Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs A B C Z - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs A B C Z - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

0 Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs A B C Z Hannes Gross , Manuel Jelinek, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Unterluggauer, and Mario Werner Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications Graz University of


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D O M

Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs

Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs

Hannes Gross, Manuel Jelinek, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Unterluggauer, and Mario Werner Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications Graz University of Technology

A B C Z

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Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs

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C

This work in one slide…

  • V-scale processor (RISC-V)

+

  • Domain-Oriented Masking

=

  • SCA protected V-scale
  • arbitrary protection level
  • flexible and updateable
  • transparent to software designers
  • open source:

https://github.com/hgrosz/vscale_dom

A B Z d + 1

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This work in numbers…

Unprotected

2.6 k 1.0 k 3 LUTs 1 registers 1 random bits pipeline stages

1st-Order

4.1 k 1.8 k 64

4 2nd-order

5.6 k 2.5 k 192

4

+ 57% + 80% + 37% + 39%

1) for Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA

3 ∗

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Motivation

Masking is…  very effective SCA countermeasure  cumbersome  error prone  requires expertise  lots of evaluation work  for specific implementations  decomposition of complex functions  slows down the implementation

  • traces
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Boolean Masking from Different Perspectives

Boolean masking Masking Sharing ⋯ …

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Domain-Oriented Masking

CIRCUIT (insecure) CIRCUIT (insecure)

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Domain-Oriented Masking

  • ← 2
  • ← 2

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Domain-Oriented Masking

CIRCUIT (insecure) CIRCUIT (insecure)

, , … Domain A , , … , , … Domain B , , …

1 domains

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Linear Operations

Domain B

Domain A

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Nonlinear Operations

Domain B Domain A Z

  • `
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Protecting Arbitrary Circuits

CIRCUIT (insecure) CIRCUIT (insecure) transform

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  • Order Secure AND Gate
  • DOM-indep

Multiplier DOM-indep Multiplier

… …

  • 1. Calculation
  • 2. Resharing
  • 3. Integration
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  • 1. Calculation

⋯ ⋯

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  • 1. Calculation

⋯ ⋯

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  • 2. Resharing

⋯ ⋯ ⋯

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  • 2. Resharing

⋯ ⋯ ⋯

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  • 3. Integration

⋯ ⋯ ⋯

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RISC-V ISA

  • free and open RISC ISA
  • register sizes 32, 64 or 128 bit
  • only base integer instructions (I, E) mandatory
  • lots of extensions
  • multiplication/division (M)
  • atomic operations (A)
  • single- (F) and double-precision (D) floating

point ops

  • compressed instructions (C)
  • extensions (X)
  • no flags
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V-scale Processor

  • RV32IM instruction set
  • 32 x 32-bit registers
  • single-issue in-order 3-stage pipeline
  • combined decode & execute stage
  • write back stage with bypass functionality
  • AHB-Lite interface  either Harvard or von Neumann
  • open source

https://github.com/ucb-bar/vscale/

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DOM Protected V-scale Processor

  • High-level overview of changes
  • Protected (shared) parts
  • “I” instructions
  • data memory interface
  • register file
  • Unprotected parts
  • “M” instructions
  • instruction memory
  • instruction decoder
  • program counter
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DOM Protected V-scale Processor

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Protected ALU

  • Linear functions
  • Shifts
  • XOR
  • Nonlinear functions
  • AND (OR)
  • Adder
  • Two fresh random Z’s
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Protected Adder

  • Kogge-Stone Adder
  • Calculation split into “generate” and “propagate”
  • Logarithmic runtime (init. + 5 steps + postproc.)
  • Two Z shares
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Results

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Required Randomness

64 128 192 256 320 384 448 512 576 640 1 2 3 4

random bits protection order

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Influence on the Maximum Clock

10 20 30 40 50 60 1 2 3 4

fclk [MHz] protection order

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T-test – 1. Collect Traces for Constant Input

0x0001020304…

R

A

DOM V-Scale

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T-test – 2. Collect Traces for Constant Input

0x??????????…

R

B

DOM V-Scale

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T-test – 3. Calculate “t” Value

Null hypothesis: both trace sets have equal mean Pass criterion |t| < 4.5 for > 99.999% confidence

  • therwise fail
  • ||
  • ||
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T-test – Result

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Conclusions

  • SCA resistant RISC-V processor
  • DOM for arbitrary protection level

 Advantages

  • more flexible
  • transparent for SW designers
  • inherently a lot of noise
  • faster development of secure systems
  • faster than SW based masking
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Conclusions

 Drawbacks

  • requires a lot of randomness
  • slower than dedicated HW solutions
  • does not seal all leakages sources
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Concealing Secrets in Embedded Processor Designs

Hannes Gross, Manuel Jelinek, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Unterluggauer, and Mario Werner Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications Graz University of Technology

The HECTOR project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 644052. This work was partially supported by the TU Graz LEAD project "Dependable Internet of Things in Adverse Environments". This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 681402).