Current status of collaboration between India and Japan Koji Nakao - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Current status of collaboration between India and Japan Koji Nakao - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Current status of collaboration between India and Japan Koji Nakao KDDI, Information Security Fellow 1 CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY: All materials contained in this document cannot be reproduced in whole or in part, distributed, published or


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Current status of collaboration between India and Japan

Koji Nakao

KDDI, Information Security Fellow

1 3/21/2015

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

M2M (streamin g data) Open data Persona l data Digitally stored knowledg e Collected and stored big data

(static / dynamic)

More severe risks Dessemination of risks Globalization of risks

Cyber Space

“Big Data” Society and Cybersecurity

2

Increasing dependence

  • f socio-

economic systems on IT

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Sophisticated Attacks to Sensitive Information

2

[Recent major cases]

2011.9

[Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI), House of Representative (HR) etc.]

Found virus infection by targeted attacks 2012.5

[Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)] Found possibility of information leakage over previous months

2013.1

[Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF)]

Announced attack case on TPP-related information leakage 2013.4

[Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)] Found unauthorized access to servers from outside

2013 autumn

[Government agencies etc.]

Found zero-day attack* causing particular entities to be infected by web

browsing

2014.1

[Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)]

Found possibility of information leakage by virus infection

[Threats to government’s organizations]

* Zero-day attack: Attack misuses unpatched or undisclosed security holes in software. * * No. of no normal accesses or communications among events detected by sensors installed in the ministries by the GSOC (abbreviation for Government Security Operation Coordination team) etc.

  • No. of threats detected

through monitoring by sensors, etc.**

  • No. of notices issued

through monitoring by sensors, etc.

App rox. 660,000 Appr ox. 1,080,00

Appro x. 5,080,000 139 175

139

  • No. of warnings issued
  • n suspicious e-mails

209 415

381

FY 2012 FY 2011 FY 2013

24 hrs & 365 days (10 times in a min.)

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Attacks on Critical Infrastructures

3

[No. of attacks on critical infrastructures] [Area of the Critical infrastructure]

(1)Information and Communications (2) Finance (3) Aviation (4) Railways (5) Electricity (6) Gas (7) Gov’t and

  • Admin. Services

(8) Medical Services (9) Water (10) Logistics

* Reports from the critical infrastructure operators to the NISC * * * Reports from the five industries (45 organizations), or critical infrastructure equipment manufacture, power, gas, chemistry and petroleum to Information-Technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan

(11) Chemistry (12) Credit Card (13) Petroleum

* * * * These three sectors were added to the third action plan to security measures for critical infrastructures decided by the Information Security Policy Council (ISPC) on 19th May 2014.

  • No. of info. Messages or

reports* from critical infrastructures areas

110 (76)** 153 (133)

Unauthorized access,Dos 121 Virus infection 7 Other intentional factors 5

FY 2012 FY 2013 Main Details

  • No. of received info.

Messages*** about targeted attack e-mail, etc.

246 385

FY 2012 FY 2013 ** Reports concerning Cyber Attacks

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

[Spread of smart phones etc.] [Penetration throughout all of society in Japan]

* * Approaches for Vehicle Information Security (August 2013) by Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan * 2013 White Paper – Information and Communications in Japan by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) Regarding the increase rate of illicit sites: Research by Trend Micro corp.

Household ownership rate increased five times rapidly* (End of 2010: approx. 10% -> End of 2012: approx. 50% ) Illicit sites targeted at mobile devices increased twenty times rapidly (End of 2011: approx. 3 thousand -> End of 2013: approx. 57 thousand)

* * * Handout at 14th Study group for Smart Meter system, by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI)

Widespread Scope of Targets

5

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Overse as 97% Japan 3%

[Attacks on Japan from Overseas] [Recent major cases]

2011.3

[Korea] DDoS attacks to 40 web servers of government agencies etc.

→ At t ack

ck co com m ands s issu ssued usi sing hom e PCs s in Japan as s bot s 2013.3

[Korea] Large-scale cyber attacks to critical infrastructures

→ Sam e m

m alicious program c concurrent ly found in Japan

(Reference)

2013.5

[US] The US government points out t h

t he po possibil ilit it y of t t he involvem ent t of f foreign gn governm ent s or m m ilit ilit arie ies in targeted attacks made to steal national or corporate

secrets* *

* * Source: “The Administrative Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets” (White House, February 2013) & “the Annual Report to Congress” (Department of Defense, May 2013)

Attacks from a Variety of Entities in the World

6

Geological location of IP addresses used by malware (2013)*

97% of malware tried to connect to

  • versea servers.

* Source: National Police Agency of Japan (Feb. 2014)

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Recent Efforts on Cybersecurity Strategy (Summary)

″ Cybersecurity Strategy ″

(June 2013) ″Resilient″ Cyberspace

  • Strengthening

protection -

Organizational Reform

  • Revision of the Standards for Information

Security Measures for the Central Government Computer Systems (May 2014)

  • Issuing the Third Edition of the Action Plan
  • n Information Security Measures for

Critical Infrastructures (May 2014)

  • Revision of the Information Security Human

Resource Development Program (May 2014)

  • Revision of the Information Security

Research and Development Strategy (July 2014)

  • Issued ″International Strategy on

Cybersecurity Cooperation – j-initiative for Cybersecurity (October 2013)

  • ASEAN-Japan Commemorative

Summit Meeting (held in December 2013)

  • Strengthening the function of

NISC (scheduled in FY2015)

  • Issuing Annual Report on Cybersecurity

(July 2014)

″Vigorous″ Cyberspace

  • Building

fundamentals -

″World-leading″ Cyberspace

  • International

Strategy -

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Policy Agenda on Cybersecurity towards 2020

21

  • Security enhancement through global collaboration, such as strengthening

the multinational frameworks including the UN and OECD, and bilateral policy discussions, is required.

  • Promoting utilization and application of the ICT in various fields, and

strengthening its security are the two wheels of a cart. In particular the security standards in a cloud computing environment should be urgently clarified.

  • Measures to ensure security across various fields in an IoT environment

need to be considered.

  • The Defence in Depth system needs to be established to counter targeted
  • attacks. Necessary measures have been promoted by the government

agencies.

  • Information sharing framework among critical infrastructure operators needs

to be enhanced.

  • International collaboration and human resources development aiming to

strengthen information security of the Control System is necessary.

  • Preparation for the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020 as a milestone for

cybersecurity enhancement.

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Based on NISC strategy…

MIC has started the following three cyber security projects.

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Leaking of classified information

caused by sophisticated cyber- attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).

Advanced Persistent Threat Malware infection of individual computers

Comprehensive countermeasures for malware infections such as prevention of access to malware propagation websites by collaborating with ISPs and so on. Started in November 2013.

Malicious attacks (e.g. DDoS) caused by Malwares

Among individual Internet users, fraud such as unjust remittance of funds has appeared by way of malware infections through websites. Malicious activities such as DDoS etc. which are caused by Malwares have been frequently

  • bserved and have affected

Japanese business.

ACTIVE

(Advanced Cyber Threats response InitiatiVE)

CYDER

(CYber Defense Exercise with Recurrence)

PRACTICE

(Proactive Response Against Cyber-

attacks Through International Collaborative Exchange)

Understanding of current status by analyzing APT, considering defensive models for APT and capacity building through practical defensive exercises participated in by the public and private sectors. Started in September 2013. R&D and field trials for grasping symptoms of attacks and acting quick response to cyber-attacks by deep analysis and constructing networks through international collaboration to exchange cyber-security

  • information. Started in August

2011.

MIC’s Ongoing Projects

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

ACTIVE(Advanced Cyber Threats response InitiatiVE)

  • “ACTIVE(Advanced Cyber Threats response InitiatiVE)” is a project of

providing comprehensive countermeasures against malware by collaborating with ISPs, anti virus vendors, and so on.

  • Aiming at preventing malware infection and cleansing malware, ACTIVE

will alert Internet users who don’t recognize malware infection.

(1)Gathering information on malignancy website (2)Alerting(user) (3)Alerting (web-site administrator) (1)Infection detected (2)Alerting (3)Exterminati

  • n

(1)Identifying user’s PCs infected by malware. (2) Sending an alert email to the users to make them aware of current infected condition. (3)Exterminating malware by complying with instructions in the email. (1)Listing information on malignancy websites. (2)Alerting users when they are accessing malignancy websites. (3)Alerting administrator of malignancy websites.

Alert! This website is malicious. Would you really like to access? Yes No

(i)Approach for preventing malware infection (ii)Approach for malware extermination

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

CYDER(CYber Defense Exercise with Recurrence)

  • Large scale emulated network of a thousand staff level organizations.
  • Practical cyber exercise based on real Advanced Persistent Threat.
  • 293 people from 33 organizations such as national government agencies(e.g.,

MOD, NISC, MOFA, MOJ), incorporated administrative agencies and private businesses (critical infrastructure sectors), etc. participated in groups of three or four people through ten CYDER session.

Staff to imitate attacker supporting imitation attack Staff to imitate business operator

  • r chief of participant supporting

exercise

Staff room

Firewal l DNS E-mail Web DMZ LAN File AP server DB

Participants Participants

Exercise venue

Instructor and assistant Secret

DC

Staff supporting

  • peration

Large scale emulated LAN

  • Strengthen ability of LAN administrators in government agencies, large

enterprises to tackle Advanced Persistent Threat.

  • Develop a defensive model through experiences obtained by conducting

CYDER repeatedly. Features

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

In order to realize Secure and trust communication environments against new types of cyber-attacks, analysis

  • f new attack behaviors and development of effective protection model should be carried out, and practical

cyber-security exercise against new cyber-attacks should be conducted among public/private participants.

CYDER: Analysis, Protection-Model and Exercise against Cyber-Attacks

Analysis of Cyber-attacks

・・・ !!! %$%

Targeted e-mails Analysis of Malware Specific behaviors

Utilizing the resulsts Practice of Protection Model Improve the Model Improving methods

Utilizing the results

Feed-back

Study of Protection Model Verification s of Protection Model for SMEs

Systems in The Organizations

Studies for method

  • f protections

against attacks Attacker

Operations of Practical Exercise Practical Scenarios

LAN Admin

Test-bed For the exercise

Collaborations

VPN

Virus, etc. Internet

Se Security Contr trols by y ISP SPs Net etworks a and Systems a are e shared ef effici iciently

SME SME SME SME

Analysis Protection Model

Practical Exercise

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

PRACTICE

As of Sep. 2014, 8 foreign countries have participated in the PRACTICE project. It is expected to cover more than 10 countries by the end of 2015. We have succeeded in finding some symptoms of Cyber- Attacks through R&D of analyzing Cyber attacks such as DDoS. Symptoms will be utilized in the actions taken by ISPs for their Early

  • Response. The actions will be direct

action (e.g. Filtering / Port Blocking) and/or be connected with ISP readiness against Cyber-Attacks among international participants.

International Collaboration

NL, FR… Indonesia Thailand Malaysia The Philippines Singapore Maldives

Global Monitoring

Real-time capturing attack traffic by using “darknet sensors” located in many foreign regions.

Analysis

Based on data-mining and correlation technologies, collected data/traffic are deeply analyzed.

Quick Response

Symptoms and new malware behavior will be an effective trigger of quick Response.

(Proactive Response Against Cyber-attacks Through International Collaborative Exchange)

India

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

15 3/21/2015

Joint Press Statement for The Second India - Japan Joint Working Group under India-Japan ICT Comprehensive Cooperation Framework New Delhi, December 03, 2014

During the conference, Japan made a proposal for candidates of joint projects involving the said priority areas, and as a result of discussions, it was decided to work on the following five projects as India-Japan joint projects to be implemented. 1) Green ICT - Green Mobile Base Station project 2) Cyber Security Cooperation - Japan-India Combat Spam project 3) Cooperative project for detecting symptoms and quick response to cyber attacks (PRACTICE) 4) ICT for Disaster Management (ICT4DM) - ICT Use in disaster-affected areas project 5) ICT Application for Social and Economic Challenges - National ID Application and Utilization Platform project MCIT, India and MIC, Japan will coordinate the activities for taking these projects forward by discussing with the industry from both sides.

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting GISFI TTC/??

Japan India

Government (MIC) ・ICT Security Office Advanced R&D

  • Malware Collection & Analysis
  • Cyber Attack Detection

Field Trial (Telecom-ISAC Japan) Government level

Proactive Response Scheme against Cyber-attack with ISPs

Research Institutes

PRACTICE Project

ISPAI (ISP group) Government (MCIT) ・ICERT Operational level Research level NEC

University and Research institute

CERT

Future work

India - Japan collaboration framework: High Level

Standardization level

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17 3/21/2015

PRACTICE Collaboration with India

 Oct 3, 2013

 Japan-India ICT Public-Private Partnership Dialogue

 Aug 22, 2014

 Sensor implementation at NEC India (Chennai) and started

cyber-attacks data sharing

 Agreement between NEC and PRACTICE members (NDA)

 Sep 1, 2014

 Brainstorming Workshop on 5G Standardization: WISDOM

 Mar 14, 2015

 This meeting (second joint-workshop of GISFI & PRACTICE)

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting Project Overview

18

Building a cooperative structure betw een Japan and India for Detecting Symptoms and Quick response to Cyber Attacks

  • A R&D project, called PRACTICE, for detecting symptoms of cyber-attacks and taking proactive

responses by collection and analysis of attack information thorough international collaboration. Current status (Overall project)

  • Global Monitoring : 8 foreign countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Netherlands, Philippines,

Singapore, Thailand, and US, have participated in PRACTICE (except India). Current status (Collaboration with India)

  • Research level collaboration : Installed a sensor of PRACTICE at the Chennai brunch of NEC in

India (with Dr. Anand Prasad) and started data exchange on August 22, 2014.

  • Governmental level collaboration : Had discussions with CERT-In. We are expecting to have a

meeting/discussion with them for further collaboration.

Global Monitoring Real-time capturing of attack traffic by using “darknet sensors” located in many foreign regions. Analysis Based on data-mining and correlation technologies, collected data/traffic is deeply analyzed. Quick Response Symptoms and new malware behavior will be an effective trigger of quick response.

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

19 3/21/2015

Information from the Sensors located in India

PRACTICE: Research Level Collaboration

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20 3/21/2015

Distribution of source host’s location monitored by a darknet sensor in India

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21 3/21/2015

Comparison with Japanese sensor’s data (march, 2015)

Distribution of source country is not so different each other Japan India

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22 3/21/2015

Comparison with other sensor’s data (march, 2015)

Several ports can be found India Japan all 8807/tcp scan is carried out in order to search for vulnerabilities regarding to Web Servers “Apache Mod_SSL Apache-SSL” Buffer Overflow vulnerabilities. 9064/tcp scan is carried out in order to search for open proxies.

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23 3/21/2015

Information from the Sensors located in Japan

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Atlas: Real-time Cyber-attack Visualization by darknet monitoring

  • Visualizing incoming packets at our darknet (240,000 unused IP addresses)
  • A packet (represented by a rocket) is traversing from source to destination
  • Color of the rocket indicates the type of packet
  • Altitude of the rocket is in proportion to its destination port number

TCP_SYN TCP_SYN_ACK UDP ICPM

2014 From India

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25 3/21/2015

2015/3/1 1184559 31229 20388 1236176 2015/3/1 568746 2015/3/2 1384364 48902 38996 1472262 2015/3/2 579010 2015/3/3 1645330 37853 139214 1822397 2015/3/3 675514 2015/3/4 2012464 44207 43659 2100330 2015/3/4 639833 2015/3/5 1433883 53881 37410 1525174 2015/3/5 568489 2015/3/6 1343279 47640 21416 1412335 2015/3/6 553285 2015/3/7 1407878 48282 28727 1484887 2015/3/7 554030 2015/3/8 1299106 55299 18279 1372684 2015/3/8 615964 2015/3/9 1470418 58662 38137 1567217 2015/3/9 619184 2015/3/10 1824699 52588 40667 1917954 2015/3/10 724630 2015/3/11 1269618 54259 40091 1363968 2015/3/11 391632 2015/3/12 1260787 56537 41082 1358406 2015/3/12 294473

date tcp packet counts udp packet counts icmp packet counts ALL packet counts date 23/tcp packet counts

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

DAEDALUS by NICT

(Direct Alert Environment for Darknet And Livenet Unified Security)

Daedalus Ikaros

Introduction of a new function

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Goal and Mechanism of DAEDALUS

Goal:

Utilize the darknet monitoring results for securing the livenet.

Mechanism: if (nicter receives packets from a cooperative organization)

alert;

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System Overview

nicter

: Darknet : Livenet

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

Internal Darknet Alert (Local Scan)

Case 1 nicter

: Darknet : Livenet : Infected Host

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

External Darknet Alert (Global Scan)

: Darknet : Livenet : Infected Host

Case 2 nicter

Darknet Traffic

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

External Darknet Alert (Backscatter)

nicter

Darknet Traffic

Case 3

: Darknet : Livenet : DDoS Victim

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activities toward the next GSFI meeting

DAEDALUS