Introduction Failed Barrier Analysis Proposed Barrier Strategy Conclusion Analysis and Discussion of Deepwater Horizon Accident and Barrier Strategies Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde Faculty of Engineering Science and Technology, Department of Marine Technology, NTNU noliveira@oceaneering.com jeevith.hegde@ntnu.no January 23, 2015 Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction Failed Barrier Analysis Proposed Barrier Strategy Conclusion Content Introduction 1 Summary of Macando Blowout Comparison to other similar accidents Failed Barrier Analysis 2 Step Diagram MTO Analysis Bow-Tie Diagram Proposed Barrier Strategy 3 PSA Process Hazard Identification Specific Barrier Strategy Barrier Requirements Conclusion 4 Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction Failed Barrier Analysis Summary of Macando Blowout Proposed Barrier Strategy Comparison to other similar accidents Conclusion Accident Summary Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction Failed Barrier Analysis Summary of Macando Blowout Proposed Barrier Strategy Comparison to other similar accidents Conclusion Comparison to other similar accidents Similar Blowout Accidents Macondo 2010 The evacuation process in Deepwater Horizon, did not Initiating event- High pressures in the wellbore result in fatalities [Vinnem, 2014]. Accident Progression- Well abandonment- kick in well- hydrocarbon leak- two explosions Fatalities- 11 of 126 (9%) One could infer that Transocean had better evacuation procedures than PEMEX (Usumacinta) or Petrobras (Enchova). Usumacinta 2007 Texas City Refinery Initiating event- Bad weather Accident Progression- Storm- hydrocarbon leak Initiating event- Overfilling of splitter tower. Fatalities- 22 of 81 (27%) Accident Progression- Maintenance faults- malfunction of level transmitters- explosion Fatalities- 15 people Enchova 1984 Injured- 170 people Initiating event- Unknown Accident Progression- Drilling- Gas leak Fatalities- 42 of 249 (17%) Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction Step Diagram Failed Barrier Analysis MTO Analysis Proposed Barrier Strategy Bow-Tie Diagram Conclusion Step Diagram Events February April 15 April 16 April 18 April 19 April 20 13:28 Hours 20:00 Hours 21:45 Hours 21:49 Hours 21:52 Hours 2010 March 2010 April 2010 April 9 2010 April 12 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 Actors Halliburton Report issued to BP with concerns on Analyzed 7 number of Centralizers design centralizer used sent after cementing Loss of Circulation at 18260ft and BP 18360ft- Stopped Drilling Choice of Long String Marinas Casing to complete the changed to well. Deepwater Decision to use 7 Centralizers Horizon Different Incomplete Early Presurre Simultaneous Iterpretation of Bottoms Up Testing. Before Operations Two Negative operations Cement Setting. Pressure Test Redirected Bending of Gas to Drill Pipe Separator Transocean BOP: Leak in yellow Pod Alarm Outage of Explosion 1 EDS Uncontrolled HC Well Kick Software Power and 2 Malfunction 6 Centralizers Disconnected Leak installed Management Minerals Services Approved Single Long string casing design Barrier Legend Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project Man Technology
Introduction Step Diagram Failed Barrier Analysis MTO Analysis Proposed Barrier Strategy Bow-Tie Diagram Conclusion MTO Analysis Failed MTO Barriers Failures in the intersection of man and organizational barriers Man Technology are higher in number than other 2 3 2 categories. 1 5 0 The combination of man and 3 organization resulted in six failed barriers Organization Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction Step Diagram Failed Barrier Analysis MTO Analysis Proposed Barrier Strategy Bow-Tie Diagram Conclusion Bow-Tie Diagram Alarm and Deluge Energy Choice of Single Validate Results Communication Redirection of HC Maintenance of Wellhead Seal Validate Test Testing after Cement Set Preventors Fire Fighting Flow String Casing Shear Rams F&G Barriers Preparedness Internal Annular Fire & Gas Emergency Pipe Rams Certificatio Detection Results Systems System BOP Energy Macondo n Flow Blowout Single String Completion Centralizers Pressure Testing Blow Out Preventer HC Detection and Mitigation Explosion Evacuation Casing Barrier Legend Man Technology Organization Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction PSA Process Failed Barrier Analysis Hazard Identification Proposed Barrier Strategy Specific Barrier Strategy Conclusion Barrier Requirements PSA Barrier Mangement Process Figure: [PSA, 2013] Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction PSA Process Failed Barrier Analysis Hazard Identification Proposed Barrier Strategy Specific Barrier Strategy Conclusion Barrier Requirements Hazard Identification SL. No. Generic Hazard Hazard 1 Mechanical hazards High/unstable pressure in the well Stability Degradation of equipment 2 Dangerous materials Flammable 3 Thermal hazards Flame Explosion Personnel exposed to high temperature and heat radi- ation 4 Organizational hazards Safety culture Less than adequate maintenance Less than adequate competence Crowd control [Rausand, 2011] Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction PSA Process Failed Barrier Analysis Hazard Identification Proposed Barrier Strategy Specific Barrier Strategy Conclusion Barrier Requirements Preliminary Hazard Analysis Terminologies Generic Hazard Probability Mechanical, dangerous, thermal and organizational. Evaluating likelihood of occurrence of an accident event. Identifier Severity Identify and arrange different probable causes. Evaluating consequences if an accident event occurs. Hazard Initial Risk Level Specific hazard in relation to generic hazard. Factor of probability, severity and lack of preventive measures. Accidental Event Describe what, when, where things can go wrong. Residual Risk Level Factor of probability, severity and introduction of Probable Causes preventive measures. Causes triggering the accidental event. Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction PSA Process Failed Barrier Analysis Hazard Identification Proposed Barrier Strategy Specific Barrier Strategy Conclusion Barrier Requirements Risk Picture Initial Risk Picture Residual Risk Picture Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
Introduction PSA Process Failed Barrier Analysis Hazard Identification Proposed Barrier Strategy Specific Barrier Strategy Conclusion Barrier Requirements Barriers according to PSA Memo- Part 1 Reduce Risk of Hydrocarbon Leak from the Well Barrier Functions Isolate areas with different Prevent collapsing and leak of Regulate flow of Isolated hydrocarbons Avoid Rig Drift and Drive off pressures and fluids. well formation. Hydrocarbons subsea. Sub-Functions Avoid Kill the well External Ship Collision Dynamic Collision Barrier Elements Drilling Drilling Safety Zone Risers BOP Casing Casing Centralizers BOP BOP Positioning Avoidance Mud Mud Regulations System Alarms Choke Emergency Kill Line Pressure Testing Valve Shutdown Valve Bottoms- (Negative and up Postive) Organization and Man barriers are included in each barrier element because the selection of the above phyiscal barriers depends on the individual/organization perceptions in form of analysis and design. Performance Requirements Management focus on safety through campaigns. (Top to bottom and bottom to top) Accountability of the company towards safety incidents through industry and national regulations Establishing single point of contacts and analysing it through Social Network Analysis tools Continuous improvement of safety drive in the company and expansion of each project’s Risk Analysis Assessment to keep up wit h changes made to the original plan during the execution phase - continuous reassessment of the risk picture. Periodically re-optimize maintenance costs Investment in continuous training of personnel in best available safety practices Investment in mentoring programmes Hiring competent personnel Sharing lessons learnt to other companies Timely certificaiton and maintenance of safety critical systems Nathalie M. De Oliveira, Jeevith Hegde TMR4555 Project
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