Communal Entrances Communal Entrances Building Regs AD Building - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction

Communal Entrances Building Regs AD Part Q – Unauthorised Access

Introduction

Communal Entrances Building Regs AD Part Q – Unauthorised Access

Company Profile

• Formed in June 2011
• Team have vast experience

in chosen field – incl Blast and Ballistic Protection

• SBD critical to our growth
• Leading UK Company -1st’s
• Website –

www.neosprotect.com

Official Police Security Initiative

Secured byDesign

Presentation Objectives

• 1) To get a consistent interpretation of the SBD

Standards to be used Nationally by ALL DOCO’s, ALO’s, CPO’s etc. At present some regions accept

• ne standard and other regions have a different

approach – confusing for all.

• 2) To stress the importance of long term

reliability and to apply the most appropriate performance Standard for high usage doors.

• CONSISTENT approach
• APPROPRIATE application
• = LONG TERM SECURITY ASSURED

Communal Entrances / Common Doors Communal Entrances / Common Doors

Communal Doors are not “just doors”. As our first focal point of contact with a building, they are integral to its architecture and appearance. They are a building's first protection against the outside world plus the first impression of the community spirit within – a damaged entrance can detract from the intended community spirit designers aimed to build. A communal door must be seen as - and be - a key point in the security and aesthetics of a building – however the many uses of these doors set them apart from “JUST DOORS”

The following is an extract from AD Part Q

This shows the main references covering security doors – very brief and nondescript . It however clearly shows that PAS24 standard is referring to doors with letterplates, door veiwers etc – ie doors into the house or apartment

Extract from AD Part Q

SBD Involvement

This is the important insertion that SBD managed to get included within the document. It advises that there are better tter (or more e appropr ropriate iate) standards that should be considered. SBD can advise further

Why PAS 24 as Headline Standard ?

Building Regs due to legal reasons can only include National Standards (BS/EN) within their documents as a cross reference to performance standards.

• However there is no BS/EN standard covering

doorsets and PAS standards occupy an intellectual space between National and Test house standards.

Wikipedia

• A

Publicly Available Specification

• r

PAS is a standardization document that closely resembles a formal standard in structure and format but which has a different development model

• The objective of a Publicly

Available Specification is to speed up standardization. PASs are often produced in response to an urgent market need

Why were further standards added ?

• PAS24 unfortunately is a limited Standard which had been

used extensively covering ALL types of doorsets and in many instances is not appropriate – use, risk, opportunity etc.

• However SBD were consulted during the writing of the

document and they were able to have further Test House Standards to be also referenced - STS202 BR2 and LPS1175 SR2 - though unable to be elaborated upon to fully explain their significance.

• Critically “Further advice is available in Secured by Design

“Homes 2014” was also inserted and this should guide Specifiers to you to help them through the appropriate

STS202 BR2 or LPS1175 SR2

• STS202

BR2 is a Test House Standard where the physical attack tests are carried out at EXOVA (UK) Ltd

• LPS1175

SR2 is a Test House Standard where the physical attack tests are carried out at BRE Ltd (LPCB)

Aide Memoir to Standards

Gene neral ral rule of thumb mb PAS 24 4 = = Private vate and Sing ngle le Doors rs ST STS202 02 = = Severa eral l Tenants nants

• r LPS 1175

5 = = Lots ts of People ple (

“HOMES 2016” DESIGN GUIDE

Communal Doorsets with a separate control panel (not a key) Section 2A Clause 27.2.2 and 27.3

Photograph courtesy of NEOS Protect Ltd

HOMES 2016 Design Guide

This clearly rly deals ls with h the high gh usage ge issue e that t these e doors sustain in and nd the ne need d to sp specify cify a hi a high gher er perfor formance mance to withs hstand tand the robust st usage ge and nd offer er a long ng term m solution tion over r the expected ected li life fespan span of f these se doors s = 20 = 20ye years ars plu lus

There may be instances – rural areas, tenancy, low crime neighbour-hood etc – that a more sympathetic approach may be applied and reduced security levels / designs are applied. However it is important to remember that security levels are constantly increased due to migration, changing economics etc and it may be prudent to plan ahead

DOCO’s Discretion

INVITATION TO TENDER COMMUNAL ENTRANCE DOORSETS AND ASSOCIATED PRODUCTS – CED1

• A National tender has been issued by LHC

following consultation with SBD and it is important that any regional queries reflect the guidance contained within the Tender Doc

• > 4 dwellings PAS 24 Main Entrances allowable
• 4 dwellings > STS202 BR2/ LPS1175 SR2
• Internal compartmental doors PAS24*

Internal Compartment Doors

• The general guidelines indicate, as these are 2nd

line defence, a lower security specification of PAS24 is allowable.

• NEOS disagree on this – these doors will also be

subject to high footfall, aggressive usage etc and as before if the “compartment” contains more than 4 flats it should be as the main entrance.

• Lower security can be achieved by using P1A

laminated glazing not STS tested double glazing.

• It is the assurance that these doors will not fail or

breakdown in a relatively short period of time that we feel is critical.

Other External /Internal Common Doors

• There are many associated external or internal

common doors that also require consideration against robust use, high risk (theft or arson),

• r alternative routes into the building core.
• Access controlled to allow monitoring of who,

and when.

• Fob entry reduces key replacement costs,

change of locks etc – fob simply deleted from system

Internal Lobby Doors

• If the mail delivery

is located with a foyer area the internal Lobby Door should be the same construction as the Outer Door – STS202 BR2 or LPS1175 SR2

Louvre Design Doorsets

• Louvred Doorsets

protecting high value bicycle sheds – louvre blades very weak, easily

• Refuse Stores – risk of

arson

• Louvred.

Louvre Panels are very weak (not really designed for doors) however they may house expensive bicycles / equipment and a target for theft. PAS24 tested doors would not truly test the robustness of the louvre blade inserts .

Refuse Stores

• Refuse Store doors are another optional route

into the building cores – tenants access from inside the building.

• Risk of arson

UG Car Park Doors

• Alternative entry

point into building cores.

• Car theft from

sheltered car parks

• Fire Resistant

performance from car fire

Internal Compartmental Doors

• High usage – robust construction
• Fire Performance – fire containment
• 2nd Line of Defence – P1A glazing in lieu of STS202

BR2 Glazing

Door Construction

• It is important that due consideration is made when

procuring high usage Doorsets. The new SBD Standards will ensure that a true “fit for purpose” product is installed and will eliminate the risk of obtaining a lower cost product which is claimed to be suitable, only to find, that in practice, this is not the case

• If End Clients, Designers and Developers apply these

Performance Specifications they will be assured of meeting all their responsibilities to provide a safe and secure environment for the tenants who will be inhabiting their Housing Schemes.

• All door components have been carefully selected to ensure

that the needs of all stakeholders are fully catered for and the doors will perform reliably for many years to come.

Manufacturers problems

NEOS Listing on SBD Website

We are re ke keen en to show the ful ull ra range e and

• pt

ptions

• ns that we can pr

provid ide e – the po potential ntial varia riation ion of door r designs igns howeve ever r are re never ver ending ing

Common sense approach

• We have completed 10No tests at between

£10k - £20k per test and yet we are still unable to meet every project design requirement.

• No sooner had we tested a 3m high doorset

the very next enquiry asked for a 3.5m high doorset.

• The 3m high door was secured on mechanical

locks to add to our portfolio but is not permissible with maglocks !!!

Why Maglocks ??

Instant release – user friendly Fast, Efficient - No Moving parts – Reliable – Fail safe – (emergency escape) 750kg holding force per maglock

NEOS unique attention to detail based upon experiences:- armature plate

Mechanical Locks

• Moving parts – so not instant release =

damage occurs by people pulling door when lock snib has not fully retracted

• Electric locks require armoured loops for

cables at hinge side which can get jammed or easily vandalised

• Electric strikes are often visible externally and

easily overcome

• Locks and keeps can be easily tampered with.

Minimum correct SBD Compliance Guide

Product Tested AND Accredited to SBD Recommended Standards LPS1175 SR2 or STS BR2 Level of Burglary Resistance. Product Tested with Electro Magnetic Locking Door opening mode – Inward or Outward Correct Glazing Tested, as required:- Polycarbonate for High Risk Locations or “All” Glass for Prestigious Housing Developments Door Style conformity – Full height glazing / 2XG Tested with Access Control Panel

Door Entry & Proximity Access Control.

• BS8300 6.5.4 & 5 States that the call panel

should be within 200mm of the locking system fitted to the door for wheelchair user’s access.

• This means that call panels and proximity

access control readers in many cases should be fitted within the door side screens.

• Only doors tested with the call panels and

Proximity readers fitted in the side screen at the time of the test should be acceptable.

Partnership

• NEOS Protect Ltd provide SBD Doorsets and Sidescreens
• We are working in conjunction with ENTROTEC Door Entry &

Proximity Access Control Manufacturer's to provide an incorporated call panel and system as part of the SBD STS202 BR2 test.

• However we have various Manufacturers systems that have successfully

passed when fitted within our NEOS Protect-AS Door assembly.

• The test was to make sure once the call panel had been removed that the

door could not be opened by “short circuiting” the wiring to release the door.

• The protection was manufactured and fitted in a way, that it neither access

to or interference with, the cables controlling the magnetic lock could be affected.

• Separate wiring systems between maglock and control panel power

Damaged Access Control during attempted illegal entry test STS202 BR2

Door Automation

• This is a regular request nowadays to assist

disabled persons access buildings safely (AD M and BS8300).

• Security Problems – tailgating
• Operational Problems – able bodied persons

pull / push the door - not prepared to wait until the opening cycle has been completed. Operator behaves erratically – stays in open position – building security breached

SOLUTION

Door operator fitted with a receiver. Designated persons given transmitters. Operator works as normal manual door closer for able bodied. Operator works on auto operation for designated persons only.

The scenario that is closest to satisfying safety v security requirements is as follows: The operator is commissioned to fully automatic mode with safety sensors which allows the doors to be

• pened more quickly than low energy set up. The size and weight of the doors need to be taken into

account. Able bodied users – the proximity reader would unlock the doors only for the able bodied users to push and pull the doors open manually like using a standard closer. This is the quickest cycle time as the hold open period is removed. (overall 5-6 seconds opening /closing cycle. as a standard door closer) If the power assist feature is applied to make the doors ‘lighter’ to open manually, the assist feature has an adjustable timer that dictates for how long the assist is applied to the door. If this is set to 1-2 seconds, this should not interfere with the immediate closing of the door. (the spring will only close the door once the assist has timed out. Disabled/Elderly Users – would be issued with a hand held RF transmitter as a dedicated means of triggering the door to unlock and then open automatically. The opening cycle would be typically 2-3 seconds from closed to ninety degrees. The hold open time will be determined by the age and mobility of the residents. On average this is normally set between 5-7 seconds. The closing cycle would typically be 2-3 seconds also. This reduces the cycle time down to around 10 seconds. Low energy cycle time is typically 15-17 seconds as the door is regulated to move more slowly.

Letterbox Banks

• There is only one tested

SBD letterbox bank product on the market provided by SBD Approved Supplier –DAD Group UK

Spot the Error

Break ak Glass located ted on th n the outside side

• f the building

lding ???

Se Secur ured ed by Des esig ign Leg egacy acy

It is critical therefore that a product does not only comply to SBD on Day One. It is very important that the integrity and security remains throughout the expected lifespan of the product > 20 years +. A doorset robustly tested to STS202 BR2 or LPS1175 SR2 not only meets the security performance but the testing involved confirms that it will withstand aggressive usage and a building security issue does not arise in the following months or years. A constantly damaged or failing entrance can detract from the intended community spirit designers aimed to build into these new developments.

We may not be Diva’s but NEOS know how to make a “Grand Entrance”