in agreement Boys should get more opportunities/ resources for education than girls Boys Girls

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Primary outcomes

Three pre-specified primary outcomes

• 1. Gender attitude index

◮ 18 questions on attitudes towards gender equality in education, employment, gender roles and fertility

• 2. Girls’ aspirations index:

◮ 5 questions capturing expectations on academic performance, educational goals and occupation

• 3. Gender behavior index:

◮ 12 questions capturing communications and interaction with other gender, household chores, communication with parents about aspirations, decision making and school attendance, girls’ mobility

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Primary outcomes

Three pre-specified primary outcomes

• 1. Gender attitude index

◮ 18 questions on attitudes towards gender equality in education, employment, gender roles and fertility

• 2. Girls’ aspirations index:

◮ 5 questions capturing expectations on academic performance, educational goals and occupation

• 3. Gender behavior index:

◮ 12 questions capturing communications and interaction with other gender, household chores, communication with parents about aspirations, decision making and school attendance, girls’ mobility

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Primary outcomes

Three pre-specified primary outcomes

• 1. Gender attitude index

◮ 18 questions on attitudes towards gender equality in education, employment, gender roles and fertility

• 2. Girls’ aspirations index:

◮ 5 questions capturing expectations on academic performance, educational goals and occupation

• 3. Gender behavior index:

◮ 12 questions capturing communications and interaction with other gender, household chores, communication with parents about aspirations, decision making and school attendance, girls’ mobility

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Impacts on attitudes, girls’ aspirations, and behavior

0.25 0.03 0.32

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 Standard deviations Gender Attitudes Index Girls' Aspirations Index Behavior Index

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Benchmarking effect size

Effect on attitudes 0.25 Treatment effect 0.11 Parent attitude effect 0.68 Girl-boy attitude gap 0.25 0.5 0.75

Effect size as a “persuasion rate”: 14%

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Benchmarking effect size

Effect on attitudes 0.25 Treatment effect 0.11 Parent attitude effect 0.68 Girl-boy attitude gap 0.25 0.5 0.75

Effect size as a “persuasion rate”: 14%

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Do people just give social desirable answers?

◮ One concern is “social desirability bias” ◮ Treatment group knows that saying they support gender equality will make them look good to the surveyor ◮ We use a tool developed by social psychologists to measure tendency to give socially desirable answers (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) ◮ Would be worrisome if effects were driven by those prone to giving socially desirable answers, but this is not the case

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Do people just give social desirable answers?

◮ One concern is “social desirability bias” ◮ Treatment group knows that saying they support gender equality will make them look good to the surveyor ◮ We use a tool developed by social psychologists to measure tendency to give socially desirable answers (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) ◮ Would be worrisome if effects were driven by those prone to giving socially desirable answers, but this is not the case

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Do people just give social desirable answers?

◮ One concern is “social desirability bias” ◮ Treatment group knows that saying they support gender equality will make them look good to the surveyor ◮ We use a tool developed by social psychologists to measure tendency to give socially desirable answers (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) ◮ Would be worrisome if effects were driven by those prone to giving socially desirable answers, but this is not the case

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Do people just give social desirable answers?

◮ One concern is “social desirability bias” ◮ Treatment group knows that saying they support gender equality will make them look good to the surveyor ◮ We use a tool developed by social psychologists to measure tendency to give socially desirable answers (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) ◮ Would be worrisome if effects were driven by those prone to giving socially desirable answers, but this is not the case

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Social desirability scale (Crown & Marlowe, 1960)

◮ It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. ◮ There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. ◮ I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. ◮ I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

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Robustness to social desirability bias

Gender Attitudes Index Aspirations Index Behavior Index (1) (2) (5) Treated 0.223∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] Low social desirability score

• 0.108∗∗∗
• 0.099∗∗∗
• 0.055∗∗∗

[0.021] [0.021] [0.019] Treated*Low social desirability score 0.044

• 0.020
• 0.008

[0.031] [0.032] [0.028] Observations 13,988 13,988 13,988

Same effect size for those with low tendency to give socially desirable answers

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Robustness to social desirability bias

Gender Attitudes Index Aspirations Index Behavior Index (1) (2) (5) Treated 0.223∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] Low social desirability score

• 0.108∗∗∗
• 0.099∗∗∗
• 0.055∗∗∗

[0.021] [0.021] [0.019] Treated*Low social desirability score 0.044

• 0.020
• 0.008

[0.031] [0.032] [0.028] Observations 13,988 13,988 13,988

Same effect size for those with low tendency to give socially desirable answers

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Robustness to social desirability bias

Gender Attitudes Index Aspirations Index Behavior Index (1) (2) (5) Treated 0.223∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ [0.025] [0.027] [0.028] Low social desirability score

• 0.108∗∗∗
• 0.099∗∗∗
• 0.055∗∗∗

[0.021] [0.021] [0.019] Treated*Low social desirability score 0.044

• 0.020
• 0.008

[0.031] [0.032] [0.028] Observations 13,988 13,988 13,988

Same effect size for those with low tendency to give socially desirable answers

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Improved attitudes for both genders; larger behavior change for boys

0.281 0.226

.1 .2 .3 Standard deviations

Gender Attitudes Index

Boys Girls

0.462 0.212

.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Standard deviations

Behavior Index

Boys Girls 40 / 41

Planned follow-up surveys

2 years after end of program (currently in the field) ◮ Attitudes ◮ School enrollment ◮ Behaviors (e.g., application for girls’ scholarship, signature on petition) Long run ◮ Completed education ◮ Age of marriage and childbearing ◮ Sex composition of children ◮ Employment of female students and male students’ wives

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Planned follow-up surveys

2 years after end of program (currently in the field) ◮ Attitudes ◮ School enrollment ◮ Behaviors (e.g., application for girls’ scholarship, signature on petition) Long run ◮ Completed education ◮ Age of marriage and childbearing ◮ Sex composition of children ◮ Employment of female students and male students’ wives

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Thank you

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Social norms perceived as more progressive

Towards work

Student agrees that... women should be allowed to work community thinks women should be allowed to work women should be allowed to work and thinks community will not

• ppose them

(1) (2) (3) Treated 0.129∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] Extended controls No No No Observations 6,862 6,464 6,409

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Restricted female mobility among adolescents in Haryana

72.6% 55%

20 40 60 80 Percent Boys Girls

Allowed to go alone to relative's house in village 35.8% 9.3%

20 40 60 80 Boys Girls

Ever been to village market to buy personal items with friends 36.1% 8.1%

20 40 60 80 Boys Girls

Ever attended community events without guardian

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Financial incentives to have daughters

Table A1—Financial Incentive Programs Targeting Both Total Fertility and Sex Ratio Scheme Country State Year Eligible compositions Devi Rupak India Haryana 2002 G, B, GG Girl child protection scheme India Andhra Pradesh 2005 G, GG Balri Rakshak Yojana India Punjab 2005 G, GG Care for girls campaign (in conjunction with the OCP) China Nationwide 2005 G, B, GB, GG Dikari Yojana India Gujarat 2006 G, GG Bhagya Lakshmi scheme India Karnataka 2006–2007 G, GG, BGG, BBG Ladli Laxmi scheme India Madhya Pradesh 2007 G, GG, BG Indira Gandhi Balika Suraksha Yojana India Himachal Pradesh 2007 G, GG Majoni India Assam 2009 G, GG, BG Notes: More details on some of the above programs are available in Sekher (2012). G and B stand for a daughter and a son, respectively.

Source: Anukriti (2018)

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