dftcalc a tool for advanced reliablity availability
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DFTCalc: A tool for Advanced Reliablity, Availability, Maintenance and Safety analysis. Enno Ruijters, University of Twente Supervisor: Marielle Stoelinga 28/01/16 1 Reliability of critical systems System failures can be catastrophic


  1. DFTCalc: A tool for Advanced Reliablity, Availability, Maintenance and Safety analysis. Enno Ruijters, University of Twente Supervisor: Marielle Stoelinga 28/01/16 1

  2. Reliability of critical systems ● System failures can be catastrophic ● Airplanes, nuclear power stations, etc. ● How to ensure reliability: ● At design stage: component selection, redundancy, diversity, isolation ● During operation: Inspection, maintenance, repairs, replacement 2

  3. ● Effect of maintenace ● Maintenance: ● Improves reliability ● Adds maintenance costs ● Reduces costs of failure and downtime ● Goal: Find cost-optimal maintenance policy 2 Inspection cost Downtime cost 1.5 T otal cost Cost 1 0.5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Inspections per year

  4. DFTCalc: 3 key ingredients Fault Trees Maintenance Model checking DFTCalc analysis goals: DFTCalc analysis goals:  What is the effect of maintenance on system performance:  What is the effect of maintenance on system performance: - reliability, availability, mean time to failures? … - reliability, availability, mean time to failures? …  Can we do better (lower costs / better performance)?  Can we do better (lower costs / better performance)? 4

  5. Ingredient 1: fault trees Preferred tool for RAMS Preferred tool for RAMS Model Model ● ● How do component failures How do component failures ● ● propagate to system failures? propagate to system failures? Analysis Analysis ● ● P [failure within mission time] P [failure within mission time] ● ● (Reliability) (Reliability) E [up-time] (Availability) E [up-time] (Availability) ● ● MTTF, MTBF MTTF, MTBF ● ● …. …. ● ● Talk: Talk:  Add maintenance  Add maintenance  Large effect on MTTF  Large effect on MTTF  Hardly considered  Hardly considered 5

  6. Ingredient 1: fault trees Graphical formalism road trip road trip Decompose system failures ● into combinations of component failures phone car phone car Gates: failure propagation ● Leaves component failures ● Traditionally contain failure ● rates/probabilities engine engine We add degradation tires tires ● behavior Related: attack trees ● in security tire 1 tire 2 tire 3 tire 4 spare tire 1 tire 2 tire 3 tire 4 spare 6

  7. fault trees: who uses them? fault trees: who uses them? 7

  8. Ingredient 2: maintenance Types corrective maintenance preventive maintenance Strategies condition-based age-based usage-based Our approach model these in FT leaves 8

  9. Modelling: failure behaviour in BEs BE model • Describes one failure mode / cause (eg from FMECA) • Degradation behavior (phases) • Detection threshold • Maintenance effects  condition-based maintenance 9

  10. Modelling: Inspection module Inspection module • Above: dedicated for 1 components • More complex for multiple components 10

  11. Ingredient 3: (stochastic) model checking Model checking Model checking  state-of-art stochastic analysis  state-of-art stochastic analysis  flexible, rigorous  flexible, rigorous  used in HW verification  used in HW verification  2007: Turing Award  2007: Turing Award 2 flavors 2 flavors  verification: complete search  verification: complete search  statistical: simulation  statistical: simulation  complimentary  complimentary Many tools Many tools MRMC, Prism, UPPAAL, nuSMV, MRMC, Prism, UPPAAL, nuSMV, IMCA, ... IMCA, ... 11

  12. Recap: 3 key ingredients Fault Trees Maintenance Model checking DFTCalc analysis goals: DFTCalc analysis goals:  What is the effect of maintenance on system performance:  What is the effect of maintenance on system performance: - reliability, availability, mean time to failures? … - reliability, availability, mean time to failures? …  Can we do better (lower costs / better performance)?  Can we do better (lower costs / better performance)? 12

  13. Outline ● Introduction ● Approach ● Case studies ● Conclusions 13

  14. Our approach: how does it work? DFTCalc FT + maintenance DFTCalc Analysis • Gates: AND, SPARE • Extensible framework • system reliability over time • BEs: failure behavior • mean time to failure • IM/RU: inspections, • availability repairs Questions: Questions: •Does system meets reliability / availability requirements? Can we do better? •Does system meets reliability / availability requirements? Can we do better? •What is the effect of different maintenance policies? (= different BEs / parameters) •What is the effect of different maintenance policies? (= different BEs / parameters) 14

  15. Our approach: how does it work? Fault Tree DFTCalc maintenance model Translation Analysis Efficiency: Efficiency: •Compositional aggregation •Compositional aggregation •Context-dependent state space •Context-dependent state space generation 15 generation

  16. Our approach: alternative Fault Tree Uppaal-SMC maintenance Manual model translation Benefits: Benefits: •Often much faster •Often much faster •Supports arbitrary failure time distributions •Supports arbitrary failure time distributions Disadvantages: Disadvantages: •Results are less precise •Results are less precise •Can be much slower if high accuracy is desired •Can be much slower if high accuracy is desired 16

  17. DFTCalc: Extensions • • New Inspection module Context dependent • New repair module generation • • New maintainable Basic Inspection and repair Events communication 17

  18. DFTCalc: web-interface http://fmt.ewi.utwente.nl/puptol/dftcalc/ 18

  19. Outline ● Introduction ● Approach ● Case studies ● Conclusions 19

  20. Case 1: Electrically Insulated Joint • Electrically separates tracks • 45.000 EIJs in the Netherlands • Important cause of train disruptions 20

  21. EI-joint: modeling New features: • RDEP gate • Advanced BEs 21

  22. EI-joint: maintenance Maintenance policy: Four trackside inspections per year. ● Repair action can either repair specific failure ● (e.g. removing a foreign object) ● Or needs to replace the entire joint. ● Costs for inspections and maintenance actions are ● known. Costs for failures depends on how many passengers ● are affected. 22

  23. Results EI-joint: Current maintenance policy Result: ● Failure behaviour is very linear after first few years. 23

  24. Results EI-joint: Current maintenance policy Breakdown of failure causes: ● Majority of failures are due to electrical insulation ● Almost all electrical failures are due to external shorts 24

  25. Results EI-joint: Different maintenance policies Result: ● Inspections are clearly important. ● Does increased reliability lead to lower cost? 25

  26. Results EI-joint: Different maintenance policies Result: ● Inspections are important, but the exact frequency does not strongly affect cost. 26

  27. Results EI-joint: Maintenance optimization Result: ● Cost optimum around 3 – 4 inspections per year. ● Costs fairly constant between 3 and 6 per year. 27

  28. EI-joint: modeling process Fault tree based on existing FMECA by Prorail. ● Structure of FT is clear from context. ● Total failure rate per failure mode is documented. ● More details obtained using questionnaire to experts: ● Variance of failure rate ● External factors affecting failure ● (location, surface condition, etc.) Translation of physical description of maintenance ● threshold ('>5mm vertical movement') to time- based description ('repair needed within 1 month') Tweaking and validation using recorded failure data. ● 28

  29. ● Conclusions EI-joint ● Our model of the EI-joint agrees with reality under the current maintenance policy. ● We find the cost-optimal maintenance policy consists of four inspections per year. ● More inspections result in noticably fewer disruptions, but are not cost- effective.

  30. Case 2: pneumatic compressor Purpose: Provide compressed air for brakes, automatic doors, etc. ● Complex maintenance policy with several levels of inspections and repairs. ● Modeling performed by NedTrain, analysis by UT. 30

  31. Compressor: modeling Similar features to the EI-joint fault tree 31

  32. Compressor: maintenance policy Quick inspection every two days. ● Check diagnostic computer logs for errors. ● Visual inspection for obvious problems (e.g. oil leak). ● Services every 3 months, more intensive every 9. ● Replace consumables (e.g. filters) ● Functional tests. ● Minor overhaul every 3 years, major overhaul at 6. ● Compressor disassembled, components inspected. ● After major overhaul, compressor is as good as new. ● At any level, if a fault cannot be repaired, the next ● level of maintenance is performed, at increased cost (called an unplanned maintenance event). 32

  33. Results compressor: Current policy Result: ● Outcomes are fairly close to reality 33

  34. Results compressor: Other policies Results: ● Service period is important to maintain reliability. ● Minor overhaul does not have much effect. 34

  35. Conclusions case studies • Fault maintenance trees can model realistic maintenance strategies. • We can analyze systems with maintenance and gain insight into cost-optimal performance. • Our results are in agreement with reality. 35

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