EMP Strategic View David Ball, American Electric Power Managing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2017

2017 energytech

EMP Strategic View

David Ball, American Electric Power Managing Director, Transmission Operations

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus

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EMP Threat Mitigation Transmission EMP Concerns

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AEP Transmission has taken the position that the E1 environment poses the most significant threat to electronic protection, control and monitoring devices

• Substation Electronic Equipment
• These substation facility devices could be defined as system protection relays, security

systems, network switches, routers, and any other solid state components

• Transmission Operations Centers
• Situational Awareness tools (servers, monitors and electronics)
• Communications paths (SCADA data)
• Telecomm routing hubs using electronic devices for priority 1 substations needed for strategic service

restoration

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus

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Vulnerability #1

• Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the

protection equipment

• Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the control building can help

reduce impact to protection devices and other critical components Vulnerability #2

• Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of

currents on to outdoor control cable coming into the control building

• Mitigation: Proper grounding techniques and the use of sufficient cable shields can

reduce overall impact to protection devices

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus

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• Control Building Device Impact (Mitigation of Vulnerability #1)
• In 2010, American Electric Power started the development of a modularized control building

standard

• The purpose of this standard is to gradually replace protection and control assets as both

time and budgets permit

• Each building module contains project specific protection and control system components

that have been installed and tested prior to delivery

• This affords AEP the flexibility to pay and plan for assets that are only needed today, rather

than risking the under or oversizing of a control building for future needs

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus

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• Control Cable Protection (Mitigation of Vulnerability #2)
• Control cable can pose a significant problem as Transmission facilities require copper cable

runs in excess of 1000’ or more for EHV installations that can cover several acres

• USE SHIELDED CABLE
• Common types of cable shields:
• Aluminum/Copper Foil
• Helically Wrapped Aluminum/Copper Tape
• Braided Wire Shields
• Longitudinally Wrapped Corrugated Copper
• The appropriate grounding methodology must be used with the type of shield selected
• Improper grounding of shields could result in shield failure

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus

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• Control Cable Protection (Cont’d)
• Following proper industry standard procedures as outlined in IEEE 525, IEEE Guide for the

Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Substations can also reduce the impact on electronic equipment and provide guidance on grounding methodology and when to use shielded cable

• Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV’s) and other surge protection devices (SPD’s) can also be used to

in conjunction with proper grounding methodologies to protect equipment

• Burying cables in pre-cast trench systems and removing exterior cable risers will also provide

additional protection

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments

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Neutral Environment Tests

• Low-Level Characterization Tests (LLCT)

performed on the Drop-in Control Module designs in 2011/2012 were done in a neutral environment

• No control cables were connected
• Few conduit penetrations were created
• Average attenuation ~40-50dB across

frequency spectrum

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments

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Live Environment Tests

• Follow up tests in 2014 were performed on

a Drop-in Control Module using both LLCT and Continuous Wave Immersion (CWI) methods on an in-service EHV 345/138kV substation

• Requires an FCC Special Temporary

Authorization (STA)

• All control cables were connected
• Several conduit penetrations had been

created

• Average attenuation ~30-40dB across

frequency spectrum

50 100 150 200 10

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10

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Vert SE Bz Vert SE By Vert SE Bx

Frequency (Hz) SE (dB)

AEP TP02 F02 Vert Shielding Effectiveness (SE)

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments

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Legacy Building Assessment

• The follow-up testing in 2014 also included

the evaluation of a 30yr old metal control building

• Differences included:
• Poured concrete floor
• Several dozen conduit penetrations from years
• f construction and maintenance
• Metal walls not as robust
• All control cables were connected
• Average attenuation ~20-40dB across

frequency spectrum

50 100 150 200 10

10

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Vert SE Bz Vert SE By Vert SE Bx

Frequency (Hz) SE (dB)

AEP TP01A F02A Vert Shielding Effectiveness (SE)

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments

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Direct Drive Stress Characterization

• This test injects a high current pulse directly
• nto the shield of our control cable.
• It simulates the pulse which would be

induced on the control cables in the yard, and is used to generate a transfer function for the expected stress at the critical equipment (relay, RTU, etc.).

• The test waveform is based on an EMP

coupling model for buried conductors.

AEP Coupling Loss Comparison DD I01A

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Control Center EMP Focus

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Vulnerability #1

• Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the

electronic equipment used in control centers to drive situational awareness tools

• Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the control center to reduce

impact on identified electronic equipment and other critical components Vulnerability #2

• Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of

currents on to power and control cable entering the protected area

• Mitigation: The use of wave guides, shielding and proper grounding to reduce the
• verall impact to control center electronic equipment

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EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Communications Paths

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Vulnerability #1

• Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the

electronic equipment used in telecomm “huts” to drive situational awareness tools

• Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the utility owned “huts” to

reduce impact on identified electronic equipment and other critical components Vulnerability #2

• Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of

currents on to “non fiber” based communications paths

• Mitigation: Working with utility and Teleco’s to identify risks and take proper

mitigation steps to ensure situational awareness tools are in place after an event

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Be Cautious

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• Be wary of information and publications from doomsday advocates
• Many are primary investors in testing and solutions firms that are trying to sell

systems that won’t solve any problems

• Do your research and background checks to ensure credible services and

information

• There are individuals out there overplaying the risks “end of the world”

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Next Steps

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• Industry Rule Making and Legislation Considerations
• Transmission Operations Center Hardening
• MIL-SPEC-1588 (80dB)
• Substation Control Building Hardening
• Something less that MIL-SPEC-188 – Based on type of EMP event that we expect

substation components to provide restoration (40dB, 60dB)

• Cost Effective for utility customers
• Customer Focused
• Current Information is protected requiring special Security Clearance
• Current IEC standards focus is lacking with regard to EMP
• IEC-61000-2-x

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Research

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References and Additional Reading

• IEEE 525, IEEE Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Substations, 2007
• Kotheimer, W. C. Theory of Shielding and Grounding of Control Cables to Reduce Surges. General Electric. GER-3205. 1973
• Kotheimer, W. C. Control Circuit Transients. General Electric. GER-3061
• Longmire, Conrad L. EMP on Honolulu from the Starfish Event. Mission Research Corporation. TN 353. 1985
• Longmire, Conrad L. A Nominal Set of High-Altitude EMP Environments. Mission Research Corporation. TN 354. ORNL/Sub/85-18417. 1987
• MIL-STD-188-125-1, High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical, Time-Urgent Missions. Department of
• Defense. 2005
• MIL-HDBK-419A, Military Handbook: Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic Equipment and Facilities. Department of Defense. 1987
• Sherman, R. EMP Engineering and Design Principles. Bell Telephone Laboratories. Loop Transmission Division. 1975
• Vance, E.F. Electromagnetic Pulse Handbook for Electrical Power Systems. Stanford Research Institute. AD-A009 228
• Vance, E.F. Coupling to Shielded Cables. New York: Wiley, 1978
• Vittitoe, Charles N. Did High-Altitude EMP Cause the Hawaiian Streetlight Incident?. Sandia National Laboratories. SDAN 31. 1989

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Questions?

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