Dispatch of Scheduled Network Services David Bowker Ken Secomb - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Dispatch of Scheduled Network Services David Bowker Ken Secomb - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dispatch of Scheduled Network Services David Bowker Ken Secomb May 2007 Outline The Role of Scheduled Network Services What has been happening? How does market dispatch lead to this outcome? Is the current dispatch process


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Dispatch of Scheduled Network Services

David Bowker Ken Secomb May 2007

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SLIDE 2

Outline

The Role of Scheduled Network Services What has been happening? How does market dispatch lead to this

  • utcome?

Is the current dispatch process consistent

with the NEM Rules?

Alternatives to overcome the adverse effects

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SLIDE 3

Role of Scheduled Network Services

Scheduled Network services –

Make no charge on customers due to their

presence, but rather –

Derive revenue only from transporting energy

from a lower-price region to a higher-price

Make market offers for energy transport which

specify a price difference above which the service is to be dispatched

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SLIDE 4

Basslink Business Model Basslink Business Model

National Grid Australia (NGA) is developer, owner and

  • perator

Tasmania Victoria

NEMMCO Hydro Tasmania

Victorian generators expected to focus on southward sales Inter-regional revenues (IRR)

IRR

Facility fee Hydro Tasmania is focussed on northward sales Flows reflect market outcomes Flows reflect market outcomes

IRR Aucti IRR

  • n
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SLIDE 5

History

Basslink is often dispatched with energy price

difference in the wrong direction (see following information)

Results in the market charging Basslink for providing

a service (cost passed on to Hydro Tasmania - HT)

Restricts HT’s ability to compete with mainland

generators

Leads to changes from HT’s intended pattern of

generation (water management issues)

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SLIDE 6

History of Basslink dispatch contrary to its offer

Incidence of negative residues on Basslink: 1 May 2006 - 16 April 2007

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 100.00% May 1 - 7 May 15 - 21 May 29 - June 4 June 12 - 18 June 26 - July 2 July 10 - 16 July 24 - 30 August 7 - 13 August 21 - 27 September 4 - 10 September 18 - 24 October 2 - 8 October 16 - 22 October 30 - November 5 November 13 - 19 November 27 - December 3 December 11 - 17 December 25 - 31 January 8 - 14 January 22 - 28 February 5 - 11 February 19 - 25 March 5 - 1 Ma Southward Basslink Flow Northward Basslink Flow

Total Cost to date $2.3m

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SLIDE 7

HT response to this risk

As the risk due to Basslink dispatch has been

better understood, HT has taken risk mitigation measures,

These reduce the incidence of Basslink

dispatch contrary to offer, but adversely affect competition between Tasmania and the mainland

Thus, materiality remains significant,

although in a different form

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SLIDE 8

Effects of risk mitigation

Basslink flow direction controlled, based on

forecasts, rather than as market outcome

Inefficient resource pricing to control Basslink

flows

More uncertainty over value of inter-regional

residues

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Diagnosis

The dispatch of these counter-price flows is

due to a particular form of constraints defining Frequency Control Ancillary Service requirements

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Background

Basslink is the first scheduled network service

provider in the NEM to have a frequency sensitive control system

This allows single market in FCAS, with competition

between Tasmania and the mainland

Variation of Basslink flow is necessary for FCAS

transport, but is limited by both availability limits AND a “no-go” zone

This lead to a complex interaction of FCAS transport

capability with Basslink dispatch level

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Effect of Basslink frequency controller Effect of Basslink frequency controller .George

Town

. . McGuaran’s

Beach

Loy Yang If both frequencies are normal -

  • Dispatched flow of, say, 100 MW north

If mainland frequency becomes low –

  • Flow increases to, say, 150 MW north,

supports mainland frequency, depresses Tasmanian frequency If Tasmanian frequency becomes low –

  • Flow reduces to, say, 50 MW north,

supports Tasmanian frequency, depresses mainland frequency Similar effects for high frequencies Shared FCAS gives efficient outcome 100 MW

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Forms of FCAS constraint

FCAS constraints specify the requirements for

FCAS, and can be –

Global, specifying a requirement to be met without regard

to location, or

Local, specifying a requirement to be met within a region or

set of regions eg in Tas the need for services to cover loss

  • f Basslink, which cannot be transmitted via Basslink, or

Co-optimised Local, where for example the amount

required in a region or regions depends on the amount that can be transported by Basslink at its dispatched flow (occasionally applies with other inter-connectors)

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FCAS requirements and Basslink flow

The automatic limitation of Basslink flow by its

control system causes limits to FCAS transfer

Limit to FCAS transfer depends on the dispatch

target for Basslink, and relates to the amount of “headroom” between dispatched flow and a flow limit

Limit is implemented by constraint equations that set

FCAS requirements for Tasmania, or for the mainland, in relation to Basslink flow

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Form of constraint equations

FCAS enabled ± Basslink flow ≥ Constant Where “FCAS enabled” is specific to a particular service, and also a region or set of regions eg Tas or mainland

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Variation of local FCAS requirements

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Variation of -- A Tasmanian Raise service, or

  • - A Mainland Lower service
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Variation of local FCAS requirements

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Variation of -- A Tasmanian Lower service, or

  • - A Mainland Raise service
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Effect on Dispatch - example

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Dispatch point Energy market alone indicates less southerly flow FCAS market alone indicates more southerly flow Dispatch point set by balance of “tensions”

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Energy market “tension”

At any dispatch point for Basslink, there will

be a “tension” for a different flow, which depends on –

Difference in energy market prices, less

  • Offer price of Basslink (commonly zero)
  • Loss allowance

The tension will increase with movement

away from an energy market equilibrium point

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SLIDE 19

Illustration of energy market tension

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Equilibrium point on energy only Price steps occur when – marginal unit in Tas. switches to cheaper unit, or

  • marginal unit on mainland switches to dearer unit
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FCAS market “tension”

At any dispatch point for Basslink, there will be a

“tension” for a different flow, which depends on the effect of reduced transport on FCAS costs

This is more complex than energy but has similar

broad characteristics

The tension will increase with movement away from

an FCAS market equilibrium point

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Illustration of FCAS market tension

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Equilibrium point on FCAS

  • nly

Price steps up when – an additional FCAS service has co-optimised eqn binding, or

  • price difference for a service increases, or
  • price of additional quantity increases
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Illustration of market balancing tensions of energy and FCAS

  • 480
  • 50

+50 +600 Dispatch point where tensions balance

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Effect of FCAS co-optimisation

All 8 FCAS services have co-optimised equations

involving Basslink

Several of these may be binding simultaneously,

with their effects in balancing the energy market tension being additive

The competing tensions may give a dispatch

  • utcome contrary to the Basslink offer, and there is

currently no mechanism to ensure that the dispatch

  • utcome is consistent with the Basslink offer
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Hydro Tasmania View of the Rules

Hydro Tasmania (HT) believes that NEMMCO has inadvertently

created a situation where dispatch is contrary to the market Rules

The requirement to maximise the value of trade is subject to

being based on market offers and bids

Basslink transport offers are market offers in this context The dispatch of Basslink has often been contrary to the current

market offer: the offer is to transport energy if the price difference exceeds the offer price, but dispatch has been for energy transport when this price difference is not present

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Hydro Tasmania view (continued)

The dispatch of Basslink counter-price can be

considered as “constrained-on”

The market rules lead to “constrained-on” dispatch

  • f generators due to the inherent mismatch between

dispatch and settlement

The rules, in the HT view, prohibit constrained-on

dispatch within the dispatch process,

But the current NEMMCO arrangements DO

constrain-on, for Basslink only, within the dispatch process

Hence we see a need for change

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Hydro Tasmania internal consideration

HT concluded that clarification of the Rules

was the best approach only after considering a number of alternatives

Many of these would have only marginal

effects, and hence were not in reality a solution to the issue

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Attempts to resolve with NEMMCO

Hydro Tasmania had extensive discussions

with NEMMCO, seeking a different interpretation of their responsibilities under the Rules

Unfortunately, these did not start until current

dispatch process was well established and hence NEMMCO had a substantial stake in the current approach

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NEMMCO proposed actions independent of Rule change

NEMMCO propose to change the Basslink

dispatch process in November this year

This would resolve some, but not all, of the

relevant dispatch outcomes

In terms of dispatch technology, their

intended change is very compatible with our proposal

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Remaining alternatives to Rule clarification

Permanent disabling of frequency control by

Basslink, but

This would degrade both physical performance of the

network and competition in FCAS

Temporary disabling of frequency control by

Basslink when dispatch is contrary to Basslink offer, but

This would lead to periods of insecure operation of the

network (due to insufficient FCAS)

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Summary

Our proposal is consistent with a proper reading of

the current Rules, and clarifies a possible ambiguity

Implementation of our proposal is technically

compatible with changes that NEMMCO plan to make anyway

There are alternatives to our Rule change but these

involve degradation of system security or of network performance or of the FCAS market,

The adverse effects of the current process must be

eliminated in some way