Efficiency in Health Research Time for a Haircut from the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Efficiency in Health Research Time for a Haircut from the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Efficiency in Health Research Time for a Haircut from the Barber-Surgeon Joel Ray 1 CSIM Annual Meeting 2019 Conflict Disclosures None 3 4 What DS said: The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (which replaces the


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Efficiency in Health Research – Time for a Haircut from the Barber-Surgeon

Joel Ray

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CSIM Annual Meeting 2019

Conflict Disclosures

“None”

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What DS said:

  • “The Canadian Institutes of Health Research

(which replaces the Medical Research Council and certain other agencies) is charged with the task of reorganizing health research to better serve the health of Canadians.”

  • “I suggest that it will fail to do so unless it

dramatically increases support for randomised clinical trials (RCTs) and those who design and conduct them.”

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… sort of, again …. but, we all must go on trial, and some are going to get wet

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  • CIHR was created in June 2000 by the

Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act

  • Mandate: “to excel, according to

internationally accepted standards of scientific excellence, in the creation of new knowledge and its translation into improved health for Canadians, more effective health services and products and a strengthened Canadian health care system.”

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$1.05 billion CIHR planned spending Funding Health Research and Training $1.14 billion $1.15 billion

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CIHR's core values

  • Excellence
  • Scientific Integrity and Ethics
  • Collaboration
  • Innovation
  • Public Interest – “The public interest is of

paramount importance in the creation and use of health knowledge through all research and related activities supported by CIHR.”

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CMAJ 1995;152

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N Engl J Med 2002; 346:285-287

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https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/are-we-measuring-research-success-wrong/

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Joshua M. Pearce says …

  • Academic researchers are, for the most part,

competitive.

  • These intellectual gladiators like to succeed—

but more than that, they like to win.

  • Historically this “winning” was determined by

solving problems no one else has ever solved before, thereby driving a particular scientific discipline forward.

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  • Recently, however, many universities have

been overrun by administrators without sufficient academic qualifications to obtain tenure in their own disciplines.

  • These administrators needed some relatively

simple way to determine which academic researchers were winning. The metric that has gained traction among such administrators is “research expenditures.”

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The researcher The research institute

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  • As a metric, “research expenditures” enables

administrators to compare individual faculty members on what appears to be a level playing field.

  • It also boils down the research efforts of an

entire university to a single number to be used for simpleminded ranking.

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  • The more grants you win, the more time you

have to spend administering the grant: managing budgets, writing reports and meeting with grant administrators.

  • This reduces the time and effort you can put

into research.

  • What if the collective effect of focusing on

research expenditures actually is slowing science down?

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There exists a real and undocumented conflict of interest between a research institute and the researcher who resides therein

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$

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  • Each paid research institution receives from

CIHR a ~ 17% “Indirect costs” (ICP) re- imbursement (even though the real costs are actually closer to 40%).

  • Provides funding to universities, colleges and

research hospitals to help cover a portion of the indirect costs associated with the research funded by federal granting councils.

$ indirect costs

Tenth-year Evaluation of the Indirect Costs Program. NSERC-SSHRC Evaluation Division. June 23, 2014

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Includes scientists’ salaries

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University of Toronto

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$ indirect costs

  • Hence, the institution has a potential conflict
  • f interest.
  • The more operating funds their researchers

get  the more ICP the institution gets.

  • Thus, the incentive is for their researchers to

bring in more tri-council grant money (in addition to the many positive aspects of having successful researchers, including institutional prestige).

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  • But CIHR may not see this as a necessary good
  • As it may promote excesses
  • And betray the public trust
  • CIHR is a FUNDING agency, so its obligation is

to ensure that funds are spent in a productive manner, for health promotion.

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So other metrics have been proposed

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The “Hirsch score”

  • In 2009, Dr. Greg Hirsch
  • A "Deliverable scoring metric“
  • Keep track and give value to research being

done in Dept. of Surgery at Dalhousie.

  • Annually: All deliverables are accounted and

compiled.

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Research output score (ROP)

  • Sum of grant points (g), publication points (p)

and PhD supervision points (s):

ROP = g + p + s

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For grant points

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My addition

(Number of PI or Co-PI grants over “Z” years)

My addition

Number of co-applicant grants over “Z” years

+

x (some sort of weighting factor)

g =

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x (some sort of weighting factor) x (total dollar value) x (total dollar value)

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For supervision points

  • Consider each PhD student supervision as 1 point
  • Consider each Master’s student supervision as

0.5 points

  • Consider each PhD or MSc thesis committee non-

supervisor role as 0.2 points

  • Consider supervision of a clinical trainees (med

student, resident or fellow as 0.2 points)

  • All of the above must have a formal protocol of

research written up.

  • Sum up over “X” years

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For publication points

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x (journal impact factor)

P =

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  • There are critics of journal impact factor, etc…

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.02099.pdf

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PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0173152 March 9, 2017

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After 1 year, 5 years and 10 years of a scientist’s academic appointment …

  • At the level of one’s own research institute,

ROPs can be compared.

  • Annually, each scientist submits a

standardized ROP = g + p + s

  • ROP percentile is then created for each

person, standardized to the number of years since their first academic appointment (accounting for leave of absence).

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But what about how well they spend their grant money?

  • CIHR must respect the public trust
  • I.e., taxpayers fund researchers’ research
  • That these monies must be well spent
  • As the pool of money is clearly limited
  • So, productive people who get things done

should be well funded

  • Unproductive people should not be funded (or

funded less)

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Efficiency in labor

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Flip this around: How much ROP per grant $

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I propose a new additional (dimensional) metric for research output

“Productivity of Research Output (PROP)”

= Output Input = ROP x 1000 R&D expenditures = g + p + s x 1000 Research funding

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PROP example 1

Researcher A

  • ROP = 20
  • Grants = $100,000

PROP = (20/100,000) * 1000 = 0.2 Researcher B

  • ROP = 10
  • Grants = $100,000

PROP = (10/100,000) * 1000 = 0.1

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While grants (g) are a part of ROP, grants cancel out in this scenario

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PROP example 2

Researcher A

  • ROP = 20
  • Grants = $1,000,000

PROP = (20/1,000,000) * 1000 = 0.02 Researcher B

  • ROP = 20
  • Grants = $100,000

PROP = (20/100,000) * 1000 = 0.2

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Grants (g) are a part of ROP, and grants do not cancel out in this scenario

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PROP example 3

Researcher A

  • ROP = 100
  • Grants = $1,000,000

PROP = (100/1,000,000) * 1000 = 0.1 Researcher B

  • ROP = 10
  • Grants = $100,000

PROP = (10/100,000) * 1000 = 0.1

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Grants (g) are a part of ROP, and grants do not cancel out in this scenario

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PROP

  • Not only applied to an individual researcher
  • Can be applied to a research institute, where the

Institutional mean PROP, X =

where i is each of the appointed scientists

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Exceptions to the rule are necessary

“Someone has painted an amusing picture of Newton ordered by the director of a modern

  • rganization to make a progress report on his

theory of gravitation.”

LA ROGERS. “WHAT CONSTITUTES EFFICIENCY IN RESEARCH?” Address of the President at the Twenty-fourth annual meeting of the Society of American Bacteriologists, Detroit, Michigan, December, 1922.

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  • Could allow individuals whose work does not

fall under these metrics, to apply for an exemption

  • E.g., those solely involved in policy work

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Research output score (ROP)

  • Sum of grant points (g), policy points

(p) and PhD supervision points (s):

ROP = g + p + s

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CIHR's core values

  • Excellence
  • Scientific Integrity and Ethics
  • Collaboration
  • Innovation
  • Public Interest - The public interest is of

paramount importance in the creation and use of health knowledge through all research and related activities supported by CIHR.

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What should CIHR do with researchers who have a low PROP?

  • Those < 10th percentile would be offered

strategies (e.g., a course to improve their efficiency).

  • If remain < 10th percentile after some amount of

time  exclude from applying as a PI or co-PI for tri-council funding, on the likely assumption that they are unable to meet productivity requirements.

  • This is objective
  • This might save CIHR both time (for reviews and
  • ther administration) and money.

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What should CIHR do with institutions that have a low PROP?

  • Institutions < 10th percentile would have to

demonstrate how they will be more accountable for research spending.

  • If they remain < 10th percentile  indirect

costs would be withheld, as would their eligibility for Canada Research Chairs.

  • This is objective (and punitive)
  • This might save CIHR money.

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  • In the ideal research organization the

investigator can follow the lure of his [her] elusive [research] problem protected from the distractions of business and finance and propaganda: he [she] can make better progress and enjoy it none the less because the paths have been made smooth and the camp grounds supplied with wood and water.

LA ROGERS. “WHAT CONSTITUTES EFFICIENCY IN RESEARCH?” 1922.

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In honor of:

  • Jim Nishikawa
  • Jeff Ginsberg
  • Bill Geerts
  • Clive Kearon
  • Robert Burrows
  • Ann Kenshole
  • Robert Hyland
  • Don Redelmeier
  • Doreen & Michael Mason
  • Sam Ray
  • David Naylor
  • David Sackett
  • Marian Vermeulen

All who influenced how I think about science, and about people, (who gave me food and water)

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And with special thanks to:

  • Alison Park (ICES)
  • Kathlyn Babaran-Henfrey

(St. Michael’s Hospital) Who put up with my BS, on a daily basis, and have facilitated my growth through collegiality and good counsel

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