1993-2013 : 20 000 nuclear w arheads to be dismantled (500 tons of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1993 2013 20 000 nuclear w arheads to be dismantled 500
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1993-2013 : 20 000 nuclear w arheads to be dismantled (500 tons of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1993-2013 : 20 000 nuclear w arheads to be dismantled (500 tons of HEU) 2011, August 25 : 17 000 w arheads already dismantled (425 tons of HEU) 2 Dismantling (1992) HEU (1993) Energy - SWU Feed (1999) Feed - UF6 3 4 5 Soviet


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1993-2013 : 20 000 nuclear w arheads to be dismantled (500 tons of HEU) 2011, August 25 : 17 000 w arheads already dismantled (425 tons of HEU)

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Dismantling (1992) HEU (1993)

Energy - SWU

Feed (1999)

Feed - UF6

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  • Soviet Foreign debt : from $18 bn in 1984 to $ 70 bn in 1991
  • Industrial production : - 35% in June 1993 (compared to 1989)
  • Investments : - 45% in 1992 (compared to 1991)
  • Inflation : +2.600% in 1992 (26% monthly rate in Oct. 1993)
  • 1992, January 1st : 1 $ = 213 RUR

01.07.92 : The State decrees the end of the Ruble/Dollar parity 1993, January 18th : 1 $ = 1193 RUR

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  • June 1998 : IMF’s assistance plan ($ 22.6 bn)
  • 1998, August 1 st : Total amount of unpaid wages = RUB 12.5 bn
  • Inflation rate : 84%
  • Urals crude price : <10 $ per barrel in August 1998
  • 1998, August 17 th : Russian debt default. 4 fold devaluations of

the Ruble : from 6 RUB/1 $ to 24 RUB/1 $

  • 1999, August 9 th : V. Putin becomes the 4th Prime Minister in 18

months

  • October 1999 : Russian debt reaches $ 17,38 bn >> 2020

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  • 50% of the U.S. civil demand or

12% of the world demand

  • Value : $ 8 bn
  • 163.000 T from which 118.000

T purchased by Cameco, Cogema (Areva) and Nukem

  • Value : $ 4 bn
  • r

30 tons of HEU / year

(full years)

from which 6.000 T purchased by AREVA, Cameco and Nukem = 46 X 1000 MW reactors capacity = 37 X 1000 MW reactors capacity

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Potential electricity to pow er Energy equivalents

Source : USEC

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HEU-LEU agreement represents

  • World NPP (nuclear power plant) demand (2008 and 2009) :

45.8 m SWU/year

  • Production capacity :
  • In France (AREVA)

George Besse 1 : 10.8 m SWU/year

  • In USA (USEC)

PGDP : 8 m SWU/year

  • In Russia

4 facilities : 27 m SWU/year ?

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HEU-LEU agreement represents

HEU feed component = 30% of the 10 largest mines production

Source : World Nuclear Association

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HEU feed as a percentage of world demand

Source : World Nuclear Association

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HEU feed as a percentage of U.S. demand

Source : U.S. Energy Information Administration

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  • Uranium Mines
  • Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan
  • Enrichment
  • 40-45% of the world production capacity
  • Facilities (combines)
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After 2013 ? Introduction of some other stocks of HEU (USA-Russia) on the market ? Plutonium stocks ?

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Russia and USA ow n 95% of the w orld’s nuclear w arheads

  • HEU & Pu stocks (1991), in tons
  • Operational w eapon stocks (March 2006), in units
  • Warhead stocks (estimations), in units
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  • Objective 2018
  • Operational w eapon stocks, in units
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  • Estimated w orld stocks : about 260 T
  • 1995 : 50 T of Pu in excess in Russia and USA

(B.Clinton/B.Yeltsin)

  • MOX conversion project + vitrification program
  • 2007 and 2010 : G.W.Bush (B.Yeltsin) then B.Obama

(D.Medvedev)

  • Recycling agreement concerning 34 T in both countries
  • Important energy content for Rosatom
  • 1 g Pu = 3 T oil

34 T Pu = 102 m T of oil

  • 2030 (?) : Pu to be burnt in Fast Breeder Reactors
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  • Multiple advantages

non-proliferation policy energy feed dollars

  • Importance of the figures / financial cost of

the Cold War

  • Military

stocks = potential (secondary) energy supply, but possibly destabilizing the primary market

! !

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