Accidental and continuous beam losses Protection of the accelerator - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt

• Accidental and continuous beam losses
• Protection of the accelerator from beam losses

Machine Protection

Rüdiger Schmidt, CERN and ESS CAS Accelerator School October 2013 - Trondheim

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt

CERN

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Protection from Energy and Power

• Risks come from Energy stored in a system (Joule), and Power

when operating a system (Watt)

• “Very powerful accelerator” … the power flow needs to be controlled
• An uncontrolled release of the energy, or an uncontrolled power

flow can lead to unwanted consequences

• Damage of equipment and loss of time for operation
• For particle beams, activation of equipment
• This is true for all systems, in particular for complex systems such

as accelerators

• For the RF system, power converters, magnet system …
• For particle beams

This lecture on Machine Protection is focused on preventing damage caused by particle beams

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Content

• Different accelerator concepts: Examples for ESS and LHC
• Hazards and Risks
• Accidental (uncontrolled) beam losses and consequences
• Accidental (uncontrolled) beam and probability
• Machine Protection Systems
• For high energy proton synchrotrons (LHC)
• For high power accelerators (ESS)
• Some principles for protection systems

CERN

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LHC pp and ions 7 T eV/c – up to now 4 T eV/c 26.8 km circumference Energy stored in one beam 362 MJ

Switzerland Lake Geneva LHC Accelerator

(100 m down) SPS Accelerator

CMS, TOTEM ALICE LHCb ATLAS

CERN

Proton collider LHC – 362 MJ stored in one beam

CERN

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LHC pp and ions 7 T eV/c – up to now 4 T eV/c 26.8 km Circumference Energy stored in one beam 362 MJ

Switzerland Lake Geneva LHC Accelerator

(100 m down) SPS Accelerator

CMS, TOTEM ALICE LHCb ATLAS

CERN

Proton collider LHC – 362 MJ stored in one beam

If something goes wrong, the beam energy has to be safely deposited

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ESS Lund / Sweden – 5 MW beam power

Power of 5000 kW Drift tube linac with 4 tanks Low energy beam transport Medium energy beam transport Super-conducting cavities High energy beam transport

• Operating with protons
• Operation with beam pulses at a frequency of 14 Hz
• Pulse length of 2.86 ms
• Average power of 5 MW
• Peak power of 125 MW

RFQ 352.2 MHz 75 keV 3 MeV 78 MeV 200 MeV 628 MeV 2500 MeV

Source LEBT RFQ MEBT DTL Spokes High β Medium β HEBT & Upgrade Target

2.4 m 4.0 m 3.6 m 32.4 m 58.5 m 113.9 m 227.9 m

352.21 MHz 704.42 MHz

As an example for a high intensity linear accelerator (similar to SNS and J-PARC)

~ 500 m

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 8 Power of 5000 kW Drift tube linac with 4 tanks Low energy beam transport Medium energy beam transport Super-conducting cavities High energy beam transport

• Operating with protons
• Operation with beam pulses at a frequency of 14 Hz
• Pulse length of 2.86 ms
• Average power of 5 MW
• Peak power of 125 MW

RFQ 352.2 MHz 75 keV 3 MeV 78 MeV 200 MeV 628 MeV 2500 MeV

Source LEBT RFQ MEBT DTL Spokes High β Medium β HEBT & Upgrade Target

2.4 m 4.0 m 3.6 m 32.4 m 58.5 m 113.9 m 227.9 m

352.21 MHz 704.42 MHz

As an example for a high intensity linear accelerator (similar to SNS and J-PARC)

~ 500 m

ESS Lund / Sweden – 5 MW beam power

If something goes wrong, injection has to be stopped

CERN

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Energy stored in beam and magnet system

0.01 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 10000.00 1 10 100 1000 10000

Energy stored in the beam [MJ] Momentum [GeV/c]

LHC 7.0 TeV LHC at injection ISR SNS LEP2 LHC ions TEVATRON SPS ppbar SPS transfer to RHIC proton LHC energy in magnets LHC 4.0 TeV SPS material test

Factor ~200

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What does it mean ……… MJoule ?

360 MJ: the energy stored in

• ne LHC beam corresponds

approximately to…

• 90 kg of TNT
• 8 litres of gasoline
• 15 kg of chocolate

It matters most how easy and fast the energy is released !!

The energy of an 200 m long fast train at 155 km/hour corresponds to the energy of 360 MJ stored in one LHC beam.

• 860 litres H2O from

0 0C to 100 0C

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Consequences of a release of 600 MJ at LHC

Arcing in the interconnection 53 magnets had to be repaired The 2008 LHC accident happened during test runs without beam.

A magnet interconnect was defect and the circuit opened. An electrical arc provoked a He pressure wave damaging ~600 m of LHC, polluting the beam vacuum over more than 2 km.

Over-pressure Magnet displacement

CERN

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Energy and Power density

Many accelerators operate with high beam intensity and/or energy

• For synchrotrons and storage rings, the energy stored in the

beam increased with time (from ISR to LHC)

• For linear accelerators and fast cycling machines, the beam

power increases The emittance becomes smaller (down to a beam size of nanometer)

• This is important today, and even more relevant for future

projects, with increased beam power / energy density (W/mm2 or J/mm2 ) and increasingly complex machines Even a small amount of energy can lead to some (limited) damage

• Can be an issue for sensitive equipment

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Hazards and Risks

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Hazard and Risk for accelerators

• Hazard: a situation that poses a level of threat to the accelerator.

Hazards are dormant or potential, with only a theoretical risk of

• damage. Once a hazard becomes "active“: incident / accident.

Consequences and possibility of an incident interact together to create RISK, can be quantified:

RISK = Consequences ∙ Probability

Related to accelerators

• Consequences of an uncontrolled beam loss
• Probability of an uncontrolled beam loss
• The higher the RISK, the more Protection is required

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Example for ESS

• Bending magnet in an accelerator deflecting the beam
• Assume that the power supply for the bend in HEBT-S2 fails and

the magnets stops deflecting the beam

• Probability: MTBF for power supply is 100000 hours = 15 years
• The beam is not deflected and hits the vacuum chamber
• Consequences: what is expected to happen? Damage of magnet, vacuum

pipe, possibly pollution of superconducting cavities

• Detect failure and stop beam

5 MW Beam

~ 160 m following the sc cavities

HEBT-S2

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Example for LHC: SPS, transfer line and LHC

1 km

Beam is accelerated in SPS to 450 GeV (288 bunches, stored energy of 3 MJ) Beam is transferred from SPS to LHC Beam is accelerated in LHC to high energy (stored energy of 362 MJ)

Transfer line 3 km

LHC SPS

6911 m 450 GeV 3 MJ transfer to LHC

IR8

Fast extraction kicker Injection kicker

Transfer line

Injection kicker

IR2

Fast extraction kicker

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Protection at injection

LHC circulating beam

Circulating beam in LHC

LHC vacuum chamber Transfer line vacuum chamber

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LHC circulating beam

Beam injected from SPS and transfer line

Protection at injection

Beam from SPS Injection Kicker LHC injected beam

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LHC circulating beam

Kicker failure (no kick)

Protection at injection

Beam from SPS Injection Kicker

Major damage to sc magnets, vacuum pipes, possibly LHCb / Alice experiments

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LHC circulating beam

Beam absorbers take beam in case of kicker misfiring Transfer line collimators ensure that incoming beam trajectory is ok

Protection at injection

Beam from SPS Injection Kicker Set of transfer line collimators (TCDI) ~5σ Injection absorber (TDI) ~7σ

phase advance 900

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LHC circulating beam

Beam absorbers take beam in case of kicker misfiring on circulating beam

Protection at injection

Injection Kicker Injection absorber (TDI) ~7σ Circulating beam – kicked out

phase advance 900

LHC circulating beam Set of transfer line collimators (TCDI) ~5σ

This type of kicker failure happened several times: protection worked

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(Accidental) beam loss and consequences

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Beam losses and consequences

• Charged particles moving through matter interact with the

electrons of atoms in the material, exciting or ionizing the atoms => energy loss of traveling particle described by Bethe-Bloch formula.

• If the particle energy is high enough, particle losses lead to

particle cascades in materials, increasing the deposited energy

• the maximum energy deposition can be deep in the material at the

maximum of the hadron / electromagnetic shower

• The energy deposition leads to a temperature increase
• material can vaporise, melt, deform or lose its mechanical properties
• risk to damage sensitive equipment for less than one kJ, risk for damage
• f any structure for some MJ (depends on beam size)
• superconducting magnets could quench (beam loss of ~mJ to J)
• superconducting cavities performance degradation by some 10 J
• activation of material, risk for hand-on-maintenance

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Energy loss: example for one proton in iron

(stainless steel, copper very similar)

Low energy few MeV, beam transport, RFQ for many machines SNS - ESS 1 – 3 GeV LHC 7 T eV

From Bethe- Bloch formula.

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Beam losses and consequences

• Proton beam travels through a thin window of thickness 𝑒
• Assume a beam area of 4 𝜏𝑦 × 𝜏𝑧, with 𝜏𝑦, 𝜏𝑧 rms beam sizes (Gaussian beams)
• Assume a homogenous beam distribution
• The energy deposition can be calculated, mass and specific heat are known
• The temperature can be calculated (rather good approximation), assuming a fast loss

and no cooling

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Heating of material with low energy protons

(3 MeV)

Temperature increase in the material: dTFe Np dEdxFe  cFe_spec Fbeam 

Fe

  Temperature increase for a proton beam impacting on a Fe target: Beam size:  h 1.00 mm   and  v 1.00 mm   Iron specific heat: cFe_spec 440 J kg K    Iron specific weight: Fe 7860 kg m3   Energy loss per proton/mm: dEdxFe 56.696 MeV mm   Number of protons: Np 1.16 1012   Energy of the proton: Ep 0.003 GeV   Temperature increase: dTFe 763K 

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Heating of material with high energy protons

(> GeV) Nuclear inelastic interactions (hadronic shower)

• Creation of pions when going through matter
• Causes electromagnetic shower through decays of

pions

• Exponential increase in number of created particles
• Final energy deposition to large fraction done by

large number of electromagnetic particles

• Scales roughly with total energy of incident particle
• Energy deposition maximum deep in the material
• Energy deposition is a function of the particle type,

its momentum and parameters of the material (atomic number, density, specific heat)

• No straightforward expression to calculate energy

deposition

• Calculation by codes, such as FLUKA, GEANT or

MARS

http://williamson-labs.com/ltoc/cbr-tech.htm

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Maximum energy deposition in the proton cascade (one proton) : Emax_C 2.0 10 6



 J kg  Specific heat of graphite is cC_spec 710.6000 1 kg J K  To heat 1 kg graphite by, say, by T 1500K  , one needs : cC_spec T  1  kg 1.07 106  J  Number of protons to deposit this energy is: cC_spec T  Emax_C 5.33 1011   Maximum energy deposition in the proton cascade (one proton): Emax_Cu 1.5 10 5



 J kg  Specific heat of copper is cCu_spec 384.5600 1 kg J K  To heat 1 kg copper by, say, by T 500K  , one needs: cCu_spec T  1  kg 1.92 105  J  Number of protons to deposit this energy is: cCu_spec T  Emax_Cu 1.28 1010  

Copper graphite

Damage of a pencil 7 TeV proton beam (LHC)

copper graphite

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Beam losses and consequences

• Calculate the response of the material (deformation, melting, …)

to beam impact (mechanical codes such as ANSYS, hydrodynamic codes such as BIG2 and others)

• Beams at very low energy have limited power…. however, the

energy deposition is very high, and can lead to (limited) damage in case of beam impact

• issue at the initial stage of an accelerator, after the source, low energy

beam transport and RFQ

• limited impact (e.g. damaging the RFQ) might lead to long downtime,

depending on spare situation

• Beams at very high energy can have a tremendous damage

potential

• for LHC, damage of metals for ~1010 protons
• ne LHC bunch has about 1.5∙1011 protons, in total up to 2808 bunches
• in case of catastrophic beam loss, possibly damage beyond repair

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Controlled SPS experiment

• 81012 protons clear damage
• beam size σx/y = 1.1mm/0.6mm

above damage limit for copper stainless steel no damage

• 21012 protons

below damage limit for copper

6 cm 25 cm

• 0.1 % of the full LHC 7 TeV beams
• factor of three below the energy in a

bunch train injected into LHC

• damage limit ~200 kJoule

V.Kain et al

A B D C

SPS experiment: Damage with 450 GeV protons

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Vacuum chamber in SPS extraction line, 2004

• 450 GeV protons, 2 MJ beam in 2004
• Failure of a septum magnet
• Cut of 25 cm length, groove of 70 cm
• Condensed drops of steel on other side
• f the vacuum chamber
• Vacuum chamber and magnet needed to

be replaced

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Collimator in Tevatron after, 2003

• A Roman pot (movable device)

moved into the beam

• Particle showers from the Roman

pot quenched superconducting magnets

• The beam moved by 0.005

mm/turn, and touched a collimator jaw surface after about 300 turns

• The entire beam was lost, mostly
• n the collimator

Observation of HERA tungsten collimators: grooves on the surface when opening the vacuum chamber were observed. No impact on

• peration.

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Beam Current Monitors (BCM) measure current pulse at different locations along the linac. About 16 µsec of beam lost in the superconducting part of linac

680 µs of beam before sc linac 664 µs of beam after sc linac 16 µs of beam lost in the sc linac Beam energy in 16 µs End of DTL = 30 J End of CCL = 66 J End of SCL = 350 J

Beam losses in SNS linac

M.Plum / C.Peters

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Beam loss with low energy deposition

• Beam might hit surface of HV system (RFQ, kicker magnets,

cavities)

• Surfaces with HV, after beam loss performance degradation

might appear (not possible to operate at the same voltage, increased probability of arcing, …)

• SNS: errant beam losses led to a degradation of the performance
• f superconducting cavity
• Bam losses likely to be caused by problems in ion source, low energy

beam transfer and normal conducting linac

• Cavity gradient needs to be lowered, conditioning after warm-up helps in

most cases

• Energy of beam losses is about 100 J
• Damage mechanisms not fully understood, it is assumed that some beam

hitting the cavity desorbs gas or particulates (=small particles) creating an environment for arcing

M.Plum / C.Peters

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Accidental beam loss and probability

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Beam losses mechanisms

In accelerators, particles are lost due to a variety of reasons: beam gas interaction, losses from collisions, losses of the beam halo, …

• Continuous beam losses are inherent during the operation of

accelerators

• Taken into account during the design of the accelerator
• Accidental beam losses are due to a multitude of failures

mechanisms

• The number of possible failures leading to accidental beam losses

is (nearly) infinite

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Continuous beam losses: Collimation prevents too high beam losses around the accelerator (beam cleaning) A collimation system is a (very complex) system with (massive) material blocks close to the beam installed in an accelerator to capture halo particles Such system is also called (beam) Cleaning System Accidental beam losses: “Machine Protection” protects equipment from damage, activation and downtime Machine protection includes a large variety of systems, including collimators (or beam absorbers) to capture mis-steered beam

Machine Protection Beam Cleaning

Beam losses, machine protection and collimation

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Regular and irregular operation

Failures during

• peration

Beam losses due to failures, timescale

from nanoseconds to seconds

Machine protection systems Collimators Beam absorbers

Regular operation

Many accelerator systems Continuous beam losses Collimators for beam cleaning Collimators for halo scraping Collimators to prevent ion-induced desorption

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Continuous beam losses: Collimation

Continuous beam with a power of 1 MW and more (SNS, JPARC, PSI)

• A loss of 1% corresponds to 10 kW – not to be lost along the beam line to

avoid activation of material, heating, quenching, …

• Assume a length of 200 m: 50 W/m, not acceptable
• Plans for accelerators of 5 MW (ESS), 10 MW and more

Limitation of beam losses is in order of 1 W/m to avoid activation and still allow hands-on maintenance

• Avoid beam losses – as far as possible
• Define the aperture by collimators
• Capture continuous particle losses with collimators at specific locations

LHC stored beam with an energy of 360 MJ

• Assume lifetime of 10 minutes corresponds to beam loss of 500 kW, not

to be lost in superconducting magnets

• Reduce losses by four orders of magnitude

….but also: capture fast accidental beam losses

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RF contacts for guiding image currents Beam spot 2 mm

View of a two sided collimator for LHC about 100 collimators are installed in LHC

Ralph Assmann, CERN

length about 120 cm

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Accidental beam losses: Machine Protection

Single-passage beam loss in the accelerator complex (ns - s)

• transfer lines between accelerators or from an accelerator to a target

station (target for secondary particle production, beam dump block)

• failures of kicker magnets (injection, extraction, special kicker magnets,

for example for diagnostics)

• failures in linear accelerators, in particular due to RF systems
• too small beam size at a target station

Very fast beam loss (ms)

• e.g. multi turn beam losses in circular accelerators
• due to a large number of possible failures, mostly in the magnet

powering system, with a typical time constant of ~1 ms to many seconds

Fast beam loss (some 10 ms to seconds) Slow beam loss (many seconds)

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Classification of failures

• Type of the failure
• hardware failure (power converter trip, magnet quench, AC distribution

failure such as thunderstorm, object in vacuum chamber, vacuum leak, RF trip, kicker magnet misfires, .…)

• controls failure (wrong data, wrong magnet current function, trigger

problem, timing system, feedback failure, ..)

• perational failure (chromaticity / tune / orbit wrong values, …)
• beam instability (due to too high beam / bunch current / e-clouds)
• Parameters for the failure
• time constant for beam loss
• probability for the failure
• damage potential

defined as risk

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Probability of a failure leading to beam loss

• Experience from LHC (…..the most complex accelerator)
• When the beam are colliding, the optimum length of a store is in the order
• f 10-15 hours, then ended by operation
• Most fills (~70 %) are ended by failures, the machine protection systems

detect the failure and dump the beams

• MTBF of about 6 h
• Other large accelerators (SNS, plans for ESS, synchrotron light

sources)

• MTBF between 20 h and up to several 100 h

(…. more accurate numbers are appreciated)

• At high power accelerators, most failures would lead to damage if

not mitigated = > the machine protection system is an essential part of the accelerator

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Machine Protection

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Example for Active Protection - Traffic

• A monitor detects a

dangerous situation

• An action is triggered
• The energy stored in

the system is safely dissipated

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Example for Passive Protection

• The monitor fails to

detect a dangerous situation

• The reaction time is

too short

• Active protection not

possible – passive protection by bumper, air bag, safety belts

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Strategy for protection and related systems

• Avoid that a specific failure can happen

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Strategy for protection and related systems

• Avoid that a specific failure can happen
• Detect failure at hardware level and stop beam operation
• Detect initial consequences of failure with beam instrumentation

….before it is too late…

• Stop beam operation
• inhibit injection
• extract beam into beam dump block
• stop beam by beam absorber / collimator
• Elements in the protection systems
• equipment monitoring and beam monitoring
• beam dump (fast kicker magnet and absorber block)
• chopper to stop the beam in the low energy part
• collimators and beam absorbers
• beam interlock systems linking different systems

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Beam instrumentation for machine protection

• Beam Loss Monitors
• stop beam operation in case of too high beam losses
• monitor beam losses around the accelerator (full coverage!)
• could be fast and/or slow (LHC down to 40 s)
• Beam Position Monitors
• ensuring that the beam has the correct position
• in general, the beam should be centred in the aperture
• Beam Current Transformers
• if the current difference between two locations of the accelerator is too

high (=beam lost somewhere): stop beam operation

• if the beam lifetime is too short: dump beam
• Beam Size Monitors
• if beam size is too small could be dangerous for windows, targets, …

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• Ionization chambers to detect beam losses:
• Reaction time ~ ½ turn (40 s)
• Very large dynamic range (> 106)
• There are ~3600 chambers distributed over the ring to

detect abnormal beam losses and if necessary trigger a beam abort !

LHC Beam Loss Monitors

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Layout of beam dump system in IR6

51

LHC Layout eight arcs (sectors) eight long straight section (about 700 m long) IR6: Beam dumping system IR4: RF + Beam instrumentation IR5:CMS IR1: ATLAS IR8: LHC-B IR2: ALICE

Injection Injection

IR3: Moment Beam Clearing (warm) IR7: Betatron Beam Cleaning (warm)

Beam dump blocks

Detection of beam losses with >3600 monitors around LHC

Signal to kicker magnet Beams from SPS

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LHC: Continuous beam losses during collisions

CMS Experiment ATLAS Experiment LHC Experiment ALICE Experiment Momentum Cleaning RF and BI Beam dump Betatron Cleaning

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LHC: Accidental beam losses during collisions

CMS Experiment ATLAS Experiment LHC Experiment ALICE Experiment Momentum Cleaning RF and BI Beam dump Betatron Cleaning

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LHC: Accidental beam losses during collisions

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Beam 2

Beam dump block Kicker magnets to paint (dilute) the beam about 700 m about 500 m 15 fast ‘kicker’ magnets deflect the beam to the

• utside

When it is time to get rid of the beams (also in case of emergency!), the beams are ‘kicked’ out of the ring by a system of kicker magnetsd send into a dump block ! Septum magnets deflect the extracted beam vertically quadrupoles The 3 s gap in the beam gives the kicker time to reach full field.

Ultra-high reliable system !!

R.Schmidt HASCO 2013 55

CERN

Layout of LHC beam dumping system in IR6

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Beam dumping system line for LHC

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LHC Beam dump

• Screen in front of the

beam dump block

• Each light dot shows

the passage of one proton bunch traversing the screen

• Each proton bunch

has a different trajectory, to better distribute the energy across a large volume

50 cm

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High power accelerators …

• Operate with beam power of 1 MW and more
• SNS – 1 MW, PSI cyclotron – 1.3 MW, ESS – planned for 5 MW,

FRIB (ions) – planned for 0.4 MW

• ESS (4 % duty cycle): in case of an uncontrolled beam loss during

1 ms, the deposited energy is up to 130 kJ, for 1 s it is up to 5 MJ

• It is required to inhibit the beam after detecting uncontrolled

beam loss – how fast?

• The delay between detection and “beam off” to be considered

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Example for ESS

source

dT = dT_detect failure + dT_transmit signal + dT_inhibit source + dT_beam off inhibit beam interlock signal Example: After the DTL normal conducting linac, the proton energy is 78 MeV. In case of a beam size of 2 mm radius, melting would start after about 200 µs. Inhibiting beam should be in about 10% of this time.

L.Tchelidze

Time to melting point

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Some design principles for protection systems

• Failsafe design
• detect internal faults
• possibility for remote testing, for example between two runs
• if the protection system does not work, better stop operation rather

than damage equipment

• Critical equipment should be redundant (possibly diverse)
• Critical processes not by software (no operating system)
• no remote changes of most critical parameters
• Demonstrate safety / availability / reliability
• use established methods to analyse critical systems and to predict failure

rate

• Managing interlocks
• disabling of interlocks is common practice (keep track !)
• LHC: masking of some interlocks possible for low intensity / low energy

beams

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Accelerators that require protection systems I

• Hadron synchrotrons with large stored energy in the beam
• Colliders using protons / antiprotons (TEVATRON, HERA, LHC)
• Synchrotrons accelerating beams for fixed target experiments (SPS)
• High power accelerators (e.g. spallation sources) with beam

power of some 10 kW to above 1 MW

• Risk of damage and activation
• Spallation sources, up to (and above) 1 MW quasi-continuous beam

power (SNS, ISIS, PSI cyclotron, JPARC, and in the future ESS, FRIB, MYRRHA and IFMIF)

• Synchrotron light sources with high intensity beams and

secondary photon beams

• Energy recovery linacs
• Example of Daresbury prototype: one bunch train cannot damage

equipment, but in case of beam loss next train must not leave the (injector) station

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Accelerators that require protection systems II

• Linear colliders / accelerators with very high beam power

densities due to small beam size

• High average power in linear accelerators: FLASH 90 kW, European XFEL

600 kW, JLab FEL 1.5 MW, ILC 11 MW

• One beam pulse can lead already to damage
• “any time interval large enough to allow a substantial change in the

beam trajectory of component alignment (~fraction of a second), pilot beam must be used to prove the integrity” from NLC paper 1999

• Medical accelerators: prevent too high dose to patient
• Low intensity, but techniques for protection are similar
• Very short high current bunches: beam induces image currents

that can damage the environment (bellows, beam instruments, cavities, …)

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For future high intensity machines

Machine protection should always start during the design phase of an accelerators

• Particle tracking
• to establish loss distribution with realistic failure modes
• accurate aperture model required
• Calculations of the particle shower (FLUKA, GEANT, …)
• energy deposition in materials
• activation of materials
• accurate 3-d description of accelerator components (and possibly the

tunnel) required

• Coupling between particle tracking and shower calculations
• From the design, provide 3-d model of all components

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 64

Summary

Machine protection

• is not equal to equipment protection
• requires the understanding of many different type of failures that

could lead to beam loss

• requires comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the

accelerator (accelerator physics, operation, equipment, instrumentation, functional safety)

• touches many aspects of accelerator construction and operation
• includes many systems
• is becoming increasingly important for future projects, with

increased beam power / energy density (W/mm2 or J/mm2 ) and increasingly complex machines

• I find it a fascinating topic ……… at least until nothing breaks

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 65

Acknowledgements to many colleagues from CERN and to the authors of the listed papers

• R.F.Koontz, Multiple Beam Pulse of the SLAC Injector, PAC 1967
• R.Bacher et al., The HERA Quench Protection System, a Status Report, EPAC 1996
• C.Adolphsen et al., The Next Linear Collider Machine Protection System, PAC 1999
• M.C.Ross et al., Single Pulse Damage in Copper, LINAC 2000
• C.Sibley, Machine Protection Strategies for High Power Accelerators, PAC 2003
• C.Sibley, The SNS Machine Protection System: Early Commissioning Results and Future Plans, PAC

2005

• S.R.Buckley and R.J.Smith, Monitoring and Machine Protection Designs for the Daresbury

Laboratory Energy Recovery Linac Prototype, EPAC 2006

• L.Fröhlich et al., First Operation of the FLASH Machine Protection System with long Bunch Trains,

LINAC 2006

• L.Fröhlich et al., First Experience with the Machine Protection System of FLASH, FEL 2006
• N.V.Mokhov et al., Beam Induced Damage to the TEVATRON Components and what has been

done about it, HB2006

• M.Werner and K.Wittenburg, Very fast Beam Losses at HERA, and what has been done about it,

HB2006

• S.Henderson, Status of the Spallation Neutron Source: Machine and Experiments, PAC 2007
• H.Yoshikawa et al., Current Status of the Control System for J-PARC Accelerator Complex,

ICALEPCS 2007

• L.Froehlich, Machine Protection for FLASH and the European XFEL, DESY PhD Thesis 2009
• A.C.Mezger, Control and protection aspects of the megawatt proton accelerator at PSI, HB2010
• Y.Zhang, D.Stout, J.Wei, ANALYSIS OF BEAM DAMAGE TO FRIB DRIVER LINAC, SRF 2012

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 66

CERN and LHC

• R.B.Appleby et. al., Beam-related machine protection for the CERN Large Hadron Collider

experiments, Phys. Rev. ST Accel. Beams 13, 061002 (2010)

• R.Schmidt et al., Protection of the CERN Large Hadron Collider, New Journal of Physics 8 (2006) 290
• R.Schmidt, Machine Protection, CERN CAS 2008 Dourdan on Beam Diagnostics
• N.Tahir et al., Simulations of the Full Impact of the LHC Beam on Solid Copper and Graphite Targets,

IPAC 2010, Kyoto, Japan, 23 - 28 May 2010 Theses

• Verena Kain, Machine Protection and Beam Quality during the LHC Injection Process, CERN-THESIS-

2005-047

• G.Guaglio, Reliability of the Beam Loss Monitors System for the Large Hadron Collider at CERN /,

CERN-THESIS-2006-012 PCCF-T-0509

• Benjamin Todd, A Beam Interlock System for CERN High Energy Accelerators, CERN-THESIS-2007-019
• A. Gomez Alonso, Redundancy of the LHC machine protection systems in case of magnet failures /

CERN-THESIS-2009-023

• Sigrid Wagner, LHC Machine Protection System: Method for Balancing Machine Safety and Beam

Availability /, CERN-THESIS-2010-215

• Roderik Bruce, Beam loss mechanisms in relativistic heavy-ion colliders, CERN-THESIS-2010-030

Acknowledgements to many colleagues from CERN and to the authors of the listed papers

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 67

• L.Tchelidze, In how long the ESS beam pulse would start melting steel/copper accelerating

components? ESS AD Technical Note, ESS/AD/0031, 2012

• Conference reports in JACOW, keywords: machine protection, beam loss

Acknowledgements to many colleagues from CERN and to the authors of the listed papers

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 68

68

Example for LHC

Collimation and Machine Protection during

• peration

Assume that two 100 MJoule beams (=25 kg TNT) are circulating with the speed of light through the 56 mm diameter vacuum chamber and 2 mm wide collimators

1.

Suddenly the AC distribution for CERN fails – no power!

2.

An object falls into the beam

3.

The betatron tune is driven right onto a 1/3 order resonance

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 69

LHC from injection to collisions

3.5 TeV / 100 MJoule 0.45 TeV / 13 MJoule Energy ramp Luminosity: start collisions Injection of 1380 bunches per beam About 2 hours

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 70

Orbit for last 1000 turns before power cut

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 71

Example for power radiated during particle collisions for LHC Rate of collision: 𝑔 𝐼𝑨 = 𝑀 𝑑𝑛−2 ∙ 𝑡−1 ∙ 𝜏 𝑑𝑛2 Power in collision products: 𝑄[𝑋] = 𝑔[𝐼𝑨] ∙ 𝐹[𝑓𝑊] Assume LHC operating at 7 TeV with a luminosity of: 𝑀 = 1034 ∙ 𝑑𝑛−2 ∙ 𝑡−1 Total cross section for pp collision of 110 mBarn: 𝑄 𝑋 = 1034 ∙ 𝑑𝑛−2 ∙ 𝑡−1 ∙ 10−25 𝑑𝑛2 ∙ 7[𝑈𝑓𝑊] Power in collision products per experiment: 𝑄 𝑋 = 1100 𝑋

• Some fraction of the protons are deflected by a small angle and

remain in the vacuum chamber

• Some fraction hits close-by equipment

Continuous beam losses

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 72

Total power cut atLHC - 18 August 2011, 11:45

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 73

• 1. Suddenly the AC distribution for

CERN fails – no power for LHC!

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 74

\\cern.ch\dfs\Users\r\rudi\Documents\ConferencesWorkshops\SCHOOL S\CAS\CAS2011\UFO-slideshow.pptx

UFO at LHC

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 75

LHC from injection to collisions: beam loss

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 76

…zoom - going into collisions

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 77

Beam cleaning system captures beam losses

• In case protons are lost because of low lifetime
• In case of protons are lose when colliding beams, and scattering
• f protons during the collisions that would be lost around the LHC
• In case of protons outside the RF bucket – losing slowly energy –

are captured by collimators in the Momentum Cleaning Insertion Questions

• How to stop high energy protons?
• Why so many collimators?
• Why carbon composite or graphite used for most collimators?

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 78

Collimator material

• Metal absorbers would be destroyed
• Other materials for injection absorber preferred, graphite or

boron nitride for the injection absorber

• In case of a partial kick (can happen), the beam would travel

further to the next collimators in the cleaning insertions

P.Sievers / A.Ferrari /

• V. Vlachoudis

7 T eV, 21012 protons

• For collimators close to

the beam, metal absorbers would be destroyed

• Other materials for

collimators close to the beam are preferred (carbon – carbon)

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 79

Collimation

• For a circular accelerator, the transverse distribution of beams is

in general Gaussian, or close to Gaussian (beams can have non- Gaussian tails)

• In general, particles in these tails cause problems when they

might touch the aperture

• Background
• Quenches in magnets (for accelerators with sc magnets)
• For high intensity machines, possible damage of components
• Nearly all particles that are in the centre go first through the tails

before getting lost (except those that do a inelastic collision with gas molecules)

• Tails are scraped away using collimators

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 80

Phase space and collimation

x’ x x’

Starting with a Gaussian beam profile

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 81

Phase space and collimation

x’ x x’

Collimator outside the beam

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 82 82

Phase space and collimation: multi turn

x’ x’ x

Collimator driven into the beam tail: loss of particles

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 83 83

Phase space and collimation: multi turn

x’ x’ x

Collimator again outside the beam – beam size reduction (for proton synchrotrons)

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 84 84

Phase space and collimation: single turn

x’ x’ x

Collimator in a transfer line or linac: cuts only part

• f the beam

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 85 85

Phase space and collimation: single turn

x’ x x’

Collimator in a transfer line or linac: cuts only part

• f the beam

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 86 86

Phase space and collimation: single turn

x’ x’ x

Collimator in a transfer line or linac: several collimators are required

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 87 87

Phase space and collimation: single turn

x’ x’ x

Collimator in a transfer line or linac: several collimators are required …. at different betatron phases

90 degrees further down

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 88

Gaussian beam not collimated

4



3



2



1



1 2 3 4 3 10

4





6 10

4





9 10

4





1.2 10

3





1.5 10

3





1.8 10

3





2.1 10

3





2.4 10

3





2.7 10

3





3 10

3





0.003

g.h t ( )

4 4

 t

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 89

Gaussian beam collimated at 4 sigma

4



3



2



1



1 2 3 4 3 10

4





6 10

4





9 10

4





1.2 10

3





1.5 10

3





1.8 10

3





2.1 10

3





2.4 10

3





2.7 10

3





3 10

3





0.003

g.h t ( )

4 4

 t

N = 0.999 (number of protons) L = 0.999 (luminosity)

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 90

Gaussian beam collimated at 3 sigma

4



3



2



1



1 2 3 4 3 10

4





6 10

4





9 10

4





1.2 10

3





1.5 10

3





1.8 10

3





2.1 10

3





2.4 10

3





2.7 10

3





3 10

3





0.003

g.h t ( )

4 4

 t

N= 0.987 L = 0.992

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 91

Gaussian beam collimated at 2 sigma

4



3



2



1



1 2 3 4 3 10

4





6 10

4





9 10

4





1.2 10

3





1.5 10

3





1.8 10

3





2.1 10

3





2.4 10

3





2.7 10

3





3 10

3





0.003

g.h t ( )

4 4

 t

N= 0.863 L = 0.866

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 92

Collimation: why so many?

Answer A:

• For a transfer line or a linear accelerator, many collimators are

required to take out particles at all phases Answer B:

• Cite: “It is not possible to stop a high energy proton, it is only

possible to make them mad”

• Collimators cannot stop a high energy proton
• The particle impact on a collimator jaw is very small, in the order
• f microns or even less
• Particles scatter….. depends on particle type, energy and impact
• n collimator jaw
• Staged collimation system in a ring and in a transfer line

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 93

Betatron beam cleaning

Cold aperture Cleaning insertion Arc(s) IP

Circulating beam Illustration drawing

Arc(s)

Primary collimator Secondary collimators

Tertiary beam halo + hadronic showers

Shower absorbers Tertiary collimators SC Triplet

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 94

Measurement: 500kJ losses at primary collimators (loss rate: 9.1e11 p/s) – IR7

Daniel Wollmann

94

TCP: ~505 kJ Q8L7: ~335 J Q11L7: ~35 J Q19L7: ~4.7 J Q8L7:  ~ 6.7e-4 Lower limit: RqLdil ~ 1.22e9 p/s (with cresp= 2 ) Lost energy over 1 s

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 95

Film from Alessandro

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 96

173 bunches grazing incident on injection absorber

Upstream of IP2

Beam 1

Downstream of IP2

Beam 1

Insertion losses: 3 magnets quenched (D1.L2, MQX.L2, D2.R2)

TDI

Losses starting at TDI, no injection loss signature  only circulating beam kicked by MKI

In comparison to flashover event of April 18th in P8 (LMC 20/04/11), cleaner in arc less magnet quenches (3), ALICE SDD permanent effect, open MCSOX.3L2 circuit

C.Bracco

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 97

Is protection required?

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 98

Protection for beam transfer from SPS to LHC

A signal “extraction permit” is required to extract beam from SPS and another signal “injection permit“ to inject beam into LHC

• After extraction the trajectory is determined by the magnet fields: safe

beam transfer and injection relies on correct settings

–

• rbit bump around extraction point in SPS during extraction with tight

tolerances verified with BPMs – correct magnet currents (slow pulsing magnets, fast pulsing magnets) – position of vacuum valves, beam screens,… must all be OUT – energy of SPS, transfer line and LHC must match – LHC must be ready to accept beam

• Verifying correct settings just before extraction and injection
• The kicker must fire at the correct time with the correct strength
• Position of collimators and beam absorbers in SPS, transfer line and

LHC injection region to protect from misfiring

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 99

Case studies

The principles of machine protection are illustrated with examples from different accelerators

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 100

Example: SNS

• normal conducting linac
• superconducting linac
• accumulator ring
• transfer lines
• target station
• beam power on target 1.4 MW
• beam pulse length 1 ms
• repetition rate 60 Hz
• (more or less) continuous beam to above 1 MW

– the deposited energy is proportional to the time of exposure – the risk (possible damage) increases with time

• Protection by detecting the failure and stopping injection and acceleration

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 101

SNS damage limits

• Damage of a copper cavity: Time to reach the thermal stress limit for

copper assuming a beam size of 2 mm, a current of 36 mA and an energy density of 62 J/gm as maximum permitted energy deposition (from C.Sibley, PAC 2003)

• The SNS MP system uses inputs from BLMs, beam current monitors, RF,

power supplies, vacuum system, kickers, etc.

102

Radiation Damage to Undulator Magnets

• Nd2Fe14B magnets lose magnetization

when irradiated

• literature: relative demagnetization rate

10−8/Gy (gammas) — 10−4/Gy (fast neutrons)

hybrid magnet structure Nd2Fe14B permanent magnets soft magnetic pole pieces

Lars Froehlich, DESY and Uni Hamburg, Machine Protection Machine Protection for FLASH and the European XFEL

103

Conclusion

• Superconducting linacs can transport

dangerously powerful beams

• Permanent magnet undulators are

among the most vulnerable components

• Beam losses must be controlled

tightly (FLASH design: 3∙10−8)

• Dark current can be problematic
• Good passive & active protection is

required

• FLASH machine protection system is

fully functional & reliable

• XFEL machine protection system will

be more complex, but concepts & first prototypes are ready

Lars Froehlich, DESY and Uni Hamburg, Machine Protection Machine Protection for FLASH and the European XFEL

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 104

Machine Protection during all phases of operation

• The LHC is the first accelerator with the intensity of the injected beam

already far above threshold for damage, protection during the injection process is mandatory

• At 7 TeV, fast beam loss with an intensity of about 5% of one single

“nominal bunch” could damage equipment (e.g. superconducting coils)

• The only component that can stand a loss of the full beam is the beam

dump block - all other components would be damaged

• The LHC beams must ALWAYS be extracted into the beam dump blocks

– at the end of a fill – in case of failure

• During powering, about 10 GJ is stored in the superconducting magnets,

quench protection and powering interlocks must be operational long before starting beam operation

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 105

Multiturn beam losses

Consequence of a magnet powering failure

– Closed orbit grows and moves everywhere the ring or downstream the linac (follows free betatron oscillation with one kick) – Beam size explodes – Can happen very fast (for example, if a normal conducting magnet trips or after a magnet quench) – Can be detected around the entire accelerator

Local orbit bump

– Can be generated due to BPM offset – Needs several magnets to fail and cannot happen very fast – Might be detected only locally

• Protection: Detect failure and dump beam
• Detection by equipment monitoring and beam monitoring

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 106

Failure of normal conducting magnets

After about 13 turns 3·109 protons touch collimator, about 6 turns later 1011 protons touch collimator

V.Kain / O.Bruning

“Dump beam” level

1011 protons at collimator

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 107

Fast Magnet Current change Monitors

(initial development for HERA, upgrade for LHC in collaboration with DESY)

• Several FMCMs are installed on critical magnets
• T

ested using steep reference changes to trigger FMCM. The trigger threshold and the magnet current (resolution one ms)

• Beam tests confirmed these results

Reference PC current time (ms) I (A) FMCM trigger  0.1% drop ! time (ms) I (A) 10 ms

FMCM triggers @ 3984.4 <103

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 109

Principle of LHC / SPS Beam Interlock Systems

BIS

LHC Dump kicker

Beam ‘Permit’

User permit signals

• ‘User systems’ survey equipment or beam parameters, detect failures and

send a hardwired signal to the beam interlock system (user permit)

• The BIS combines user permits and produces beam permit
• The beam permit is a hardwired signal to injection / extraction kickers :
• LHC ring: absence of beam permit

 dump triggered !

• LHC injection: absence of beam permit  no injection !
• SPS: absence of beam permit

 no extraction !

Hardware links /systems, fully redundant

SPS Extraction kicker LHC Injection kicker SPS Dump kicker

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 110

Machine Protection and Controls

• Software Interlock Systems (SIS) provides additional

protection for complex but also less critical conditions

– Surveillance of magnet currents to avoid certain failures (local bumps) that would reduce the aperture – The reaction time of those systems will be at the level of a few seconds – The systems rely entirely on the computer network, databases, etc – clearly not as safe as HW systems!

• Sequencer: program to execute defined procedures

– To execute defined well-tested procedures for beam operation

• Logging and PM systems: recording of data – continuous

logging and for transients (beam dump, quench, …)

– Very important to understand what happened

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 111

P.Sievers / A.Ferrari /

• V. Vlachoudis

Beryllium

Accidental kick by the beam dump kicker at 7 TeV part of beam touches collimators (about 21012 from 31014 )

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 112

T arget length [cm] vaporisation melting

N.Tahir (GSI) et al.

Copper target 2 m Energy density [GeV/cm3]

• n target axis

2808 bunches 7 T eV 350 MJoule

Full LHC beam deflected into copper target

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 113

LHC circulating beam Injection absorbers (TCLI) ~7σ

n·180 +/- 20 degrees

Beam absorbers take beam in case of kicker wrong strength

Protection at injection

Beam from SPS Injection Kicker Set of transfer line collimators (TCDI) ~5σ Injection absorber (TDI) ~7σ Circulating beam – kicked out Injection kicker – wrong strength

phase advance 900

LHC circulating beam

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 114

LHC circulating beam Injection Kicker Injection absorber TDI ~7σ Injection absorbers TCLI ~7σ

Only when beam is circulating in the LHC, injection of high intensity beam is permitted – verification of LHC magnet settings

Probe Beam: Replacing low intensity beam by a full batch from SPS

Set of transfer line collimators TCDI ~5σ Beam from SPS

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 115

Active and passive protection

Start operation with low intensity beam (“pilot beam”) Active protection

• Detect failure
• Turn off the beam as fast as possible (e.g. source, RF, …)
• Only permit beam injection into the next part of the

accelerator complex in case of positive confirmation that all parameters are within predefined limits

• Abort the beam from a storage ring / accumulator ring

Passive protection

• Install collimators and beam absorbers, in particular if active

protection is not possible

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 116

Active protection

Monitoring of the beam detects a failure and allows to switch off the beam before damage

• Stored beam in a circular accelerator

– multi turn beam losses – monitor beam losses, and dump the beam if losses exceed threshold

• “Continuous” beam in linacs of other accelerators

– continuous: if the time constant for a failure is such that the source can be switched off in time

• There is a large number of possible failures, mostly in the

magnet powering system, with a typical time constant of ms to many seconds

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt

Cold aperture

Primary beam halo

Primary collimator Secondary collimators

Tertiary beam halo + hadronic showers Secondary beam halo + hadronic showers

Shower absorbers

Cleaning insertion

Tertiary collimators SC Triplet

Arc(s) IP

Protection devices

Circulating beam

Illustrative scheme

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 118

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 119

Failure of a kicker magnet

1 km

Extraction kicker magnet:

• wrong pulse strength
• wrong timing

Injection kicker magnet:

• wrong pulse strength
• wrong timing

Transfer line

LHC SPS

6911 m 450 GeV / 400 GeV 3 MJ Acceleration cycle of 10 s

CNGS Target

IR8

Switching magnet Fast extraction kicker Injection kicker

Transfer line

Injection kicker

IR2

Fast extraction kicker

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt 120

Failure in the transfer line (magnet, other element)

1 km

Wrong setting of magnets Object in the transfer line blocks beam passage

Transfer line

LHC SPS

6911 m 450 GeV / 400 GeV 3 MJ Acceleration cycle of 10 s

CNGS Target

IR8

Switching magnet Fast extraction kicker Injection kicker

Transfer line

Injection kicker

IR2

Fast extraction kicker

CAS October 2013 R.Schmidt

M.Jonker

Beam damage capabilities

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 122

Accidental beam losses: Risks and protection

• Protection is required since there is some risk
• Risk = probability of an accident (in number of accidents per year)

 consequences (in Euro, downtime, radiation dose to people)

• Probability of an accidental beam loss
• What are the failure modes the lead to beam loss into equipment (there

is an practical infinite number of mechanisms to lose the beam)?

• What is the probability for the most likely failures?
• Consequences of an accidental beam loss
• Damage to equipment
• Downtime of the accelerator for repair (spare parts available?)
• Activation of material, might lead to downtime since access to

equipment is delayed

• The higher the risk, the more protection becomes important

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 123

Damage of LHC during the 2008 accident

Accidental release of an energy of 600 MJoule stored in the magnet system - no beam in LHC

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 124

Energy loss: example for protons in Aluminium

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 125

Temperature increase in the material: dTFe Np dEdxFe  cFe_spec Fbeam 

Fe

  Temperature increase for a proton beam impacting on a Fe target: Beam size:  h mm   and  v mm   Iron specific heat: cFe_spec J kg K    Iron specific weight: Fe kg m3   Energy loss per proton/mm: dEdxFe MeV mm   Number of protons: Np  Energy of the proton: Ep GeV   Temperature increase: dTFe 

Heating of material with low energy protons

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 126

Strategy for Machine Protection

Beam Interlock System Collimator and Beam Absorbers

• Early detection of failures for equipment acting
• n beams and generating beam abort request

(inhibit injection, dump beam).

• Active monitoring of the beams detects

abnormal beam conditions and generates beam abort request.

• Reliable transmission of beam abort requests to

beam stop system. Active signal required for

• peration, absence of signal is considered as

beam abort request and injection inhibit.

• Reliable operation of beam abort system.
• Passive protection by beam absorbers and

collimators for specific failure cases.

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 127

LHC: Strategy for machine protection

• Definition of aperture by collimators.

Beam Cleaning System Beam Loss Monitors Other Beam Monitors Beam Interlock System Powering Interlocks Fast Magnet Current change Monitor Beam Dumping System Collimator and Beam Absorbers

• Early detection of failures for equipment acting
• n beams generates dump request, possibly

before the beam is affected.

• Active monitoring of the beams detects

abnormal beam conditions and generates beam dump requests down to a single machine turn.

• Reliable transmission of beam dump requests

to beam dumping system. Active signal required for operation, absence of signal is considered as beam dump request and injection inhibit.

• Reliable operation of beam dumping system for

dump requests or internal faults, safely extract the beams onto the external dump blocks.

• Passive protection by beam absorbers and

collimators for specific failure cases.

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 128

Beam losses and consequences

• Equipment becomes activated due to beam losses (acceptable is

~1 W/m, but must be “As Low As Reasonably Achievable – ALARA”)

CERN

Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 129

Energy deposition and temperature increase

• SPS at 450 GeV, number of protons per cycle about 4 × 1013
• Energy deposition in vacuum chamber (stainless steel)

2.2 MeV/mm

• Assuming a beam size of 1 mm, the temperature increase is

expected to be about 1020 C

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Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 130

Energy deposition and temperature increase

• ESS at 3 MeV, number of protons per 14 Hz pulse is about

1.1 × 1015

• Assume we consider the space between RFQ and MEBT, with a

proton energy of 3 MeV

• Energy deposition in vacuum chamber (stainless steel)

59.7 MeV/mm

• Assuming a beam size of 3 mm, one full beam pulse that is

deflected to the wall would be far above damage limit

• If the source is stopped after 30 𝜈𝑡, the temperature would

increase to about 600 C

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Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 131

Energy deposition and temperature increase

• There is no straightforward expression for the energy deposition
• The energy deposition is a function of the particle type, its

momentum, and the parameters of the material (atomic number, density, specific heat)

• Programs such as FLUKA, MARS, GEANT and others are being

used for the calculation of energy deposition and activation

• Other programs are used to calculate the response of the

material (deformation, melting, …) to beam impact (mechanical codes such as ANSYS, hydrodynamic codes such as BIG2 and

• thers)

Question: what is dangerous (stored beam energy, beam power)?

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Rüdiger Schmidt CAS Trondheim 2013 page 132

What parameters are relevant?

• Momentum of the particle
• Particle type
• Activation is mainly an issue for

hadron accelerators

• Time structure of beam
• Energy stored in the beam
• ne MJoule can heat and melt

1.5 kg of copper

• ne MJoule corresponds to the

energy stored in 0.25 kg of TNT

• Beam power
• ne MWatt during one second

corresponds to a MJoule

• Beam size
• Beam power / energy density

(MJoule/mm2, MWatt/mm2)

Consequences for an accident with 360 MJ beam can be catastrophic (LHC damage beyond repair) Delicate components can be damaged already with some Joule (e.g. RFQ) Machine protection becomes very important if beam energy > 0.1 – 1 MJ