Trust in water 1
Customer Challenge Group (CCG) Chairs meeting Jon Ashley, Chair
Ofwat, Centre City Tower, Birmingham 8 November 2017
Customer Challenge Group (CCG) Chairs meeting Jon Ashley, Chair - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Customer Challenge Group (CCG) Chairs meeting Jon Ashley, Chair Ofwat, Centre City Tower, Birmingham 8 November 2017 Trust in water 1 Agenda Time Agenda item Presenter 10.30 Welcome and introductions Jon Ashley Jon Ashley 10.35 CCG
Trust in water 1
Ofwat, Centre City Tower, Birmingham 8 November 2017
Trust in water 2
Agenda Time Agenda item Presenter
10.30 Welcome and introductions Jon Ashley 10.35 CCG Aide Memoire Jon Ashley (Cathryn and David joining by VC) 11.20 DWI – long term planning guidance Sue Pennison 11.50 Break 12.00 Water 2020 – update Jon Ashley 13.00 Corporate Culture - Customer participation John Drummond 13.30 Lunch
Trust in water 3
Trust in water 4
Aide memoire
main elements of the PR19 methodology consultation that relate to CCGs and customer engagement.
statement in December 2017.
Trust in water 5
– i.e. use drinking water safety plans to protect public health and maintain consumer confidence
– drinking water quality is always accounted for in all cost benefit assessments
– sustainability and resilience of supply quality must be an integral part of all planning and delivery
– maintain drinking water quality protection, confidence and supply acceptability
LTPG para 5.3.3
management for all supplies
for new/altered supplies, consumers must not be exposed to a greater risk of exposure to unwholesome water
at abstraction points of each treatment works and associated supply system; investigate the cause of any deterioration and take action to protect consumers, primarily catchment investigations and actions to control pollution at source
evaluate the risk including the “indicative dose” to establish the extent of the risk
mitigating risks to public health, wholesomeness and acceptability;
short-, medium- and long-term timescales to support resilience and prevent supply of inadequately treated water;
supply provision consider implications for supply quality;
monitoring systems to improve responsiveness. NOTE: Companies are reminded that it is a criminal offence to supply water that is not treated adequately, as required by the Regulations.
including maintenance and repair history
maintenance and operation regime
responsiveness to interruptions NOTE: it is not acceptable to routinely and passively accept impacts on the quality of supplies arising from burst mains
collective approach with stakeholders (e.g. local authorities, Director of Public Health) and support action aimed at vulnerable consumer groups;
identification of non-compliance, including enforcement (s75, WIA 1991) NOTE: Companies in Wales need to have regard to Welsh Government SPS; Wales Water Strategy; Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015; and Water Health Partnership for Wales on the development of lead policy
Supply (Water Fittings) Regulations 1999; Mitigate failures in buildings using powers under s 74/75 of WIA 1991
commitments
CRI (Overall) = CRI for compliance failures in water supply zones + CRI for compliance failures at water treatment works + CRI for compliance failures at service reservoirs ∑ (Seriousness x Assessment x Impact (population / WTW volume / SR capacity) Total population served / WTW volume/ SR capacity CRI =
Σ(Seriousness · Assessment · Impact (population, time) ) population served by the company ERI =
PR19 final submission from Companies 31 Dec 2017 (some flexibility will be allowed ) DWI final decision letters to companies 30 May 2018 Legal instruments in place 31 Dec 2018
Trust in water 21
Trust in water 22
statement.
Trust in water 23
Trust in water 24
Summary of responses – Affordability
Three aspects of affordability Respondents agreed
Five principles to assess business plans Respondents agreed
Common metrics to assess affordability in plans Mixed views
methodology consultation
Trust in water 25
Summary of responses – Vulnerability
Qualitative information and views of CCGs Respondents agreed
plans support customers in circumstances that make them vulnerable based on the challenges we set in our 2016 Vulnerability focus report.
Bespoke performance commitments Respondents agreed
performance commitments for addressing vulnerability in their business plans after engagement with their customers.
Common metrics to assess vulnerability in plans Mixed views
Methodology consultation
Trust in water 26
How well are companies addressing affordability and vulnerability
Other test areas Quantitative measures Qualitative measures
Common metrics form only part of our assessment in these two areas We propose to assess companies’ approaches and common metrics ‘in the round’
We will be promoting affordability / value for money in several ways at PR19
including bad debt
We will be promoting:
the Vulnerability focus report
in customer data
report
Trust in water 27
Affordability common metrics Vulnerability common metrics
Percentage of customers finding the level of their bills affordable. Percentage of customers aware of support services offered Percentage of customers finding their bills acceptable. Number of customers on Special Assistance/ Priority Service Register Benefits (in £) of applying affordability measures. Percentage of total customers on Special Assistance/ Priority Service Register Costs (in £) of applying affordability measures. Year-on-year percentage increase on number of customers on Special Assistance/ Priority Service Register from 2011-2016 (2010 base year) Percentage of customers aware of financial assistance measures. Percentage of customers satisfied services are easy to access Percentage of customers who are on financial assistance schemes offered by the company and who are satisfied Percentage of customers on SAR/PSR contacted
receiving the right support
Our current working common metrics for affordability and vulnerability
Trust in water 28
Trust in water 29
Clarification on performance commitments
We have discussed with you on a number of occasions the case for more stretching performance
1) A more stretching performance commitment does not cost customers more money
Our price review cost and outcomes tests work together. In essence:
If a company responds to our outcomes challenges by changing its performance commitment, for example, for sewer flooding from 400 to 300 incidents per year this does not, of itself, cost customers anything. We have a separate test on cost efficiency which challenges companies to have efficient levels of cost and we do not allow the company a higher cost allowance for a more stretching performance commitment. Indeed, doing so would undermine the benefit of more stretching performance commitments for customers. An example from PR14 was that Welsh Water proposed a performance commitment of 43 minutes in 2019- 20 for the average duration of supply interruptions for its customers. We reduced the performance commitment to 12 minutes during PR14 at no extra cost to customers. In 2016-17 Welsh Water actually achieved 12.2 minutes. We are looking to CCGs to challenge companies on the degree of stretch in companies’ performance
2) A more stretching performance commitment makes outperformance payments less likely
Customers only pay more for service performance through ODI outperformance payments (formerly known as “rewards”) where a company has outperformed its stretching performance commitment. The more stretching the performance commitment, the less likely the company is to achieve ODI outperformance payments and the more likely the company is to incur an underperformance penalty, which reduces customers bills.
Trust in water 30
July consultation - key messages on proposals for outcomes
We consider:
customers benefit from better service;
deliver more of what customers want by better aligning the interests of company management and investors with those of customers.
to customers, and larger penalties for those who do not achieve their commitments; and
the scope for efficiency improvements at PR19.
companies to improve customer experiences.
Trust in water 31
Summary of responses – Outcomes
Respondents agreed
(PCs)
introducing the Developer Services Measure of Experience (D-MeX) .
Mixed views
consumption, pollution incidents and asset health metrics.
use of financial ODIs.
Respondents disagreed
average performance will incur ODI penalties.
rather than promoting competition.
Trust in water 32
Trust in water 33
July consultation - key messages on proposals for risk and reward
cost of equity for PR19.
winners and losers
delivering the plan and how it has assured itself that the risk mitigation and management plans in place are appropriate
customers
Trust in water 34
Summary of responses – Risk and Return
Respondents supported
assessment
Respondents disagreed
assumptions driven from dividend growth models and market to asset value assessments. Companies supported their views with reports commissioned from KPMG and Ernst and Young
that returns for an average performing company are asymmetrically skewed to the downside
Trust in water 35
that it is financeable on both the notional and actual financial structure.
address such financeability constraints.
financeability constraints arising from a company’s choice of financial structure or inefficient financing strategy.
July consultation - key messages on proposals for financeability
Trust in water 36
Summary of responses – Financeability
Respondents supported
however a number of companies raised the point that changes in the balance of incentives at PR19 would put pressure on company financeability due to increased revenue volatility.
Mixed views
companies suggesting that metrics should be those used by the credit rating agencies.
Trust in water 37
July consultation - key messages on proposals for cost assessment
dynamic efficiency and evidence from other sectors.
efficiency benchmark. A different approach to funding of unconfirmed environmental requirements
baselines, plus take account of cross sector comparators. No indexation to inflation index. No glide path.
Trust in water 38
Summary of responses – Cost Assessment
Respondents supported
average benchmark to an efficient and independent benchmark, developed through econometric analysis, in residential retail.
Environment Programme (WINEP) requirements.
Mixed views
regulation and the use of a simplified cost sharing incentive but some respondents suggested that our proposal creates a perverse incentive for companies to bid “too” low, with unintended consequences.
agreed that downward adjustments could be appropriate, but raised issues related to their ability to raise informed cost claims and challenge downward adjustments.
Respondents disagreed
companies supported an alternative approach of providing an allowance for inflation as part of totex, if appropriate
Trust in water 39
July consultation - key messages on proposals for form of controls
Our proposed approach will protect customers, through better targeted regulation; and create value through wholesale markets where appropriate:
is our traditional approach to regulation
services, creating opportunities for companies to look beyond traditional company boundaries and their own in-house solutions to meet the long-term needs of customers.
introduced business retail competition) as well as for those that cannot switch (e.g. residential customers). NB: we cannot regulate exited retailers in the business market in England this way, instead they companies are regulated through our Retail Exit Code.
year duration. This would give us an earlier opportunity to take account of information and lessons from the English competitive businessmarket.
Trust in water 40
Summary of responses – Wholesale controls
Respondents supported
incentive mechanism
resources yield as the measure for capacity
revenue control There were mixed views on developer services; access pricing; and the calibration of the incentive mechanisms in bioresources. Some of these requiring further clarification.
Mixed views Respondents disagreed
the benefits of bilateral markets, and our reporting requirements to support this market at PR19
Trust in water 41
Summary of responses – Direct Procurement
Respondents supported
notable exception of some stakeholders in Wales who oppose direct procurement as an approach).
Respondents disagreed
their own tender processes
schemes on the basis it was too low and that we should consider either changing it to capex or raising it
Trust in water 42
Summary of responses – Retail form of control
Respondents supported
PR14).
Mixed views
based on the view that there is not evidence that competition in the market it working yet.
Trust in water 43
July consultation - key messages on proposals for Initial Assessment of Plans (IAP)
We want companies to produce high quality, ambitious and innovative business plans, pushing forward the performance of the industry as a whole and stretching the boundaries for delivery and efficiency.
ambition and innovation, and the extent to which it requires intervention from us to protect customers.
plans that are right first time, and to demonstrate that their plans will benefit customers, the environment and wider society.
Addressing affordability and vulnerability Securing long- term resilience Securing cost efficiencies Engaging customers Delivering
customers Aligning risk and return Targeted controls, markets and innovation Accounting for past delivery Securing confidence and assurance
9 test areas
We proposed an IAP methodology framework including:
quality, ambition and innovation
fast-track, exceptional
incentives
Trust in water 44
Summary of responses – IAP
Respondents supported
4 categories (significant scrutiny; slow-track; fast-track; exceptional)
Mixed views
weak; and by some as disproportionate to financial penalties. On the other hand also a suggestion that there should be no financial incentive associated with the IAP.
Trust in water 45