Disaster Evacuation and Risk Perceptions in Democracies Norichika Kanie François Gemenne (francois.gemenne@iddri.org) (kanie@valdes.titech.ac.jp) Alexandre Magnan Noriyuki Ueda (alexandre.magnan@iddri.org) (ueda@valdes.titech.ac.jp) Reiko Hasegawa Shunji Matsuoka （ smatsu@waseda.jp ） (reiko15@olive.ocn.ne.jp) Yui Nakagawa Masahito Tanada
This study aims at clarifying the disaster evacuation process and risk perception in demoocracies, by examining the immediate response of Japanese politics and society to the triple disaster triggered by 3.11 earthquake, and providing a comprehensive and multidisciplinary analysis.
Decision-making in the Evacuation Process Futaba Two municipalities, Futaba and Naraha, are chosen for further investigations to explore the immediate response to the nuclear disaster.
The evacuation instruction in the early phases T he evacuation zone was expanded 4 times within only 24 hours 3/11 20:50…An EI to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant 21:23…An EI to persons within a radius of 3km from the plant 3/12 5:44…An EI to persons within a radius of 10km from the plant 18:25…An EI to persons within a radius of 20km from the plant 2 Research Questions: How and why were instructions determined and/or revised? Were those instructions actually effective?
3/11 Actions taken right after the earthquake 14 ： 46 METI established an NISA called up essential ERC NISA Director-General A 9.0 magnitude Emergency Response personnel and formed six Terasaka was deispatched to earthquake 15:27 ~ Headquarters for the squads, each with a specific the Crisis Management disaster Center at the PM ’ s Office. function. Tsunami arriving 15 ： 42 15 ： 42 NISA informed the METI established a Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the PM ’ s Office and NEPHQ in ERC and STATION BLACKOUT of the a Local NEPHQ in Act on Special Measures Concerning other competent Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear the Off-site Center Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Power Plant bodies. notified by TEPCO. (TEPCO→NISA) 16:36 NISA informed the Crisis Management 16:36 PM ’ s Office and 16:42 Deputy Chief Ito Disability of the emergency established an other competent Based on Article 15, Clause 1 of the core cooling system of Emergency Response bodies. Act notified by TEPCO. Units 1 and 2. Office in the PM ’ s Office Around 17:00 Around 17:35 Several TEPCO executives were PM ‘ s Office took METI Minister Kaieda agreed to declare a summoned to the PM ’ s Office as time before nuclear emergency situation. requested to explain the situation launching the Around 17:42 emergency action. METI Minister Kaieda and NISA Director- General Terasaka submitted the Article 15 Situation to PM and asked him to agree to 18 ： 10 declare a nuclear emergency situation. Start of reactor core The report was suspended at 18:12 for PM's schedules. exposure 19 ： 03 18 ： 50 × lack of information sharing A declaration of a nuclear Start of reactor core 19:03 – 19:22 emergency situation was damaged the first NERHQ issued by the government . meeting was held in the Prime around 20:00~ NERHQ at the PM's Office. a Local Minister’s Office Fukushima Prefectural ERHQ at Off-site Center, and the PM gathered members in a small NERHQ secretariat in the Emergency Government had a room on the mezzanine floor Response Center (ERC) were sense of crisis and formed a team for the established. accident response.
around 20:00~ Fukushima Prefectural It consisted of the Prime Minister Kan, Chief PM gathered members in a small Government was Cabinet Secretary Edano, METI Minister Kaieda, room on the mezzanine floor feeling sense of crisis Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuro and formed a team for the Fukuyama, Special Advisor Hosono , and NISA 20:50 ... 1st EI accident response. Director-General Terasaka Fukushima Governor ordered Around at 21:00 to 22:00 evacuation of Futaba Town and NISA Vice Director-General Hiraoka, Okuma Town within a radius of 2km NSC Chair Madarame, and TEPCO 21:23 ... 2nd EI Fellow Takekuro also joined to provide from the plant . An evacuation instruction was × confusion in decision-making explanations. issued by PM to persons within a Proposal of a venting operation radius of 3 km from the plant. by NSC Chair Madarame and communication gap 0:06 3/12 Site Superintendent Yoshida ordered preparations for the venting of Unit 1. 1 ： 30 Permission of a venting operation to TEPCO. 3:05 The press conference held by METI to 3:00 ~ 4:00 announce a venting operation. It would no information on the 3:30 be carried out at around 3:30 progress in the venting to The venting was not carried out on time. PM’s office from NISA Trial-and-error efforts were exerted manually × information did not reach where in carrying out the venting, due to loss of power of the valves that operated by air pressure decisions should have taken The PM ‘ s Office was Around at 5:00 irritated, as a venting PM asked and TEPCO Fellow Takekuro why operation was delayed the venting was not being carried out. The answer was “I don’t know.” 5:44 ... 3rd EI The evacuation zone was determined to be around 6:00 expanded within a 10km radius MELTDOWN of Unit 1
3/11 20:50 - 1st Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant • issued by the Fukushima Governor • "2 km" came from the prior emergency prevention training • The instruction was not issued on the basis of a specific act, but de facto measure. 3/11 21 ： 23 - 2nd Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 3km from the plant Persons within 10 km of the plant were told to stay indoors. • issued by Prime Minister. • "3 km" came from Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ) presented by IAEA documents
3/12 5:44 - 3rd Evacuaiton Instrcution • to persons within a radius of 10km from the plant • issued by Prime Minister • "10km" came form Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) presented in “Guideline for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness” by NSC . • “We decided to expand the zone. That’s not because something happened. That’s because it may possibly happen.” ( a comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary)
6:15 PM departed for the plant, together In the helicopter, PM with NSC Chairman Madarame. 6:50 asked NSC Chairman METI Minister Kaieda ordered Madarame about the TEPCO to carry out the venting 7 ： 12 possibility of hydrogen based on Reactor Regulation Act PM arrived at the Fukushima Daiich NPP explosion. Madarame by helicopter, for an inspectation and a answered “It wouldn’t demand of implementation of venting. 7 ： 45 happen.” Issuance of the declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation of the Fukushima 8 ： 37 Daini NPP TEPCO informed the Fukushima prefectural government about carrying out the venting around at 9:00. They were requested to undertake a venting when the evacuation of residents is completed. 9:02 TEPCO instructed a venting operation, regarding the evacuation completed. ( The evacuation was actually not done at that time.) 14 ： 50 A vent operation of Unit 1 was finally succeed. 15 ： 36 an explosion in the Reactor Building of Unit 1 But it did happen. × This contributed 18:25 ... 4th EI to the sense of The evacuation zone was be determined to mistrust. be expanded within a 20km radius .
3/12 18 ： 25 - 4th Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 20km from the plant • issued by Prime Minister • not clear how "20km" was caliculated. • Some point out that the evacuation zone within 20 ㎞ was determined by few people with their personal knowledge.
Significant amount of confusion in decision-making, communication gap, lack of information sharing can be pointed out at important points. Centralization of information? × Both did not function Decentralizatio sufficiently. n of information?
Evacuation Processes carried out effectively at Futaba Town ? 3/11 15 ： 42 Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the On the basis of regional × Municipality of Futaba Act on Special Measures Concerning disaster prevention plans, was not notified of this. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, in an accident situation, 6 TEPCO notified METI, the Governor relevant municipalities of Fukushima, the Mayors of Okuma were supposed to send and Futaba. staffs to an Off-site Municipality of Futaba got 16:42 Center for coordination. contacted by phone for the Based on Article 15, Clause 1 of the notification. Act, TEPCO notified . 19 ： 03 × Municipality of Futaba was not A declaration of a nuclear emergency notified of the declaration. situation Municipality of Futaba was notified 20 ： 50 took possible measures to alert By using a municipal An EI to persons within a radius of citizens in the area. disaster management 2km from the plant radio communication 21 ： 23 networks Municipality of Futaba alerted An EI to persons within a radius of citizens in the expanded area. 3 km from the plant was issued. × Low awareness of the accident can be pointed out Many citizens actually did "I was told to be evacuated to not notice the EI in the day, a community center by because electorical radio volunteer fire corps, but I networks stopped chose to stay home with my functioning. mother all the day."
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