Digital Security of Physical Objects Slava Voloshynovskiy Stochas:c - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Digital Security of Physical Objects Slava Voloshynovskiy Stochas:c - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 Digital Security of Physical Objects Slava Voloshynovskiy Stochas:c Informa:on Processing Group University of Geneva Switzerland SCURIT DE LINFORMATION, 2016 2 Outline Physical object security Why not tradi:onal security? Proposed


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Digital Security of Physical Objects

Slava Voloshynovskiy

Stochas:c Informa:on Processing Group University of Geneva Switzerland

1 SÉCURITÉ DE L’INFORMATION, 2016

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Outline

Physical object security Why not tradi:onal security? Proposed solu:ons for Object recogni:on Design verifica:on Physical uncloneable func:ons Conclusions

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SIP group at glance

Basic facts: Founded in 1998 Currently 8 people Group produced 10 PhDs Main background: Sta:s:cal image processing Informa:on theory Machine learning Exper7se in: Digital watermarking Fingerprin:ng Physical object security

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DCT!

1999 2003 2015

Technology valoriza7on: 6 licensed patent families 3 spin-offs

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  • 1. Physical object security

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Why security is important?

§ Damage of brand reputa:on § Loss of profit § Danger for life § …..

Humans = biometrics Physical Objects

Watches Packaging Electronics

Main security concerns

§ Authen:city § Origin (iden:fica:on) § Ownership § Track and trace

All physical objects are unique like humans

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  • 2. Why not “tradi:onal” security

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Main restric7on of exis7ng security technologies for physical objects: § Proprietary technologies (rare or expensive materials, inks, holograms, etc.) § obsolete and easy to clone by modern means § expensive for mass markets § special equipment or special knowledge of original features are required § Crypto security § not directly applicable to noisy data § very sensi:ve to light and geometrical varia:ons § RFID/Connected devices/Internet of Things § s:ll quite expensive § serious security wholes

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  • 2. Why not “tradi:onal” security

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Requirements to modern physical object security:

§ easy to verify authen7city but difficult to clone

  • cloning should economically inefficient

§ non-proprietary: based on physical-crypto principles

  • protec:on mechanism is assumed to be public

§ no special equipment required

  • preferably on mobile phone (in possession of everyone)

§ no special training required

  • any user can validate it

§ cheap and scalable to mass markets

  • millions or billions of products

§ non-invasive

  • products and produc:on should not be modified
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  • 3. Product security: a framework

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Object recogni:on Design verifica:on Individual

  • bject

iden:fica:on

Typical object features Micro features

  • f design

Micro features

  • f carrier (PUFs)

Three levels of security: § Object recogni:on § Printed/reproduced visible features typical for all object of the same category

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  • 3. Product security: a framework

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Object recogni:on Design verifica:on Individual

  • bject

iden:fica:on

Typical object features Micro features

  • f design

Micro features

  • f carrier (PUFs)

Three levels of security: § Object recogni:on § Printed/reproduced visible features typical for all object of the same category § Design verifica:on § Features of probe are verified wrt features of original template

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  • 3. Product security: a framework

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Object recogni:on Design verifica:on Individual

  • bject

iden:fica:on

Typical object features Micro features

  • f design

Micro features

  • f carrier (PUFs)

Three levels of security: § Object recogni:on § Printed/reproduced visible features typical for all object of the same category § Design verifica:on = digital forensics § Features of probe are verified wrt features of original template § Individual object iden:fica:on § Features of probe carrier are tested wrt features of enrolled PUFs

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3.1. Stage 1: object recogni:on

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Main specs to object recogni7on: § Mobile phones § Very accurate § Fast and scalable to millions § Invariant to observa:on condi:ons such as light, geometry, etc

Experimental dataset Enrollment system

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3.1. Stage 1: object recogni:on (universal SketchPrint descriptor)

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Main steps of SketchPrint:

  • key-points detec:on
  • SketchPrints extrac:on and filtering
  • aggrega:on of many SketchPrint descriptors into one super-vector
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  • 3. Stage 1: object recogni:on (universal SketchPrint descriptor)

)

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Remarks

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PM PF

SIFT ORB Sketchprint

Remark

§ SketchPrint considerably outperforms both SIFT and ORB § smaller number of descriptors per image less memory

Performance and comparison to SOTA

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3.2. Stage 2: design verifica:on

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Ques7on:

  • Is this package authen:c?

Remark: you have never seen it or remember its design roughly… Given: a package Your thinking: well....quality of print looks OK ......logo seems OK ........I buy it from a reputable vendor (incl web) ..............so probably authen7c!

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3.2. Stage 2: design verifica:on

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Observa7on: if we know the original design, we can easily verify its authen:city. Ques7on:

  • Can we perform the design verifica:on automa:cally?
  • And how accurately (say with the precision about 10-15 microns)?
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3.2. Stage 2: Automa:c design verifica:on on mobile phones

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Modified text

5’000 printed objects

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3.2. Stage 2: Automa:c design verifica:on on mobile phones

16 Text Graphics Images Microstructures Watches Photos

Authen:c Not authen:c

15 micrometers

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3.3. Stage 3: individual object recogni:on

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  • Ques7on: can we differen7ate each individual object?

Package 1 Package 2 Package M Visibly packages look iden:cal Paper microstructures =PUFs Individually unique PUFs . . .

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  • 2. Stage 3: individual object recogni:on

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  • Open issue: Big Data (millions of objects with high-dimensional features)

Defini:on (Digital content fingerprin:ng)

Digital content fingerprin:ng (a.k.a. robust perceptual hashing) is a technique for compu:ng a compact robust, secure and private binary representa:on of image.

Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) 1 1

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3.3. Stage 3: individual object recogni:on

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Proper:es

Correct acceptance Correct rejec:on Binomial distribu:on Binomial distribu:on

Hypothesis tes:ng

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3.3. Stage 3: individual object recogni:on

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  • Fast search

Hamming sphere decoding

Observa:on: the most likely codewords are within a Hamming sphere with radius around . §

Iden:fica:on = codeword presence verifica:on

Hamming sphere

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P L

y

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Server query Data user Y/N Fingerprint Codebook/Database

1 2 M

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  • 4. Conclusion

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  • Physical object security = mul7disciplinary research field covering:
  • Image processing
  • Computer vision
  • PUFs
  • Crypto
  • Big Data
  • Physical object security is of:
  • great interest for industry and especially for the Swiss industry

(protec:on of Swiss brands)

  • great significance for end users
  • Demos aZer presenta7on slot