based Deep Networks Hang Zhou 1 Dongdong Chen 2 Jing Liao 3 Kejiang - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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based Deep Networks Hang Zhou 1 Dongdong Chen 2 Jing Liao 3 Kejiang - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

LG-GAN: Label Guided Adversarial Network for Flexible Targeted Attack of Point Cloud- based Deep Networks Hang Zhou 1 Dongdong Chen 2 Jing Liao 3 Kejiang Chen 1 Xiaoyi Dong 1 Kunlin Liu 1 Weiming Zhang 1 Gang Hua 4 Nenghai Yu 1 1 University of


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LG-GAN: Label Guided Adversarial Network for Flexible Targeted Attack of Point Cloud- based Deep Networks

Hang Zhou1 Dongdong Chen2 Jing Liao3 Kejiang Chen1 Xiaoyi Dong1 Kunlin Liu1 Weiming Zhang1 Gang Hua4 Nenghai Yu1

1University of Science and Technology of China 2Microsoft Research 3City University of Hong Kong 4Wormpex AI Research

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Problem

Point shifting/adding/dropping car

Adversarial example attack

house

Threat!

Neural network

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Motivation

Related work

Current attack methods:

  • Optimization-based:

High attack success rate/slow runtime/visible outliers

  • Gradient-based:

Fast runtime/low attack success rate

  • riginal

point cloud

  • ptimization

based adversarial example gradient based adversarial example

Motivation

Generation based adversarial examples will avoid creating

  • utliers and be fast in generation with high attack success

rates.

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Framework

real/fake? 𝒬

NΓ—3 NΓ—3

ΰ·  𝒬 Label encoder

padding

Target label 𝑒 Multi-level Feature integration Reconstruction loss Attacked model Prediction Classification loss Decoder

aggregation interpolation

… … …

FC

Point cloud encoder

sampling feature learning

conv conv conv N N/2 N/4 N/8

Prediction Discriminative loss Discriminator

feature learning

residual graph conv pooling conv

residual block

conv conv

…

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Objective loss functions

ℒ𝒣 = β„’π‘‘π‘šπ‘‘ + 𝛽ℒ𝑠𝑓𝑑 + 𝛾ℒ𝑒𝑗𝑑 Generator: β„’π‘‘π‘šπ‘‘ = βˆ’ 𝑒 log β„‹ ΰ·  𝒬 + 1 βˆ’ 𝑒 log β„‹ 1 βˆ’ ΰ·  𝒬 where ℒ𝑠𝑓𝑑 is β„“2 distance ℒ𝑒𝑗𝑑 ΰ·  𝒬 = 1 βˆ’ πΈπœ„ ΰ·  𝒬

2 2

Discriminator: ℒ𝐸 𝒬, ΰ·  𝒬 = 1 2 πΈπœ„ ΰ·  𝒬

2 2 + 1

2 1 βˆ’ πΈπœ„ 𝒬

2 2

ΰ·  𝒬 = π’£πœ„ 𝒬, 𝑒

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Results

clean plane C&W L2 attack C&W chamfer attack C&W hausdorff attack C&W cluster attack C&W object attack IFGM attack (to toilet) LG attack (to sofa) LG-GAN attack (to lamp) Single-layered LG-GAN attack (to vase)

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Results

Table: Attack success rate (%, second to fourth column), distance (fifth-sixth column) between original sample and adversarial sample (meter per object) and generating time (second per object) on attacking PointNet. β€œTarget” stands for white-box

  • attacks. The hyper-parameter setting of two gray-box attacks is: for the simple random sampling (SRS) defense model,

percentage of random dropped points is 60%∼90%; for DUP-Net defense model, k = 50 and Ξ± = 0.9 from [39]. The default LG-GAN (ours) consists of multi-layered label embedding, β„“2 loss and GAN loss.

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Thank You