Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: What Might Go Wrong A Presentation by Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www npolicy org www.npolicy.org before Moving Toward a Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012 in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012 June 13 ‐ 15, 2011 Washington, D.C. 1
LWR – the Reactor of Choice – Is Considered P Proliferation Resistant lif i R i 2
Result: Many, Large, Reactors Planned by 2030 i in the M.E. h M E 3
Wh What Might Go Wrong Mi h G W 4
M.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of Nuclear M.E. Nuclear Customers Suspected of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Fuel Making Ambitions Iran & Syria ‐‐ violated IAEA safeguards with covert reactors and fuel making plants Algeria Algeria ‐‐ tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs in tried to build a large covert research reactor in excess of its needs in desert surrounded by air defenses and has hot cells to batch reprocess spent fuel Egypt – declared interest developing bombs, hired Germans to help in the l950s on nuclear program caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel related on nuclear program, caught playing with undeclared nuclear fuel related experiments. Turkey – declared interest in developing bombs, studied how might use LWRs to make weapons usable pu make weapons usable pu, Saudi Arabia – declared interest in acquiring bomb option, financed and visited Pakistani nuke program, acquired nuclear capable PRC missiles Jordan – Declared interest in enriching uranium 5
Some Nuclear Visitors to Iran Are Hardly Pushing y g Atoms for Peace New York Times , “ Nuclear Aid by New York Times , Nuclear Aid by Drs. Prasad and Surendar, Russian to Iranians Suspected ” Indian tritium extraction October 9, 2008, PARIS — International experts “ advising ” on Bushehr ’ s nuclear inspectors are investigating “ safety ” ; USG sanctioned both whether a Russian scientist helped Iran whether a Russian scientist helped Iran conduct complex experiments on how to detonate a nuclear weapon. WMD Commission unanimously recommended IAEA require visitors to register IAEA require visitors to register at any IAEA safeguarded site, p. 50 6
Bifo Russian Weapons Lab High Speed Cameras, R Russian HWR Fuel Tech & IAEA UF6 Help to Iran i HWR F l T h & IAEA UF6 H l I 7
The Reactors Are A Problem Too bl 8
But the Reactors Will be LWRs : Aren ’ t they “ Proliferation Resistant ” Enough? “ P ” E h lif i R i h? 9
But Wouldn ’ t the Needed Nuclear Fuel Making ld ’ h d d l l ki Plants Be Difficult to Hide? 10
Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant Can Make 20 or More Bombs/Month from Spent Fuel < 10 ‐ day startup, 1 bomb ’ s ‐ worth ‐ a ‐ day production rate 1GWe LWR at first refueling would have 330 kgs of near weapons grade Pu 1GWe LWR at first refueling would have 330 kgs of near weapons grade Pu The Ferguson ‐ Culler Design 11 11 11
What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E. What the IAEA Has Missed in the M.E. 12
How the Mid ‐ East Nexus Between Reactors and Bombs Has Been Handled to Date 13 Military Strikes against IAEA member 13 Military Strikes against IAEA member states ’ large reactors since 1980 11 against safeguarded reactors since 1980 1980 Iran against Osirak 1980 Iran against Osirak 1981 Israel against Osirak 1980 ‐ 1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr 1990 US against Osirak 1990 US against Osirak 2003 US against Osirak 2 against IAEA member states reactors 1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted 1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Dimona 2007 Israeli strike against Syria ’ s Reactor Israeli 67 war a Russian provocation aimed at Israeli 67 war, a Russian provocation aimed at Dimona reactor that Israel claimed was “ peaceful ” for electricity 13 13 13
What About the the Economic and Environmental What About the the Economic and Environmental Arguments for Nuclear? 14
Middle Eastern Natural Gas: Production Is I Increasing i 15
North Africa and the Continent North Africa and the Continent 16
Latest Levant Basin Natural Gas Finds: “ Bigger than Anything We Have Assessed in the US ” ‐‐ USGS d i th US ” A thi W H A USGS 17
Rising Costs of Nuclear Power Plant Construction C i 12000 10000 Construction Cost Projections ) ed KW (2008$) Average of the Projections for Each Year 8000 6000 6000 Dollars/Installe 4000 D 2000 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 18 Year
Natural Gas Likely to Stay Cheaper, More Plentiful than Nuclear for Some Time 19 19
Largest US Nuke Utility Says New Reactors Bad Buy for Reducing Carbon for the Next 10 ‐ 20 yrs for Reducing Carbon for the Next 10 ‐ 20 yrs. chart courtesy Excelon 20
Recommendations Recommendations Restrict nuclear sales to nonweapons states that forswear making • nuclear fuel and ratify Additional Protocol l f l d f dd l l – Amend US AEA to penalize suppliers doing business in the US that fail to adopt these conditions with regard to their exports – NSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supply NSG agreement to the Gold Standard as a condition of supply Clarify what IAEA can and cannot effectively safeguard against diversion • – Work with IAEA – Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act) Do national evaluations (FY 2009 House State Authorization Act) Compare costs of different energy projects with an eye to which is the • quickest and cheapest way to reduce carbon – G ‐ 20 effort to agree to common energy project accounting standards – IRENA UN effort – national evaluations (that include cost of subsidies) 21
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