Brent Doberstein Banda Aceh, Indonesia Dec 26 2004 University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Brent Doberstein University of Waterloo

bdoberst@uwaterloo.ca Banda Aceh, Indonesia Dec 26 2004

• What is failure knowledge?
• Disciplines using failure knowledge
• Use in disaster recovery
• Theory
• Practice: 2 Cases

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• “…knowledge or understanding emerging from a

systematic analysis of failure”

• Ex-ante failure knowledge
• Testing an experimental design or system until it fails, then

improving design/system to avoid future failure

• Ex-post failure knowledge
• Investigating accidental failure, then improving design or

system

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• Aviation industry (ex-post)
• steady and consistent advances based on the

“meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306).

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• Aviation industry
• steady and consistent advances

based on the “meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306).

• Civil, Mechanical & Aeronautical

Engineering (ex-ante & ex-post)

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Tacoma Narrows bridge, USA

• Aviation industry
• steady and consistent advances based on the

“meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306).

• Civil & Mechanical Engineering
• Resource & Environmental

Management (largely ex-post)

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Failure knowledge

Failure Knowledge (ex-post)

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• “…knowledge or understanding emerging from a systematic

analysis of failure”

• Ex-ante failure knowledge
• Testing an experimental design or system until it fails, then

improving design/system to avoid future failure

• Ex-post failure knowledge
• Investigating accidental failure, then improving design or

system PROBLEM: Generally unadvisable to stage an intentional social failure… Failure knowledge in social sciences usually learning after unintentional failure (ex-post)

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• Disasters: confluence of hazardous potential (e.g.

flooding) & human vulnerability (e.g. living in a floodplain)

• Failure knowledge:
• reduce hazard potential
• reduce human vulnerability
• increase resilience in the face of disaster

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Pre- Disaster:

Mitigation & planning Hazard mapping Risk assessment Vulnerability assessment Regional planning Land use planning & zoning Insurance Incentives & penalties Protection structures Public education Emergency preparedness plan Disaster

Post- Disaster:

Recovery

Relief:

• Search/Rescue
• Medical
• Psychological
• Food aid
• Shelter

Rehabilitation

• Debris removal
• Public services

(water, elect)

• Housing
• Reconnect families
• Relocate

Recovery:

• Decrease vuln.
• Re-plan
• & DRR
• Rebuild

Does failure knowledge inform recovery? Challenges &

• pportunities?

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• Challenges: Chaotic environment
• Time pressure
• Simultaneous

relief/rehabilitation/reconstruction

• Multiple institutions & multiple agendas
• Disaster profiteering
• Resistance: “slow down & plan properly”
• Opportunities
• Aid $
• Coordinating body(ies)
• New disaster recovery paradigm (2005)

• 1. 1999 North Vargas State, Venezuela

debris flows (30-50,000 people est. killed);

• 2. 2004 Banda Aceh, Indonesia tsunami

(80,000 est. killed)

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• 900mm of rain in 24 hrs
• Simultaneous debris flows in 26

watersheds

• 30-50,000 killed
• Largest debris flow disaster in

recent global history

Case #1: Failure Knowledge, Disaster Causes

• Rainfall
• Settlement(s) location:
• Alluvial fans
• No watershed monitoring
• Lack of hazard-oriented zoning
• No warning/evacuation system
• Lack of public awareness of risk
• “No history of recent debris flows”
• Ineffective physical protection structures

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Case #1: Disaster Recovery

Little to no evidence failure knowledge influenced recovery

• Recovery Philosophy: “Rebuild largely as before (1999)”
• Physical protection structures
• Far too small
• Monitoring/warning/evacuation system
• Largely absent 9 years after disaster (one siren, one

community)

• Public awareness
• Initially high, but fading…no evidence of community awareness
• r preparedness exercises
• Zoning: unchanged post-disaster

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High water mark Evidence: massive flow volumes

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Small-scale Engineered Solutions

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2005 „mini-flood‟ 2008 Old flood deposits

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New Destroyed in 1999

Clock stopped when tsunami struck: 9:00am

• Earthquake >9.0 strongest in >40 years
• Banda Aceh “shook for over 8 minutes”
• Tsunami: 20 minutes after earthquake stopped
• >20% of city’s Pop’n killed

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Seismic energy radiated over the 1500 kms rupture zone Epicentre

Banda Aceh

• aftershocks

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Roof repair showing evidence

• f tsunami’s height

Former hospital

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Case #2: Failure Knowledge, Disaster Causes

• City location (coastal, near known fault line)
• Lack of tsunami awareness
• Lack of monitoring/warning/evacuation

system

• Housing design (single story)

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March 2009

Significant evidence failure knowledge  recovery

• Recovery Philosophy: “Build Back Better”
• Tsunami-resistant housing + relocation villages
• Comprehensive monitoring, warning & evacuation

system

• Commitment to learning/failure knowledge
• Public awareness & Evacuation preparedness

Case #1: Disaster Recovery

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Different styles: Many tsunami resistant

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Banda Aceh Relocation Village

Escape building

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Tsunami research & training

Networking: South-south-north cooperation

Tsunami warning drill: November 2008

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Failure knowledge

Assess & mitigate all disaster causes Social learning Community-Based Disaster Recovery (CBDR) Failure knowledge “Platforms” (collective learning/decision- making bodies)

“The only good thing about the bad things are the lessons learned…”

(Disaster survivor, 2005)

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Brent Doberstein University of Waterloo

bdoberst@uwaterloo.ca

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