Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: What Might Go Wrong A - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: What Might Go Wrong

A Presentation by

Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski

Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

www npolicy org www.npolicy.org

before Moving Toward a Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012 in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012 June 13‐15, 2011 Washington, D.C.

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LWR – the Reactor of Choice – Is Considered P lif i R i Proliferation Resistant

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Result: Many, Large, Reactors Planned by 2030 i h M E in the M.E.

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Wh Mi h G W What Might Go Wrong

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M.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of Nuclear M.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Fuel Making Ambitions

Iran & Syria ‐‐ violated IAEA safeguards with covert reactors and fuel making plants Algeria ‐‐ tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs in Algeria tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs in desert surrounded by air defenses and has hot cells to batch reprocess spent fuel Egypt – declared interest developing bombs, hired Germans to help in the l950s

• n nuclear program caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel related
• n nuclear program, caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel related

experiments. Turkey – declared interest in developing bombs, studied how might use LWRs to make weapons usable pu make weapons usable pu, Saudi Arabia – declared interest in acquiring bomb option, financed and visited Pakistani nuke program, acquired nuclear capable PRC missiles

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Jordan – Declared interest in enriching uranium

Some Nuclear Visitors to Iran Are Hardly Pushing y g Atoms for Peace

New York Times, “Nuclear Aid by

• Drs. Prasad and Surendar,

Indian tritium extraction experts “advising” on Bushehr’s “safety”; USG sanctioned both

New York Times, Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected” October 9, 2008, PARIS — International

nuclear inspectors are investigating whether a Russian scientist helped Iran whether a Russian scientist helped Iran conduct complex experiments on how to detonate a nuclear weapon.

WMD Commission

unanimously recommended IAEA require visitors to register IAEA require visitors to register at any IAEA safeguarded site,

• p. 50

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Bifo Russian Weapons Lab High Speed Cameras, R i HWR F l T h & IAEA UF6 H l I Russian HWR Fuel Tech & IAEA UF6 Help to Iran

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The Reactors Are bl A Problem Too

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But the Reactors Will be LWRs : Aren’t h “P lif i R i ” E h? they “Proliferation Resistant” Enough?

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ld ’ h d d l l ki But Wouldn’t the Needed Nuclear Fuel Making Plants Be Difficult to Hide?

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Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant Can Make 20 or More Bombs/Month from Spent Fuel <10‐day startup, 1 bomb’s‐worth‐a‐day production rate

1GWe LWR at first refueling would have 330 kgs of near weapons grade Pu 1GWe LWR at first refueling would have 330 kgs of near weapons grade Pu The Ferguson‐Culler Design

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What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E. What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E.

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How the Mid‐East Nexus Between Reactors and Bombs Has Been Handled to Date

13 Military Strikes against IAEA member 13 Military Strikes against IAEA member states’ large reactors since 1980

11 against safeguarded reactors since 1980 1980 Iran against Osirak 1980 Iran against Osirak 1981 Israel against Osirak 1980‐1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr 1990 US against Osirak 1990 US against Osirak 2003 US against Osirak 2 against IAEA member states reactors

1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted 1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Dimona 2007 Israeli strike against Syria’s Reactor Israeli 67 war a Russian provocation aimed at

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Israeli 67 war, a Russian provocation aimed at Dimona reactor that Israel claimed was “peaceful” for electricity

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What About the the Economic and Environmental What About the the Economic and Environmental Arguments for Nuclear?

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Middle Eastern Natural Gas: Production Is I i Increasing

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North Africa and the Continent North Africa and the Continent

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Latest Levant Basin Natural Gas Finds: “Bigger than A thi W H A d i th US” USGS Anything We Have Assessed in the US” ‐‐ USGS

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Rising Costs of Nuclear Power Plant C i Construction

12000 10000 )

Construction Cost Projections

6000 8000 ed KW (2008$)

Average of the Projections for Each Year

4000 6000 Dollars/Installe 2000 D 18 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Year

Natural Gas Likely to Stay Cheaper, More Plentiful than Nuclear for Some Time

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Largest US Nuke Utility Says New Reactors Bad Buy for Reducing Carbon for the Next 10‐20 yrs for Reducing Carbon for the Next 10‐20 yrs.

chart courtesy Excelon

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Recommendations Recommendations

• Restrict nuclear sales to nonweapons states that forswear making

l f l d f dd l l nuclear fuel and ratify Additional Protocol

– Amend US AEA to penalize suppliers doing business in the US that fail to adopt these conditions with regard to their exports – NSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supply NSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supply

• Clarify what IAEA can and cannot effectively safeguard against diversion

– Work with IAEA – Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act) Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act)

• Compare costs of different energy projects with an eye to which is the

quickest and cheapest way to reduce carbon

– G‐20 effort to agree to common energy project accounting standards – IRENA UN effort

– national evaluations (that include cost of subsidies)

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