2 Transportation Card Access Card - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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2 Transportation Card Access Card - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 13, 2023 114 likes •445 views

2 Transportation Card Access Card Credit Card Any potential security risk with these cards? Any potential security risk with these cards? 3 Thievery Loss Why cant these

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Transportation Card Access Card Credit Card

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Any potential security risk with these cards? Any potential security risk with these cards?

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Thievery Loss

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Why can’t these cards resist loss and thievery? Why can’t these cards resist loss and thievery?

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Who are you?

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Sth you have?

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Device Authentication User(Biometric) Authentication

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  • Not convenient
  • Not easy to customize
  • Not light-weight
  • Not fast to implement
  • Not low cost
  • …

Issues with these approaches:

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User-dependent & Unique User-dependent & Unique

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Our goal

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Device Authentication Device Authentication User Authentication User Authentication Replay Impersonation Counterfeiting Universal Light-weight Low-cost

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Radiative & Inductive coupling

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Observation 1

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  • -- Impact of tag coupling
  • Tags in a vicinity  Their circuit characteristics change.
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Observation 1

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  • -- Impact of tag coupling
  • What will happen if we collect their phases together?
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Why does the phase change due to coupling?

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Observation 2

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Impact of human impedance

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Why does phase change with fingertip touch?

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Phase Difference of Tags (PDoT) User-dependent & Unique Phase Fingerprint

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Challenge 1

The impact of touching is unstable.

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Tackle with challenge 1

Introduce a conductor

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Complexity of coupling & Size of array Complexity of coupling & Size of array

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Challenge 2

Phases change with distance.

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Tackle with challenge 2

Phase shifting algorithm

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Max PDoT

Max PDoT Max PDoT

Get phase fingerprint at this status

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Tackle with challenge 2

Phase shifting algorithm

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Tackle with challenge 2

Phase shifting algorithm

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Challenge 3

Impact of accessories

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r=ring w=watch n=necklace

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  • 1. Impinj R420 reader
  • 2. Larid antenna A9028
  • 3. Alien-9629 tag
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Overall accuracy vs. Human diversity

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  • 7 females + 8 males
  • 15 representative tag array layouts

Accuracy > 99%

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Resisting impersonation attack

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  • 10 attackers try to use an authorized user’s

credential to access the system. FAR < 0.05 Maximum FRR < 0.1

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Resisting counterfeiting attack

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  • Attacker produces a counterfeited array with the same tag

model and layout.

  • 90 Alien-9629 tags
  • 10 arrays

FRR < 0.005 Average FAR < 0.01

Tags’ hardware differences will reflect in phases.

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Resisting replay attack

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  • Effective read range < 30cm
  • Tolerable space angle of tag rotation < 10°

(w.r.t. x-y-z axis)

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Accuracy vs. distance

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Effective authentication range 15cm ±4cm region > 90% accuracy

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Accuracy vs. rotation and accessories

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Tolerable space angle < 10°

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  • Converting an array of tags attached on a card into

an effective authentication credential.

  • Light-weight, low-cost, universal solution for a

fingertip profiled RF identifier, authenticating both the card and its holder’s identity simultaneously.

  • Demonstrated a working system implemented

purely based on COTS RFID devices.

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