Competition and Consumer Authorities Ex-Post Analysis of Packaging - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Competition and Consumer Authorities Ex-Post Analysis of Packaging - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Impact Assessment of Interventions of Competition and Consumer Authorities Ex-Post Analysis of Packaging Waste Market De-Monopolization Amsterdam, 16 November 2016 Arno Rasek The views expressed are those of the Chief Economist presenter and

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 16 November 2016

Chief Economist Bundeskartellamt

Impact Assessment of Interventions of Competition and Consumer Authorities

Ex-Post Analysis of Packaging Waste Market De-Monopolization

Amsterdam, 16 November 2016 Arno Rasek

The views expressed are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bundeskartellamt.

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 2

Agenda

I.

The story

II.

The data set

  • III. The results

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 3

Collection and recycling of packaging waste is organized by “compliance schemes”

Other household waste: Monopoly of municipality (~450 local monopolies throughout Germany) Packaging waste: Former nationwide monopoly of DSD ; now: several competing compliance schemes (“Duale Systeme”)

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 4

Compliance scheme DSD enjoyed a monopoly until 2003

  • Yellow bin was introduced 1990-1995
  • Industry (producers, retailers) and government designed

DSD to be the only packaging waste compliance scheme

  • 500+ shareholders of DSD included predominantly

producers/retailers, but also waste management companies

  • DSD as “non-profit” company: DSD’s prices should equal

costs

  • DSD as “no operations” company: Operations were

performed by private and public waste management companies.

  • Yellow bin perceived as a joint national effort;

extensive promotion campaigns with The Green Dot

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 5

Competition authorities’ interventions eventually enabled market entry

  • Bundeskartellamt brought 20+ antitrust cases in the area of

packaging waste since 2000

  • Two antitrust cases brought by EU COM in 2001
  • First competing compliance scheme received regulatory

approval in 2003 (regional scope) – 2006 (nationwide) ; some fringe competition by individual take-back solutions since ~2001

  • Nine competing compliance schemes since 2008
  • Sector inquiry 2012:

evaluation of the effects that the de-monopolization had

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 6

Agenda

I.

The story

II.

The data set

  • III. The results

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 7

Almost ideal market conditions for conducting an ex-post evaluation

  • Clear market boundaries and homogeneous service:
  • service defined by Packaging Ordinance
  • customers (=retailer/producer) obliged to procure service
  • customers focus on price only (view it akin a tax)
  • No distortion by quality effects:
  • quality of collection defined by municipality
  • minimum recycling quotas defined by Packaging Ordinance
  • quality slightly improved over time
  • No distortion by quantity effects:
  • quantities of collected waste roughly constant

 Except for de-monopolization, market conditions remained basically unchanged for 20+ years

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 8

Data set covers a time span of 19 years ...

  • 11 years of monopoly and 8 years of competition
  • data collected through compulsory request for information
  • 100% market coverage: all 9 compliance schemes provided

all requested data / documents

  • requested data previously tested by auditing firms and

public authorities:

  • turnover (annual accounts)
  • quantities: compliance schemes are obliged to provide

waste authorities with a yearly proof of packaging waste collection, sorting and recycling (“Mengenstromnachweis”)  unparalleled time span and data quality if compared to other ex-post evaluation studies

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 9

... supplemented by rich information already in possession of BKartA

  • since 2003 yearly monitoring of DSD tenders for collection,

sorting and recycling: in-depth cost/quantity data for each municipality throughout Germany

  • dawn raid of waste service operators in 2003 (on suspicion
  • f bid rigging to the detriment of DSD)
  • several pieces of information from other BKartA proceedings

 in other ex-post evaluations, causality is typically established

  • nly indirectly (comparison with a control group – “DID”)

 this ex-post evaluation study is able to establish causality directly (through cost data, bidding data, etc.)

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 10

Agenda

I.

The story

II.

The data set

  • III. The results

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 11

Market share of DSD dropped down to 44%

100% 99% 96% 87% 76% 76% 63% 51% 44% until 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

16 November 2016

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Competition reduced prices by more than 50%

  • bn. Euro

0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5

Total cost 2.068 mn. € 962 mn. €

Aggregated turnover of all compliance schemes

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 13

Recycling quotas have not fallen

70% 68% 67% 63% 62% 64% 64% 72% 76% 74% 73%

Overall recycling ratio for „yellow bin“ materials

* Recycling ratios for 2003, 2008 and 2009 not representative due to statistical reasons. 16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 14

Competition unleashed a wave of innovation in recycling technology

  • significant investments by sorting plant operators after

introduction of competition

  • rapid transition from manual sorting of waste towards

automated sorting

  • increased sorting depth, e.g. separation of plastics by type,

thus enabling higher quality recycling

  • Aggregate cost of sorting and recycling dropped from

715 mn. Euro (2003) to 173 mn. Euro (2011)

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 15

How could competition reduce prices that much ?

DSD as a former non-profit company: High prices were not due to DSD earning monopoly profits, but rather due to inefficiencies during monopoly period (until 2003):

  • Inflated remuneration paid by DSD to contractors:
  • perating margins of DSD-contractors typically ~30%
  • Direct awarding of contracts without tendering procedure,

thereby selecting less efficient contractors

  • Lack of innovation

Competition led to drop of operating costs of compliance schemes (=costs of collection, sorting, recycling) by 54%

aggregated operating costs 2003: 1.777 mn. Euro aggregated operating costs 2011: 824 mn. Euro

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 16

De-monopolization resulted in huge consumer welfare gains

Very conservative assumptions for welfare estimation

  • e.g. monopoly price would have stayed equal, even though
  • inflation since 2003 more than 20%
  • prices for similar service (household waste) increased
  • additional high lump-sum markdown

(200 mn. Euro per year) Consumer savings for the years 2003-2011 at least 5,6 bn. Euro, possibly up to more than 10 bn. Euro

  • is there any other antitrust case worldwide which was

followed by an in-depth ex-post documentation of such a high consumer welfare gain?

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 17

Consumers save at least ~1 bn. Euro per year since 2008

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

lowest bound consumer savings

  • mn. €

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 18

Conception of results by sector stakeholders

  • stakeholders did not criticize methodology, data validity or

causality between de-monopolization and price drop

  • “criticisms”:

“competition drove wages down” (not true) “recycling should be improved” (competition link?) “there is still too much free-riding” (competition link?) “BKartA study is only a collection of data”

  • notion that competition cut prices by more than 50% is

accepted by all stakeholders

  • BUT: municipalities lobby for becoming the new monopolist

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de

Chief Economist Bundeskartellamt

Impact Assessment of Interventions of Competition and Consumer Authorities

Thank you for your attention!

Arno Rasek

The views expressed are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bundeskartellamt.

16 November 2016

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www.bundeskartellamt.de 20

BACKUP

16 November 2016

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Packaging ordinance 1991 introduced “yellow bin”

  • Packaging ordinance 1991 obliged manufacturers/retailers

to take back and recycle packaging waste, without (separately) charging waste generators (i.e. end consumers)

  • Obligation can be met by individual take-back or by

contracting a compliance scheme that assures collection

  • at/near households
  • free of charge
  • on a full-area coverage basis
  • In addition to existing waste containers (grey, blue, green),

new yellow bin for packaging waste was introduced

  • Full cost of take back and recycling system assigned to

manufacturers/retailers

  • Compliance scheme must meet recycling quota targets:

e.g. plastics 36%, composites 60%, tinplate 70%, aluminium 60%

16 November 2016

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Key function of a compliance scheme is to manage numerous contracts

Packer, bottler

  • r importer

Retailer Consumer Collecting

  • perator

Sorting

  • perator

Purchaser / recycler Compliance scheme Money flow Product / waste flow

16 November 2016