Advanced Macroeconomics 4. The Zero Lower Bound and the Liquidity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Advanced Macroeconomics

• 4. The Zero Lower Bound and the Liquidity Trap

Karl Whelan

School of Economics, UCD

Spring 2020

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 1 / 21

Can Interest Rates Be Negative?

Up to now, we have assumed that the central bank in our model economy sets its interest rate according to a specific policy rule. But what if the rule predicts the central bank should set interest rates equal to a negative value? Will they? In the Euro area today, some short-term interest rates are negative because the ECB is charging banks for depositing money with it. But there are limits to how negative rates can be before investors and depositors choose just to hold cash, which has an interest rate of zero. This means there is effectively a lower bound on the interest rates set by monetary policy, though exactly what that lower limit might be is a bit unclear. With these considerations in mind, we are going to adapt our model to take into account that there are times when the central bank would like to set it below zero but is not able to do so. For simplicity, we stick with zero rather than specifying a particular negative value for the lower bound.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 2 / 21

The Zero Lower Bound

Up to now, we have mainly considered a monetary policy rule of the form it = r ∗ + π∗ + βπ (πt − π∗) The lower bound problem occurs when inflation goes below some critical value. We will now change the monetary policy rule to it = Maximum [r ∗ + π∗ + βπ (πt − π∗) , 0] Because the intended interest rate of the central bank declines with inflation, this means that there is a particular inflation rate, πZLB, such that if πt < πZLB then the interest rate will equal zero. So what determines πZLB?

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 3 / 21

Triggering the Zero Lower Bound

We can calculate the rate of inflation that triggers the zero lower bound as the rate inflation that sees the monetary policy rule require a zero interest rate. Algebraically, we can write this as r ∗ + π∗ + βπ

• πZLB − π∗

= 0 This can be re-arranged as βππZLB = βππ∗ − r ∗ − π∗ Which can be solved to give πZLB = βπ − 1 βπ

• π∗ − r ∗

βπ

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When Will Interest Rates be Zero?

Zero lower bound holds if inflation is below πZLB = βπ − 1 βπ

• π∗ − r ∗

βπ Three factors determine this “trigger” value of inflation

1

The inflation target: The higher the inflation target π∗, the higher is the level of inflation at which a central bank will be willing to set interest rates equal to zero.

2

The natural rate of interest: A higher value of r ∗ lowers the level of inflation at which a central bank will be willing to set interest rates equal to zero. An increase in this rate makes central bank raise interest rates and so they will wait until inflation goes lower than previously to set interest rates to zero.

3

The responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation: Increases in βπ raise the coefficient on π∗ in this formula, increasing the first term and it makes the second term (which has a negative sign) smaller. Both effects mean a higher βπ translates into a higher value for πZLB.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 5 / 21

The IS-MP Curve and the Zero Lower Bound

To take account of the ZLB, we need to re-formulate the IS-MP curve. Remember the IS curve is yt = y ∗

t − α (it − πt − r ∗) + ǫy t

So when nominal interest rates are zero, the IS-MP curve just set it = 0 in the above. So the IS-MP curve becomes yt = y ∗

t − α (βπ − 1) (πt − π∗) + ǫy t

when πt > πZLB y ∗

t + αr ∗ + απt + ǫy t

when πt ≤ πZLB Above πZLB, higher values of inflation are associated with lower values of

• utput but below πZLB, higher values of inflation are associated with higher

values of output. This means the IS-MP curve shifts from being downward-sloping to being upward-sloping when inflation falls below πZLB.

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The IS-MP Curve with the Zero Lower Bound

Output Inflation

IS-MP ( =0)

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 7 / 21

Inflation Dynamics at the Zero Bound

When inflation falls below πZLB, output is determined by yt = y ∗

t + αr ∗ + απt + ǫy t

Inflation is still determined by the Phillips curve πt = πe

t + γ (yt − y ∗ t ) + ǫπ t

So below the lower bound, inflation is given by πt = πe

t + γ (αr ∗ + απt + ǫy t ) + ǫπ t

This can be re-arranged to give πt = 1 1 − αγ πe

t +

αγ 1 − αγ r ∗ + γ 1 − αγ ǫy

t +

1 1 − αγ ǫπ

t

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 8 / 21

The Liquidity Trap

Inflation dynamics at the zero lower bound are given by πt = 1 1 − αγ πe

t +

αγ 1 − αγ r ∗ + γ 1 − αγ ǫy

t +

1 1 − αγ ǫπ

t

The coefficient on expected inflation,

1 1−αγ is greater than one.

As with the Taylor principle example, changes in expected inflation translate into even bigger changes in actual inflation. This leads to unstable dynamics. Because these dynamics take place only when inflation has fallen below the zero lower bound, the instability here relates to falling inflation expectations, leading to further declines in inflation and further declines in inflation expectations. Because output depends positively on inflation when the zero-bound constraint binds, these dynamics mean falling inflation (or increasing deflation) and falling output. This position in which nominal interest rates are zero and the economy falls into a deflationary spiral is known as the liquidity trap.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 9 / 21

A Negative Aggregate Demand Shock

Output Inflation

IS-MP ( < 0) IS-MP ( =0) PC ( )

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Equilibrium At the Lower Bound

Output Inflation

IS-MP ( < 0) IS-MP ( =0) PC ( )

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Falling Expected Inflation Worsens Slump

Output Inflation

IS-MP ( < 0) IS-MP ( =0) PC ( ) PC ( )

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The Liquidity Trap with a Taylor Rule

For the monetary policy rule that we have considered, the zero lower bound is hit when inflation falls below some particular value. But what if policy followed the Taylor-type rule? it = Maximum [r ∗ + π∗ + βπ (πt − π∗) + βy (yt − y ∗

t ) , 0]

Zero lower bound is hit when r ∗ + π∗ + βπ (πt − π∗) + βy (yt − y ∗

t ) = 0

This can be re-written as βπ (πt − π∗) + βy (yt − y ∗

t ) = −r ∗ − π∗

There are a series of different combinations of inflation gaps and output gaps that can lead to monetary policy hitting the zero lower bound. Can represent all the combinations of output and inflation that produce zero interest rates under the Taylor rule as the area under a downward-sloping line in Inflation-Output space.

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Zero Bound is Binding in Blue Triangle Area

Output Inflation

Zero Lower Bound Area

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Zero Bound Can Be Hit With Positive Inflation

Output Inflation

IS-MP ( =0) IS-MP ( < 0) Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 15 / 21

The Liquidity Trap: Reversing Conventional Wisdom

Some predictions our model made (and which are now part of the conventional wisdom among monetary policy makers) do not hold when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Previously our model predicted that deviations of the public’s inflation expectations from this target will be temporary and the economy will tend to converge back towards its natural level of output. But once interest rates have hit the zero bound, this is no longer the case. Instead, the adaptive expectations model predicts the economy can spiral into an ever-declining slump. Similarly, our earlier model predicted that a strong belief from the public that the central bank would keep inflation at target was helpful in stabilising the

• economy. However, once you reach the zero bound, convincing the public to

raise its inflation expectations (perhaps by announcing a higher target for inflation) is helpful.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 16 / 21

How to Get Out of a Liquidity Trap

Fiscal Policy:

◮ Increasing ǫy

t helps to shift the IS-MP curve back upwards.

◮ However, liquidity traps such as the Japanese situation since the

mid-1990s have occurred at times of very persistent weak private aggregate demand that can be hard to counteract with fiscal policy. Monetary Policy:

◮ Forward Guidance: While the short-term interest rates that are

controlled by central banks may be zero, that doesn’t mean the longer-term rates that many people borrow at will equal zero. By signalling that they intend to keep short-term rates low for a long period

• f time they can lower longer-term rates.

◮ Quantitative Easing: Purchasing large quantities of longer-term bonds.

Reduces supply available to private sector and may push down interest rates on these bonds.

◮ Exchange Rate Targeting: For example, the ECB could announce that

it is willing to swap a euro for $1. Currency depreciation makes imports more expensive and raises inflation. Termed the “foolproof way to escape from a liquidity trap” by monetary policy expert Lars Svensson.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 17 / 21

Increasing Inflation Expectations

Our model tells us that output can be boosted when the economy is in a liquidity trap by raising inflation expectations. Prior to becoming Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke advocated that the Bank of Japan should attempt to raise inflation expectations by committing to having a period of inflation above some target level. In a 2003 speech titled “Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan” Bernanke said: What I have in mind is that the Bank of Japan would announce its intention to restore the price level (as measured by some standard index

• f prices, such as the consumer price index excluding fresh food) to the

value it would have reached if, instead of the deflation of the past five years, a moderate inflation of, say, 1 percent per year had occurred. The Bank of Japan did not take Bernanke’s advice. In 2013, however, under pressure from the new Japanese government, the Bank of Japan changed their inflation target from 1% to 2% but this has had little impact.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 18 / 21

Chairman Bernanke versus Academic Bernanke

In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2008, the US ended up in conditions that looked a bit like the liquidity trap. The Federal Reserve kept its policy rate close to zero for many years. The advice of 2003-era Ben Bernanke would have been for the Fed to consider signalling its intent to allow a temporary rise in inflation above its target level. Ben Bernanke, as Fed Chair, was not keen to implement the ideas he recommended as an academic. In April 2012 he said:

I guess the question is, does it make sense to actively seek a higher inflation rate in order to achieve a slightly increased reduction–a slightly increased pace

• f reduction in the unemployment rate? The view of the Committee is that

that would be very reckless. We have–we, the Federal Reserve, have spent 30 years building up credibility for low and stable inflation, which has proved extremely valuable in that we’ve been be able to take strong accommodative actions in the last four or five years to support the economy without leading to an unanchoring of inflation expectations or a destabilization of inflation. To risk that asset for what I think would be quite tentative and perhaps doubtful gains on the real side would be, I think, an unwise thing to do.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 19 / 21

Committing to Be Irresponsible

Bernanke’s former colleague Paul Krugman was critical of his reluctance to boost inflation expectations. Since his research on Japan in the late 1990s, Paul Krugman has discussed the tension that central bankers feel when in a liquidity trap. When up against the zero bound, they might like to raise inflation expectations but then they are concerned that this could make inflation go higher than they would like. The public’s awareness that the central bank will clamp down on inflation if the economy picks up then prevents there being a sufficient increase in inflation rates to get the economy out of the liquidity trap. Krugman thus stresses the need for central banks facing a liquidity trap to “‘commit to being irresponsible” as a way out of these slumps—commit to a temporary period of inflation being higher than you would normally like. But central bankers are a conservative crowd and even temporary “irresponsibility” does not come easy to them. The Fed may be willing at some point to consider more flexible approaches such as price level targeting. The ECB are unlikely to adopt such policies but have implemented a QE programme aimed at raising inflation.

Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 20 / 21

Things to Understand From This Topic

1

Why there is a zero bound on interest rates.

2

The factors that influence when the central bank sets zero rates.

3

How the IS-MP curve changes when incorporating the zero lower bound.

4

How changes in inflation expectations affect the economy above and below the zero lower bound.

5

What is meant by the liquidity trap, i.e. why the economy doesn’t automatically recover when the zero bound binds.

6

How the IS-MP-PC graphs work when we incorporate the zero bound.

7

Policies to get out of the liquidity trap.

8

Bernanke’s advice to the Bank of Japan and change of mind as Fed Chairman.

9

Why the US and Euro Area economies could be considered to be in a liquidity trap.

10 The debate about “committing to be irresponsible.” Karl Whelan (UCD) The Zero Lower Bound Spring 2020 21 / 21