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4 SoS D. Pavlovic Statement 1 4 statements Statement 2 about science and security Statement 3 Statement 4 Dusko Pavlovic Kestrel Institute and Oxford University Science of Security Workshop Oakland, CA 17-18 November 2008 rs rs rs rs


  1. 4 SoS D. Pavlovic Statement 1 4 statements Statement 2 about science and security Statement 3 Statement 4 Dusko Pavlovic Kestrel Institute and Oxford University Science of Security Workshop Oakland, CA 17-18 November 2008

  2. rs rs rs rs rs rs 4 SoS Secure channels on insecure networks D. Pavlovic Statement 1 It is easy to set up a secure channel Statement 2 Statement 3 A B Statement 4 ν x A to B : g x ν y B to A : g y kAB = ( gy ) x kAB = ( gx ) y

  3. rs rs rs rs rs rs rs rs rs rs 4 SoS Secure channels on insecure networks D. Pavlovic Statement 1 It is hard to know who you are talking to Statement 2 Statement 3 A M B Statement 4 ν x A to B : g x ν � x A to B : g � x ν y B to A : g y ν � y B to A : g � y k AB = g x � y g x � y g � xy k AB = g � xy

  4. 4 SoS What is the problem with authentication? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Why is it that Statement 4 ◮ encryptions are broken once in a while ◮ authentications are broken daily?

  5. 4 SoS What is the problem with authentication? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Why is it that Statement 4 ◮ Shannon’s first memo introduced a science ◮ Shannon’s second memo applied it to secrecy ◮ . . . but it doesn’t really apply to authentication?

  6. 4 SoS Authentication is a hard problem for science D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Derive global facts from local observations Statement 3 Statement 4

  7. 4 SoS Authentication is a hard problem for science D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Derive global facts from local observations Statement 3 Statement 4 René Descartes: "I think, therefore I exist."

  8. 4 SoS Authentication is a hard problem for science D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Derive global facts from local observations Statement 3 There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis Statement 4 that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. Bertrand Russell The Analysis of Mind

  9. 4 SoS Authentication is a hard problem for science D. Pavlovic — like the existence of God for religion? Statement 1 Statement 2 Derive global facts from local observations Statement 3 There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis Statement 4 that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. Bertrand Russell The Analysis of Mind

  10. 4 SoS Statement 1 D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ Secrecy is no problem. ◮ Authentication is the problem.

  11. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 About 6000 years ago, Kain’s son Bob built a secure vault Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Bob Alice ℓ 5 ℓ 2 ℓ 4 ℓ 3 ℓ 1

  12. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 and stored his goods in it. Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Bob Alice ℓ 5 ℓ 2 ℓ 4 ℓ 3 ℓ 1

  13. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 and stored his goods in it. When Alice wanted to go for a Statement 2 vacation Statement 3 Statement 4 Bob ℓ 5 ℓ 2 Alice ℓ 4 ℓ 3 ℓ 1

  14. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 and stored his goods in it. When Alice wanted to go for a Statement 2 vacation, she stored her goods there too. Statement 3 Statement 4 Bob Alice ℓ 5 ℓ 2 ℓ 4 ℓ 3 ℓ 1

  15. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic As a receipt for her deposit in Bob’s vault, Alice got a secure Statement 1 token in a clay envelope . Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Figure: Louvre, Paris

  16. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic As a receipt for her deposit in Bob’s vault, Alice got a secure Statement 1 token in a clay envelope . Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Figure: Louvre, Paris ◮ To take the sheep, Alice must give the token.

  17. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic As a receipt for her deposit in Bob’s vault, Alice got a secure Statement 1 token in a clay envelope . Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Figure: Louvre, Paris ◮ To take the sheep, Alice must give the token. ◮ To give the sheep, Bob must take the token.

  18. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic As a receipt for her deposit in Bob’s vault, Alice got a secure Statement 1 token in a clay envelope . Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Figure: Louvre, Paris ◮ To take the sheep, Alice must give the token. ◮ To give the sheep, Bob must take the token. ◮ Anyone who gives the token can take the sheep.

  19. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ This protocol goes back to Uruk (Irak), 4000 B.C.

  20. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ This protocol goes back to Uruk (Irak), 4000 B.C. ◮ Money developed from security tokens.

  21. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ This protocol goes back to Uruk (Irak), 4000 B.C. ◮ Money developed from security tokens. ◮ Numbers developed from security annotations.

  22. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ This protocol goes back to Uruk (Irak), 4000 B.C. ◮ Money developed from security tokens. ◮ Numbers developed from security annotations. ◮ Writing developed later.

  23. 4 SoS Where does security come from? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ This protocol goes back to Uruk (Irak), 4000 B.C. ◮ Money developed from security tokens. ◮ Numbers developed from security annotations. ◮ Writing developed later. ◮ Science developed still later.

  24. 4 SoS Statement 2 D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 Security is older and broader than science.

  25. 4 SoS Security is a social process D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 ◮ Studying security as a mere technical problem Statement 3 ◮ computer security Statement 4 ◮ web security ◮ airport security ◮ . . .

  26. 4 SoS Security is a social process D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 ◮ Studying security as a mere technical problem Statement 3 ◮ computer security Statement 4 ◮ web security ◮ airport security ◮ . . . is like ◮ studying lung diseases as mere physiology ◮ ignoring that some people smoke ◮ some people grow and sell tobacco ◮ some people collect taxes ◮ . . .

  27. 4 SoS Statement 3 D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 ◮ Security-on-its-own is simple. ◮ Security-in-its-social-context is complex.

  28. 4 SoS Adverse selection D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 T RUST E-certified uncertified honest 94.6% 97.5% malicious 5.4% 2.5 % Table: Trustworthyness of T RUST E [Edelman 2007]

  29. 4 SoS Adverse selection D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Google Statement 4 sponsored organic top 4.44% 2.73% top 3 5.33% 2.93 % top 10 5.89% 2.74 % top 50 5.93% 3.04 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

  30. 4 SoS Adverse selection D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Yahoo! Statement 4 sponsored organic top 6.35% 0.00% top 3 5.72% 0.35 % top 10 5.14% 1.47 % top 50 5.40% 1.55 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

  31. 4 SoS Adverse selection D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Ask Statement 4 sponsored organic top 7.99% 3.23% top 3 7.99% 3.24 % top 10 8.31% 2.94 % top 50 8.20% 3.12 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

  32. 4 SoS Adverse selection D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Statement 4 "Pillars of the society" phenomenon ◮ social hubs are more often corrupt ◮ the rich are more often thieves ◮ . . .

  33. 4 SoS Trust distribution D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3 Theorem Statement 4 In the long run, the distribution of the number of trustees with trust rating n is � n C · n − ( 1 + 1 c ) · w n γ ℓ ≈ ℓ = 1 where γ ℓ is the probability that a principal with trust rating ℓ is malicious.

  34. 4 SoS What does this mean? D. Pavlovic Trust is like money Statement 1 Statement 2 If γ ℓ → 1 fast enough (the cheaters do not wait too long), Statement 3 then the distribution of trust is scale free. Statement 4 Figure: Power law w ( x ) = ax − ( 1 + b )

  35. 4 SoS What does this mean? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Origin of scale-free distributions Statement 2 Statement 3 V. Pareto: "The rich get richer" Statement 4

  36. 4 SoS What does this mean? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Origin of scale-free distributions Statement 2 Statement 3 V. Pareto: "The rich get richer" Statement 4 Robustness of scale free distributions The market is stabilized by the hubs of wealth.

  37. 4 SoS What does this mean? D. Pavlovic Statement 1 Origin of scale-free distributions Statement 2 Statement 3 V. Pareto: "The rich get richer" Statement 4 Robustness of scale free distributions The market is stabilized by the hubs of wealth. Fragility of scale free distributions Theft is easier when there are very rich people.

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