Dj Q All Over Again: Tighter and Broader Reductions of q -Type - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Dj Q All Over Again: Tighter and Broader Reductions of q -Type - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions Dj Q All Over Again: Tighter and Broader Reductions of q -Type Assumptions Melissa Chase - MSR Redmond Mary Maller - University College London


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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Déjà Q All Over Again: Tighter and Broader Reductions of q-Type Assumptions

Melissa Chase - MSR Redmond Mary Maller - University College London Sarah Meiklejohn - University College London

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Subgroup Hiding ⇒ certain q-Type Assumptions

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Example: Broadcast Encryption

Methods of delivering encrypted content over a broadcast channel where only qualified users can decrypt the content.

Example

Boneh Gentry and Waters’ broadcast encryption scheme [BGW-Crypto05].

◮ Pairing based solution ◮ Short ciphertexts and private keys ◮ Collusion resistant

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

The q-BDHE Assumption

The BGW broadcast encryption scheme bases its security

  • n the q-BDHE assumption [BGW-Crypto05].

Given g,gc,gα,...,gαq,gαq+2,...,gα2q it is hard to distinguish e(g,gc)q+1 from random.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

The q-BDHE Assumption

The BGW broadcast encryption scheme bases its security

  • n the q-BDHE assumption [BGW-Crypto05].

Given g,gc,gα,...,gαq,?,gαq+2,...,gα2q it is hard to distinguish e(g,gc)q+1 from random.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Déjà Q: Using Dual Systems to Revisit q-Type Assumptions [CM-Eurocrypt14]

Subgroup Hiding Specific classes of q-type & ⇒ assumptions in asymmetric Parameter Hiding bilinear groups of order N = p1p2 1. Pr[break q-type assumption] ≤ O(q) Pr[break subgroup hiding]

1Asymmetric composite order bilinear groups do exist - see

[BRS-JNT11].

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

[CM-Eurocrypt14]: Contributions

Decides Computes Source Group given info in one group given info in both groups Target Group given info in one group given info in both groups q-BDHE

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Contributions: Broader

Decides Computes Source Group given info in one group given info in both groups Target Group given info in one group given info in both groups q-BDHE

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Contributions: Tighter

Subgroup Hiding Specific classes of q-type & ⇒ assumptions in asymmetric Parameter Hiding bilinear groups of order N = p1p2p3 . Pr[break q-type assumption] ≤ O(logq) Pr[break subgroup hiding]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Outline of Presentation

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Bilinear Groups

Standard Bilinear Groups: G = (N,G,H,GT,e,g,h).

◮ N = group order; prime or composite ◮ |G| = |H| = kN, |GT| = λN ◮ G =< g >, H =< h > ◮ e : G × H → GT

Properties

Bilinearity: e(ga,hb) = e(g,h)ab Non-degeneracy: e(x,y) = 1∀y ∈ H ⇒ x = 1.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Subgroup Hiding [BGN - TCC05]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Subgroup Hiding [BGN - TCC05]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Subgroup Hiding [BGN - TCC05]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Parameter Hiding [Lewko-Eurocrypt12]

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Parameter Hiding [Lewko-Eurocrypt12]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Parameter Hiding [Lewko-Eurocrypt12]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Parameter Hiding [Lewko-Eurocrypt12]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Outline of Presentation

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Reductions we can Cover

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Aim of Reduction

Model q-type assumption as a game. Transition to statistically impossible game. [CM-Eurocrypt14]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Déjà Q: Reduction Techniques

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Déjà Q: Reduction Techniques

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Déjà Q: Reduction Techniques

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Déjà Q: Reduction Techniques

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Déjà Q: Reduction Techniques

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Our Tight Reduction Techniques

Double the randomness.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Result

Given gρ1(x),...,gρq(x),hσ1(x),...,hσq(x) ˆ h Then Adv[Deciding e(g, ˆ h)f(x) from random] ≤ (3 + log(q + 2))Pr[Breaks Subgroup Hiding]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Result

Subgroup Hiding Specific classes of q-type & ⇒ assumptions in asymmetric Parameter Hiding bilinear groups of order N = p1p2p3 . Pr[break q-type assumption] ≤ O(logq) Pr[break subgroup hiding]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Outline of Presentation

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Example: Broadcast Encryption

Methods of delivering encrypted content over a broadcast channel where only qualified users can decrypt the content.

Example

Boneh Gentry and Waters’ broadcast encryption scheme [BGW-Crypto05].

◮ Pairing based solution ◮ Short ciphertexts and private keys ◮ Collusion resistant

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Broadcast Encryption

The asymmetric q-BDHE assumption: given ˆ h,gα,hα,...,gαq,hαq,gαq+2,hαq+2,...,gα2q,hα2q it is hard to distinguish e(g, ˆ h)q+1 from random is tightly implied by subgroup hiding and parameter hiding. The BGW broadcast encryption scheme is implied by the symmetric q-BDHE assumption.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Symmetric Reductions

◮ The previous asymmetric reduction fails in the

symmetric case.

◮ Adversary given components that would allow it to

trivially break subgroup hiding in the symmetric case (e(G1,H2) = 1).

◮ Show how to push through the same reduction in the

symmetric case by adding randomness from a fourth subgroup. Symmetric schemes can also be translated into asymmetric groups.

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

The Asymmetric BGW Variant

Techniques from [AGOT-Crypto14].

g gi p0[0] gc C0 vi di p1[0] p2[0] Ci p0[1] p2[1] p1[1]

= G = G&H = H

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Identity Based KEM [ACF-Eurocrypt09]

g Bi g1 gc C gij p1[0] hi skID p0[0] p4[0] p2[0] p3[0] p4[1] p0[1] p1[1] p2[1] p3[1]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

ABE Scheme [Waters08]

The less efficient construction.

g ga gi hi msk L C' gc p0[1] p1[0] K Ci Kx p5[0] p5[1] p0[0] p1[1] p2[1] p3[1] p4[1] p2[0] p4[0] p3[0]

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

HIBE Scheme [BBG-Eurocrypt05]

g yi g3 hi g1 B gc g2 a1 C a0 bi p0[0] p2[0] p1[1] msk p0[1] p1[0] p2[1]

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Outline of Presentation

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Asiacrypt 2016, Hanoi Bilinear Groups and Assumptions Reductions Symmetric Schemes Conclusions

Open Problems

◮ How secure are q-type assumptions in prime order

groups?

◮ How secure are q-power knowledge of exponent

assumptions (non-falsifiable assumptions)?

◮ How secure are q-type when the adversary has inputs

from both source groups and the challenge component is also in the source group?

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Thank-you for Listening.

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