By Suleman Malik About Me About Me Suleman Malik is an independent - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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By Suleman Malik About Me About Me Suleman Malik is an independent - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Huntjng Bugs in Web App By Suleman Malik About Me About Me Suleman Malik is an independent security researcher and author specializing in web applicatjon security, IOS and Android applicatjon security. He has reported many security issues


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Huntjng Bugs in Web App

By Suleman Malik

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About Me

  • About Me

Suleman Malik is an independent security researcher and author specializing in web applicatjon security, IOS and Android applicatjon security. He has reported many security issues under the industry practjce of coordinated disclosure and he is listed in more than 50 Halls of Fame including Google, Microsofu, Intel, Sony, LinkedIN, Blackberry, Apple, Oracle, Huawei, US Department of Defense and so on. He has been featured in top cyber security magazines including hakin9 & Pentest magazine and also has been declared as one of top ten highest paid security researchers in the world. HackerOne CEO also has acknowledged his work and invited him to visit the United States

  • f America. Donald Freese, the director of FBi's cyber crime unit (NCIJTF) has

also endorsed his skills. Suleman is currently a full tjme student working toward his degree in computer forensics and security www.sulemanmalik.com

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Overview

  • Session Hijacking
  • Hacking Huawei accounts
  • RCE on Intel
  • Account takeover – Cisco
  • Pwd validatjon bypass in Blackberry
  • PostMessage vulnerability
  • Subdomain Takeover
  • Oauth token stealing
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  • Front end Cookies
  • Backend Cookies
  • Vulnerability Chaining

(XSS+Session)

Oracle, Shopify, ICloud, SourceForge & so on.

Session Hijacking

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  • Brup Suite
  • Cookies manager

Session Hijacking

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Huawei Endpoint Vulnerability

htup://webaccount.huawei.com/en/PersonalPost? jsonpUpdateRegBack=&type=2

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Huawei Endpoint Vulnerability

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Huawei Endpoint Vulnerability

Logged in with sulemanmalik003@gmail.com

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Intel - RCE/SSTI

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Intel - RCE/SSTI

{php}$s=fjle_get_contents(‘/etc/passwd’);var_dump($s);{/php}

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Cisco CSRF/XSRF Vulnerability

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Cisco CSRF/XSRF Vulnerability

Email confjrmatjon from Cisco

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Cisco CSRF/XSRF Vulnerability

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Cisco CSRF/XSRF Vulnerability

  • Request new password & BoOm
  • Victjm will no longer be able to access his/her account.
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Cisco CSRF/XSRF Vulnerability

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Password validatjon bypass in blackberry

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Password validatjon bypass in blackberry

  • No Param/Form – No validatjon
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Password validatjon bypass in blackberry

  • Using Burp Suite
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Password validatjon bypass in blackberry

  • Request new password on atuacker email and change the victjm

password with the atuacker password.

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PostMessage Vulnerability

  • What is PostMessage ?

The postMessage API is an alternatjve to JSONP, XHR with CORS headers and other methods enabling sending data between origins. It was introduced with HTML5 and like many other cross-document features it can be a source of client-side vulnerabilitjes.

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PostMessage Vulnerability To send a message, an applicatjon simply calls the "postMessage" functjon on the target window: targetWindow.postMessage("hello World!", "*"); And to receive a message, a “message” event handler can be registered on the receiving end: window.addEventListener("message", functjon(message){console.log(message.data)});

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PostMessage Vulnerability

Receiver must validate the origin of the message with the “message.origin” aturibute. If regex is used to validate the origin, it’s important to escape the “.” character, since this code: //Listener on htup://www.examplereceiver.com/ window.addEventListener("message", functjon(message){ if(/^htup://www.examplesender.com$/.test(message.origin)){ console.log(message.data); } }); Would not only allow messages from “www.examplesender.com“, but also “ wwwaexamplesender.com“, “wwwbexamplesender.com” etc.

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PostMessage Vulnerability

  • You can check if a page has a registered message listener (and

which script registered it) by using Chrome Devtools, under Sources -> Global Listeners:

  • A lot of third party scripts use postMessage to communicate

with the third party service, so your applicatjon might be using postMessage without your knowledge.

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Subdomain Takeover

  • 1. Search all subdomains with subdomain scanner.
  • 2. Check subdomain alias in the terminal by using

command #host example.com or #CNAME info.hacker.one

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Oauth Token Stealing

  • OAuth is an open standard for authorizatjon, commonly used

as a way for Internet users to log into third party websites using their Microsofu, Google, Facebook, Twituer, One Network etc. accounts without exposing their password.

  • In this atuack, the atuacker presents the victjm with a URL to

an authentjcatjon portal that the victjm trusts (like Facebook), and by using this authentjcatjon portal the victjm's secret access token is delivered to an HTTP server controlled by the atuacker.

  • Authentjcatjon is about intentjon, tricking a user into allowing

access to an unintended resource is a vulnerability.

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Oauth Token Stealing

Payload %2F%2F  // %5c%5c  \\ %3F  ? %23  # %40  @ The %2F%2F relates to " // " (forward slashes). The "two forward slashes" are a common shorthand for "whatever protocol is being used right now". Example request:- htup ://example.com/socialize.login?client_id=123456&redirect_uri=htup://victjm.com/& x_provider=facebook&response_type= token Forged request :- htup://example.com/socialize.login? client_id=123456&redirect_uri=htup://example.com%2f %2f.victjm.com/&x_provider=facebook&response_type=token Response :- htup://example.com//.victjm.com/?code=9999999999

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Oauth Token Stealing

ANY QUESTION?

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Oauth Token Stealing

Thanks