federal convictions in FY ZAn FightAgoinst Violent 1n - - PDF document

Guns accounted for I2.I%"of federal convictions in FY ZAn

1n

Violent FightAgoinst Lou"Letel Cun 7ìrrgel.r Ðept.

Make Sessions "Nervous"

Two Firearms Offenses That Are Most Common

P<¡ssession of fire.rrm by.r convicted felon (rB USC $ 9zz(g)(r)); and

Firearm possessed during and in relation to crime of violence or drug trafficking offense (r8 l",SC 6 q¿¿(cxrx.À) )

FIRST TYPE OF GUN CASE:

18 Usc S e22{exr}

r8 U.S.C. $ gzz(gxr) makes it a Federal crime or

• ffense ft¡r an individ¡¡al wl¡o has been convictccl of .r

felony oflense to possess å fìrealm in or affècting

i nterstate coûlrrìerce.

Other "Prohi bited Persons"

l)r'olr ibitecl persons .rls<¡ inclucle:

"lllegal".-rliens Fugitivcs flom justice Unlawful users of controlled substances; acldicts

Adi ud icatecl "melrtal defèctives"

I ) i s h on o r"rtrly discharged service personnel

L.l.S. citiz.ens who have renounced cítjzerrslrip M isde rneanor dornesric violence nåtters

Elements of Offense

A defenclant ca¡r be found ¡¡uilty of a $ Szz(g)

• ffþnse only if all of the following facts are

provcd beyond a reasonable cloubt:

'I h¿ L Lhe [)cfi,nt1¡nt knoH irtgly ¡rossessed .r f ìrearrr ; .l'h¿ t the [)ele¡lc{¡ rrt knorvingly possessed .r fìre¿ rnr

i n 0r ¿lfi-criDg irìl(fstatr or f' rrciÍln c' ìilr¡ìrerre, ¿\

chargetl; and 'l'hat befo¡e the Defendrnt possessed the fire¿rm the Dcfendant had been convict¿d in a court

• f a crime punishable by Ímprisonment fora

term in excesg ofone yea6 that ie, a felony

• ffens¿,

lJ¡rt se¿ rB IJ.S.C. S q¿l(aXzollB): ifstateclasgifìesoffense.rs.r

nl is<lrnr¿arror and dorsnt errcee<l z year sfat rn ¡r, not a lelony.

'l hird:

Li]:r:

Seco¡rtl:

Antique Firearm Bill

Fetleml law does not prevent prohibiterl pelsons fronr posst'ssing, a n "a¡ìtique" f ì re¡r'm. Arr .rntique fìrearnr is any fìrearrn nranufàctr¡¡'ecl bcfblc 1898, See r8 U.S.C. S 9¿r(a)(r6)(A). On Jr.rly rz, zor7, Sen. Billl C.rssidy (lì-LA) introduced

bill (S. r54r) to modify tlre definition of antique

firear¡n. Unclcr ploposcd bill, "1898," is stricken and lepl"rced rvitlr "the c.rlenclal year that is roo years bcfble the calend.rr: year in which the detclminatir-rrl âs to whethe r the lìrearrn n'le€ts the le<¡uilement of this subparagraph beirrg nradel'

• II. KNOWLEDGE ËLEMENT

Defenclant consciously possessed u,hat hc knew to be a firearrn.

' Government must only prove that

defendant wa$ aì/vare that he possessecl a fìrearm. (lovelnlnent need not plove that clefþndant knew

¡rosscssion of fìr'e.rrr-¡r was unla'¡,f ul.

• US. v. (iorne.s.-Perez,667 [r.jd 1136, u4o-41 (ro'l' (ìin

:orz); [J..9. y. Thonra.s, 615 F.3d 89S, 8sg (8tlì Cir.

zoro); {./.5. v. McCrcy, ¡+: }'. App'x 498 (ntl' Cir.

¿t¡t'rg); U.S. v. Wilson, $7 Y.}d 616, 6¿o (7'r' Cir: zoo(r); U.S. v. Dodd, zz5F3d 3,.+<r, 344 i3d Cir., :,crr¡o); U.S. v. Frazier-El,zo4F3d 551,56r (4'l'Cir.

:uro).

Gorsuch and Knowledge?

'. Gorsuclr concurrence in Game.s-Pe¡ez, (rfi7 [:'.3d rr36, rr4u-43 (roth Cir. zor:,) (Gorsuch, f., conculring)

Precedent dictates that the r,rnly knou'lcdgc rt <¡uirccl is t he linowleclgc lhat instrtunent possr:ssed is a fir'ca¡rl. "Ilt]recedent son'retilrres ¡'equircs r.ls to lìlakc nìistakcs."

Holding that thegovernmerrttloes not necd to provc a defbnd.¡nt,knew be was a felon "sirnply can'l bc squarttl u'ith the text of [$ çr¿¿(C)l 5 92,1(a)(:) autlrolizes irnplisonmerrt for "u,hoever hnorvirrgly violates" 5 9¿z(g). Prececlent "leapfrog[sl" over first element (fblony

corrviction) to focus on the second (possessed

fircalm)

Colsuch argues that knowingly should be applied to o/1 three elenrents.

Bifurcation in a single-count case.

• fiemendous risk of unfäirprejudice inherent in

the fäct of a prior felony conviction. Llnite(l States y ?ñompson, 675 Fed. App'x :,2r, zz4 (3d Cir. zotT ) (concltrd,ing bifurcation for single-count c;rses nôl required but perrnissible).

Bifurcation

• lll. Actual vs. Constructive

Possession

'l\vo tvoes of uerssession; actual and corlstructive Constructive posses$ion: power and intent to exerclse dominioaand control over

• bject. Mere proximity ß)t enough.

DEFENSES TO POSSESSION

" Insufficient eviclence to establish that clefend.rnt

constructively possessed firear'¡n:

• U5. rr Cunninrrh<rnr, 5r7 F.3cl r75 (ld Cir. zooS) (holding

th¡t <tefend¡¡t - u'ho sintply walked tk¡rv¡r stleet u'ith

co-de{endant who rvas canying gun in a [.lackp.rck clitl rìot coûstructi!'ely possess gun in backpack)

See olso U.S. v. Anderssn, 6zz F 3ð 1264, 1268-69 ( D.C.

• Cir. zol) {rlefendar* "trying to kick the gun up undcr

the se.rt" {toes ¡rot arïosrlt to¡dmission of constnrctive possession) LJ.S. v. Hooks, 55r F.jd rzo5, rzr3-r4 (roth

Cir'. zoog) (no constructive possession u'hel'e clefendant was one of several passengers, no fingerprints, no showing of kno.,r4 edge or control)

Duress

l.)ixon v. U¡titecl States, ¡+tl U,S. r (zoo6)

I)ixon w.rs charged rvith rS U.S.C. fi .{j 9zr(n)

(receivirrg a fì¡'e¿rnr while under indictrnent) .rnrt

g¿t(a)(6) (making false statements in connectior.r with the acqlisition of a firearnr). Dixon claimed duress and requested a .iury iustructíon placing the burclen on the golernment

to rlisprove her dures clefbnse beyoncl .r reason¿blc doubt.

ltclcl: (r) 'I'he jury instructions in this casc

clicl not run afoul of the DP clausc u'hcn

they placecl the burclen on Dixon to cst.rblish the existence of duress by a preponderance of the evidence', (z) Modelrr

corrmon law requires Dixon to bear burden

• f ploving defense <¡f clur:ess by a

prepond,erance of the evidence.

lnnocent Possession

' 'l'he'l'hird Cilcuit lras yet to recognize the affirrnative defènse of "innoccnt" or "transitoly" possession. , Only one published appellate opinion fì nding crime r¡l innocent possession and affìlmative clefènse to !i gz¿(gXr). U,S. v. Mason, 233 F.jcl 6r<.¡ (D.C. Cir. zooo)

'lir successfuìly invoke innocelrt possession dclbnse, the l¿cts must be that:

(r) tl're fìr'earrn was attained innocently and held

witlr no illicit purpose and (z) possession of the lìreamr was transitory * i.e., in liglrt of the circurn$tä,ûces presented there is a

goocl basis to fìnd that th.e defendant took .ìdequate rìleasur€s to lid l¡i¡nself of posscssion of

thc fìrearnr as pronqrtly as reasonably possible. 'I'he'l'hild Circuit has assumecl for the salce of' argument that if tlre afiìrmative defl'nse applied, it rvould use the standard articulated in U.S. v.

Mason.

See U.S, v, Longfo,rddavis, 454 Fed. App'x 34 (3d

Cir: zorr) (hold,irtg ir¡st¡uclio* <¡n i¡urocent possession not wa¡¡ânted)l sec r¡lso U,S. v.

Hollowoy,4oe Fed. App'x 692 (¡oroXholding

defþndalrt not enti.tled to instruction on f leeting innocent contaet).

U.S. v. Jockson, z8:u Fed. App'x 999 (3d Cir: zootÌ) (no evidence suggesting that clefèndant obtained \\¡capons in an "i¡rnocent" fäshion as required to

support atïìrmative defense fol tlansitory possession).

U.S. v. Duniels, 248 Fet1. App'x 387 (3tl Cir. "reru7)

(holding innocent possession not a{Hrmative

detènse to possessio¡l of fì¡earm try convicted felon)

Rule 4A4(b) ls A Rule Of Exclusion, Not lnclusion

, Rule 4o4(b) c¿rries rtr> ¡:r'esunr¡:tion of

adnrissibility. Plior act evidence is inadn'rissible unless the evidence is (l) oflerecl fbr.r proper non*plopensity purpose; (z) relevantto rhat identified pulposc; (3) sufficiently probati.ve r¡nder Rule 4o3; (4) accornpanied by a li,rnìting instrt¡ction.

U.S. v. ( uldu,ell, 7(ro [r.jd 267 (i<l Cir. zor4)

(holding evidence of defelrdant's plior convictions for unlawhrl fircar'¡n possession u,as not adrnissiblc

t o slrorv knou,leclge).

Calclrvcll was charged u'ith violating 9zz(g)(r). 'l'lrc gove¡-nnìent's theory rvas "purely one of actual

¡.rossession [. l"

Knowledge Not At lssue

A defe nclant's "knowleclge" is alnrost neve l a

nraterial issue when the govelnment l'elies exclusively on a theory of actual possession."

' l'he goverrr nrent tìr ilecl to .rdec¡uately a rt icu l"rte thc

rron-¡rro¡rensity chain of inferences it lro¡red thc

july n,oulcl nrake flom the introduction of

Cal drvell's priol convictions. t'krw di<l Caltlrycll'.s two prior cor,victions for u¡rl¿rvlul fire'arrn possessit¡n Èom ¿oo5.rnt{ zoo6 sugg*st he krrowingly pr.rssessecl a gun seven years later?

Two Prior Gun Convictions lrrelevant

Not enough to nrerely recite.r Rtrle 4c4(b) ¡;ur¡>ose; must articulate how the evit{ence is prob.rtive of that purpose. How dirl Caldwell's pr,io¡ unl¿,wfll firearnr ¡:ossession convictions suggest lre knowir,rgly posse.ssecl this gun rrn this occasiora?

{/..S. v /ìoi/r'y, B4o F. 3d ggnq (jd Cir'. (lct, rlì, :orl>)

dlue tr'.1ffi cking.rncl grrn case challenging adrnissiorr

• f drug traffìcking-related murder.

District court.rdnritted video of murderand non- viclco cvitletce (testimony and recorded convelsations).

l leld: Court did not err in adnritting non-video evidence of mu¡der, Fforvever. court was "extremely

t lou blecl" tl're cou ¡t all¡wed surveillance video of

shooti nglnrulcler into evidence,

Reverse 404(b) evidence inadmissible to show

another person's propens¡ty to possess firearms

. U.S. v. lUilliants,45tl Ir.3d )12,317 (3d Cir. :oo(;) (affir'nring exclusion of revelse 4o4(b) eviclence where only purpose rvas to shor,r, propensity to carry fìr'eanns rvhere defendant plesented no evidence that inclividual's prior conviction involvcd the same gun, the sarne type of gun or that he hacl continued access to the t,?e of gun). Iror more support t¡f the use ol Reverse 4o4(ll) evidence see:

[./.5. v. Srcvens, 935 ['.zd lf8o, r4o4-o5 (:d Cin

r<.¡9r) (defèndan t may introcluce revelse 4o4(b)

evidence so long as its probative value under Rule 4or is not sr"rbs{antially outweighed by Rule 4o3 considerations)

REVERSE 404(b) cont'd ' U.S. v. Sr:cls, 4rg fr.3d 6oo, 6o6-<>7 (7tl' Cir. zoo5)

(explaining that a reverse 4c4(b) analysis should

be helcl ttr a less rigorous standard because prejudice to the defenclant is not.r factor)

U.S. v. lucas, 357 F:d 59q, 6os-ç6 (titr' Cir. roo4)

(applying the saare ruleas Sfevens)

ls 922{g) C0NSTITUTIONAL?

I)istritt o.f Ct>lumbio v. Ileller, ¡28 S. Ct. 2783 (zor.r8) (holtling t).C. ban on h.rndgun possessiou irr honre

viol¿tcs tho :"'l Amcrìdrìrcnt)

• Ilrrrvever. evely cilcuit poít-Helll.rr has held qz¿(g)

ct) Ìtslituti(.,tìal.

Sec U.5. v ?b¡rc.s-Rosario,658 F.jd tro. rr3, rr j n.r (r'r

Cir: :,orr); US. rr llogle, 7ry F.jd 2th, 28: (zd Cil zor3); t/.S. v. /Jo¡¡on,63j F.3rl t6B, rTtt-t75 (3<1 Cir: :orr): ti..!. y Mctore,666 F.3d 3r3, jr(rr7 (4'h Cir zorz); [/.S. v.

t\lcuntar.T)tFAd r4l, r45 (5th Cir. zorj); t/.S. v. Khani, 16: Freci. Appx 5or, 5o7-8 (6'h Cir. aoro); tLS. ri lltilliants, ó16 F.3d 685,69r-94 (7tr'Cir. ¿oro); [i..S. v.

/oo.s, (r38 F.3d 58r. 586 iSth Cir. :on)l [15. v. V'ong-ray, 594 F.3d rr1r, rn4-5 (9th Cír. ¿oro); U.S. v. Ì\|cCane, 573 F.3d ro37, ro47 (roth Cirl :oo9) ånd U.S. rr Ãozicr, 59Íì F.3d 7ó8. 77o^t (ttt, Cir. zolo),

Heller Extends to the States

Mc'[)onold v- City t¡f-Chicago, t3o S.Ct. 3ozo (:,oro) Second Anrendrnent light to bear alms is fully ap1:licable to the States by virtue of tlre r,1,1' Arnendlnent. McDonold leaves in tact ban on ow:rership of firearnrs by [elons.

Second Amendment &

Machine Guns

Hollis v. I¡tnch, Bz7 F.3d 436 (5rr' Cir'. zor(r) (upholding federal law barring posscssit'rn of machine guns holcling rnachine guns âr'e rìot protected by the Second Amenchnent). Machine guns not pfotected by Secontl Anrendnrent.

As-Applied Challenge

to s e22(ext)

ßinclcrup v. Htilder, No. r3-cv-o675o, zor4 WL

.176.+.124, slip. op. (8.D. Pa. Sept. :,5, zor,¡).

l)espite prior conviction, defendant demonstrated th.rt lre poses no gre¿ter risk of future yiole¡rt corrduct than averrge lau-abiding citizen. 'Ihus, applic.rtion of $ 922(gxr) as appliecl to him viol¿te's the Second Amendment Ilindeltr¡r rebutted the pt'esurnptio¡r r.risecl in I lalle r that there is no ploblcrn rvith barring felons fìr¡nr

possessing guns.

'lb raise s¡,tccessful as-applied cha lleng,e, chll lenger

must distinguish lris circt¡mst.lrÌces fronr tbose historically bar¡ed f¡om Second Amendment protectioRs.

' Case of[e¡s thirr ray of hope fbr the oxtreme case

Binderup v. Att'y Gen.

'I'hir<l Cilct¡it cn bc¡¡c court.rffìrrned trvo as-a1.lplied Sect¡nd Amendment challerrges to clainlatìts wh<¡ were ¡rlohibite<l persons based on non-r,iole¡rt state rnisdemeanor convictions that were pr.rrrishable by nrore th¿¡l one year in prisotr. T'he claiurants were convicted of corrupting the nrolals

• f a minor(foldatinga ryyear-o:ld), ancl misdemeanor'

unlicensed gun possession, crírnes tirat are punishable by rnole than one year in prison, but¿re not serious enough to justify stripping away a person's Second Amentünent rights.

, lìoth defendants had ¡¡one crime frec for sutrstanti¿l

amourltri of time. 'l'he governrnent could not show that thc fbl<¡n-in- possession statute suryives intermediate sclutiny as- applied to these ch¿llengers, because their'isolatcd, decades-old non-violent misderneanor crrnvictions tlo not permit an i¡ference that dirarming peoplc like them woulcl pr:omoteresponsible fìrearnr usc l'-r.rctured cn hanc clecision.

Lar,r, of Circuit:

the tu,o.'step US v. Marzzarell.r f'rar¡ework corrtrols all Second Arrrendment challenges, irrcluclíng as-applied challenges to g qzz(gXr);

.r challengel will satisfy the first step o[ that

fianrework ouly if he proves that the law or regulation at issue burdens conduct prctected by the Second Anrendnrerrt;

to satis\'stcp one in the colìtext of ¿ìn .ìs-apl)lied rhalle nge to S g¿z(gXr),a clr.rllenger nÌust prove th..rt

he u'as not previousll, convictcrl of ¡ se¡'ious clinle : eviclence r¡f a challenger's relrabilitatio¡r or his

likelihood of recidivisrn is r¡ot relevant to thc stcp-

• ne analysis:

às the nârrowest ¡¡round $upporting the Cr¡ur('s

iudgnlerrts fo.r Binclerup ar¡d Suârez, th(' co¡rsideratior¡s r{isclr¡;sed above will deternrinc whet¡er cri¡¡res are se¡'icrus (r.c., tlisqrralifying) at step one; and

if'a challenger rn"rkes the necessary step-one shorvinq, the bulclen shifts io thc Covc¡'nnrent at step two to prove that the regulation at is$ue survives intermediate scruti ny.

52Aid¡ng&Abetting

Principal is a felon and possessed firearrn Must co-defenclant know of ,principal's convicted fclon status? 9zz(g)(r) violation

YES

U.S. v. li¡rrl, l3:r lr.3cl 63 (r't Cir. zo16) (holdinggov't rìrust ¡:rrovo lleyorrrl .r re¡srrn¡ble doubt th¡t put.ìtive ùi(ler atìd

¿bettol kuew that princip.rl had previously lreen convicted of

.r crirne punishable by nrore rl'ran one year in prison).

• tlS. v [cklin, 837 F. Supp.zd 58q, 59r (8.Ð. V¡. zorr) (sarne)

{lS. v ,5arnur,/s, 5rr F'.yl 8o4,8u*"2 iTth Cir. zooS)(explairring

tl¡.rt rlelèntlant "nìüst knorv ôr håve rea;on to knorv" that

indivitlu¡l is a fþlon af ti¡ne of aiding and alætting)

LI.S. v. Gurdner, +tl8 F.:,d 7oo, 714-16 (6rl' Cir. 2o()7)

( holdi ng gov't nìust sl¡ow defenrla¡rt "knerv or h,rcl causc

to know that thc principal was a convicted fblr.rn'')

IJ.S. v. Xuvíer, z F.3d rz8r, n86-87 (3d Cir rq93) (hol<ìing

"there c¿n l¡e no c¡irninal liability for aìr1ing arrd;rbetting

a violation r¡f S gzz(gxr) wíthout knowledge or ltaviug cùuse ro believe the possesgort status as a felon'')

NO

(/.S. r (Ì¡non, 993 F.:tl 4j9, t.+42 (9¡r'Cir r9g3) (g6vl tloes not lr.rvc to prr)ve that defendarrt krrcrv prin<:ipal rt'as a fi'lon); åu¡ see U.S. r,. Cr<¡|e"-, 14¡ F.;cl r¡85, u88 n.l (9'r' Cir r998) (aclinowledgjng "serious ¡eservations

at¡out the soul'rclness" of the holding ìr,r Conon)

SECOND îYPE OF GUN CASE:

18 usc 5 e2a(c)(1XA)

5 gz+(cxrXA) '' ftirearn¡ possessecl during and in relation to crirne of violence ol drug tr'.rf ficking

• ffense:

if posse'ssecl r mantio consecutive 5 yeals if b¡andished - nrûndo consecut¡\¡e 7 yeårs ifdischargor{ - rnaüdo coüsecutive rô yeårs

5 92a(c) Offense

Ch a racte ristics {cont'd )

sz+(cxrXB) -

if rnachinc gun - nrando conseclrtive 3.: ye¿rs

(J.5. v. ()'llrien, r3o S. Cr. z169 (zoro) (g gea(c)

nr.rchine gun ¡rrovision reqtriring 3o-year mandatory rnirrir¡rurn is.rn element of rhe crin¡e to be proved to.r

f ury beyonti a reasonable doubt, not a sentencirlg, f.rctor'

to be ¡r't},ed to.r iudge at sentenci*g)

U.S. v. []urwell, 69o lr.3d 5oo, 5r5 (D.C. Cìr. zorz)

(rciecting notion that O?rien cont.rincd intplicit requirernent that the lfovernlnent ¡>r'tlve defèuclarrt

knerv firear¡n was a machine gun )

See olso U.S. v. Haíle ,68: F.fd r:,n, r:,r8 (utl, (lir.

¿or:,) (explaining that O'Brien does not requirc proof defendant knew firearm'*'as machine gun)

The 8th Amendment & 924(c)

LJnited Stcttes v S/aften, 865 l::.jd 7tr7 (D.C. Cir'. .zor7) (lrolclin¡¡ g:4(c)'s lo- yeâr nrarrclatoly

rninirnunr, as-applietl, violates the Eighth ¡\rnencLnent)

I )e fên<lant's were ¡rrovidin g diplcxna ti c secu rity

It.lr l)epartrnent of State in lraq.

Cov't-issued weapons.

Nr.r ¡'lrior convictio,rrs.

Jury lnstructions Requiring Knowledge

U.S. v. Franklin,3zt F.3d rz3r, rz4o (9tl' Cir

zoo3) (instruction requiring knowing possession fìrearm was machine gun rìot plain erlor)

U.S. v. Dixon, qjf ðá6y6,64a-4r (5th Cir, :,oor ) ( knowùgly used sho¡t-barrelecl

slrolgun);

I 924(c) Possession

Ll.S. v. WLtlkt'r, 657 lr.jd 16o (jcl Cir: :otr) (rvhcrc

blothels jointly sold coc.rine, blotlrer's knowledge of

• thel blother"s fìrearm ntrs sriffìcient for',ir.rry to

reasorr.rbly infþr th¿t he constructively possessed we¿porì ilr lurtherance of clmg traffìcking,); U.S. t. Ki¡t9,63: F.3d 646 (roth Cir. ¿ou) (concluding evidence w"rs suffìcient that King had the ability to exelcise donrinion or cûntrol over rifle U.S. v. Perez, 66r F.3cl 568, 578 (ntl'Cir.

zorr)(mere awareness of the presence of guns is insufficient for constmctive possession. Need intention or ability to exercise do¡rrinion

• r control over weapons).

$ 924(c) Accomplice Liability

In llosernond, thc Suprcme Court clarified what the !4overnment must prôve to convict a defenclant of $924(c) under an aiding-and- abetting theory {i.e., when the gun is

used /carried/possessecl /brandished by

someone else). Rosemond v. U.S.,134 S. Ct. *4o (zo4)

Holding of Rosemand

The governrnent r'¡lust prove

(r) Advance knowledge of gun ancl

(z) F'acilitation of underlying offense (not fäcilitation of gun)

Adva nce Knowledge

'I'lris nreans knowledge "beforelra¡rd," suclt that the detènrlant h.1s.-r "realistic opportunity to cluit the crinre." A key lactol in determining "realistic

• ppoltr"ruity" is whetåer withdrawal c{uring

comnrission of offbnsewould risk danger ttr bystunclers, to ather criminal particþanfs, or to

t he defentla nt hintself.

Rejection of Contin ued-

Pa rticipation Sta nda rd

l(nou'leclge tìrst gained during the comnrission ol- the offense ty¡rically rvill not be erroug,h, e vcn rvhe¡r tlre clefend.rnt cr:ntinues to participate.

ln unusual cbcunrstalrces, such knorvledge coukl

be sufficient * perhaps i* a particulally protr.ìcted

• flense where the defendant actually had a lealìstic
• ¡rporttrnity to rv!thd¡aw.

Knowledge -- Government's Burden

It is the sovernment's burden beyond .r leasonable doubt. It is not the clefendant's burden to prove lack

• f aclvance knowleclge

Facilitation of Underlying Offense

,No facilitation required as to the gun itsel{ so long as the defendant facilitates the underlying offense.

CRI"I'IC/T L O U N DERS'IAN D THAT WITH MU I,T'I PI-E t¡24(C) COUN'¡'S, S'IACKING IS APPLIEDTO EACH

c()[]N'I Exanrple: Multiple Hobbs Act Robbery counts rvith multiple 924(c) counts, if fìrst 9z+(c) count is branclished the consecutive application u,ould ¡nandate B4 months plus :5 consecutive years for each adclitional cou¡rt in adclition to the underþing guidelines.

See U.S. v. Deql,5o8 U.S. ng (1993) Using or Carrying a Firearrn During ancl ln Rel.rtion To Any Crirne of Violence or f)rug

Tr.rfficking Crime (rB U.S.C. S e¿+(c)(r)(A))

MUS I' BE IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY TO OTH I]II

COUNTS.

See ez+(cXrXÞXíi)

924(c) penalty:

A|le¡,ne v. L1.5.,31S. Ct. zr5r (zorj), overnrling Harris

• t. U.5., tzz S. Ct. 2.1o6 (¿ooz) (holding any fact

increasing statutoty mandatory minimum sentence

is elenrent of offense, not â serltencíng fhctor', that

rnust be sutrmitted to jury and frlund BRD) Holding applíes to clrug types and qr"rantities, an<l any othe r fact niggering a manclatory rnininrurn sentence

' A rnajorityof fìve justicesview thecontiur.ring

vitality of Alm endurez-Torres v. Unitecl Stotes, 523

U.S. zz4 (1998) as an open qr"restion, rnaking these

• biections importârrt to presew€ fbr appeals

'['his c.rse lr.rs no irnpact on guidelines fact-fìncling, so long.rs the guiclelines relnain advisory t\lle1,ng not ¡-etroactive to cases on collateral review: LI.S. v. Olvera, n5F.3dZz6 (S't'Cir'. zor5);

t/..S. v. Re1,e.r, 755 F.7& uro $d C;¡. zo4) ; ]ettn ty v.

lUardett, l;(l-Micmi,757 F,3d rz83 (uth Cir'. ¿or4).

t Nnn) sl^1f:5 0l,\u!f,1(i{.

l¡¡nfif

til0r.\tx. sLÀG¡iR,

Itcfrqd¡¡r. C.¡ô¡nrl N.: 2!16-f7A (;L(tù^¡ pr ¡^ -{a,RË¡IMFNT tN TXlr uNtftf,)sT,rTtìs DIsrRtcl couRT

!(rRllrt DIsl Rt(rt oFsowl c^IloLlNÀ

?.

ÀqKmlrß bT lht Stal( 0f Soutb (iqr0lins, ln rËrmtor ühc defend¡nt's ple¿

• lg0illyð st fo'1h herein, lh€ Stâre0lS0urh C¡roliuô$eús:

{a) lo disñisj, ùjlhin tile dars 0l lhe Nrrpn,ìcÈ of ihìs gui lly pk¡, lhc chtrgc

pcndinl in,S/4/{ r:.\T¿f!¡, C¿s! No.20l5.CS.ll!-146.6, sübjæl ro rc-indictrncil if, tir ary re*oncrued b¡'lhcdclìÂdnrt, rhcagr.{rcnl i! not fqlûlledl

(b) r0 rrcl filc ut additioNl clur¡ts agair* tfu delendanr arisin¡ our trfrhe

fels lomjngtlÉ b¡sis foilhe cdnrschuged in tlr lndictment. 'lle dcfcdant agrucsthat úr Sliicitor ruyaddrcss the Court al snlenci){ on t*h¡lf of üc StÀte Df Soùtlr l-'ùolii¡.

' Just ice Ginsburg, ioined by Justice 'lhonìas, wlote a

concurling opinion which urges defense practitioners

to challenge tlìe "sepårate sovereigns" exceptiolt to double ieopardy when the separate sovereign is a state

• r Indian tribe.

' According to Justice Ginsburg, the doctrine fails to

serve the purpcse of double jeopardy and is 'ãn affront

to human dignity." The

a case where the

and tlren prosecuted be strongest in i¡¡ state court,

r.

On lt"*l zr.:otS,f!¡!

rßr.d by lh¡ldclpl';¡ Policc Onìc.s ond

rlúBcd iì ihrrtoùr srrh mu[i'û sun{.húdedn¡5.

?. ù Moy ¡ 9, :0 I 5, a ÈeÞl S.¡'ú jury ..runÉd rhk iil¡crhùnt clur8¡n8 thc

• ulnl-,, |

*u Fscsionofo tìroonn by ¡(Nv¡drd ß{o¡, in viohrio¡ott8

tj.S.(. i922{rXl), lu*d o¡tk Mm.h 28. ?015 Phikddptilr Ìolic€¡ncn.

L

IhÉ lh¡ld.lphit D¡rrhr

^noh.y

s Onic. hß cl.dcd ro prcccd vnh Ìi fÉ.m

rrsc ¿r¡n¡sr rh &lcúnr i. shr. coun, I h go!.ñh.nt &lì.!.3 thût ¡ is in th irreßr ol

jüile h d.fq ro rhß s{c 0ro*cur¡on.

5 922(g)(L) is not a Crime of

Violence Under BRA

"l'llhe crime of fèlon in possession is not a crime of

violence rvithin the meaning of g :r:6(aX+)l' U.S. v. Bowers,43zF3d 5r8,5:o (3d Cir. zoo5) "Felon in possession does not involve substantial risk of violence, r8 U.S.C. S:rS6{aX+XÐ), and there

is not a direct lelationshíp between the ofense and a risl< of violencel. j" fd at 43e F.3d at 5zz. See also U.S. v. Hardon, No. 98-r6e5, ryt¡&WL3zog45 16tt' Cir: June 4, 1998); {J.5. v. Lane, z5z F.3d go1, go7-

• 8 (7'h Cir. ¿oor); U.S. v.TNvine,344f.3d 987,987-88

(9'h cir. eoq); uS. v. lngle, 4s4 Fad ro8z {ro'r' Cir.

U.S. v. Grøy,529

tzg?,r3Ðz (uth Cir. zoo6); U.S. v. /ohnsor.t, zoo5); U.S. v,

16 (Ð;C. Cir. 1999)

(D. Mass

lqt,'tSz (5.D.

zooT); U.S. v.

• Miss. zoo5).

But see U.S. v. Dillard, zr4 F.3d 88, 93 (zd Cir. zooo) (holding that being felon in possession

• f fìrearm is a "crirneof violence" under Bail Reform

Act); U.S. v. Allen,4o9 F.Supp. zd 6zz,63r (D. Md. zoo6); U.S. v. Green, 4r4 F.Supp. zd tozg (N.D. Okla.

2tlcl6) (holding rnagistrate judge erred in finding

that g¿z(gXù is not C0Vwitþia naeaning.of

llRA);U.S. v. Shirley, r89 F.$upp. zd966, g68 (W,D.

• Mo. eooz) ; {J.5. v. Lee, 196 F. Supp.zd 6zo, 624 (8.D.
• La. zoor).

U.S. v. Peralte,464 Fed. App'x 55, 57 (3d Cir: zorz)

(appellate waivers are valid "if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, unless they work a miscarriage of iustice") (citing U.S. v. Khattok, z13F3d 557, 558 (3d Cil zoor)). the full and voluntarily, lo66 (nth Cir. made knowingly understood

U.5. v.,Iol:nson, 54r zooS)

Constitutional Challenge to Statute

A guilty ple.r cloes not inhelently rv.rive a

constitution¿l challer-rgc to the statute of

• corrviction. Clas.s y. United Sttttes, No. r(i 42,1, Nrr.

rb-q24, ¿or8 U.S. LtiXlS 1378 (tìeb.:r, zorS). Note that C/ass will not be of âny help if your client enters into a plea agreemerìt that broadly waives his or her right tn challenge the convict iorr

with larrguage that encrxnpasses constítLlti{,ìn"r I

challenges.

But Are Waivers Ethical?

l)t )J irnnourrces in zor4 that "[f]tdtral prosecuto¡s slrortld no Lrnqel seek irr plea agreements to h.ì\,e.1

rlcf c¡rtli¡¡lt w.rive cl.rinrs of inell'ective assistance of

counsel|.j"

t incler ¡rolicy, however, prosecutors ate "f¡ee to request

rv.rir,els of appeal and of post-conviction remedies to

the firll extent pennitted by law."

• N4enr. firr all Federal Pr,osecutor* l.mrn J. Cole of ro/14lr.1

COOPERATION

Only way to get below mandator')¡ r¡ini¡'nunr

sentence is if the Government fìles a substantial assistance motion. l8 USC 1553(e).

Only leal way to evaluate cooperation vari*bles is to have a roäl appreciation <¡f your forunr,

Refusal to File $ SK1.1

"I lr]edelal district courts have authority to review a prosecut()r1s refiusal to file a substanti¿l-assistance

rnotion and to granta ren'redy if tlrey find that the relus.rl .¡as based on an unconstitutional rnotive," such as delendant's r.1ce or relig.ion."

lUade v. l/nifed Sfûfes, to4 U.S. r8r, 185-86 (rqgz) (no ¡rlea agleement)-

Substantial Assistance &

Plea Agreements

.See oLso U.S, v. Floycl,4zS F.jd 5r3, 5r5-16 (3d Cir. zoo5)

(using contract lar,r. to determine whether the ag,r'eenìent

has been satisfìed); U.5. n Iscac, r4r F.3d 477,481, q84 bÅ Cir. r9q8) (even where prosecut{rr retains'ssle discretion" irì plca

iìgreement, court is required ro evaltate rvhether plosecutor has made decírÍon in good faith).

PRETRIAL MOTIONS

Su¡rpression- 4tl' Arnendment Frecluently turns on police cledibility involving circumstances leadirrg to reasonable suspicion .rnd/<¡r probable cause. Consider conditional plea under Rule ¡r(aXz). Goal is to obtain "Acceptance of Responsibiliry" while motion issue is preserved. If defendant is successful on âppeal, withdraw plea.

• US. v. Roöer¿s, No. u-ct-oor8, zorz WL ro335r5, '7

(E.D. P.r. Mar'. :,8, :,r,trz) (granting motion due t{) l.rck of creclibility ol the testifying ofïìcer.) Officer's f.rbricatio,n of fäcts to justify illegal search, warrantecl finc{ing a*l subsequent evidence (even that which under most circu,mstances rvould be consiclered legaTly cbtained) to be lmit of the pr-risonous tree,

Credibility

.See also L|nitecl Srafes v. Broomfelcl,4rT F3tl

654 (7,1' Cir. zoo5).

Stop upheld, butgood languagebyf. Posner

"tlilding the lily, the officer testifìed th¿¡t he u'.rs

additionally sus¡ricious bec¡use wlren he tllove by Ilroorr¡field in his squad c¡r belilre turning.ri'ountl .rntl gctting out ånd åccosting hirn he noticed th.rt lìrurornfìeld was "staring straight .rhea<i." Broomfield,4r7 F.jd at 655.

"llad llroonrfìclcl inst.e.r<l ¡llanctcl around hinl, t he

• fl'ice l noulcl doubtless h.l'e testifìecl th¿t ll¡oonrfìeld

sccnlccl rìcrvr)us or, thc preferreil terrn because of its v<ìguencss, 'fìr'tive.' IvVht:lhr:¡ y¡rrr st¡nd st ill or ÌTlr)\;c, rlrirc.rìrt¡r'(:. bckxt.r¡r¿it f hr:s¡tcctl linrit,,vorr uill bc tlt:rr:r'ilrt:r I hr' t he polìt t: as .rct ilrg suspricious lv sllou lcl

Illcv rri:;ìr to st(Ìp or au'csit you. Srtch sul),eclivc,

¡>r ornìsrr.rr)r1\.ìl)lxr(ìls t(),11 íncffablc inluiti¡r¡l shuuìil

r¡ot l¡t' t r'ctliir:c1." /t/. ( ernplrasis.rclded) U.S. v. Gaines, No. RDB*ro-..-o198, 2oro U.S. Dist LEXIS r3oru (D. Md. Dec. 8, zoro ) (suppressing,

firearm and corn¡tìenting that "it simply str.ìins credtrlity to believe that L)fficer. . . could see tlÌis crack f in windshieldl from the rear seåt of tlÌe police vel'ricle. . . êcros$ a'n íntersection")

Fruits Loophole?

Lltah v. Strtì.ff, r:6 S. Ct. zo5l> (zo16)

ln this ca.se, a police officel u¡rlarvÂ:lly st<lppecl

and detained Streifland learnecl during the

dcterìtion that he had a valid warrênt out for his arrest fbl a traftìc violation. 'flre offìcer arrested him pursuånt to the w¿rnant and co¡rducted a search incident to arrest,

lìn di ng nrethamphefarni.ne and paraphrrnal ia. Helr/: LJndel the three "attenuation" fàctors

.tnrtounced i¡r Brolyn v. lllinois, 4ze U.S. 5qo (1975): (r) the terrrporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovely of' evidence, (z) the presence ûf inter!'ening cilcurnst¿nccs, and (j) thc purposc and flagrancy

• f the officia.l nri*conduct, tlre evidence was

acl m issible in St¡'eiffs criruinal prosecu t ion.

. INVF;S]'IGAT'ION

hlvidence:

ATF investig.rtes

Oftcn little fbrensic evidence - no prints, DN¡\, etc.

Freqrrently seeing client hr - prison telepho¡re ¡cer¡mlints Not dealing, with infornrarts orvideota¡:e Alnrost exclusively cop oedibility Reverse 4o4(b) (i.e., ¿np ñles, prior acts, etc.)

• IV. TRIAL MODE

STIPULATIONS

C)bvious prejuclicial elenrerrt ol'9rz(g)(r) is ¡rrcvitrus ctlnvictir-¡n pturishable by one year or nl()te.

BF.CTAUSU OF SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE ANr)

I{ISI( (]F VERDICT"TAINTçD BY IMPROPËR CONSIDIIRATIONS FROM NAT'URI OF PRIOR,

0NIY ELEMENTWHERE DEFENSE CÂN I)IìM^ND STIPULATION. ûldChíefv. U.5., tt7 S

Ct.64.1, ry4çgg?1.

Commerce Element

Pleselve a consti tutional co¡n merce cl'rallen ge in case there is one day a change in the larv. Request a jury instruction requiring gov't to prove that possession had substantial elfèct on l/S comrnerce ()K to obt.rin langu.rge indicating by virtuc of fìr'calnl's preserìce in st"rte, given rl.rn u lact u rer's I ocatiolr, f ì¡'ea lln rnust have tr.l,ellcd irr irrterstate <¡r fìllei¡¡n cornrnerce -- providecl no languag,e as to effect or impact on cornrnerce is in stipulation

L/.5-. v. Cnrfe¡, z7olt.3dZï,77j (8'i'Cir. zoor),

(assunring arquendo that the stanrped info on g.un is hearsa¡,, p{rsuant to F.R.E. 7oJ, ån expert nìay rely upon it trecause it is 'bf'a type leasonably relied upon" try fìrearms experts).

' Thc governme¡rt r¡'ill provide an l/S nexus l'cl)ort to

shou, that the gun(s) travelecl i¡r l/S c¡rn-rnrelce.

' [Jsually, an agent wíth ÄTF will make a report th.'ìt

he/she researchecl the uranufacturer of the gun(s) and tl.re gun was manufacturecl by the XIZ compan)', which is located in, sa1,, Kansas City, Missouri. 'laylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. :,o74 (:o16) 'ltr obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act tbr lobbery or atterrrpted robbery of a drug dealer, the govcnrnrent is nct required to prove that the drugs the defèndant stole or attempted to steal either traveled or welr destined for transport across state lines. It is sulfìcient f'or the governmelìt to l:'rove the tiefendant knor,r'ingly stole orattenìpte(l to steùl drugs

• l dnrg proceetls, because, as ¿ mattel of law, t he

nrarket for illegal drugs is commerce ovel which the fèdelal governrnent has jurisdiction.

, The evidence on tlre interstate coûlrterce elenrent r+as

sufficierrt in this case because the governnlent introduced evidence rhat TayJor's gang intentionall¡, targeted drug dealers to obtaiu dnrgs and drug proceeds, and both rob,beries w.e¡e conrmitted with intent to obtÀin thos* ilÏegal drugs and drug proceecls.

RECENT CASE EXAMPLES

L,itigate pre-trial hearing

Credibility

Ph'e¡r¡¿r.Flâ&:

• ._

I

JURY INSTRUCTION

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Kêhae€ ) ¿/zt îuaaz

<æêâj) Ð ae/z.=

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Residual Clause ls Void

for Vagueness

lJelcl: ''illnrposirrg an ilrcreasecl senterrce urrdcr thc rt'sirltr¿l clause of the Arnrt'd C.rreer Crirninal ¡\ct vir¡|.¡tes thc Constittttion's guarantee of due process." lVe ¡re convinced that the indÈtenninacy of the wide- langing inquiry required try the resitlual clause both tlenics f.rir notice to defendants.lnd invites arbitrary enf()rcenrent by judges. Increasing, a defend¿nt's seotence u¡rrler tht

cl.rr.rse clenies clue process of :law."

Two Features That Make Residual Clause U nconstitutional ly Vague

(r) "['f]he residual clause leaves grave

runcertainty about how to estimate the risk posecl by a crirne. lt ties the juclicial assessment of risk to a iudicially inraginecl 'ordinary case'of a crime, not to real-ryorld facts or statutory elements."

(z) "[T]he residual clause leaves unceltainty

abrout how much risk it takes for: a crimc to qualify as a vialent felonyl'

Johnson & ACCA

'I'he gov't .rnd prob.rtion should no longer be lclyi ng on rcsidual-clause predicates. [)r'e-/oAnson caselaw holding valious climes to be ACCA prcdicates under residual clause no longel gutcl la,uv.

Fìvc n i l' gov't/prol¡ation labels pred icate as

fc¡rce/cnuurerated offense, make sure it is not a

rcsidu.T l clause-type offense.

Retroactivity of J ahnson?

Welch v. United Sfafes, 136 S. Ct. rz57 (:,o16). Johnson a¡rnounced new substantive rulc of

constitutional law that applies retroactively

to ACCA cases on collateral review.

Career Offenders

'l'hc clelinition <.¡f "crime of violence" utrcler the caleer-rlffbndcr guideline contains a substantially i<lentic.rl residual clause at +Br.z(aXz). Argue that it, too, is void forvaguer¡ess urtder lohnsort.

Vagueness and Advisory Guidelines

'|he advisory Cuitlelines ¡re uot subject to v.lguc¡ìess challen¡;es u¡rder tlre l)ue Process Cl.ruse.

' 'l'helcftrre, IJ,S.S.C. S 4Br.z's (career offènrler gtrideline)

residual clause is not void for vagueness.

' NOTE: The Courtl holding is limited to the advisory

Cuir{elines only, leaving open tlae possibility that defendants sentenced r¡n¡iar tlr*ple-Booker manclatory Cuitlelínes rray raise vagreness challenges to their setìteIìce.

USSC Votes to Change

Definition of COV

'l'hc USSC's amendrnent eliminates the residual

clause plovicling tlr.rt a "crime r-¡f violence" includes

.r fèlony offense that "otherwise ìnvolves concluct

that presents a serious risk ofphysical iniury to

¿rrut.lter," See USSG 5 +Br.¿{a){r}

. ln voting to elin-rinate the lesiclual clause in thc c¿r'et'r'

• ffend er guidcl ine', the Cornmission acknowlecl ges

"the ongoingi litigation i¡r this area across the' natiotr and the uncertainty resulting frorn the foånson case."

Press Relcase, United States Sentencing Conrr.nissit>r'r, U.S. Senterìcing Comm'n Adopts Amendmerìt to

Defìnition of "Crirae of Viole¡rce" in Federal Sentettcìtrg Guidelines and Proposes A<lditional Arnentlnrents ( f arr.

fì, zo16).

e2a{cl

():+(cXl)(B) tlefines "crirne r¡f violence" .'rs a critne: tlrat, by its nature, involves a substantial risk

that ¡rhysical force against the person or pl'operty of another may bre usecl in ther coulse of committing the offþnse. Argue that clause is void fbr va¡¡ueness. Alsr¡, s.rme language as ró{b). Make sirnilar ar!1ument (See Dimaya)r.

92 k) Challenge

''IA ]ny person who, tluring "rnd in lcl¡tiorr to .r rr r r r irrrr

• l vi¡ rlcn(c ol dlug, tlaffickinl4 clinre . . .

' Johnson as ¿ trasis fòr'challen¡1ing the 924(c)

r\rgunrcnt: Hr"rbbs Act, bank robtrery, c.rrj.rcking, etc.,

no longel qualifu as crinres of violence, firllon,ing loÅnson, because they do not categorically recluile t hr: use ol force. 'I'hus. they rnay not lionn the basis for gz4(c) counts.

Third Circuit View

t/r?if cd.Sfofes v. Iloåin.son. 844 l'ì.jd r37 (3d Cir.

:or(r) (holding catc¡¡orical ap¡lroach docs not a¡rply

rvlre le rol;Lrcly and $ 924(c) u'ere tried tr.r the same

july)

When the pleclicate COV offense and li qz4(c) are tried togctlrer, categorical approach not required. Thelefore, court mllst exalnine conternporaneous ct'¡¡n'iction to dcter¡nine whether preclicate is COV.

e2a(cX3XB) & 16(b)

,"The rcsidual clause in rB U.S.C. fi 16(b) uscs language that is virtually ide¡rtical to that

u'hich the high court cleclareel unconstitutionally vague in the ACCA in Johnson. Dirnuya v. Lynch,8o8 F.jd uro (9th Cir'. zor5) (applying/oån.son and ruling that S 16(b) is

tr nconstitutionally vague)

Se,ssions v. Dimaya,l3S S. Ct. rzo4 (zor8)

(holding ¡'esidual clause in the CCIV clefinition of r8 U.S.C. S r6(b) is

u n co nst i tutional ly vague)

lm plications

Sessions v. Ðimaya rìreans that/ohnson's analysis is not Iirnited to the ACCA, 'l'herefore, any larvs that use language like tìre residual clause (federal/state) shoulcl be declared unconstitutionally vague.

Post-D imaya

Post-f)irrrcyc thc Supreme Coult has issucd

a numbel of GVR orclers (grant, vacate,

remand) Thc'list of cases includes not only S r6(b)

cascs, but also numcrous cascs challcnging

g 924(c)'s residual clause.

'l'he 924(c) c.rses that rvere GVIìed rvere: (ìlovcl v. Unitcd States, No. r(r-8777;'Ihylorv. Llnitcrl St¿tes, No. r(r-8996; I)avis v United States, No, rfr-8997; lJnitctl

States v. lenkins, No. 17-97; Lhrited States v. J.rcksorr,

• No. 17-65r; McCoy v. Unitecl States, No. 17-5484;

Wintcrs v. Uniterl St¡tes, No. 17-5+95; l,in v. Uniterl St¡tcs, No. q-5767; Ëize¡nberv. United States, No. 17

{rr17; Enix r,. (Jnited States, No. r7-ó34o; Ecoulse-

Westbrook v. United States, No. r7-63fi8l Carleon'"'. United Statcs, No. 17-69ró

LOth Cir Holds 92a{Q Residual

Clause Void for Vagueness

'l'hc'resirlual clause of g 9z+(c)(¡)(f]) defining, Cf)V is tunconstitutionally vague in light of Sessions v.

I)inruy<t. St¡<:tiorr 9:+kXi)(R) possesses the sa¡ne featurt's.rs the ACCA's lesiclu.rl cl.ltse and S 16(b) that conrhined to ¡>rorluce nrore unpredictability and arbitrariness than

thc IIP Clause woulrt allow.

[./n itr<i .S¡cfcs v. Sa&rs, No,z:r¡-CR-o3r8¡- Rll-:, ¿or8 L].S.

r\pp. l.tiXlS n(rti65 (roth Cir. May 4, zorB).

Preserve, Preserve, Preserve

lìeading the 'l-e¿ Leavcs: the 924 (c) r'csidu.rl

clar-rse may be struck dou,n.

l-ile a M'I"D in every S g:+(c) case. And if it

is a plea, try to negotiate a conclitional plea

to preserve the iszue {negotiate a cârve-ollt if you have a plea agreement appeal waiver). Evcry $ gz+(c) cäse raust be appealed.

{lS. u }irung, 7ri6 Ir.3rl 6zr (irtr,Cir. :or1) (tlef'entl.rrit

se¡ttc'rtcc'tl to nr.nrl.rtory r5-,ve.ìr term of irn¡rrisottrttetrt

un<lcr thc ACCA lcll being a fe.lon itr possessiorr of ¿nrnrtrnitir¡n)

It4.r ncla tor¡ Ììi nìrm¡nì sentence did not vioLrte Ei¡;hth

Ânrc¡ldurent because it rlãs not grossly disproportionate to

• llirrse corl mitted. Gravity of offense is viewed in light ot'

defc nd;rn t's previous crimes.

T hc ÂC(¡\ as.rpplietl to defend¡nt bet-¿use he l¡¡d f.¡ir not ice

• f t Ire pr0hibitirrrr acainst feloro possæsirrg, ammurril iorr.

OTHËR ACCA CASES

Begay v. U.S. rz8 S. Ct. r58r (zorr8) Nerv Mexico

DUI not a "violent felony" fbr ACCA pul'poses.

' Watson v. U.S., rr8 S. Ct. 579 {zool) * Exchange of

drugs for gun * rrot "use" within meaning, of e+(c)(1XA). (låanrlrers v. L).5., ns S. Ct. rr87 (¿oo9) (11.. failule to rcpolt conviction rrot violent felony undcr

ACCA's othenvise clause) Shepard v. U.5.,544 U.S. r3 (zoo5) * Sentencing

Coult can't look at police leports in making

"general bulglary" determination. Need to look at

le liable Court documents, plea agleernent , or

tr.rnscript, etc.

"Except to tììe cxtent tlìat à g,reater nrirrimurn selltcncc is

• tlrerrvise provided by tlris subsection or by any other'

provision of lau', any person who, during ancl irl relat ion to

.rny crinre oiviolence or drug traffìcking crinte . . ."

¡\ delencl.rnt is subject trl:r mandatory, consecr¡live

serìterÌcrÌ fol a 92,1(c) colrviction. and is not s¡>aled fì'om th.rt sente¡ìce by virtue of rcceivirrg a higher

nì¿ndato¡y mini¡num ôn ¡ differerìt count of convict ir¡ rr. A defèncl¿nt is subject to the highest mandatory mirrimunr specified for his co¡rduct in

$ 92.¡(c) uuless ¡nother provision oflaw directe<l to

corrtluct proscú,bed by $ ç¿¿{c) imposes an even gre.rtel mandarory minímum,

92A{c)(1){A} "EXCE PT" CLAUSE

Ahhott v. U.S., r3r S. Ct. r8 (¿oro)

f f other marrdns srrch a* rlrrrgs or gtrns, i.e.. 85r or A('('A

c.rses, exceedthe qze(r) provision

U.S. t'. Roblt's,7r>g F.3<{ 98, roo (zcl Cir. zor3,) (holcling

that the "except" clause clot's not exempt (r dcfþnclant. sentenced on nrultiple $ g24(c) counts, fi'onr receiving

<l collsecutive rnandatory milrimtrm selrtence firI e.rch

• f his consecutive $ 924þ) convictions)

If your clicnt is not an Ar¡ncd Career Crirninal then lris/hel guidelines will fäll under USSG $zKz.r. tn light crf ßegay , lohnson, Archer, Harrison, be caref ul

• f'the base oltènse level that calls fbr its application

to offenses involving a crinre(s) ofviolence.

I2K2.1. Gun Guidelines

(.r) tlasc Ofïènse l,evel (A¡r¡rly thc'Greatest): (r) :6, if (A) the ollþnse involved a (i) semiautonraric fìre¿rm th.rt is capable of acceptinrl

.r l.rrge capacity magazine; or (ii) firearrn that is

desclibecl in ¡6 U.S,C. 5845(a); arrd (B) the tlelenclant committed any palt of the instant

• llirrse subsequent to sustaining at least trvo fblony

co¡l'ictions of eithe¡ a cri¡ne of violence ol' ¿

c<.rn t rolled sübstðnce of&nse;

U.S.S.G. 2K2,7

I)r)tJ tÌt,t; cr()tJNl't NÇ PÊRMtsslßt,E

S,ìrìre pre(lic.ìte use<l fbr both BL)t. & Cl-l U.S. t. L'iz<:arra,6ó8 Ir.3d 516, 5:o-:r (7rl'Cir. :or"r)

(dorrble courrti¡'rg pernrissible uriless.r speci{ìc gtritleline pr'ovirles othelu'ise)

Lt.S. v. l\tchb, ó65 F.3t1 r38o, r'¡82 (rlr'Cir. ror:,) (double

countiru permiüeel if US.SC interrded th.rr rest¡lt and

cach guideline sectiorì in question concerns scp¡r.ltt: notio¡rs rel.rted to se¡¡1çna¡r*, Ll.S. t'. ¡4nrnnn,687 l"-.]d l>8f3, 695 (fr,r' Cir. zorz)

("Permissible cloutrle countirìg occurs 'where it .lp|)er'ìrs that Congless o¡' tlìe Serìterìcing Cornmission ilrtcrrclecl to ðttach multiple penalties to tlre s.rnre conduct."')

U.S. v. l'lunrpton, 6¿8 fj.¡d 654, 664 (4'h Cir: :oro)

(presunring double cor.lnting proper where tlre guidelines do not expressly prohibit it).

(./.S. v. Fis/¡e.¡', 5o¿ F.j<l >93, log {¡rt Cit zooT) (doublc

counting irnperrnissible onþ wllen guidelines specifìc.rll,v prohibír it)

What About Variances?

{/..S. r¿ /ìt¡/¡crl"^on. 3og Fed. App'x 9r8.923 (6th Cil

zoor¡) "An rlgument that ¿ distlict court should award ¡

r,¿ri¿rrÌce b¡sed o¡r the 'fi ¡ssr(a) fäctors because the

guicleline rarrge dolble counted prior offenses is a

no ¡r fì'ivolous argurn€nt.'