Evaluating State-Space Abstractions in Extensive-Form Games Michael - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

evaluating state space abstractions in extensive form
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Evaluating State-Space Abstractions in Extensive-Form Games Michael - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Evaluating State-Space Abstractions in Extensive-Form Games Michael Johanson, Neil Burch, Richard Valenzano and Michael Bowling University of Alberta, Canada Outline Using CFR-BR to evaluate abstractions Using imperfect recall in


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Evaluating State-Space Abstractions in Extensive-Form Games

Michael Johanson, Neil Burch, Richard Valenzano and Michael Bowling University of Alberta, Canada

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Outline

  • Using CFR-BR to evaluate abstractions
  • Using imperfect recall in abstractions
  • New abstraction features

– Read our paper!

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Extensive-Form Games

Rock Paper Scissors 9 states Limit Texas Hold'em ~1018 states RTS Games many states

TOO BIG!

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Abstraction

  • Combine strategically similar situations to create a

smaller (hopefully) strategically similar game

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Evaluating an Abstraction

  • Gilpin and Sandholm (AAAI '08) listed three

methods for evaluating abstractions

– One on one comparison – Play versus real-game equilibrium – Play versus best-response

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Evaluating an Abstraction

  • One on one comparison

– Not transitive: cycles of winners – Depends on the particular abstract solutions

Abstraction A Abstract Solution a Real Game Strategy a Abstraction B Abstract Solution b Real Game Strategy b Expected value

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Evaluating an Abstraction

  • Play versus real-game equilibrium

– Generally intractable – Depends on the particular abstract solutions

Abstraction A Abstract Solution a Real Game Strategy a Real Game Solution Expected value

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Evaluating an Abstraction

  • Play versus best-response

– Depends on the particular abstract solutions – Does not match observed one-on-on performance

Abstraction A Abstract Solution a Real Game Strategy a Best Response Exploitability

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CFR-BR

Real game strategies Abstract game strategies Abstract solutions Real game solutions CFR-BR finds the least exploitable abstract strategy [Johanson et al. 2012]

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Evaluation using CFR-BR

  • CFR-BR (Johanson et al. AAAI '12) can be

used to find an abstract strategy with lowest real-game exploitability

Abstraction A CFR-BR Solution a Real Game Strategy a Best Response Exploitability

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Imperfect Recall

1

Perfect Recall Imperfect Recall NDepth information sets K information sets ...

1 N

...

1 N

...

...

1

...

1 M

...

1 M

...

...

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Imperfect Recall

Abstraction # Information Sets

10/10/10/10 perfect recall 57,330,780 10/100/1000/10000 imperfect recall 57,330,780 169/9000/9000/9000 imperfect recall 57,331,352

Chance Player Actions Chance Player Actions Chance Player Action Chance Player Actions Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4

Texas Limit Hold'em

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Evaluating Imperfect Recall Abstractions

Abstraction One-on-One Performance

  • vs. Best

Response CFR-BR vs. Best Response 10/10/10/10 PR

  • 24.8
  • 282.856
  • 84.039

169/9000/9000/9000 IR

24.8

  • 282.395

≥ -64.820 Should we use imperfect recall in an abstraction?

Comparison of perfect and imperfect recall abstraction of limit Texas Hold'em All values are big blinds per thousand hands

Yes!

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Summary

  • Use CFR-BR to evaluate abstractions

– Transitive measure – Tracks one-on-one performance well – Not dependent on a particular strategy

  • Use imperfect recall in abstractions

– More flexibility in abstraction choices – Demonstrable improvement in abstraction quality

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Thank you!

  • Mihai Ciucu, Eric Jackson, Mengliao Wang, UofA Computer Poker Research

Group

  • NSERC, Alberta Innovates Technology Futures, WestGrid, Réseau

Québécois de Calcul de Haute Performance, Compute/Calcul Canada

  • Pictures from freepokerphotosite.com and Wikipedia