CLOUD SECURITY OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Click to edit Master title style CLOUD SECURITY � OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP � WORRYING AND LOVE THE � CLOUD PUBLIC Jakob I. Pagter Alexandra Instituttet A/S 1

About ”Alexandra Instituttet A/S” Click to edit Master title style • Non-profit application oriented research institution – focus on IT • GTS – Godkendt Teknologisk Service Institut • 100+ employees generating Commercial R&D • Development • Consultancy • Researchers • Providers • Ideation • Users • Networks • Dissemination inspiration

Essential Characteristics of Cloud Click to edit Master title style Computing On-demand self-service • provision computing capabilities automatically without requiring human interaction Broad network access • Capabilities are available over the network promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client Measured Service Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency Rapid elasticity • Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically provisioned, automatically, to quickly scale out or rapidly scale in Resource pooling • A sense of location independence. customer has no control or knowledge over the location of the resources

Cloud Service Models - Click to edit Master title style

NIST Visual Model of Cloud Computing Click to edit Master title style Definition

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Governance and compliance Click to edit Master title style • We have four datacenters in the US, two in Europe and two in Asia. Even though you choose to store your data in Europe instead of Worldwide, your data will be stored at least three times. Two times on your main location and one time at a secondary data center’ Statement MS Azure:

Click to edit Master title style Note: MS first movers on EU standard contract clauses

SLA’s Click to edit Master title style http://aws.amazon.com/message/65648/

Multi-Tenancy Click to edit Master title style Multi-Tenancy ¡ Separation ¡ • one program, need to • Solution that supports serve at the same time the Multi-Tenancy, capable of number of consumer creating separation organizations (Tenants) ¡ between the different Tenants ¡

Technical attack vectors Click to edit Master title style 1. Outsiders 2. Platform 3. Insiders 4. Neighbours

Business pros (and cons!) Click to edit Master title style Fate- Built-in sharing 2000 Economies Added Location $150.000 of scale Total Armbrust et al.: Above The Clouds , 2011 security Berkeley 2009 $1500 ? ? IaaS PaaS SaaS ? Cost Location/ Compliance Who Self service Agility • is on? • where? SLA’s • which Innovation data? Multi-tennancy/ Complexity Innovation Risk profile? Cost Virtualization Innovation År1 År2 År3 År4 År5 År6 År7 År8

Two problems Click to edit Master title style Technical protection Compliance • Adress specific problems • Law • Part of bigger picture • Regulations (e.g PCI, HIPAA, data protection) • Relies on proper technical measures

Two approaches Click to edit Master title style SLA’ing Ide Vurdering Analyse Realisering Security by design Security by design SLA’ing • Adapt to user capabilities • Exploit existing protection • Divide-and-conquer

But first – “go old school” Click to edit Master title style Probability Risk Very low Low Medium High Very high 1 2 3 4 5 Very low ” t p Impact ($$) e 1 c c A “ low 2 e t a g e l e Medium d / e c u d 3 e R High y l l u f e 4 r a c e c u d e R Very high 5 Good security is Good analysis is business driven ! knowledge driven !

Security by design using cryptography Click to edit Master title style • Adapt to user capabilities CSP • Exploit existing protection Security Own – Understand first! Security • Divide-and-conquer Total – Trust, classification, … Security IaaS PaaS SaaS • Understand context – Protection level <-> key sizes – What does and doesn’t crypto provide – When aren’t data encrypted • Don’t DIY • Protect the key!

Context – key sizes! Click to edit Master title style Level Protection Symmetric Asymmetric Hash 1 Attacks in "real-time" by individuals 32 - - Only acceptable for authentication tag size 2 Very short-term protection against small organizations 64 816 128 Should not be used for confidentiality in new systems 3 Short-term protection against medium organizations, medium- 72 1008 144 term protection against small organizations 4 Very short-term protection against agencies, long-term 80 1248 160 protection against small organizations Smallest general-purpose level, 2-key 3DES restricted to 2 40 plaintext/ciphertexts, protection from 2009 to 2012 5 Legacy standard level 96 1776 192 2-key 3DES restricted to 10 6 plaintext/ciphertexts, protection from 2009 to 2020 6 Medium-term protection 112 2432 224 3-key 3DES, protection from 2009 to 2030 7 Long-term protection 128 3248 256 Generic application-independent recommendation, protection from 2009 to 2040 8 "Foreseeable future" 256 15424 512 Good protection against quantum computers Baseret på www.keylength.com

Crypto check/wish list Click to edit Master title style Client-side encryption No trust in third parties Minimal user responsibility Full functionality

Dropbox case study Click to edit Master title style Data hidden to Dropbox Transparent integration

Storage-as-a-Service Click to edit Master title style Solution DYI Boxcryptor Secretsync completely Tahoe privatefiles Service(s) Anything dropbox dropbox box Any storage Client-side yes Yes/ yes yes yes encryption password based! Trust in third no no yes yes Divide-and- parties conquer Minimal no no (yes) (yes) no user responsibilit y Full no no no no no functionality

IaaS/PaaS Click to edit Master title style Built-in Added Total IaaS PaaS SaaS Solution DYI Porticor CipherCloud Tahoe Service(s) Anything AWS Salesforce etc. Any storage Client-side yes yes yes yes encryption Trust in third no Divide-and- no Divide-and- parties conquer conquer Minimal user no yes yes no responsibility Full no no tokenization no functionality

SaaS Click to edit Master title style Built-in Added Total IaaS PaaS SaaS Solution DYI Ciphercloud Voltage Service(s) Nope! Salesforce etc. SaaS eg. PCI Client-side yes yes yes encryption Trust in third no no no parties Minimal user no yes yes responsibility Full functionality no tokenization tokenization

Summary Click to edit Master title style Client-side encryption No trust in third parties Minimal user responsibility Full functionality

Crypto evolution Click to edit Master title style

More fancy abbreviations Click to edit Master title style SMC • Secure Multiparty Computation • Research since ’78 • “Practical” since 2008 ABC • Attribute-Based Credentials • Research since at least ’83 (blind signatures) • Software “previews” available: U-Prove (Microsoft) + IdentityMixer (IBM) 25 Alexandra – Sikkerhed og Innovation i Skyen

SMC: Shallow confidentiality Click to edit Master title style No real confidentiality web server.. Computation: decrypted! ?! Storage: encrypted Local computation

SMC: Deep confidentiality Click to edit Master title style Divide-and- web server.. conquer Security Performance Computation: encrypted! Storage: encrypted

SMC: energiauktion.dk (via partisia.com) Click to edit Master title style 100 90 80 70 2. Submit bids 1. Define Usage 60 auction 50 Base cost 40 30 SMC cost 20 (amortized) 10 0 Elasticity 0-2 2-4 6-8 10-12 14-16 18-20 22-24 2-3 4-6 8-10 12-14 16-18 20-22 3. Find => confidentiality! winner 4. Make the deal

ABC: Identity in the cloud (simplified) Click to edit Master title style Parent Citizen “When you have a hammer…” IdP Jakob Above 18 !!! Unique !!! person Jakob: Shop, Arto, Skat, Below 14 Love.dk, …

ABC: properties Click to edit Master title style Existing properties (digital signatures/IdP) New desirable properties • Identification • Non-traceable/anonymitet • Accountability – IdP can’t trace your transactions • Unlinkable/pseudonymitet – Eg. a provider can’t link your Can we have it profile in a merger with all? another provider • Verified claims – Eg. age og zipcode Yes we can! • Minimal disclosure

ABC: Credentials Click to edit Master title style Claims provider PKI: ID + pub key PKI: signatur 3. Proof of claim 1. “claims” (attributes) Using credential 2. credential(token) PKI: certificate

ABC: IdP vha. credentials (“on-demand”) Click to edit Master title style Claims provider 5. Signed token 2. Request 3. Request token token + credentials 1. Request access 4. Signed token

ABC: Anonymity Click to edit Master title style Claims provider CA can’t recognize user Claim certifed by CP 3. Alder > 18 1. “alder = 34” (attributes) 2. credential(token)

ABC: Pseudonymity Click to edit Master title style Claims provider 3. Alder > 18 1. Alder = 34 2. credential(token) 3. Alder > 15