. Democratic Political Culture in Hard Times: Results from the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Democratic Political Culture in Hard Times: Results from the 2010 AmericasBarometer

Presentation Order 1. About the surveys: when, where how 2. Economic crisis and democracy 3. The vulnerabilities of democracy in the Americas

LAPOP’s Beginnings

The 1970s The 1990s

The AmericasBarometer

2004 2010

26 countries, 43,990 interviews

What is unique about the AmericasBarometer? What is unique about the AmericasBarometer?

Fea eatur tures es

AmericasBar AmericasBarometer meter

Includes North America/ Caribbean (26 countries)



Interviews in indigenous languages (15 total) and widespread use of handheld computers (PDAs) allowing “code-switching” among languages



Samples of 1,500 vs. typical 1,000



Full disclosure of sample designs



National stratification and sub-stratification by rural/urban residence



Functions as a consortium of academic partners



Central oversight over data collection: pre-tests in all countries; interviewer training; auditing of data sets



What is unique about the AmericasBarometer? What is unique about the AmericasBarometer?

Fea eatur tures es

AmericasBar AmericasBarometer meter

No cost/no registration, on-line multivariate analysis (no embargo period)



No-cost, online reports for each country, in addition to a report for the entire region



Confidence intervals are sample design based in all charts and regressions



Statistical analyses based on theoretical models



Entire questionnaire (in all local languages used for surveys) included as an appendix in each report



Full adherence to federal human subjects protection rules; all team leaders IRB certified



Donors 2010

The L e LAPOP R POP Resear search Team eam at V Vanderbilt nderbilt

Partner Country T ner Country Teams f ams for r 2010 AmericasBar 2010 AmericasBarometer meter Star Startup meeting tup meeting, San San Salv Salvador ador, El Salv , El Salvador ador, , No November ember, 2009 , 2009

• Face-to-face interviews by

Face-to-face interviews by interviewers trained by interviewers trained by LAPOP LAPOP personnel personnel

• Stratif

Stratified national probabili ed national probability ty samples samples down to the household level down to the household level (quotas within households) (quotas within households) of 1500

• f 1500

voting-age respondents voting-age respondents

• Probabili

Probability proportional to ty proportional to size (PPS) size (PPS) sampling sampling is used at every stage is used at every stage

• Estimated Error:

Estimated Error: < +/- < +/- 3% % with 95% with 95% confidence interval confidence interval

• Use of PDAs (handheld

Use of PDAs (handheld computers) computers) in most countries in most countries

Methodology

Country Sample Size Sampling Error Mexico/ Central America

Mexico 1,562 ±2.5% Guatemala 1,504 ±2.5% El Salvador 1,550 ±2.5% Honduras 1,596 ±2.5% Nicaragua 1,540 ±2.5% Costa Rica 1,500 ±2.5% Panama 1,536 ±2.5%

Andean/Southern Cone

Colombia 1,506 ±2.5% Ecuador 3,000 ±1.8% Peru 1,500 ±2.5% Bolivia 3,018 ±1.8% Paraguay 1,166 ±2.9% Chile 1,965 ±2.5% Uruguay 1,500 ±2.5% Brazil 2,882 ±1.8% Venezuela 1,500 ±2.5% Argentina 1,505 ±2.5%

Caribbean

Belize 1,504 ±2.5% Dominican Republic 1,500 ±2.5% Guyana 1,540 ±2.5% Haiti 1,752 (+4,248) ±2.4% Jamaica 1,499 ±2.5% Suriname 1,500 ±2.5% Trinidad & Tobago 1,503 ±2.0%

United States and Canada

Canada 1,500 ±2.2% United States 1,500 ±2.0%

Sample Size and Confidence Intervals (National Level)

Use of Use of handheld computer handheld computers: s: 1.

• 1. Reduces da

duces data ta entry er entry error

• rs

2.

• 2. Allows f

Allows for m r multiple langua ltiple languages 3.

• 3. Permits embedded e

rmits embedded experiments periments Guyana Honduras Costa Rica

Guayas Azuay Cañar Bolivar Zamora Chinchipe Carchi Chimborazo Cotopaxi El Oro Esmeraldas Imbabura Loja Los Ríos Manabí Morona Santiago Napo Pastaza Pichincha Sucumbíos Tungurahua

Na National Samples Str tional Samples Stratif tified b ied by K Key y Re Regions

Three Str ee Strata in ta in Ecuador Ecuador: Coast, Coast, Mountains Mountains, , Amaz Amazon

• n

(N = 3,000) (N = 3,000)

Chuquisaca Tarija Potosí Oruro Cochabamba Santa Cruz Beni Pando La Paz

Nine Str Nine Strata in ta in Bolivia Bolivia Eac Each point = point = 20 inter 20 intervie iews ws

Na National Samples Str tional Samples Stratif tified b ed by K Key R y Regions gions

Ve Venezuela Ur Urugua uguay

IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos

Ec Ecuador dor Colombi Colombia

Andes/Cono Sur

Brazil azil Chil Chile Pa Paraguay Boli Bolivia

IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos

Pe Peru

Andean / Southern C Andean / Southern Cone ne

Partners 2010

Pa Panama Costa Costa Rica Rica Nicar aragua gua Hond Hondur uras El El Salv Salvador ador Gua Guatema emala Me Mexi xico

Mexico and Central America

Opinión Publica y Mercados Opinión Publica y Mercados

Partners 2010

U.S. Canad

Canad áy Estados Unidos

Canada

Canada and United Sta nada and United States es

Jamaica Haiti Guyana Dominican Republic

Carib Caribbean ean

Partners 2010

Making Results Accessible

Country Reports: all on-line, free

Dissemination in Each Country

Colombia Ecuador Uruguay

Insights Series & Americas Quarterly

Free on-line subscription: Free subscriptions to the “Insights Series” of bi-weekly studies t i i ht@ il i b t

Free on-line data analysis: www.LapopSurveys.org

Free on-line data analysis

Economic Crisis and Democracy

What economists tell us……

On p. 3:

“In 1920, 26 out of 28 European states were parliamentary democracies”

Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: the Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy. Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 21

“By 1938, 13 of those democracies had become dictatorships” Italy, October 1922 Bulgaria, June 1923 Portugal, May 1926 Poland, May 1926 Yugoslavia, January 1929 Germany, January 1933 Austria, March 1933 Estonia, March 1934 Latvia, May 1934 Spain, July 1936 Romania, 1938

• Breakdown is not limite

Breakdown is not limited to the distant past: to the distant past: Worldwide, nearly 38 perce Worldwide, nearly 38 percent of the 114 nt of the 114 democratizations 1960-2003 were reversed, at democratizations 1960-2003 were reversed, at least for some period of time least for some period of time

• (Converse and Kapstein, The Fate of Young Democracies, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

The Theory: Country-Level

 Economic Underdevelopment Przeworski et al: “No democracy has ever been subverted…in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975: $6,055. There is no doubt that democracy is stable in affluent countries” (98).

1200.1 1341.4 1743.5 1982.0 2165.1 2206.8 2523.4 2618.7 2659.2 2735.3 2755.6 3534.5 3957.1 4003.9 4099.1 4178.7 4735.6 4781.2 5067.8 5724.5 6344.2 7352.9

Przew orski et al. threshold of breakdow n immunity Haiti Honduras Bolivia Nicaragua Guyana Guatemala Peru Ecuador Jamaica Paraguay El Salvador Colombia Belize Dominican Republic Venezuela Brazil Mexico Panama Costa Rica Uruguay Argentina Chile 2000 4000 6000 8000 Real Income (GDP) per capita (1985 International Prices)

Economic context also matters for the stability of democracy

Two published studies using pre-crisis 2008 AmericasBarometer data: Latin American Politics and Society PS: Political Science and Politics

www. LapopSurveys.org

• 6.5%
• 4.4%
• 3.8%
• 3.3%
• 2.6%
• 2.5%
• 2.5%
• 2.4%
• 2.0%
• 1.5%
• 1.5%
• 1.0%
• 0.5%
• 0.2%

0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 2.4% 2.5% 2.9% 3.4% 3.5%

• 8.0%
• 6.0%
• 4.0%
• 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% Mexico Trinidad & Tobago Paraguay Venezuela Jamaica El Salvador Canada United States Honduras Chile Costa Rica Nicaragua Belize Brazil Ecuador Guatemala Colombia Argentina Guyana Peru Panama Suriname Uruguay Bolivia Dominican Republic

Source: World Bank 2010

Changes in Real GDP: 2008-2009

While breakdown is an extreme and unlikely outcome, will the current global economic downturn weaken citizen support for key components

• f democracy, thus slowing or even

undermining democratic consolidation?

Research Question:

Economic Experiences and Perceptions in the Americas, 2010

Yes, but found a new one 7.3% Yes, but have not found a new one 8.5% No, did not lose your job 73.7% Own decision not to work/ disabilities 10.5%

Have you lost your job in the past two years?

Yes 16.1% No 83.9%

Has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Job Losses in the Americas, 2008-2010

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

9.0 14.3 15.6 16.1 18.6 19.8 20.7 24.3 24.7 25.4 26.4 26.7 26.9 27.4 27.4 28.7 29.6 29.8 32.0 33.4 35.4 37.3 38.0 38.3 39.5

Suriname Guyana Trinidad & Tobago Bolivia Panama Honduras Belize Costa Rica Uruguay Chile Peru Venezuela Canada Paraguay Guatemala Ecuador Jamaica Nicaragua United States Argentina El Salvador Brazil Dominican Republic Colombia Mexico

10 20 30 40 50

Percent of households with at least one member who lost a job in the past two years

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Percentage

• f

households with job loss (past two years)

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Household Income Changes, 2008-2010 Household Income Changes, 2008-2010 in the Americas in the Americas

Increased? 22.8% Remained the same? 49.9% Decreased? 27.3%

Over the past two years, has the income of your household:

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Decrease in household income, by area of residence and level of wealth: crisis hurt the poor the most

25.9% 28.6% 10 20 30 40 Percent of People who Reported a Decrease in Household Income Urban Rural Urban/Rural 34.7% 31.1% 26.3% 22.8% 18.7% 10 20 30 40 Percent of People who Reported a Decrease in Household Income 1 2 3 4 5 Quintiles of wealth Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Is your country experiencing an economic crisis?

Very serious economic crisis 45.7% A crisis, but not very serious 45.7% No economic crisis 6.9% Don't Know 1.7%

Perception of Magnitude of Economic Crisis

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Perception that the economic crisis is “very serious”

10.4 14.9 21.0 28.8 30.3 30.8 32.0 36.0 36.5 38.3 39.0 46.2 48.4 49.8 51.7 55.6 55.9 57.6 58.9 60.1 60.9 61.4 74.8 79.6 81.2

Uruguay Suriname Chile Costa Rica Brazil Panama Peru Paraguay Canada Bolivia Ecuador Trinidad & Tobago Venezuela Dominican Republic Colombia Guyana Mexico Argentina Nicaragua Belize Guatemala El Salvador Honduras United States Jamaica

20 40 60 80

Percentage or population who say economic crisis is very serious 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Who is to blame for the crisis? (among those who perceive a crisis)

2.8% 4.0% 7.3% 7.8% 11.6% 13.0% 13.4% 19.4% 20.8% 5 10 15 20

Other The problems of democracy The rich people of our country The rich countries Do not know Ourselves, the citizens of the country The economic system of the country The current administration/government The previous administration/government Who is to blame for the economic crisis?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Percentage blaming “rich countries” (among those who perceive a crisis)

0.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.7% 3.3% 4.5% 4.9% 5.2% 5.6% 6.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.8% 8.0% 8.4% 9.2% 10.6% 10.7% 11.0% 11.0% 11.4% 12.3% 14.8% 17.0% 19.7%

United States Guyana Paraguay Belize Honduras Venezuela Colombia Dominican Republic Jamaica Nicaragua Argentina Ecuador Panama Peru Trinidad & Tobago Bolivia Suriname Mexico Guatemala Canada El Salvador Brazil Uruguay Chile Costa Rica

5 10 15 20 25

Blames the Crisis on Rich Countries

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

Who blames the crisis on rich countries?

(among those perceiving a crisis)

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Blames the Crisis on Rich Countries 1 2 3 General Political Knowledge Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Note: Based on 23 countries (excludes Haiti, the US, and Canada).

In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, democratic attitudes democratic attitudes and the legitimacy legitimacy of the political system

• f the political system

have turned out to be surprisingly resilient.

Main findings on the crisis/democracy nexus:

Agreement with Churchill?

• “Democracy may have problems, but it

is better than any other form of

• government. To what extent do you

agree or disagree with this statement?”

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly disagree Strongly agree

Low Support High Support

Support for democracy showed no significant decline from the 2008 survey

Low 28.9% High 71.1%

Support for Democracy

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

2008

Low 30.2% High 69.8%

Support for Democracy

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

2010

Note: Includes all 26 countries

“Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”

Support for democracy remains widespread

60.1 62.6 62.8 63.3 64.1 65.8 66.8 68.4 68.6 69.6 69.7 70.3 70.9 71.3 72.3 72.9 73.5 73.7 74.0 75.5 76.1 77.5 78.9 79.6 80.4 86.2

Peru Honduras Guatemala Paraguay El Salvador Haiti Mexico Ecuador Dominican Republic Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Bolivia Belize Nicaragua Colombia Guyana Canada Brazil Venezuela Panama Chile United States Suriname Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay

20 40 60 80 100

Support for Democracy

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

“Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”

(No country below 60)

Satisfaction with democracy: 2008 vs. 2010

60.6 67.9 53.2 62.5 65.1 62.5 44.8 57.8 65.8 57.2 56.7 49.0 56.1 53.1 54.7 44.5 48.1 53.9 51.4 51.9 51.3 52.8 54.0 50.7 57.3 50.6 50.6 49.9 30.2 49.9 52.6 48.6 46.2 52.1 47.8 46.3 58.8 45.3 50.2 48.7 45.3 44.7 42.7 44.7 44.6 50.4 43.8 48.2 38.9 37.8

2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 Uruguay Panama Costa Rica Honduras Canada Bolivia Brazil El Salvador Chile Colombia Ecuador Dominican Republic United States Suriname Paraguay Belize Nicaragua Guatemala Venezuela Argentina Jamaica Peru Trinidad & Tobago Mexico Guyana Haiti

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Satisfaction with Democracy

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Major increases:

• Post-coup Honduras
• Paraguay after first
• pposition win
• El Salvador after FMLN

victory

Note: Includes all 26 countries

How Economic Experiences Affect Support for Democracy and System Support

Support for democracy heavily impacted by satisfaction with government economic performance

68 70 72 74 76 78 80

Support for Democracy Satisfaction with the Economic Performance of the Government

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

By far the biggest impact of any economic attitude

www. LapopSurveys.org

Who is satisfied with democracy?

Female Age Urban Education Level Quintiles of Wealth Satisfaction with Performance of Current President Negative Perception National Econ. Situation Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation Households with at least one Member who lost her job Decrease Household Income Very Serious Economic Crisis No Economic Crisis Perception of Government Economic Performance

• 0.05

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 95% I.C. (Efecto de diseño incorporado) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-Squared=0.233 F=167.370 N =32403

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy

Country Fixed Effects and Intercept Included but Not Shown Here

Note: Includes 25 countries (excludes Haiti)

Sy System stem Suppor Support Inde Index

• B1.
• B1. To what extent do you think the

courts in (country) guar guarantee a antee a fair trial air trial?

• B2.
• B2. ¿To what extent do you respect the

espect the political ins litical institutions itutions of (country)?

• B3.
• B3. To what extent do you think that

citiz citizens’ basic rights ar ens’ basic rights are e well pr ell protected

• tected

by the political system of (country)?

• B4.
• B4. To what extent do you feel pr

eel proud

• ud of

living under the political system of (country)?

• B6.
• B6. To what extent do you think that one

should suppor support the the political sy political system stem of (country)?

System Support Index: Slight Increase 2008-2010

51.5 53.2

10 20 30 40 50

System Support 2008 2010 Year

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all countries surveyed in each year.

System Support in the Americas 2010

(9 countries below 50)

32.0 44.0 45.2 46.3 46.8 48.6 48.9 49.0 49.6 50.0 51.7 53.5 53.6 53.9 54.0 54.9 56.7 56.8 57.1 57.8 58.7 60.2 60.3 60.4 63.2 68.0

Haiti Trinidad & Tobago Argentina Paraguay Peru Jamaica Ecuador Venezuela Guatemala Brazil Nicaragua United States Belize Dominican Republic Bolivia Guyana Chile Mexico Suriname Canada El Salvador Panama Colombia Honduras Costa Rica Uruguay

20 40 60 80

System Support

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

56.6 53.8 50.2 10 20 30 40 50 60

System Support Increased? Remained the same? Decreased? Over the past two years, has the income of your household:

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Who supports the political system?

40 50 60 70 80

System Support Satisfaction with the Economic Performance of the Government

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP Note: Includes all 26 countries Note: Includes all 26 countries

Counter-cyclical and pro-poor policies may have prevented not

• nly a more serious economic crisis

but also a region-wide decline in support for democracy and political legitimacy and perhaps even threats to the consolidation of the democratic regime. Government Economic Performance: A Cause for Unexpected Optimism

Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica Guyana Belize

• Adj. R-Squared = 0.6466
• 10

10 20

Change in System Support, 2008-2010

• 20.0
• 10.0

0.0 10.0 20.0

Change in Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008-2010

Source: AmericasBarometer 2010 by LAPOP

Changes Changes in in perceptions of performance perceptions of performance predict predict changes changes in system in system support support (2008/2010, country-level) (2008/2010, country-level)

Note: Includes all 26 countries

Changes Changes in in perceptions of performance perceptions of performance predict predict changes changes in system in system support support (2008/2010, subnational level) (2008/2010, subnational level)

• Adj. R-Squared=0.3821
• 10

10 20 30 Overtime Variations in Average System Support (Change in Regional Average, 2010 and 2008)

• 20.0

0.0 20.0 40.0 Overtime Variations in Average Perception of Government Economic Performance (Change in Regional Average, 2010 and 2008) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

The Vulnerabilities of Democracy in the Americas

• Countries at risk: predicting instability?
• Non-economic threats and their impact on

democratic support

• The armed forces, hard-line policies: a

double-edged sword?

Tolerance

System support

High Low

High

Stable Democracy Authoritarian Stability

Low

Unstable Democracy Democracy at Risk

The Critical Combination of System Support and Political Tolerance

Political Tolerance and Stable Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Measuring Political Tolerance

There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove:

D1

• D1. Of such people’s right to

right to vote vote? D2

• D2. That such people be allowed to conduct

to conduct peaceful eaceful demonstrations demonstrations? D3

• D3. Of such people being permitted to run for public office

to run for public office? D4

• D4. Of such people appearing on television to make speeches

to make speeches?

43.4 45.1 47.2 47.5 47.5 48.4 49.2 49.4 50.2 50.2 50.9 51.8 51.9 58.5 59.0 59.0 60.0 60.4 61.4 63.4 64.5 64.6 66.6 66.7 67.3 70.4

Haiti El Salvador Bolivia Peru Honduras Paraguay Mexico Dominican Republic Guatemala Ecuador Panama Colombia Chile Jamaica Belize Brazil Nicaragua Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Guyana Canada Trinidad & Tobago Costa Rica Argentina United States

20 40 60 80

Political Tolerance

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2010

(8 countries below 50)

Empirical findings, Costa Rica

Tolerance

System support

High Low

High

Stable Democracy 46% Authoritarian Stability 40%

Low

Unstable Democracy 6% Democracy at Risk 8%

7.9 8.9 12.6 12.6 13.0 14.0 14.9 17.0 17.3 18.1 18.3 18.4 18.4 19.4 19.8 21.1 21.2 21.2 21.8 23.4 26.2 27.3 28.8 37.0 38.3 61.6

Costa Rica Uruguay Suriname United States Canada Guyana Colombia Venezuela Trinidad & Tobago Panama Argentina Nicaragua Honduras Mexico Chile Brazil Jamaica Belize El Salvador Dominican Republic Guatemala Bolivia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Haiti

10 20 30 40 50 60

Democracy at Risk

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Democracy at Risk

Note: Includes all 26 countries

Tolerance

System support

High Low

High Stable Democracy Authoritari an Stability Low Unstable Democracy Democracy at Risk

Triple Dissatisfaction Index: “Predicting” coups”: adding the economic dimension

• Regime Principles

gime Principles Rights to participation

• Sy

System suppor stem support Trust in institutions … and now adding

• Ev

Evalua aluations of tions of R Regime gime Economic P Economic Perf rformance

• rmance

Respondents’ satisfaction with their personal and national economies

Estimating Triple Dissatisfaction (2010)

Triply Dissatisfied Mixed Triply Satisfied Haiti 43.3% 55.2% 1.4% United States 7.9% 76.6% 15.5% Jamaica 7.7% 86.4% 5.9% Costa Rica 2.7% 68.7% 28.6% Uruguay 1.8% 42.9% 55.3% Dissatisfied minus Satisfied 41.9%

• 7.5%

1.9%

• 25.8%
• 53.5%

* * *

Number of dissatisfied exceeds satisfied.

* * * *

Number of satisfied exceeds dissatisfied.

• 28.5
• 20.0
• 19.7
• 17.7
• 17.5
• 11.4
• 10.6
• 7.5
• 7.0
• 4.7
• 1.6
• 0.8

0.4 1.4 1.7 3.0 3.4 7.1 9.5 11.0 13.6 22.4 26.6

• 40
• 20

20 40 Net Dissatisfaction 2008 Uruguay Colombia Costa Rica Guyana Dominican Republic Venezuela Argentina Mexico Brazil Chile United States Belize Bolivia Paraguay Nicaragua El Salvador Jamaica Panama Peru Ecuador Guatemala Haiti Honduras

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Triple Dissatisfaction Index:

Net Dissatisfaction in 2008

More citizens are SATISFIED than dissatisfied. More citizens are DISsatisfied than satisfied.

• 53.5
• 25.8
• 21.5
• 20.1
• 17.2
• 16.8
• 15.9
• 15.8
• 15.5
• 11.6
• 9.5
• 9.5
• 8.8
• 7.5
• 4.5
• 2.3
• 1.9
• 1.8
• 1.5

0.1 1.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 6.9 41.9

• 60
• 40
• 20

20 40 Net Dissatisfaction 2010 Uruguay Costa Rica Canada Suriname Guyana Brazil Chile Colombia Panama Venezuela Trinidad & Tobago Dominican Republic Paraguay United States Nicaragua Argentina Bolivia Mexico El Salvador Ecuador Jamaica Honduras Belize Peru Guatemala Haiti

Source: AmericasBarometer 2010 by LAPOP

Triple Dissatisfaction Index:

Net Dissatisfaction in 2010

Public Opinion in the Aftermath of Honduras’ Coup

• f 2009

Hondurans divided on coup, but

• pposed to exile of President

Yes 41.7% No 58.3%

¿Did you favor the removal from office of President Zelaya?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP Yes 27.3% No 72.7%

¿Did you favor sending President Zelaya into exile in Costa Rica?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Hondurans strongly oppose a Constituent Assembly

Yes 24.1% No 75.9%

¿Did you favor the survey President Zelaya wanted to carry out on June 28, 2009

• n calling a Constituent Assembly?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP Yes 29.5% No 70.5%

¿Did you favor the formation of a Constituent Assembly?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Hondurans strongly oppose a reform allowing presidential re-election

Yes 25.1% No 74.9% ¿Do you support reforming the Constitution to permit presidential re-elections? Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Support for coups (2010 AmericasBarometer Honduras survey): The toxic combination of wealth and low education

Based on JC1

• JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto; JC10
• JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia;

JC13

• JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción:

Education Age Female Quintiles of wealth Size of Place

• 0.2
• 0.1

0.0 0.1 0.2 95% Confidence Interval (design effects included) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-squared =0.021 F=8.494 N =1539

Corruption, Crime, Terrorism, the Military and Natural Disasters: Threats to Democracy?

Percent who reported having been asked to pay a bribe in the past year

4.2 5.2 6.3 7.3 7.8 9.1 9.4 10.1 10.4 11.4 11.8 12.1 16.2 17.1 17.2 17.5 18.5 21.1 21.2 23.5 23.6 27.1 32.0 32.3 35.0 53.6

Canada Chile United States Uruguay Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Panama Costa Rica Colombia El Salvador Suriname Nicaragua Honduras Guyana Belize Dominican Republic Venezuela Ecuador Guatemala Argentina Brazil Paraguay Peru Bolivia Mexico Haiti

10 20 30 40 50 60

Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

• To a police officer
• To a public official
• To expedite a transaction with

the municipal government

• At work
• For public health/medical

service

• In the school system

Relationship of corruption victimization to system support

44 46 48 50 52 54 System Support None One Two Three+ Corruption Victimization Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

Crime victimization has increased

Crime victimization is higher in metropolitan areas (Central America)

16.5% 18.9% 22.3% 10 20 30 40 50 Central Bajura AMSJ

Costa Rica

19.6% 19.7% 20.6% 21.5% 34.3% 10 20 30 40 50 Oriental Occidental Central I Central II Metropolitana

El Salvador

15.1% 15.2% 19.3% 21.0% 40.7% 10 20 30 40 50 Nororiente Suroriente Suroccidente NoroccidenteMetropolitana

Guatemala

Percentage who has been a Victim of Crime

3.7% 6.5% 9.7% 17.5% 20.0% 10 20 30 40 50 Sur Occidental Oriental Norte Central

Honduras

9.0% 15.2% 17.6% 18.2% 18.4% 28.5% 10 20 30 40 50 Centro Norte Caribe Metropolitana Pacífico Sur Pacífico Norte

Nicaragua

6.9% 9.6% 13.1% 14.6% 10 20 30 40 50 Central Oriental Metropolitana Occidental

Panama

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Crime victimization in Metropolitan Guatemala City is higher than in any country in our study, and rising.

The fear of crime is also concentrated in major cities.

26.9 30.0 41.2 10 20 30 40 50 60 Central Bajura AMSJ

Costa Rica

45.8 47.5 50.1 51.4 59.2 10 20 30 40 50 60 Area Metropolitana Oriental Central I Occidental Central II

El Salvador

31.1 34.3 39.1 43.3 50.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Nororiente Suroriente NoroccidenteSuroccidenteMetropolitana

Guatemala

Perception of Insecurity

30.9 33.0 33.0 36.8 38.2 10 20 30 40 50 60 Occidental Norte Oriental Central Sur

Honduras

26.3 26.3 31.9 36.5 46.0 51.8 10 20 30 40 50 60 Caribe Centro Norte Metropolitana Pacífico Norte Pacífico Sur

Nicaragua

28.1 34.3 36.5 41.4 10 20 30 40 50 60 Occidental Central Oriental Metropolitana

Panama

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

In Honduras, for example, those who feel “very insecure” have over a 65% probability of approving crossing the line, compared with 37% probability among those who feel “very secure.”

Fear of ear of crime incr crime increases a eases appr pproval of al of the police the police “cr “crossing the line” ssing the line”

p.<0.001 p.<0.05 p.<0.001 p.>0.05 p.>0.05 p.<0.001 p.>0.05

.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Panamá Belice

p.<0.001

Approval of the police crossing the line (Estimaded average probablity) Perception of insecurity

Source: AmericasBarometer 2010 by LAPOP

Logistic regression model (standard control variables incluided)

AO

• AOJ8. In order to catch criminals,

do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88 )DK

Perception of insecurity undermines system support

48 50 52 54 56 58 System Support Very Safe Somewhat Safe Somewhat Unsafe Very Unsafe Perception of Insecurity Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries

San Miguelito District, Panama Concentration of Homicides and Gang Activities

Green dots=gangs Red dots= homicides

Source: Sistema Nacional de Estadísticas Criminales Integrado, Panama (Jan-Jun 2009)

CARSI (Central America Regional Security Initiative) Impact Evaluation in Central America

• Central America: the “most violent

region in the world” (UNDP, 10/2009)

• USAID: $56.5M for Central

America (2008-1010) for community-based violence prevention programs

signs of gang activity

• Three-year “clustered randomized experiment”
• At-risk neighborhoods in El Salvador,

Guatemala, and Panama

• Data collected before,

during, & after in treatment and control groups

• Quantitative &

qualitative data collection methods

CARSI Impact Evaluation in Central America

Interviewers in Panama

New in 2010: Measures of Concern about Terrorism

18.7 28.5 30.9 31.3 34.3 35.6 36.4 39.3 46.5 46.7 47.7 48.0 48.1 49.9 50.9 51.6 53.7 55.5 57.9 58.9 63.0 64.4 64.6 67.3

Uruguay Argentina Jamaica Canada Brazil Chile Guatemala Guyana Belize Costa Rica United States Nicaragua Suriname Dominican Republic Honduras Bolivia El Salvador Panama Mexico Venezuela Peru Paraguay Ecuador Colombia 20 40 60 80

Worried about violent attacks by terrorists

95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

WT1.

• WT1. How worried are you that there

will be a violent attack by terrorists in [country] in the next 12 months?

Fear of terrorism is negatively related to support for democracy

70 72 74 76

Support for Democracy

20 40 60 80 100

Worry about Violent Terrorist Attacks

Relationship holds when controlling for insecurity, crime victimization, ideology, and other factors

2010 Earthquake Studies

Note: Analysis on matched dataset; Predicted Effects computed based on OLS regression results controlling for Education, Gender, Age, Vote, Region, Wealth, Marital Status, Children, Race, Rural vs. Urban, City Size; rescaled 0-100.

CHILE: Disaster damage weakens democratic attitudes, increases participation

10 7 10

• 9
• 10
• 5

5 10 15

Participation Support for Autogolpe Coup Support Tolerance

Maximum predicted effects of disaster damage

www. LapopSurveys.org

Attitudes toward the Armed Forces in the Americas

www. LapopSurveys.org

Trust in the Armed Forces

38.3 53.3 53.5 54.2 54.9 55.9 56.6 56.7 57.3 60.4 60.5 60.9 64.5 64.8 64.8 65.9 66.2 67.7 70.0 70.1 71.9 72.2 76.3

Argentina Venezuela Peru Trinidad & Tobago Bolivia Guatemala Paraguay Guyana Belize Uruguay Dominican Republic Honduras Colombia Suriname Ecuador Jamaica Nicaragua El Salvador Brazil Canada Chile Mexico United States

20 40 60 80

Trust in the Armed Forces

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

www. LapopSurveys.org

Trust in Armed Forces is greater than trust in Police

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Chile Suriname Uruguay Honduras Canada Argentina Colombia Nicaragua Bolivia Peru Guyana Ecuador Brazil Venezuela United States El Salvador Belize Paraguay Dominican Republic Trinidad & Tobago Guatemala Jamaica Mexico

Chart shows mean trust in Police subtracted from mean trust in Armed Forces

www. LapopSurveys.org

Corruption by Police decreases trust in people in uniform

48.2 33.6 10 20 30 40 50 Trust in the Police No Yes Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 62.2 56.6 10 20 30 40 50 60 Trust in the Armed Forces No Yes Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

14.6 unit difference b/t non-victims and victims 5.6 unit “spill-over effect” of police corruption on trust in Armed Forces

www. LapopSurveys.org

Size of City/Town Government protects human rights Female Age Education Income

• 0.1

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-Squared =0.139 N =20564

County Fixed Effects and Intercept Included but not Shown Here

Believing Government protects human rights increases trust in Armed Forces

AmericasBarometer 2006 (15 countries included in analysis)

www. LapopSurveys.org

Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for democracy

Trust in the Armed Forces Female Education Age Quintiles of wealth Size of City/Town 0.0 0.1

• 0.05

0.05 0.15 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-Squared =0.075 N =33027

Country Fixed Effects and Intercept Included but not Shown Here

www. LapopSurveys.org

Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for political system

Country Fixed Effects and Intercept Included but not Shown Here

Trust in the Armed Forces Female Education Age Quintiles of wealth Size of City/Town

• 0.1

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-Squared =0.214 N =33987

www. LapopSurveys.org

Trust in the Armed Forces Female Education Age Quintiles of wealth Size of City/Town

• 0.1

0.0 0.1

• 0.15
• 0.5

0.05 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based) Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP R-Squared =0.064 N =33260

Country Fixed Effects and Intercept Included but not Shown Here

Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for military coups

Support for military coups

47.8 48.0 45.8 47.1 46.0 38.3 45.3 50.2 43.1 40.9 38.9 57.1 36.6 47.4 36.2 42.2 35.4 33.7 33.4 32.9 33.4 31.7 33.2 33.0 30.8 30.0 30.0 51.6 34.1 28.8 27.8 27.7 26.9 27.1 24.7 24.6 22.1 21.3 18.9

2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010

10 20 30 40 50 60 10 20 30 40 50 60

Belize Mexico Guatemala Peru El Salvador Guyana Ecuador Paraguay Nicaragua Jamaica Bolivia Trinidad & Tobago Dominican Republic Colombia Venezuela Honduras Brazil Costa Rica Uruguay Chile United States Canada Suriname Panama Argentina

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Support for Military Coups

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Now, changing the

• subject. Some people say

that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?

• 1. High unemployment?
• 2. High crime levels
• 3. Lots of corruption

Work in Mozambique

Information about subscribing to the data, or becoming a repository, is found

• n our website:

www.LapopSurveys.org

Free subscriptions to the “Insights Series” of bi-weekly studies at:

insight@mail.americasbarometer.org

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