Winners and Losers of the Industrial Revolution J. Parman (College - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Winners and Losers of the Industrial Revolution J. Parman (College of William & Mary) Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 1 / 37 The Benefits of the Industrial Revolution How were the benefits of the Industrial Revolution

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Winners and Losers of the Industrial Revolution

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 1 / 37

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The Benefits of the Industrial Revolution

How were the benefits of the Industrial Revolution distributed? Did some groups benefit at the expense of others? Which factors of production became more important and which became less important? Was the Industrial Revolution the triumph of greedy capitalists at the expense of workers?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 2 / 37

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A Pessimistic View of the Industrial Revolution

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 3 / 37

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A Pessimistic View of the Industrial Revolution

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 4 / 37

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A Pessimistic View of the Industrial Revolution

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 5 / 37

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How do we determine who gained from the Industrial Revolution?

We know that the big difference between the modern economy and the preindustrial world is sustained efficiency advances If more output is produced per unit of capital, labor and land, then payments to these factors must increase Brings us to a slight twist on our growth accounting equations: gA = agr + bgw + cgs

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 6 / 37

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Land Rents

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 7 / 37

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What about urban land?

Listing Type Land Price per acre Midtown Manhattan Parking Lot .22 acres $21,894,500 Tuscarawas, OH Pasture/Dairy 140 acres $5,000 Dawson, MT Farmland 480 acres $700 Modern Land Rents

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 8 / 37

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What about urban land?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 9 / 37

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What about other natural resources

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 10 / 37

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What about other natural resources?

7.08 billion barrels of petroleum products were consumed in the US in 2015 (www.eia.gov) Crude oil averaged $49 a barrel in 2015 (www.weia.gov) US GDP was $17,947 billion in 2015 (www.bea.gov) So oil consumption represented roughly 1.9 percent of GDP

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 11 / 37

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Land Rents

So the owners of land don’t seem to be the big gainers from the Industrial Revolution Farmland rents aren’t any higher in real terms than they were before the Industrial Revolution Urban rents have risen quite a bit but still only represent a small fraction of the total share of income in modern economies So we could think of our accounting formula as being reduced to: gA ≈ agr + bgw

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 12 / 37

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Returns to Physical Capital

The rental rate of capital is just the real interest rate We’ve already seen that modern interest rates are lower than preindustrial interest rates So if anything, the growth in gr has been close to zero

  • r even negative

However, payments to capital have expanded tremendously since the Industrial Revolution (just think

  • f all those new factories)

The increase in payments has been a result of the expansion of capital stock, not the return to a unit of capital So if gr is approximately zero, our accounting forumula is further reduced to: gA ≈ bgw

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 13 / 37

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Returns to Physical Capital

3 HP for approximately $1,750 2015 USD

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 14 / 37

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Returns to Physical Capital

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 15 / 37

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Returns to Physical Capital

The Model 60...has a 60-megabyte, half-height hard disk...It costs $7,499...The 130-Mb drive actually stores and retrieves data faster than its smaller sibling, thanks to a special memory controller device that comes with the Models 130 and 300. Yes, 300. The monster comes with a fixed disk that can hold more than 300 million characters of data...It costs $12,499. – New York Times, January 10, 1988

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 16 / 37

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Returns to Physical Capital

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 17 / 37

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Wages Over Time

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 18 / 37

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How much does an improvement in technology increase wages?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 19 / 37

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How much does an improvement in technology increase wages?

The previous figures shows that roughly 75% of national income in England goes to labor If gA ≈ bgw, then the growth in wages resulting from technological advance will be 4

3gA

A one percent increase in efficiency produces an increase in average wages of 1.3 percent This doesn’t tell us which types of workers were benefiting the most

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 20 / 37

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The Modern Distribution of Wages and Wealth

Decile Share of wages Share of wealth 90-100 26 45 80-90 14 16 70-80 12 10 60-70 10 10 50-60 9 8 40-50 8 5 30-40 7 4 20-30 6 2 10-20 5 0-10 4 Distribution of Wages and Wealth, United Kingdom, 2003-04

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 21 / 37

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The Preindustrial Distribution of Wealth

Location Year Top 1% Top 5% Perugia 1285 18 29 Paris 1292 26 52 London 1319 34 57 Florence 1427 27 67 England 1670 49 73 England 1740 44 74 England 1875 61 74 United Kingdom 2003 17 32 Preindustrial Wealth Distributions

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 22 / 37

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The Distribution of Income

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 23 / 37

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The Distribution of Income

Gini coefficient for Byzantium (1000): .45, Gini coefficient for medieval France (1300): 0.7

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 24 / 37

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Skill, Gender and Wages

1770s 1850s 2004 Annual wage, unskilled men 15.40 27.20 16,898 Annual wage, unskilled women 6.90 12.30 12,516 Female to male wage ratio 0.45 0.45 0.74 Average adult wage 22.00 40.00 23,452 Unskilled to average wage ratio 0.51 0.49 0.63 Income by skill and gender, England

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 25 / 37

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What about consumption (rather than income or wealth)?

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Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 26 / 37

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What about consumption (rather than income or wealth)?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 27 / 37

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What about other measures of well being?

Group Stature (cm) Life expectancy Surviving children Literacy Preindustrial Rich 174 39 3.85 85 Poor 168.5 33 1.93 30 Difference 3% 18% 99% 183% Modern Rich 178.2 80.8 1.33 100 Poor 176 74.3 1.64 88 Difference 1% 9%

  • 19%

14% Life Prospects of the Rich and Poor in England

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 28 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

So it seems that wealth and income inequality are lower now than in preindustrial times Inequality between unskilled and skilled wages is lower Inequality between male and female wages is lower Inequality in life prospects is much lower Why didn’t all of the pessimistic predictions materialize?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 29 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

Labor income has become a bigger share of total income Land (which can be very unequally distributed) has declined in importance Movement away from brute strength to dexterity in production helped narrow male-female wage gap It turns out that machines did not make unskilled labor completely obsolete (machines are bad at interacting with people, identifying and manipulating physical

  • bjects in complicated ways)

So where are the fat cats?

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 30 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

http://www.nytimes.com/ref/business/20070715 GILDED GRAPHIC.html

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 31 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

Rank Name Wealth Lifetime Industry 1 John D. Rockefeller $192 billion 1839‐1937 Standard Oil 2 Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt $143 billion 1794‐1877 steamboats and railroads 3 John Jacob Astor $116 billion 1763‐1848 fur trader, NYC real estate 4 Stephen Girard $83 billion 1750‐1831 shipping 5 Bill Gates $82 billion 1955‐ Microsoft 6 Andrew Carnegie $75 billion 1835‐1919 steel 7 A.T. Stewart $70 billion 1803‐1876 department stores 8 Frederick Weyerhaeuser $68 billion 1834‐1914 lumber 9 Jay Gould $67 billion 1836‐1892 railroad, "Mephistopheles of Wall Street" 10 Stephen Van Rensselaer $64 billion 1764‐1839 patroon (aristocrat granted land by the Dutch) The Ten Wealthiest Americans

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 32 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

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Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 33 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

Augustus Caesar, 63 BC - 14 AD, personal wealth equal to

  • ne fifth of Roman Empire
  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 34 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

Mansa Musa, 1280 - 1337, king of Timbuktu, more gold than you could imagine

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 35 / 37

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The Industrial Revolution and Inequality

President Peak net worth (millions of 2010 $) Lifespan George Washington 525 1732–1799 Thomas Jefferson 212 1743–1826 Theodore Roosevelt 125 1858–1919 Andrew Jackson 119 1767–1845 James Madison 101 1751–1836 Lyndon Johnson 98 1908–1973 Herbert Hoover 75 1874–1964 Franklin D. Roosevelt 60 1882–1945 Bill Clinton 55 1946–present John Tyler 51 1790–1862

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 36 / 37

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Where are the super-rich capitalists?

Many of the capitalists did not receive extraordinary profits Those invested in textiles faced a very competitive industry With a homogenous product and no major barriers to entry, textiles weren’t a way to get rich Consumers were the ones getting the rewards The exception is railroads (which had barriers to entry) Even with railroads, there was enough competition in Britain to make consumers big beneficiaries (US railroad owners get incredibly rich)

  • J. Parman (College of William & Mary)

Global Economic History, Spring 2017 April 17, 2017 37 / 37