CLASS 4: ASSEt pricing. The Intertemporal
- Model. Theory and
CLASS 4: ASSEt pricing. The Intertemporal Model. Theory and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
CLASS 4: ASSEt pricing. The Intertemporal Model. Theory and Experiment Lessons from the 1- period model If markets are complete then the resulting equilibrium is Pareto- optimal (no alternative allocation could make everyone better off).
2
3
4
Stationary, infinite horizon setting; infinite-lived agents with time-separable utility Two assets:
Equal number of two types of agents: Type I receives income
$15 in odd periods (total income is constant over time!) Type I starts with 10 trees and 0 bonds; Type II with 0 trees and 10 bonds Assets pay their dividend before a (trading) period starts; investors receive their income at that time as well Dividends/income is perishable (“cash”)
5
Cross-sectional: (Assuming risk aversion), tree is less expensive than bond (tree has higher “consumption beta”) Intertemporal: price levels move with fundamentals – the level of dividends of the “tree” Cross-sectional and intertemporal predictions reinforce each other Consumption (“cash”) is perfectly (rank-)correlated across states in equilibrium – Pareto optimality reached through dynamic completeness; investors fully insure income fluctuations by trading continuously – desired experimentally: trade is in subjects’ interest Sophisticated price risk hedging...
PERIOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 State H L L H L H Initial Holdings Tree 10 10 10 10 10 10 Bond Dividends Tree $1*10=10 $0*10=0 $0*10=0 $1*10=10 $0*10=0 $1*10=10 Bond $0.5*0=0 $0.5*0=0 $0.5*0=0 $0.5*0=0 $0.5*0=0 $0.5*0=0 Income 15 15 15 Initial Cash $10 (=10+0+0) $15 (=0+0+15) $0 (=0+0+0) $25 (=10+0+15) $0 (=0+0+0) $25 (=10+0+15) Trade Tree Bond Cash Change $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Final Holdings Tree 10 10 10 10 10 10 Bond CASH $ 10.00 $ 15.00 $ 0.00 $ 25.00 $ 0.00 $ 25.00
!
6
PERIOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 State H L L H L H Initial Holdings Tree 10 5 6 4 5 3 Bond 5 6 4 6 4 Dividends Tree $1*10=10 $0*5=0 $0*6=0 $1*4=4 $0*5=0 $1*3=3 Bond $0.5*0=0 $0.5*5=2.5 $0.5*6=3 $0.5*4=2 $0.5*6=3 $0.5*4=2 Income $0 $15 $0 $15 $0 $15 Initial Cash $10 (=10+0+0) $17.5 (=0+2.5+15) $3 (=0+3+0) $21 (=4+2+15) $3 (=0+3+0) $20 (=3+2+15) Trade Tree
+1
+1
+1 Bond +5 +1
+2
+1 Cash Change $0
+$10
+$10
Final Holdings Tree 5 6 4 5 3 4 Bond 5 6 4 6 4 5 CASH $ 10.00 $ 12.50 $ 13.00 $ 13.50 $ 13.00 $ 15.00
!
7
8
Investor maximizes lifetime consumption: max
∞
X
t=1
βt−1u(c(t)) subject to a budget constraint on consumption c(t), income/dividends and investment (in bonds and trees) First-order conditions from optimal plan: βE[
∂u(c(t+1)) ∂c ∂u(c(t)) ∂c
(p(t + 1) + d(t + 1))|I(t)] = p(t), where I(t) is information up to t (basically, only the dividend on the tree in period t), p and d denote prices and dividends, respectively Key: price anticipations are “perfect” (Radner 1972)
9
10
Holdings and Trading (Type I, who do not receive income in odd periods): Period Tree Bond (Total) Odd 7.57 0.62 (8.19) Even 2.03 7.78 (9.81) (Trade in Odd) (+5.54) (-7.16) Remarks:
Consumption smoothing – to the point that each Type consumes a fixed fraction of total available dividend (“cash”) (Sophisticated trading: buy the tree to hedge price risk) Lots of trading, desired experimentally (see also Crockett-Duffy, 2010)
11
At the end of each trading period, we roll a (twelve-sided) die If outcome is either 7 or 8, then we terminate the replication and subjects take home the cash they are holding at that moment; trees and bonds are taken away If the outcome is anything else, cash is forfeited and we move to the subsequent period, carrying over trees and bonds, which pay dividends that become cash (in addition to any income) Unlike Crockett-Duffy (2010), who use nonlinear payoffs in order to induce smoothing...
12
probability of continuing the replication
the end of the experimental session (fixed duration) has been reached, then subjects get to keep the cash for that period
13
probability of continuing the replication
the end of the experimental session (fixed duration) has been reached, then subjects get to keep the cash for that period
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Dividends from initial allocation
Income Trade to a final allocation
CASH Possible Termination of Session *If termination--keep CASH *If continuation--lose CASH, carry over “Trees” and “Bonds” Dividends from carried over allocation
Income Trade to a final allocation
CASH
Possible Termination of Session *If termination--keep CASH *If continuation--lose CASH, carry over “Trees” and “Bonds”
Etc.
14
15
Session Place Replication Periods Subject Number (Total, Min, Max) Count 1 Caltech∗ 4 (14, 1, 7) 16 2 Caltech 2 (13, 4, 9) 12 3 UCLA∗ 3 (12, 3, 6) 30 4 UCLA∗ 2 (14, 6, 8) 24 5 Caltech∗ 2 (12, 2, 10) 20 6 Utah∗ 2 (15, 6, 9) 24 (Overall) 15 (80, 1, 10)
16
17
18
Figure 2: Time series of Tree (solid line) and Bond (dashed line) transaction prices; averages per period. Session numbers underneath line segments refer to Table 4.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Period Price 1 2 3 4 5 6
19
Explanatory Tree Price Change Bond Price Change Variables Estim. (95% CI) Estim. (95% CI) ∆ State: (None=0; 0.19∗ (0.08, 0.29) 0.10 (-0.03, 0.23) High-to-Low=-1, Low-to-High=+1) R2 0.18 0.04
0.18
20
Consumption ($) Consumption Ratio Type High Low High Low I 14.93 (19.75) 7.64 (4.69) 1.01 (0.52) 1.62 (3.26) II 15.07 (10.25) 12.36 (15.31) Type Odd Even I 7.69 (2.41) 13.91 (20.65) II 14.72 (20) 11.74 (5) Positive rank correlation of end-of-period cash (vs. autarky) Sharing (of total cash) much closer to equal
21
Subjects did not hedge price risk (much) – they did not expect prices to move with fundamentals Resulting equilibrium is VERY different from Lucas model! ... but very much like in our experiments (stochastic drift, etc.) (Significant correlation between prices and fundamentals cannot easily be detected in 10-15 rounds)
22
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2012) also point out that even with only small mistakes in expectations about prices (assuming everyone knows underlying dividend processes!), equilibrium prices may look very different from the Lucas equilibrium – much more like in “the real world.” But Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2012) do not point out that equilibrium allocations could still be pretty much the same as in the Lucas equilibrium – and close to optimal! ... because our agents trade consistent with their expectations, and their expectations are almost self-fulfilling.
23
Figure 3: Time series of period-average Tree (red line) and Bond (blue line) transaction price changes. Changes are concatenated across all replications and all sesions, but exclude inter-replication observations. State is indicated by black solid line on top; state = 2 when High (tree dividend equals $1); state = 0 when Low (tree dividend equals $0).
10 20 30 40 50 60 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0.5 1 1.5 2 period price change (blue; red) and state (black) bond tree
24
Figure 4: Simulated equilibrium Tree (blue line) and Bond (green line) prices, first 100
equals $1); state = 0 when Low (tree dividend equals $0). Equilibrium is based on (false) agent beliefs that the past prices are the best prediction of future prices.
25
The cross-sectional pricing implications of the Lucas model are born out in the experimental data The intertemporal variation (predictability) in asset prices is far less than predicted (given cross-sectional difference) Subjects seem to have anticipated this and therefore reduce their demands to hedge against price risk; still, these anticipations are inconsistent in equilibrium (prices will – and do – depend on tree dividends even if this is not anticipated...) Nevertheless, the risk sharing properties of the Lucas equilibrium emerge: allocations are OK even if prices are wrong in one important dimension...
26