Five Barriers to Financial Inclusion: What can policymakers do? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Five Barriers to Financial Inclusion: What can policymakers do?

Dean Karlan Yale University and Innovations for Poverty Action

March 1st, 2016 | CEMLA

Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA)

Financial Inclusion Program (FIP)

• Team within IPA that focuses on issues of financial inclusion
• Supported primarily by Citi Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

Innovate Evaluate Replicate Communicate Scale

Work with partners to generate new ideas Identify what works and what doesn’t using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) Repeat experiments to take results from promising to proven Communicate policy results to help practitioners and policymakers pick the most effective products and programs Help scale up effective programs

IPA was created in 2002 to discover and promote effective solutions to global poverty problems.

What is financial inclusion?

Financial inclusion means…

• Access to appropriate formal financial products
• Proper product information and disclosures
• Consumer financial capability

Why care about financial inclusion?

Which could help the poor…

• Smooth consumption
• Cope with income shocks
• Increase and diversify income
• Invest more in health and education

Financial inclusion means…

• Access to appropriate formal financial products
• Proper product information and disclosures
• Consumer financial capability

The poor face greater income risk like…

• Irregular and potentially seasonal income
• Vulnerability to shocks
• Difficulty saving large sums for investments

This could lead to healthier behaviors like…

• Achieving savings goals more frequently
• Defaulting less often on loans
• Making more appropriate product choices

Financial exclusion remains a problem

• The poor maintain complex financial portfolios

to meet consumption and investment needs

Rutherford (2000); Banerjee, Duflo (2007); Portfolios of the Poor (2009)

• But most are unbanked: 77 percent of adults

living on less than $2 a day report not having an account at a formal financial institution

Global Findex (2012)

• Among those who have accounts, usage may

still be low

Financial exclusion remains a problem

Disparities in access to finance

22.3 41.8 70.4 90.6 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income High Income

Percentage of individuals age 15+

Individuals with an Account at a Financial Institution

Source: Global Findex 2014

Barriers to financial inclusion

Saver Barriers (Demand)

• Information and knowledge

gaps

• Lack of trust
• Other demands on money
• Transaction costs
• Social constraints
• Behavioral biases

Provider Barriers (Supply)

• Regulatory barriers
• Corruption/Leakage
• Profitability (transaction

costs)

Can removing barriers produce tangible benefits for the poor?

• Behavioral biases

– Self-control and present bias – Inattention – Biases in expectations

• Information and knowledge gaps
• High transaction costs
• Lack of trust and regulatory barriers
• Social constraints

Barriers to financial inclusion

Key findings on behavioral biases

• Savings decisions not always rational - can be

impacted by biases including:

– Time-inconsistent preferences & costly self- control/temptation

Ashraf, Karlan, Yin (2006); Duflo, Kremer, Robinson (2010); Brune et al. (2013)

– Inattention

Karlan et al. (2012)

– Biases in expectations

• Some financial products that account for

behavioral biases have been successful

Default enrollment in Afghanistan

Photo Credit: Jan Chipchase

Joshua Blumenstock, Michael Callen, and Tarek Ghani. “Mobile-izing Savings with Automatic Contributions: Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency and the Default Effect in Afghanistan.” Working Paper (2015). This study is an IPA project funded by the Citi IPA Financial Capability Research Fund supported by the Citi Foundation.

• Automatic payroll deduction: leads to large increases in short-term

savings

• Making savings a “passive” decision is highly effective
• Equivalent to providing 50% match on contributions
• Consistent with results from developed economies
• Linked to dynamic inconsistency

In Afghanistan, creating a simple phone-based savings account with automatic payroll deduction increased likelihood of contributing and total savings.

Default enrollment in Afghanistan

Commitment savings

Commitment savings

• Commitment = voluntary restriction of one’s
• wn set of choices
• Allow households to set aside money for

predefined future goal

– Soft Commitments e.g. “labeling” account for particular expenditure goal, with no explicit enforcement/penalty. – Hard Commitments might entail withdrawal restrictions or penalties for missed deposits.

• Studies conducted in the Philippines, Kenya, Malawi,

Uganda, Ghana, and Bolivia

• Commitment savings accounts:
• Increased savings levels
• Increased investment in health, education, durable

goods

• Is flexible commitment better?

Studies in six countries showed that commitment savings can increase savings and investment.

Commitment savings

Commitment savings

Pascaline Dupas, Dean Karlan, Jon Robinson, and Diego Ubfal. “Expanding Access to Formal Savings Accounts: Experimental Evidence from Uganda, Malawi, and Chile.” Presentation (2015).

Karlan et

• al. 2012

Reminder messages

• For savings reminders:
• Sending any type of reminder increased likelihood of reaching

savings goal by 5%

• Messages that mentioned savings goal and reward for saving

worked best

• In Peru, increased savings balances by 13%
• In Bolivia, increased savings balances by 11%
• For repayment reminders, messages that included loan officer’s

name reduced likelihood of unpaid loan by 5.5 percentage points

Reminder messages prompted small but significant increases in savings, and improved repayment rates when they were personalized.

Karlan, Dean et al. “Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving.” Working Paper (2014). Karlan, Dean, Melanie Morten, and Jonathan Zinman. “A Personal Touch: Text Messaging for Loan Repayment.” Working Paper (2012).

Reminder messages

Replicating reminders globally

• Replicating messaging in 8

countries to understand theory behind messaging impacts

• Testing variations on framing,

timing, personalization, etc. to provide guidance on how best to implement effective messaging programs

This study is an IPA project funded by the Citi IPA Financial Capability Research Fund supported by the Citi Foundation.

• Behavioral biases
• Information and knowledge gaps

– Knowledge of financial concepts – Awareness and understanding of available products

• High transaction costs
• Lack of trust and regulatory barriers
• Social constraints

Barriers to financial inclusion

Key findings on info/knowledge gaps

• Evidence on financial education is mixed:

– Limited impact on adult behavior (larger relative impact on uneducated / marginalized populations)

Cole et al. (2011); Carpena et al. (2011)

– Short, simple, targeted trainings more effective – Small at best indications for children and youth

Karlan et al. (2014)

• Product disclosures don’t always work as intended

– Audit studies show that staff may not disclose product information accurately – Design of information affects whether / how consumers act upon it

Personalizing pension info in Chile

Photo Credit: J-PAL LAC

Olga Fuentes, Jeanne Lafortune, Julio Riutort, José Tessada, and Felix Villatoro. “Personalized Information as a Tool to Improve Pension Savings.” In Progress. This study is an IPA project funded by the Citi IPA Financial Capability Research Fund supported by the Citi Foundation.

• Voluntary contributions increased significantly, particularly among

users who had initially underestimated their pension payouts

• Voluntary savings results stronger for younger individuals, women
• Results suggest that impacts continue for at least 8 months

following the intervention

• No evidence of crowding-out of alternative savings channel; weak

evidence of increased formalization of employment through survey

• Self-service modules worked best when an assistant was present to

help users navigate the platform

Concrete, personalized information about pension payouts can increase voluntary contributions.

Personalizing pension info in Chile

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

Xavier Giné and Rafael Mazer. “Financial (Dis-)Information: Evidence from a Multi-Country Audit Study.” Forthcoming.

• For shoppers who appeared experienced, staff did provide

information about fees and commissions, but only when requested

• Shoppers were often offered more costly savings and credit

products even when lower-cost options were available

• Incentives of bank staff and shoppers not aligned, thus disclosure

and transparency policies difficult to implement successfully

• Can more effective disclosure forms be developed?

An audit study in Mexico and Peru showed that financial service provider staff tended to provide incomplete or inaccurate information, particularly to shoppers who appeared inexperienced.

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

• Low-income individuals tested several types of

disclosure forms

• Several variations of forms:

– Either 5 or 10 product options – Either simple or complex information about each product option

• Participants were asked to choose the best

savings or credit product

Xavier Gine, Cristina Martínez, and Rafael Mazer. “Information Disclosure and Demand Elasticity of Financial Products: Evidence from Mexico.” Forthcoming.

Producto Institución Monto mínimo de apertura Comisión por apertura Comisión por manejo de cuenta Saldo promedio mínimo mensual requerido Comisión por no mantener el saldo mínimo requerido Comisión por consulta de saldo en cajeros propios del banco Comisión por retiro de efectivo en cajeros propios del banco Comisión por inactividad Tasa de interés anual GAT (Ganancia Anual Total)* Ganancias en un mes sin ninguna actividad Ganancias en un mes con actividad** A Libertad Servicios Financieros $100 $20 $9 $250 $45 $9 $1 $0 2.0%

• 0.61%
• 0.43%
• 0.48%

B Financiera FinComun $650 $15 $7 $300 $40 $0 $8 $0 1.0%

• 1.01%
• 0.39%
• 0.43%

C Banco Compartam

• s

$750 $20 $0 $950 $90 $0 $0 $0 1.5% 1.06% 0.11% 0.13% D HSBC $200 $0 $0 $900 $55 $0 $0 $0 1.8% 1.77% 0.14% 0.15% E Caja Popular Mexicana $400 $15 $2 $300 $65 $0 $3 $0 1.6% 0.78%

• 0.04%
• 0.04%

* GAT (Ganancia Anual Total) es un porcentaje que representa el dinero obtenido de una inversión o ahorro durante un año, se obtiene de restarle al rendimiento generado las comisiones cobradas ** Incluye dos consultas y dos retiros al mes de 250 pesos cada uno, sin ninguna penalidad por no mantener el saldo promedio mínimo mensual requerido.

5

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

Xavier Gine, Cristina Martínez, and Rafael Mazer. “Information Disclosure and Demand Elasticity of Financial Products: Evidence from Mexico.” Forthcoming.

Producto Institución GAT (Ganancia Anual Total)* Ganancias en un mes sin ninguna actividad Ganancias en un mes con actividad** A Inbursa

• 1.07%
• $3.83
• $4.25

B Caja Popular Mexicana

• 0.28%

$0.17

• $0.25

C HSBC 0.12% $1.08 $0.88 D Banco Compartamos 0.86% $4.58 $4.13 E Financiera FinComun

• 1.07%
• $3.00
• $5.50

F Banco Autofin

• 1.65%
• $6.67
• $7.00

G Banamex 1.27% $7.50 $6.75 H BBVA Bancomer

• 1.10%
• $3.58
• $3.63

I Libertad Servicios Financieros

• 1.30%
• $5.33
• $41.50

J Batoamigo

• 1.88%
• $6.00
• $8.00

* GAT (Ganancia Anual Total) es un porcentaje que representa el dinero obtenido de una inversión o ahorro durante un año, se obtiene de restarle al rendimiento generado las comisiones cobradas ** Incluye dos consultas y dos retiros al mes de 250 pesos cada uno, sin ninguna penalidad por no mantener el saldo promedio mínimo mensual requerido

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

Xavier Gine, Cristina Martínez, and Rafael Mazer. “Information Disclosure and Demand Elasticity of Financial Products: Evidence from Mexico.” Forthcoming.

The format in which the disclosures were provided had a significant impact on individuals’ product choices.

Designing better disclosures in Mexico

38.7% 36.9% 67.3%*** 55.7%*** 60.7%*** 42.1% 40.6% 45.5%*** 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Credit Savings

Percentage of people that chose best product

Original leaflet 5 Simple 5 Complex 10 Simple

Xavier Gine, Cristina Martínez, and Rafael Mazer. “Information Disclosure and Demand Elasticity of Financial Products: Evidence from Mexico.” Forthcoming.

Marketing overdrafts in Turkey

Sule Alan, Mehmet Cemalcılar, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. “Unshrouding Effects on Demand for a Costly Add-on: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey.” Working Paper (2016).

• Advertising a 50% discount on an overdraft product led to a

decrease in overdraft use

• Promoting overdraft availability without mentioning price led to an

increase in overdraft use

• More frequent and / or longer messaging intensified the impact of

the marketing

• Effects dissipated over time – no detectable impacts 5 months later

Consumers respond differently when advertising highlights different attributes of products.

Marketing overdrafts in Turkey

• Behavioral biases
• Information and knowledge gaps
• High transaction costs

– Monetary costs – Non-monetary costs

• Lack of trust and regulatory barriers
• Social constraints

Barriers to financial inclusion

Transaction cost of traveling to bank

Pascaline Dupas, Dean Karlan, Jon Robinson, and Diego Ubfal. “Expanding Access to Formal Savings Accounts: Experimental Evidence from Uganda, Malawi, and Chile.” Presentation (2015).

Policy lessons

• Addressing the barriers can impact financial

decision-making of the poor

• Keys to improving take-up and usage: product

design and cost

– Everyone’s needs are different! – Appropriate design is not always intuitive

What should policymakers / FSPs do?

• Leverage transaction data
• Test new product designs

– Integrate tests into design process – Conduct quick, low-cost, iterative tests

• Collaborate on disclosure policy

dean.karlan@yale.edu karlan.yale.edu www.poverty-action.org/financialinclusion