CSE543 Computer and Network Security Module: Cloud Computing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CSE543 Computer and Network Security Module: Cloud Computing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

CSE543 Computer and Network Security Module: Cloud Computing

Professor Trent Jaeger

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Cloud Computing Is Here

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Why not use it?

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

What’s Happening in There?

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

From Data Center to Cloud

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

From Data Center to Cloud

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

From Data Center to Cloud

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Reasons to Doubt

  • History has shown they are vulnerable to attack
  • SLAs, audits, and armed guards offer few guarantees
  • Insiders can subvert even hardened systems

5

‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11

903 678 695 986 770 641

Data Loss Incidents External 54%

Unknown 7%

Insider 16% Accidental 23%

Incident Attack Vector

Credit: The Open Security Foundation datalossdb.org

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

What is Cloud Computing?

  • Cloud vendor provides computing resources for

rent by customers

  • What do you want to rent?
  • Hosts (Infrastructure as a Service)
  • Rent cycles: Amazon EC2, Rackspace Cloud Servers
  • Environment (Platform as a Service)
  • Rent instances: Microsoft Azure, Google App Engine
  • Programs (Software as a Service)
  • Rent services: Salesforce, Google Docs
  • Other variations can be rented

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

What is Cloud Computing?

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

IaaS Cloud Example

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Client

Scheduler Network Controller Cloud Database Message Queue Volume Store Image Store

Cloud API

Cloud Customer

Cloud Node

Instances

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Laboratory Page

Multiple Stakeholders

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Cloud Node Cloud Instance (VM) Client Data

Clients Service Providers Cloud Administrators

Is my platform secure? Are my services running correctly? Are my data protected?

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Service

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

Cloud Platform

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

VM

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

VM

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

VM

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM VM VM

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

VM

Cloud Complexity

  • Cloud environment challenges
  • Opaque, Complex, Dynamic
  • Insiders, Instances, Co-hosting

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Client

Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node Cloud Node

VM VM VM

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Insider Threats

  • May trust the cloud vendor company
  • But, do you trust all its employees?
  • Insiders can control platform
  • Determine what software runs consumers’ code
  • Insiders can monitor execution
  • Log instance operation from remote
  • Insiders may have physical access
  • Can monitor hardware, access physical memory, and

tamper secure co-processors

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Insider’s Physical Access

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

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Server

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

PKI

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

PKI

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes

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Server Cloud Node

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Cloud Nodes

  • Clouds manages node provisioning
  • Administers PKI for machine identities
  • Network installs a master disk image and customizes
  • Node is essentially a static hosting utility
  • Should not require persistent changes at runtime
  • Should only allow inputs to well protected interfaces

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Server Cloud Node

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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Quote(Installer,Image,FS,AIK)

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Root of Trust for Installation

  • Root of Trust for Installation (ROTI) [ACSAC 2007]
  • Binds the filesystem to a known installer (origin)
  • Prevent persistent changes across reboots
  • Detect system reboot and reverify

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ROTI Proof

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

netROTI [IEEE S&P 2011]

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  • Need to measure entire installation process
  • Network installation receives untrusted inputs
  • Bootstrap installation from a measured launch environment

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

netROTI [IEEE S&P 2011]

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Preinstall Phase

Configure boot options Initialize RTM

Gather Phase

Gather installer client Initialize installer environment Measure installer Download disk image Measure disk image

Bootstrap Phase Download Phase Configure Phase

Customize disk image Measure filesystem

Proof Phase

Generate ROTI Proof

netROTI Proof: Sig( MLE, Installer, Image, FS, AIK)

  • Need to measure entire installation process
  • Network installation receives untrusted inputs
  • Bootstrap installation from a measured launch environment

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

netROTI [IEEE S&P 2011]

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  • Need to measure entire installation process
  • Network installation receives untrusted inputs
  • Bootstrap installation from a measured launch environment

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Evaluation

  • netROTI installed 10 Eucalyptus node controllers

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Evaluation

  • netROTI installed 10 Eucalyptus node controllers

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Evaluation

  • netROTI installed 10 Eucalyptus node controllers

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Evaluation

  • netROTI installed 10 Eucalyptus node controllers

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Evaluation

  • netROTI installed 10 Eucalyptus node controllers

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Instance Threats

  • Publisher of a pre-configured instance (AMI) may be

malicious or error-prone

  • Publishers determine the software
  • Instance could contain malware
  • Publishers may configure security policies
  • Could be insufficient to block adversaries
  • Publishers may run scans to detect problems
  • Malware detection may not find all malware, presuming

they are used correctly

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Instance Initialization

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*+,-,.' A5;$B"':521' *C'?@=-D89E"<! 0C'=F-D89E"<! G"D',6&">H89"' *+,-,.'

=F'=&5>83"' ,6%&869"-,.*+,-,.' Figure 2: VM instantiation in Amazon AWS. The Consumer chooses the image (AMI-ID), resources (Type), and availability zone (Region) for her VM on the Web Interface of the AWS Cloud App Store. Depending on the type of the AMI, the VM is instantiated (Instance-IDAMI-ID) either as (A) EBS-backed or (B) S3-backed.

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

SSH Study

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  • Publisher left an SSH user authentication key in

their AMI

  • Fortunately, Amazon agreed that this is a violation
  • Unfortunately, it was not an isolated problem
  • 30% of 1100 AMIs checked contained such a key
  • Also, pre-configured AMIs had SSH public host keys
  • Thus, all instances use the same host key pair
  • Implications?

Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Co-Hosting Threats

  • An instance co-hosted on the same physical

platform could launch attacks against your instance

  • Co-hosted instances share resources
  • Computer
  • CPU, Cache, Memory, Network, etc.
  • Shared resources may be used as side channels to

learn information about resource or impact its behavior

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Side Channels

  • Watch use of shared resource to learn secret value
  • Common case is the processor caches
  • Approach
  • Adversary tries to evict victim’s instructions/data from the

cache

  • To learn which instructions/data victim is using
  • Adversary has some means to observe a delay in the victim’s

processing

  • This works surprisingly well
  • Power usage is another useful side channel

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Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Resource Freeing Attacks

  • Setup
  • Victims
  • One or more

VMs with public interface

  • Beneficiary
  • VM whose performance we want to

improve (contend over target resource)

  • Helper
  • Mounts attack using interface

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Helper& VM# VM# Vic&m# Beneficiary#

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Resource Freeing Attacks

  • Side Channel is Cache
  • Suppose victim hosts static and dynamic web pages
  • Attack: shift resource usage via public interface
  • Normally, victim is scheduled and pollutes the cache
  • Approach lower scheduling priority
  • Make more CPU-bound

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RFA$intensi*es$–$*me$in$ms$per&second& 196%$slowdown$ 86%$slowdown$ 60%$ Performance$ Improvement$ Friday, November 30, 12

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Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page

Take Away

  • Cloud computing is established
  • In several manifestations -- IaaS, PaaS,

SaaS, ...

  • Running your jobs in a cloud

introduces some security challenges

  • Beware of insiders
  • Beware of pre-configured instances
  • Beware of co-hosted instances
  • We are just beginning to understand

the issues

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Friday, November 30, 12