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Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics Joss Wright joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Oxford Internet Institute University of Oxford


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics

Joss Wright

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk

Oxford Internet Institute University of Oxford

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 1/19

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SLIDE 2

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

1 Introduction 2 Information Sources 3 Legality and Ethics 4 Early Results 5 Questions

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 2/19

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SLIDE 3

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship

Almost every country engages in some form of Internet filtering. China’s “Golden Shield” is the classic example.

Saudi Arabia presents perhaps the most extreme filtering

  • regime. (OpenNet Initiative)

Many different technologies; many different filtering targets; many different rationales and justifications.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 3/19

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship

Almost every country engages in some form of Internet filtering. China’s “Golden Shield” is the classic example.

Saudi Arabia presents perhaps the most extreme filtering

  • regime. (OpenNet Initiative)

Many different technologies; many different filtering targets; many different rationales and justifications.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 3/19

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship

Almost every country engages in some form of Internet filtering. China’s “Golden Shield” is the classic example.

Saudi Arabia presents perhaps the most extreme filtering

  • regime. (OpenNet Initiative)

Many different technologies; many different filtering targets; many different rationales and justifications.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 3/19

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship

Almost every country engages in some form of Internet filtering. China’s “Golden Shield” is the classic example.

Saudi Arabia presents perhaps the most extreme filtering

  • regime. (OpenNet Initiative)

Many different technologies; many different filtering targets; many different rationales and justifications.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 3/19

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship

Almost every country engages in some form of Internet filtering. China’s “Golden Shield” is the classic example.

Saudi Arabia presents perhaps the most extreme filtering

  • regime. (OpenNet Initiative)

Many different technologies; many different filtering targets; many different rationales and justifications.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 3/19

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Censorship Technologies

We can classify filtering according to their focus:

DNS Tampering IP Header Filtering (address or protocol) IP Content Filtering (keyword or protocol) Proxy Filtering

We might also consider takedown, social pressure, legislation as means of filtering, but will focus on technological approaches.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 4/19

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SLIDE 15

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

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SLIDE 16

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

There are limitations to filtering technologies. A rough tradeoff between subtlety of approach and computational requirements.

In general, more sophisticated methods require greater computational resources. At a national scale, these can become severe.

Centralization of filtering can cause a variety of problems, as seen with the CleanFeed filter implemented by BT in the UK. Centrally managing filtering can also raise significant administrative and organizational burdens.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 5/19

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-24
SLIDE 24

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-25
SLIDE 25

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-26
SLIDE 26

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-27
SLIDE 27

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-28
SLIDE 28

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Localized Filtering

Countries may delegate filtering to ISPs or local areas, either for efficiency or to specifically allow localized control. We can already observe location-specific choices of filtering in response to local events. We therefore expect to see differences in filtering across a state, rather than homogeneous national filtering.

Naturally, we also expect filtering to vary over time. We may also expect organizations to have one filtering regime, even across a state.

This can reveal filtering tactics, methods, reasoning, limitations.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 6/19

slide-29
SLIDE 29

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-30
SLIDE 30

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-31
SLIDE 31

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-32
SLIDE 32

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-33
SLIDE 33

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-34
SLIDE 34

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Work

Two major existing projects examine filtering:

HERDICT: crowdsources filtering information from volunteer web users. OpenNet Initiative: have used a variety of sources, including volunteers and direct investigation as well as direct technical means, to examine filtering around the world.

Both, to some extent, consider national-level filtering as homogeneous. Both also make some judgement as to the nature of filtering. (Political, religious, social.)

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 7/19

slide-35
SLIDE 35

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Approaches

HERDICT relies largely on users for information. Visitors to the website, or users of the plugin, can report sites that appear blocked. The website actively presents potentially blocked content, allowing users to verify if it is blocked. OpenNet Initiative’s methods vary, but include direct investigation and liason with volunteers in blocked regions.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 8/19

slide-36
SLIDE 36

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Approaches

HERDICT relies largely on users for information. Visitors to the website, or users of the plugin, can report sites that appear blocked. The website actively presents potentially blocked content, allowing users to verify if it is blocked. OpenNet Initiative’s methods vary, but include direct investigation and liason with volunteers in blocked regions.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 8/19

slide-37
SLIDE 37

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Approaches

HERDICT relies largely on users for information. Visitors to the website, or users of the plugin, can report sites that appear blocked. The website actively presents potentially blocked content, allowing users to verify if it is blocked. OpenNet Initiative’s methods vary, but include direct investigation and liason with volunteers in blocked regions.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 8/19

slide-38
SLIDE 38

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Approaches

HERDICT relies largely on users for information. Visitors to the website, or users of the plugin, can report sites that appear blocked. The website actively presents potentially blocked content, allowing users to verify if it is blocked. OpenNet Initiative’s methods vary, but include direct investigation and liason with volunteers in blocked regions.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 8/19

slide-39
SLIDE 39

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Existing Approaches

HERDICT relies largely on users for information. Visitors to the website, or users of the plugin, can report sites that appear blocked. The website actively presents potentially blocked content, allowing users to verify if it is blocked. OpenNet Initiative’s methods vary, but include direct investigation and liason with volunteers in blocked regions.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 8/19

slide-40
SLIDE 40

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Sources

For fine-grained mapping we wish to combine data gathered at various locations in a state, or around the world, with GeoIP data at the city level. GeoIP databases are increasingly cheap and accurate. The problem is therefore to get a large number of readings from a wide geographical distribution. Ideally, not just blocking status but type of blocking.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 9/19

slide-41
SLIDE 41

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Sources

For fine-grained mapping we wish to combine data gathered at various locations in a state, or around the world, with GeoIP data at the city level. GeoIP databases are increasingly cheap and accurate. The problem is therefore to get a large number of readings from a wide geographical distribution. Ideally, not just blocking status but type of blocking.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 9/19

slide-42
SLIDE 42

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Sources

For fine-grained mapping we wish to combine data gathered at various locations in a state, or around the world, with GeoIP data at the city level. GeoIP databases are increasingly cheap and accurate. The problem is therefore to get a large number of readings from a wide geographical distribution. Ideally, not just blocking status but type of blocking.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 9/19

slide-43
SLIDE 43

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Sources

For fine-grained mapping we wish to combine data gathered at various locations in a state, or around the world, with GeoIP data at the city level. GeoIP databases are increasingly cheap and accurate. The problem is therefore to get a large number of readings from a wide geographical distribution. Ideally, not just blocking status but type of blocking.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 9/19

slide-44
SLIDE 44

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Fine-Grained Sources

For fine-grained mapping we wish to combine data gathered at various locations in a state, or around the world, with GeoIP data at the city level. GeoIP databases are increasingly cheap and accurate. The problem is therefore to get a large number of readings from a wide geographical distribution. Ideally, not just blocking status but type of blocking.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 9/19

slide-45
SLIDE 45

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

Crowdsourcing or using volunteers can be effective if the tool is sufficiently usable, but is limited:

Undirected, inconsistent coverage.

Direct investigation is expensive. Ideally we desire direct access to filtered internet connections.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 10/19

slide-46
SLIDE 46

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

Crowdsourcing or using volunteers can be effective if the tool is sufficiently usable, but is limited:

Undirected, inconsistent coverage.

Direct investigation is expensive. Ideally we desire direct access to filtered internet connections.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 10/19

slide-47
SLIDE 47

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

Crowdsourcing or using volunteers can be effective if the tool is sufficiently usable, but is limited:

Undirected, inconsistent coverage.

Direct investigation is expensive. Ideally we desire direct access to filtered internet connections.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 10/19

slide-48
SLIDE 48

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

Crowdsourcing or using volunteers can be effective if the tool is sufficiently usable, but is limited:

Undirected, inconsistent coverage.

Direct investigation is expensive. Ideally we desire direct access to filtered internet connections.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 10/19

slide-49
SLIDE 49

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Limitations

Crowdsourcing or using volunteers can be effective if the tool is sufficiently usable, but is limited:

Undirected, inconsistent coverage.

Direct investigation is expensive. Ideally we desire direct access to filtered internet connections.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 10/19

slide-50
SLIDE 50

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-51
SLIDE 51

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-52
SLIDE 52

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-53
SLIDE 53

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-54
SLIDE 54

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-55
SLIDE 55

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action

Direct access to other connections is possible in some limited cases.

Tor exit nodes, and similar services such as psiphon. VPN services or remote shells. Creatively-used public services – webservers, IRC, bittorrent...

Access to DNS is very simple, and directly addresses one major type of filtering.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 11/19

slide-56
SLIDE 56

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-57
SLIDE 57

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-58
SLIDE 58

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-59
SLIDE 59

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-60
SLIDE 60

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-61
SLIDE 61

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-62
SLIDE 62

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Problems

Tor exit nodes, and similar services are rare, especially in countries with interesting filtering regimes.

China seems to offer no exit nodes. Much of Africa and the Middle East is the same. No-one wants to run Tor-like services in highly filtered areas!

VPN services are also rare, and usually paid. Remote shells are even more so.

Similarly to Tor, these services are typically offered to get past filtering, not get in.

Creative misuse of open services seems the most feasible

  • ption.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 12/19

slide-63
SLIDE 63

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Mechanisms

DNS is simple and effective for detecting DNS filtering, but is not very useful beyond that. Tor and Tor-like services are rare, but wonderful. BitTorrent seems a likely candidate, and we have been investigating it, but consent is a serious issue. If only we could... botnets.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 13/19

slide-64
SLIDE 64

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Mechanisms

DNS is simple and effective for detecting DNS filtering, but is not very useful beyond that. Tor and Tor-like services are rare, but wonderful. BitTorrent seems a likely candidate, and we have been investigating it, but consent is a serious issue. If only we could... botnets.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 13/19

slide-65
SLIDE 65

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Mechanisms

DNS is simple and effective for detecting DNS filtering, but is not very useful beyond that. Tor and Tor-like services are rare, but wonderful. BitTorrent seems a likely candidate, and we have been investigating it, but consent is a serious issue. If only we could... botnets.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 13/19

slide-66
SLIDE 66

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Mechanisms

DNS is simple and effective for detecting DNS filtering, but is not very useful beyond that. Tor and Tor-like services are rare, but wonderful. BitTorrent seems a likely candidate, and we have been investigating it, but consent is a serious issue. If only we could... botnets.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 13/19

slide-67
SLIDE 67

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Direct Action Mechanisms

DNS is simple and effective for detecting DNS filtering, but is not very useful beyond that. Tor and Tor-like services are rare, but wonderful. BitTorrent seems a likely candidate, and we have been investigating it, but consent is a serious issue. If only we could... botnets.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 13/19

slide-68
SLIDE 68

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-69
SLIDE 69

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-70
SLIDE 70

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-71
SLIDE 71

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-72
SLIDE 72

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-73
SLIDE 73

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legality and Ethics

A variety of legal and ethical questions have already been raised in this talk. Is it legal to access blocked websites? Is it ethical to ask someone else to access blocked websites?

Questions of consent for automated tools or websites.

Is it legal to creatively abuse a public service? (For the specific purpose of detecting or, potentially, bypassing filtering?)

Is it ethical to potentially open a service operator to repercussions based around such misuse?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 14/19

slide-74
SLIDE 74

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-75
SLIDE 75

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-76
SLIDE 76

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-77
SLIDE 77

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-78
SLIDE 78

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-79
SLIDE 79

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Legal Concerns

HERDICT Legal FAQ: ”Rules vary by country, but we know of no nation where it is illegal for you to report information about sites you cannot access.” Some sites are blocked for serious legal or societal reasons:

Pornography, homosexuality, l` ese majest´ e, insult to religion

Reporting such sites as blocked may well be legal, but detection through access attempts may cause legal, pseudo-legal or social consequences. When is the risk too small, and how can we judge this against arbitrary cultural contexts?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 15/19

slide-80
SLIDE 80

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Current Work

Retrieved a list of 278 DNS servers across China from the APNIC WHOIS database. Selected the top 80 reported blocked websites according to HERDICT. Performed a DNS query for each site to each server. We also have code to scan China, with a relatively light touch, for DNS servers, but have not deemed it necessary at this point.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 16/19

slide-81
SLIDE 81

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Current Work

Retrieved a list of 278 DNS servers across China from the APNIC WHOIS database. Selected the top 80 reported blocked websites according to HERDICT. Performed a DNS query for each site to each server. We also have code to scan China, with a relatively light touch, for DNS servers, but have not deemed it necessary at this point.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 16/19

slide-82
SLIDE 82

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Current Work

Retrieved a list of 278 DNS servers across China from the APNIC WHOIS database. Selected the top 80 reported blocked websites according to HERDICT. Performed a DNS query for each site to each server. We also have code to scan China, with a relatively light touch, for DNS servers, but have not deemed it necessary at this point.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 16/19

slide-83
SLIDE 83

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Current Work

Retrieved a list of 278 DNS servers across China from the APNIC WHOIS database. Selected the top 80 reported blocked websites according to HERDICT. Performed a DNS query for each site to each server. We also have code to scan China, with a relatively light touch, for DNS servers, but have not deemed it necessary at this point.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 16/19

slide-84
SLIDE 84

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Current Work

Retrieved a list of 278 DNS servers across China from the APNIC WHOIS database. Selected the top 80 reported blocked websites according to HERDICT. Performed a DNS query for each site to each server. We also have code to scan China, with a relatively light touch, for DNS servers, but have not deemed it necessary at this point.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 16/19

slide-85
SLIDE 85

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Results have not yet been analysed, but some initial observations: Many blocked sites are listed an non-existent in the majority

  • f DNS servers tested.

Several servers return no result for most blocked sites, but

  • ccasionally redirect requests to other DNS servers before

doing so.

One server in Zhongxin returns a normal response for baidu.com.cn, but redirects to a Beijing server when asked about wujie.net, which then returns no result.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 17/19

slide-86
SLIDE 86

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Results have not yet been analysed, but some initial observations: Many blocked sites are listed an non-existent in the majority

  • f DNS servers tested.

Several servers return no result for most blocked sites, but

  • ccasionally redirect requests to other DNS servers before

doing so.

One server in Zhongxin returns a normal response for baidu.com.cn, but redirects to a Beijing server when asked about wujie.net, which then returns no result.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 17/19

slide-87
SLIDE 87

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Results have not yet been analysed, but some initial observations: Many blocked sites are listed an non-existent in the majority

  • f DNS servers tested.

Several servers return no result for most blocked sites, but

  • ccasionally redirect requests to other DNS servers before

doing so.

One server in Zhongxin returns a normal response for baidu.com.cn, but redirects to a Beijing server when asked about wujie.net, which then returns no result.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 17/19

slide-88
SLIDE 88

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Results have not yet been analysed, but some initial observations: Many blocked sites are listed an non-existent in the majority

  • f DNS servers tested.

Several servers return no result for most blocked sites, but

  • ccasionally redirect requests to other DNS servers before

doing so.

One server in Zhongxin returns a normal response for baidu.com.cn, but redirects to a Beijing server when asked about wujie.net, which then returns no result.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 17/19

slide-89
SLIDE 89

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-90
SLIDE 90

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-91
SLIDE 91

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-92
SLIDE 92

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-93
SLIDE 93

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-94
SLIDE 94

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Early Observations

Evidence of lying on behalf of a number of servers:

wujie.net is redirected to a number of IPs, but 161 servers that returned a response directed to only 9 separate IPs – none

  • f which appear to offer services, and are apparently unrelated

to wujie.net. Similar results for erights.net

Many blocked sites, for example torproject.org do get genuine DNS responses. Backing up these results by comparison with other forms of blocking is of great interest.

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 18/19

slide-95
SLIDE 95

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Questions

What are the legal and, importantly, ethical limits to what we can do in this area? What good services exist from which to “bounce” connections?

Specifically, public services rather than individual services.

Have we missed anything obvious?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 19/19

slide-96
SLIDE 96

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Questions

What are the legal and, importantly, ethical limits to what we can do in this area? What good services exist from which to “bounce” connections?

Specifically, public services rather than individual services.

Have we missed anything obvious?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 19/19

slide-97
SLIDE 97

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Questions

What are the legal and, importantly, ethical limits to what we can do in this area? What good services exist from which to “bounce” connections?

Specifically, public services rather than individual services.

Have we missed anything obvious?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 19/19

slide-98
SLIDE 98

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Questions

What are the legal and, importantly, ethical limits to what we can do in this area? What good services exist from which to “bounce” connections?

Specifically, public services rather than individual services.

Have we missed anything obvious?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 19/19

slide-99
SLIDE 99

Introduction Information Sources Legality and Ethics Early Results Questions

Questions

What are the legal and, importantly, ethical limits to what we can do in this area? What good services exist from which to “bounce” connections?

Specifically, public services rather than individual services.

Have we missed anything obvious?

joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk Fine-Grained Censorship Mapping - Information Sources, Legality and Ethics: 19/19