Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes

Evidence from Namibia Marie Lechler1 Lachlan McNamee2

1University of Munich 2Stanford University

June 20th, 2016

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Idea

During colonial times, southern and central Namibia were directly ruled by the German and South African authorities while northern Namibia was indirectly ruled. As a consequence, the role of traditional authorities was much more important in northern Namibia than in southern and central Namibia. This influence of traditional authorities in northern Namibia persists to the present day. Idea: use division of Namibia as natural experiment to identify the long-term effects of indirect colonial rule.

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Main result

We find that individuals living in the formerly indirectly ruled part of the country have lower support for democracy and the rule of law. ⇒ Hypothesis: local governance structures, which are organized on a ’despotic’ basis (i.e. traditional leadership) undermine democratic attitudes

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Table of contents

1

Motivation and historical background

2

Results

3

Conclusion

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Motivation

Our project contributes to understanding of determinants of political attitudes and of viability of democratic systems. We are able to document an important effect of the ongoing influence

• f traditional authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, who play a uniquely

important role in the governance of these countries.

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Motivation

Adds to literature about the importance of ’civic culture’ and individual political attitudes for the viability of democratic institutions

Almond & Verba (1963); Inglehart (1988,1990); Persson & Tabellini (2009) and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln & Sch¨ undeln (2015)

literature about long-term effects of direct vs indirect colonial rule

Iyer (2010), Acemoglu et al (2000, 2001)

literature about role of traditional authorities in Sub-Sahara Africa

Mamdani (1996); Dusing (2002); Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson (2013); Baldwin (2013, 2015); De Kadt & Larreguy (2014)

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History of the border

Figure : Precolonial map of ethnicities (Murdock, 1967)

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History of the border

1884: Namibia becomes German colony

Germans settle in central and southern Namibia

Rinderpest epidemic devastated cattle-dependent communities, which were concentrated in central and southern Namibia in the 1890s Strength tribes living in the North and inaccessibility of the North hamper settlements in the north

⇒ Germans easily conquered southern and central Namibia

1905: Introduction of the ‘’Police Zone” (police protection cannot cover entire protectorate)

Due to financial constraints German activities (administrative, economic and military) focus on Police Zone

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History of the border

Source: Miescher, Namibia’s Red Line, 2012

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History of the border

1915: Police Zone boundary and German policies of restricting movement were adopted by the South Africans. 1964: Police Zone boundary is formalized by Odendaal Commission 1990: Namibian independence. Transition to parliamentary democracy and homogenization of policies north and south of the border.

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Direct vs indirect rule

Indirect colonial rule in northern Namibia Traditional authorities in the north were given a lot of political autonomy Despotic, hereditary and authoritarian system Influence persists even after independence and constitutes a parallel system of governance Direct colonial rule in central and southern Namibia German (and later South African) colonial administration directly ruled over this part of the country Traditional authorities were given little or no political role Since independence, people only experience governance via elected and accountable local representatives at all levels of government

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Hypothesis

• 1. Indirect and direct colonial rule have persistent effects on democratic

attitudes (test with OLS).

• 2. The key mechanism underlying this relationship is the ongoing

influence of traditional authorities, which acts as a parallel despotic governance structure (test with 2SLS).

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Data

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Data

Political attitude data: Afrobarometer (1999-2008, 4 survey rounds) Covers 166 EAs and 1426 individuals Questions

Contact traditional authority: During the past year, how often have you contacted a traditional ruler? (Scale 0-3) Support for democracy (Scale: 1-3) Courts make binding decisions (Scale: 1-5) How likely is law enforcement by authorities (Scale: 1-4) Questioning leaders vs respect for authority (Scale: 1-4)

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Data

Table : Balancing table for observations from buffer zone

(1) (2) (3) Direct rule Indirect rule Difference Contact traditional leader 0.24 0.79 0.55*** Age 33.4 36.3 2.90*** Gender 1.49 1.49 0.00 Education 3.80 3.82 0.02 Without food 1.31 1.10

• 0.20**

Observations 254 1,164 1,418

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The effect of indirect rule on political attitudes

Baseline estimation equation: Yider = α + β · Indirectruled + X

′

iderγ + ηe + µr + ǫider

Y expresses the outcome variables (the measures for democratic attitudes) for individual i, living in enumeration area d, belonging to the ethnic group e, being surveyed in round r. Indirectrule is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual lives in an enumeration area which belonged to the indirectly or the directly ruled part of Namibia X is a set of individual-level control variables ηe are ethnicity fixed effects µr are survey-round fixed effects.

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Identification

Treatment: indirect vs direct colonial rule

independent of other factors affecting political attitudes close to the colonial border (location of border exogenous to pre-colonial political attitudes)

Pre-treatment attitudes were the same within each ethnic group

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OLS estimates

Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Support Courts make Courts make VARIABLES for democracy for democracy binding decisions binding decisions Indirect colonial rule

• 0.178**
• 0.189**
• 0.169*
• 0.178*

(0.0746) (0.0757) (0.102) (0.105)

Constant 2.493*** 2.660*** 3.557*** 3.844***

(0.0908) (0.237) (0.130) (0.265)

Observations 1,347 1,329 1,392 1,375 R2 0.019 0.036 0.089 0.103 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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OLS estimates

Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Law Law Respect Respect VARIABLES enforcement enforcement authorities authorities Indirect colonial rule

• 0.272**
• 0.298**

0.122 0.131

(0.115) (0.116) (0.0890) (0.0899)

Constant 3.507*** 3.134*** 1.950*** 1.978***

(0.127) (0.304) (0.121) (0.279)

Observations 1,026 1,009 1,396 1,379 R2 0.043 0.061 0.096 0.110 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters 128 128 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Robustness

Applying an ordered probit model

Link

Using observations for the entire country (not only buffer zone)

Link

Clustering observations on the constituency level (60 clusters instead

• f 165)

Link M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 20 / 27

Channel of causality

Identification of contact to traditional leaders as channel of causality by applying 2SLS estimations. → instrument contact with traditional authorities with indirect colonial rule dummy

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Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders

Table : Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders (1) (2) (3) (4) Contact Contact Contact Contact VARIABLES traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler Indirect colonial rule 0.555*** 0.391*** 0.373*** 0.350**

(0.0700) (0.104) (0.103) (0.166)

Constant 0.240*** 0.887*** 0.439 0.307

(0.0533) (0.122) (0.305) (0.462)

Observations 1,418 1,418 1,400 1,400 R2 0.045 0.142 0.178 0.183 Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Round FE no yes yes yes Region FE no no no yes Controls no no yes yes F-Test 62.67 18.36 12.95 12.05 # clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 22 / 27

2SLS results

Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Support Law Law VARIABLES for democracy for democracy enforcement enforcement Contact traditional leader

• 0.429**
• 0.484**
• 0.684**
• 0.772**

(0.216) (0.237) (0.329) (0.356)

Observations 1,347 1,329 1,026 1,009 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters 165 165 128 128 First-stage F statistic 20.90 18.53 14.57 13.50

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income

• dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
• reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p

<0.1.

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2SLS results

Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Courts make Courts make Respect Respect VARIABLES binding decisions binding decisions for authority for authority Contact traditional leader

• 0.433*
• 0.480*

0.336 0.391

(0.263) (0.281) (0.243) (0.252)

Observations 1,392 1,375 1,365 1,348 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls no yes no yes # clusters 165 165 165 165 First-stage F statistic 20.10 18.18 17.72 15.75

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Robustness checks

Exclusion restriction: Living north of the border is uncorrelated with any

• ther determinant of political attitudes.

Potential concerns: geography and culture

Link

political socialization

Link

selective spatial sorting

Link

contemporary institutions

Link

income and education

Link M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 25 / 27

Effect on voting behavior

Table : Effect on voting turnout (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES OLS Probit 2SLS Indirect colonial rule

• 0.137***
• 0.455**

(0.0463) (0.182)

Contact traditional leader

• 0.527**

(0.225)

Constant 0.328** 0.371

(0.147) (0.295)

Observations 723 721 723 R2 0.277 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes # clusters 91 91 91

Results from OLS, Probit and 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 26 / 27

Conclusion

Indirect colonial rule has persistent effects on contemporary political attitudes and political behavior. Key mechanism: influence of traditional authorities ⇒ Parallel despotic governance structure undermines support for democracy and the rule of law and and encourages to respect leaders rather than to question them.

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Appendix

Table : Summary statistics for observations from buffer zone

Mean SD Min Max Obs Contact traditional leader 0.7 1.0 3 1426 Courts make binding decisions 3.9 1.0 1 5 1399 Support for democracy 2.4 0.8 1 3 1352 Enforce law: crime 3.3 0.9 1 4 1034 Respect authority 2.5 1.1 1 5 1404 Age 35.8 14.8 18 92 1421 Education 3.8 1.8 8 1414 Without food 1.1 1.2 4 1425

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Robustness OLS: Ordered probit

Link

Table : Ordered probit model (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Indirect colonial rule

• 0.273**
• 0.200
• 0.364**

0.132

(0.124) (0.128) (0.165) (0.0943)

Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,379 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 165 165 128 165

Results from ordered probit regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 2 / 18

Robustness OLS: Observations for entire country

Link

Table : Observations for entire country (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Communal

• 0.0889***
• 0.0456
• 0.111**

0.124***

(0.0331) (0.0416) (0.0545) (0.0416)

Constant 2.263*** 3.388*** 3.128*** 1.775***

(0.117) (0.166) (0.178) (0.167)

Observations 4,598 4,826 3,263 4,134 R2 0.027 0.057 0.053 0.097 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 571 571 407 509

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample con- sists of observations for the entire country. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in

• parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Robustness OLS: Cluster on constituency level

Link

Table : Cluster on Constituency level (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Indirect colonial rule

• 0.189**
• 0.178*
• 0.298**

0.136*

(0.0792) (0.0925) (0.123) (0.0700)

Constant 2.660*** 3.844*** 3.134*** 1.960***

(0.273) (0.276) (0.390) (0.277)

Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,348 R2 0.036 0.103 0.061 0.140 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 44 44 40 44

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists

• f observations for the buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p

<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 4 / 18

Potential concern: Geography and culture

We only focus on individuals living within a 100km buffer zone of the boundary to ensure comparability between individuals surveyed on several dimensions (e.g. proximity to ports, the capital and the national

border, geographic characteristics)

We include ethnicity fixed effects to account for differences in ethnic cultures We include regional fixed effects as a robustness check, which does not change our results

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Potential concern: Geography and culture

Link

Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Law Respect VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities Contact traditional leader

• 0.695*
• 0.870*
• 0.681

0.636

(0.361) (0.509) (0.425) (0.411)

Constant 2.908*** 4.308*** 3.034*** 1.695***

(0.401) (0.498) (0.404) (0.422)

Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,348 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Region FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 165 165 128 165

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity, survey round and regional fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. The sample consists of buffer zone observations

• nly. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area)

in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 6 / 18

Potential concern: Different political socialization

Link

Indigenous population did not experience democracy in either the direct or indirectly ruled areas of Namibia during colonial times. Since the governance system of the south enabled the exploitation of the local indigenous population, if anything, the bias from different experiences with western institutions during the colonial era should bias against our hypothesis. If this concern was true the effect should be larger for older people. Interaction effect is however insignificant.

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Potential concern: Different political socialization

Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Courts make Respect VARIABLES for democracy Law enforcement binding decisions authority Indirect colonial rule

• 0.182**
• 0.320**
• 0.231*

0.0464

(0.0828) (0.123) (0.118) (0.116)

Indirect rule x Old dummy

• 0.000124

0.0850 0.109 0.171

(0.107) (0.123) (0.114) (0.143)

Old dummy

• 0.00334
• 0.132

0.138

• 0.171

(0.0957) (0.114) (0.102) (0.131)

Constant 2.628*** 3.443*** 3.920*** 2.020***

(0.225) (0.311) (0.252) (0.279)

Observations 1,334 1,013 1,379 1,352 R2 0.039 0.055 0.111 0.138 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 165 128 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and a binary age dummy as well as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The old dummy equals one if an individual is older than 31 years. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in

• parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Potential concern: Different political socialization

Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes (1) (2) (3) (4) Support Law Courts make Respect VARIABLES for democracy enforcement binding decisions authority Indirect colonial rule

• 0.0750
• 0.308
• 0.122
• 0.00732

(0.159) (0.200) (0.169) (0.211)

Indirect rule x age

• 0.00347

0.000334

• 0.00170

0.00439

(0.00450) (0.00458) (0.00404) (0.00521)

Constant 2.557*** 3.143*** 3.794*** 2.091***

(0.254) (0.334) (0.277) (0.333)

Observations 1,329 1,009 1,375 1,348 R2 0.036 0.061 0.103 0.140 Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yes Survey round FE yes yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes # clusters 165 128 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age as well as ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 9 / 18

Potential concern: Selective spatial sorting

Link

During the German and South African colonial rule, permanent migration between the two parts of the country was prohibited. We cannot rule out selective sorting after independence in 1990, however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder.

In northern areas of Namibia, land is communally held and ties to one’s family, one’s community and to ancestral land rights are extremely close Moreover, migration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agency suggest that permanent migration from the north, where it has

• ccurred, has been economic in nature and primarily inter-regional as

poor laborers move to the larger cities of the south

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Potential concern: Different contemporary institutions

Link

People living north and south of the border do not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently. Inclusion of regional fixed effects ensures that we only compare individuals living close to each other on the same part of the boundary, who are governed by the same national and regional institutions nowadays.

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Same contemporary institutions

Table : Balancing table

(1) (2) (3) Direct rule Indirect rule Difference Government officials listen 1.22 1.26

• 0.048

[1.06] [1.08] (0.11) Trust in police 1.78 1.91

• 0.13*

[0.85] [0.88] (0.070) Trust in courts 1.83 1.91

• 0.085

[0.92] [0.95] (0.067) Fear of unjust arrest 3.93 3.83 0.097 [0.73] [0.93] (0.091) Observations 253 1,163 1,416

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Potential concern: Income

Link

Table : Effect of indirect rule on income (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit Indirect colonial rule

• 0.204

0.0398 0.0147 0.0191

(0.134) (0.163) (0.146) (0.148)

Contact traditional leader

• 0.106***
• 0.109***

(0.0333) (0.0360)

Constant 1.307*** 1.216*** 0.804***

(0.126) (0.184) (0.229)

Observations 1,417 1,417 1,400 1,400 R2 0.004 0.055 0.130 Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Survey round FE no yes yes yes Controls no no yes yes # clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in

• parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Potential concern: Effect of education

Table : Effect of indirect rule on education (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit Indirect colonial rule 0.0147

• 0.274
• 0.158
• 0.0892

(0.189) (0.193) (0.150) (0.0987)

Contact traditional leader 0.0492 0.0293

(0.0481) (0.0308)

Constant 3.802*** 4.038*** 5.068***

(0.176) (0.225) (0.360)

Observations 1,406 1,406 1,400 1,400 R2 0.000 0.025 0.240 Ethnicity FE no yes yes yes Survey round FE no yes yes yes Controls yes yes yes yes # clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in

• parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.

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Afrobarometer questions

Contact traditional leader During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A traditional ruler? 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often

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Afrobarometer questions

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 0=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 1=Statement 1: Democracy preferable

Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2,

Please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.

1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree

How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like you committed a serious crime?

1=Not at all likely, 2=Not very likely, 3=Likely, 4=Very Likely

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Afrobarometer questions

Education What is the highest level of education you have completed?

0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school, 5=Secondary school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, 7=Some university, 8=University completed,9=Post-graduate

Income Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat? 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always

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Afrobarometer questions

How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Elected Local Government Councillors? 0=Never 1=Only Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always How much do you trust each of the following: The Police? 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot How much do you trust each of the following: Courts of Law? 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot

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