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Bail-in: Origins & Implementation Wilson Ervin Vice Chairman May 2015 This document and the information contained therein may not be reproduced in whole or in part or made available without the written consent of the author. The views


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Bail-in: Origins & Implementation

Wilson Ervin Vice Chairman

May 2015

This document and the information contained therein may not be reproduced in whole or in part or made available without the written consent of the author. The views contained in this document and presentation reflect those of the author.

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The “Great Financial Crisis” caused major d damage . . . . . . exposing a n need f for d deep system r reform

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20 40 60 80 100 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09

Phase 1: 1: Asset shock Phase 2

Lehman fails

  • 1. An asset class crisis (mortgages, esp. USA)
  • 2. Wall St fails – Systemic risk dials go to “eleven”
  • 3. Europe suppresses Phase 2 – but hit by (delayed) “doom loop”

Phases of the GFC

TBTF is the key GFC reform

Systemic Crisis

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Equity Volatility (VIX)

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Basel 2.5, Basel 3, Basel 4 . . . No Basel Leverage Rules Central Clearing OTC transparency New Securities Rules Radical transparency Stop short selling / CDS Procyclicality Core Capital Hybrid capital Resolution Funds Coco’s Resolution / Bail-in Volcker Rule Macro-prudential Systemic Regulation Regulatory Consolidation Consumer Protection Compensation Reform Bonus Taxes, Bonus Caps Deferrals, Clawbacks Liquidity Rules Stop Rehypothecation Repo Reform Money Market reform Intrusive supervision Vickers / Liikanen Ring-fencing National firewalls (US IHC) Glass – Steagall Subsidiarization Narrow Banking Size curbs – break ‘em up Board Governance Living Wills Bank Taxes Transaction Taxes More Mark-to-market . . . less Mark to market

Many reforms proposed . . . but one is central

Addressing the problem of ‘too big to fail’ is

the next c central step in the reform program

  • Mario Draghi

If t the crisis has a s single lesson, , it i is t that the ‘too big to fail’ problem must be solved

  • Ben Bernanke

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So . . . . . . How d do w we actually s solve T TBTF?

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Some initial proposals to address TBTF

  • 1. Hard-nosed principles – just don’t do bail-outs!
  • 2. Good-bank / bad bank strategies?
  • 3. Forced M&A?
  • 4. Narrow Banking?
  • 5. Break up the big banks?
  • 6. Better regulation – just prevent failure
  • 7. Living Wills?
  • 8. ?

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Solving the TBTF Puzzle – 4 key pieces

  • 1. Why was Lehman so bad (a.k.a. the missing

$100bn question)?

  • 2. How do other industries handle failure? Are

banks different?

  • 3. Santa Fe Question: How resilient are the

“nodes” of the financial system?

  • 4. Coco initiatives: Flannery, Squam Lake, etc.

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Too Big T To F Fail? a ( (simplified) example

Total Assets / 600 Total Liabilities Senior Liabilities

Debt, Clients &

550

Counterparties

Pref/ Sub. Debt 25

Equity

25 Asset losses (25) Zero Equity: Insolvency !

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Too Big T To F Fail? a ( (simplified) example

Total Assets /

600

Total Liabilities Senior Liabilities

Debt, Clients &

550

Counterparties

Pref/ Sub. Debt

25

Equity

25

Asset loss

(25)

Bankruptcy Losses (+100)

1.

  • 1. Enormous extra

value destruction 2.

  • 2. “Replication risk”

high ( (correlation AND contagion) 3.

  • 3. “Runs” become

highly rational 4.

  • 4. System becomes

unstable . . . . . . Bankruptcy Estate

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1.

  • 1. Separate senior liabilities

into “operational” and “financial” (i.e. term debt) 2.

  • 2. Fast “Chapter 11” recap

3.

  • 3. Re

Re-cap i investor capital for losses A AND strong new equity (25 25050) 50) 4.

  • 4. Preserve value via “going

concern” strategy 5.

  • 5. $ L

$ Losses << << liquidation 6.

  • 6. No loss o
  • f k

key functions

Key E Elements

AFTER

Total Assets 600 575 “Operational Liabilities”

Clients &

430 430

Counterparties

Senior Debt 120 95 Pref/ Sub. Debt 25 Equity 25 50

BEFORE

Asset losses

(25) No change for clients/ customers Debt 20% converted to equity 0 / warrants

investors

Too Big T To F Fail? a ( (simplified) alternative

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Bail-in - Adapting “Chapter 11” for banking

Chapter 11 evolved as a tool to preserve franchise value & continuity

1) Works on the liability side of the balance sheet – restores solvency internally − Single point of control - Avoids need for merger partners, or asset buyers − Not an asset liquidation tool - mitigates ‘fire sale’ discount & pressure on markets 2) Chapter 11: Challenges for Banks: a) Bank failure moves too fast for traditional Chapter 11 legal process b) Unlike other businesses, many bank customer activities occur on the liability side (e.g. deposits, swaps, payments). A strict pari passu process could impair the “franchise” adding significant costs faster than capital was created (e.g. Lehman swap unwind) 3) Bail-in separates “capital structure liabilities” from “operational liabilities” − Operational liabilities are protected to preserve franchise value & market stability Continuity tools like the 2014 ISDA protocol and x-border recognition are key − Capital structure liabilities convert to new equity via standard Chapter 11 techniques 4) Bail-in uses fast track procedure to preserve confidence and critical functions − Typically includes a Resolution Authority with special legal powers − RRP’s can provide a stand-by “pre-pack” for the RA (if designed properly) − Solvency, liquidity, and operations need to be clear by Monday morning − Other elements (e.g. precise valuation and allocation) can take much longer

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Resolution - Rapid Global Progress

BRRD / SRM

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Special Resolution Regime (Bridge tool) Swiss Expert Commission 10% Equity + 9% Cocos Swiss BIO FINMA “SPE Bail-in is primary strategy” Dodd Frank FDIC adopts SPE Bail-in ICB (Vickers) Ring Fence & Bail-in “Key Attributes” Selected countries

Protocol

TLAC

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Common Critiques and Commentary:

1) Bail-in is new and untried

  • Bail-in is built on straightforward Chapter 11 concepts - substantial real-world testing

2) Bail-in will only work for one-off, idiosyncratic bank failures.

  • Bail-in can (& must) work for multi-bank crises (ex ante, we don’t know type of crisis)
  • Beneficial effects for the system:
  • Provides new equity at the point of failure.
  • “Nodes” of the financial system become loss-absorbing (not loss-amplifying as in LEH)

3) Bail-in is just a bridge to liquidation or wind down – “resolution is not resurrection”

  • Preservation of going-concern “franchise value” is essential to concept and supports stability
  • Bail-in internalizes the cost of failure – no need for extra “punishment”?
  • Liquidation/“Wind-down” can be chosen by new owners, but should not be imposed

4) Banks fail because of liquidity, not solvency. Bail-in doesn’t address liquidity

  • Chapter 11 recaps typically include both: a solvency program, and a liquidity program
  • Normally provided by a bank group (DIP financing) after solvency plan is agreed
  • Recapitalized Bank needs to announce a credible liquidity program by “Sunday night”

5) Banks are often quite international with many legal entities. National interests will frustrate Bail-in

  • Bail-in eliminates taxpayer costs, eliminating the dominant political challenge
  • Secondary concerns can be addressed by clear legal entity strategy (a smart RRP)
  • Separability is important for MPE banks, but can be counterproductive for SPE firms
  • Internal TLAC important to align national incentives, but design remains a major policy risk
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Where are we? One central banker’s view

“In short, the US authorities have the technology – via Title II

  • f Dodd F

rank; . . . most US banks are . . organised in way that lends them to top-down resolution on a group-wide basis. I don’ t mean it would be completely smooth right now; it would be smoother in a year or two as more progress is made. B ut in extremis, it could be done now. Europe has not reached the same point, but contrary to some commentary is not far behind.”

  • Paul T

ucker – FSB Resolution STC Chair (October, 201 3)

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Where a are w we? A A m market v view

  • OLA passed in 2010; FDIC

adopts SPE Bail-in in in 2012

  • Tool seen as technically

credible & politically essential

  • TBTF p

premium has slowly disappeared – 2014 GAO report unable to discern any remaining market impact in US

  • Large bank holdco paper seen

as fully l loss a absorbing

  • Europe investor straw poll

(2015) 2015):

  • 94% believe bail-in will be

used next time

  • But only 16% feel they know

enough to invest intelligently

Credit Spreads by Sector

* See Credit Suisse strategy research: US Financial Institutions: Regulatory Reform Impact on Bank Credit Spreads, July 2013, by John Giordano/ Dennis Hannan

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Bail-in and future crises

Eliminating asset shock “fires” is hard

  • Phase 1 stresses – asset shocks – are hard to

foresee reliably and prohibit

  • Dampening asset markets can lead to other

risks – (“meta-risk” a la Minsky) Phase 2 – systemic crisis - is far more destructive Bail-in provides a powerful solution:

  • Built on established techniques
  • “Single point of control” simplifies execution
  • Developed as a “solution” not a “punishment”
  • Removes government burden (and helps

address bank-sovereign feedback problem)

  • Adds resilience at point of failure
  • A firebreak against systemic risks

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