ASEAN-Driven Regionalism The Politics of Institutional Divergence - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

ASEAN-Driven Regionalism

The Politics of Institutional Divergence and Convergence in the Asia Pacific

Alice D. Ba Associate Professor, Political Science & International Relations University of Delaware USA

“Southeast Asia” “East Asia “ “Asia Pacific” / East Asia ‘Plus’ Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam (Timor Leste) “Southeast Asia” Plus: China Japan

• S. Korea

(N, Korea ) “East Asia” Plus: Australia New Zealand United States Russia

Pre-1989

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967)

1989-1996

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) (1989) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994)

Post-1997

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (1997) East Asia Summit (EAS) (2005)

Outline

I.

Geopolitical Context:

Regionalism in Asia as a post-Cold War phenomenon

• II. Institutional Context:

ASEAN-style regionalism

• III. The EAS Debate

The US Challenge for Regional Processes and Effect

• n Asia’s “regional architecture”

South Korea Philippines Australia

Japan

Thailand New Zealand

United States

“US Hub plus Asian Spokes”

Defining Features of US System

Dense network of bilateral alliances Little security cooperation between US allies; no multilateral security structures Strong asymmetry in economic and security relations between US and regional actors Precedence and centrality of Japan in US security relations with East Asia Extensive economic benefits to security

• partners. (US trade and aid support

to regional allies in exchange for military access) US centric security conceptions and approaches Red: CW conflicts / hot wars Solid green: formal allies Dotted green: de facto allies

Two Interdependent Geopolitical / Geo-Economic Challenges 1) The United States 2) China

“East Asia’s greatest single problem is how to incorporate China into its regional arrangements – how to ‘socialize’ the country by reducing the element of threat while accentuating the positive elements in China’s regional relationships.”

~Jose Almonte, Former Director General of the Philippines National Security Council, 1997

ASEAN Regional Forum

• Established in 1994

 Maintain peace and stability in the region  Promote regional development and prosperity

• Three-stage process

 Stage 1 on Confidence Building Measures,  Stage 2 on Preventive Diplomacy  Stage 3 on Conflict Management

• Gradual evolutionary approach, decision-making

by consensus

 Movement at a pace comfortable to all members

ASEAN Plus Three

• Started in December 1997
• Membership: China, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN’s ten member-

states

• China setting the pace (ASEAN-China FTA); “ASEAN Plus One”

Processes very dynamic.

• Driving forces are



economic (economic gains) and



political-strategic (engaging China; offsetting dependence on / vulnerability to global forces and arrangements; ensuring ASEAN-Southeast Asia is not eclipsed by China, other major powers, or “Northeast Asia”)

Two Interdependent Geopolitical / Geo-Economic Challenges 1) The United States 2) China Middle Power Initiative: 1) ASEAN 2) Australia 3) Japan 4) South Korea

Pre-1989

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967)

1989-1996

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) (1989) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994)

Post-1997

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (1997) East Asia Summit (EAS) (2005)

ASEAN Norms:

• non-use of force,
• regional autonomy,
• non-interference,
• no military pacts

Key Features of ASEAN Institutionalism:

• Not a military organization
• Non-consequentialist
• Institutionally minimalist
• Operates by “consultation” and “consensus” (not

majority rules)

• Inclusive (e.g., non-ideological in Cold War sense;

“open to … all states in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.”)

• Non-confrontational



• Informal, voluntarist
• Consensus-driven
• Incremental

“The ‘ASEAN Way’ refers to a set of diplomatic norms…[that] encourages the Southeast Asian countries to seek an informal and incremental approach to cooperation through … consultation and dialogue.” (Katsumata 2003)

Key Founding Conditions:

• Regionalism coincides with nationalism (nation building
• ngoing; domestic instability)
• Born of conflict: Intervention (by both neighbors and extra-

regional powers) was the norm. Subsequent interpreted lessons.

• Cold War Insulation

ASEAN-style regionalism =

• Greater economic

prosperity

• Greater national stability
• Greater regional stability
• Greater international

security

• Greater international

recognition

• Membership: China, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN’s ten member-states
• Catalyzing event: the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-8) & deficiencies of US and global (IMF) response
• 1997: First Informal Summit of 10 ASEAN states, China, Japan, Korea
• 1999: Informal Summit is officially called “ASEAN Plus Three”
• 2010: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Agreement, a multilateral currency swap

contract (USD 120,000,000,000) .



Core objectives: (i) to address balance of payment and short-term liquidity difficulties in the region, and (ii) to supplement the existing international financial arrangements.

• The annual APT leaders’ summits is now supplemented by meetings of 55 other bodies covering at

least 16 areas of APT cooperation, including political-security cooperation in non-traditional security areas (e.g., terrorism, piracy, drug & human trafficking).

• APT Framework includes regular meetings of:



Heads of State Labour Ministers Environment Ministers



Finance Ministers Energy Ministers



Foreign Ministers Tourism Ministers



Economic Ministers Health Ministers

The ASEAN Plus Three Framework

“ASEAN Way” v. “American Way”?

“ASEAN Way” Consensus-driven: organic, often open- ended outcomes Regional organizations are conceived as forums for conflict moderation. Value: Relationship-building, preserving the unity of whole Logic: Reassurance (persuasion & inclusion) ASEAN operates through constructive engagement, dialogue, reassurance, and consensus. “American Way” Functionally-driven: specific pre-conceived functional outcomes Regional organizations are conceived as mechanisms for conflict resolution Value: Efficiency Logic: Deterrence (coercion & exclusion) “The United States operates with legal briefs, economic sanctions, and ‘sticks’.” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2005)

The United States is Back!

First summit held in 2005, was attended by:

• The ASEAN 10
• Australia,
• People’s Republic of China,
• Republic of India,
• Japan,
• Republic of Korea and
• New Zealand

In 2010, membership expanded to include:

• The United States
• Russia

“The EAS is a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues

• f common interest and

concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. It is an open, inclusive, transparent and outward- looking forum, which strives to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit.” (ASEAN Secretariat)

Extension of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity & Cooperation

• Code of conduct for interstate

relations adopted by ASEAN 1976.



Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations



The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion



Non-interference in the internal affairs

• f one another



Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means



Renunciation of the threat or use of force



Effective cooperation among themselves

• 1998 ASEAN Protocol Amended TAC

to allow for non-Southeast Asian states to accede to ASEAN.

• Papua New Guinea (1989)
• China (2003)
• India (2003)
• Japan (2004)
• Pakistan (2004)
• Republic of Korea (2004)
• Russian Federation (2004)
• Mongolia (2005)
• New Zealand (2005)
• Australia (2005)
• France (2007)
• Timor-Leste (2007)
• Sri Lanka (2007)
• Bangladesh (2007)
• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2008)
• United States (2009)
• Canada (2010)
• Turkey (2010)
• United Kingdom (2012)
• EU (2012)
• Brazil (2012)

The politics of regionalism in the Asia Pacific is reflective of differences over three questions:

What regionalism in Asia should do What regionalism in Asia should look like Whom regionalism in Asia should include

1) The EAS could be mired by the same kinds of disagreements and

dissatisfactions that have plagued the ARF

What Next?

As with most other regional arrangements in Asia, ASEAN has been defining in more ways than

• ne:

1. ASEAN states make up a good bulk of its membership: The ASEAN 10’, Australia, China, India, Japan, S. Korea, New Zealand, The United States, Russia 2. In the case of the EAS, a key condition of membership is that prospective members must sign an ASEAN treaty: ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. 3. EAS’s decision-making structure mirrors ASEAN’s: informal, nonbinding, consultative, consensus-driven.

“The participants of EAS have agreed on the need to maintain EAS as an open, inclusive, transparent and outward looking forum which allows its participants to have strategic discussion

• n key issues affecting the region. The retreat style format of EAS enables its Leaders to discuss

issues in a frank, spontaneous and free-flowing manner.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia)

Five “strategic precepts [to] guide the Obama administration’s engagement” with the East Asian and Asia-Pacific “multilateral architecture”

• 1. the US alliance system and bilateral partnerships

would provide the foundation;

• 2. multilateral cooperation should be more flexible and

creative;

• 3. the Asia Pacific’s defining institutions should include

all the key stakeholders such as the United States;

• 4. “result-oriented” cooperation
• 5. building a common regional economic and security

agenda

1) The EAS could be mired by the same kinds of disagreements and

dissatisfactions that have plagued the ARF

2) ASEAN states’ anxieties about US attention could lead to more attention to the

EAS, which critically translates into less attention for the APT

What Next?

1) The EAS could be mired by the same kinds of disagreements and dissatisfactions that have plagued the ARF 2) ASEAN states’ anxieties about US attention could lead to more attention to the EAS, which critically translates into less attention for the APT 3) Institutional competition is also likely to continue

What Next?

Leaders Meetings: APEC East Asia Summit US-ASEAN Leaders Summit Foreign Ministers Meetings: ASEAN Regional Forum APEC Finance Ministers (Sec of the Treasury): APEC Trade Ministers (USTR): APEC Defense Ministers Meetings: ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus 8 (every two years) Shangri La Dialogue (more than defense ministers attend)

US Commitments

1) The EAS could be mired by the same kinds of disagreements and dissatisfactions that have plagued the ARF 2) ASEAN states’ anxieties about US attention could lead to more attention to the EAS, which critically translates into less attention for the APT 3) Institutional competition is also likely to continue 4) ASEAN states could adapt the EAS and its processes to better accommodate US concerns

What Next?