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2 RFC 4650 - HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman for Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) RFC 4738 - MIKEY-RSA-R: An Additional Mode of Key Distribution in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) 3 4 5 Based on an Identity Based asymmetric

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  3.  RFC 4650 - HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman for Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)  RFC 4738 - MIKEY-RSA-R: An Additional Mode of Key Distribution in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) 3

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  6. Based on an Identity Based asymmetric cryptographic framework  Every participant has a public and a private key  Public key (PubK) is identity based (e.g., IMSidentity||date)  Private key (PrK) corresponding to Public key is issued by a trusted Key Management Service (KMS)  Participants obtain private keys from KMS offline  Example: Participants contact their KMS once a month (more generally for the length of the subscription)  Security association between KMS and participant is pre-provisioned  Encryption and Decryption of messages during key exchange based on Identity Based Encryption (IBE)  Reference: Boneh et al., RFC 5091, RFC 5408, RFC 5409 6

  7. KMS I KMS R • Key_Request(Responder_ID) • Key_Request(Initiator_ID) These exchanges take place • Key_Response • Key_Response periodically Responder Initiator Initiator’s Responder’s private key (I_PrK) private key (R_PrK) 7

  8. • Initiator’s public key (I_PubK) • Responder’s public key (R_PubK) • Responder’s private key (R_PrK) • Initiator’s private key (I_PrK) • P Public parameter: a known point on a known elliptic curve Decrypts the message using R_PrK, chooses random b , and Chooses computes b P random a, and • IBE(R_PubK, I_ID|| R_ID || a P) computes a P IBE(I_PubK, I_ID || R_ID|| a P|| b P) • IBE(R_PubK, I_ID || R_ID || b P) • Verification Initiator Responder Both Initiator and Decrypts the Decrypts the Responder generated the message using message using I_PrK and verifies R_PrK and same session key (abP) received aP verifies received bP Identity Based Authenticated Key Exchange 8

  9.  Exchanged Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) values are IBE encrypted  Session Key (abP) known only to Initiator and Responder  Due to hardness of the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem  Protocol necessitates three-way exchange  Session key can be generated after second message 9

  10. MIKEY-IBAKE securely supports following features  Forking - delivery of a request to multiple endpoints  Established session key is known only to the Initiator and the endpoint that answered the call  Retargeting - request sent to one endpoint but delivered to a different endpoint  Established session key is known only to the Initiator and the endpoint that answered the call  Deferred delivery - session content cannot be delivered to the destination at the time that it is being sent  Encrypted session content/media is stored  Stored media can be decrypted only by the intended Responder 10

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  12. Specify MIKEY-IBAKE in msec WG 12

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