Wi Voter i iii opium Bob 3_ Requirements 1 Verifiable - - PDF document

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Wi Voter i iii opium Bob 3_ Requirements 1 Verifiable - - PDF document

Sch SAC Su mmer Part I Enhance Can Democracy Crypto Concordia University Clerk Agenda 1 Requirements backend basic 1947 CGS 2 Ballots Votiable Human 3 t resistance JCJ 2005 Coercion Requirements Preliminaries Fi Enety


slide-1
SLIDE 1

SAC

Su

mmer

Sch

Can

Crypto Enhance

Democracy

Part

I

Clerk

Concordia University

Agenda

1

Requirements

2

CGS 1947

basic

backend

3

Human

Votiable

Ballots

t JCJ

2005 Coercion

resistance

Requirements

Preliminaries

Enety

Fi

i Verify

i

Oo

ii

Wi

Voter

i

iii opium

Bob

3_

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Requirements

1

Independently

Verifiable

tally

integrity

soundness

etc

correct

2

Ballot

secrecy

receipt

free

coercion

resistant

etc

REaLyIDEA

Transcript

Tully

Tully

cornet

iii asf

Anytime

JCJ

Others

situational

Dispute resolution

intern

accountability Indecent

smeltaneity

uperio

Fairness

no

running tally

Robust

unconditional

submit

U go

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Crypto

to olbox

Homeomorphic encryption

2 Kps

Ring Signatures

Mix

networks

anonymous

credentials

MPC

commitments cut

choose

secret sharing

  • blivious

transfer

blind

signatures

etc etc

200 papers

proposing

v tiny

systems

CGS

1997_

Cramer

Gennaro

schoenmakers Euroc yet

00

it

Eno

v

voter

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Enc pk

v r

Ev

public key

EA

3

  • ut
  • f

5

Distributed key General

  • n

PKG

Threshold

decryption

CPA

secure

Additively

Homomorphic

a

b

atb

a

r a r

a3

Exponigand

Rainier

BGN

B.by

I

cos

Co

Ncaa

I

Co

D

EA b

r

Mui

4

4

4

Yes

3

Nu

slide-5
SLIDE 5

JT

v

encrypts

  • r

I

given

c

ca

Ency

nir

Ngs

Cgr

gm y

X Lg

y

c

ca gv

5

DDH

trek

iff

v

Cg y

a

calgo

  • r

g y

a

Ghg

is

DDH

tuple

i

c

Al

ie

O

Teo.is

d

Bob

Tsun

n rt

I

Tiso.is David

Eo

am

I

sd z

Dawn

b

C

4

Icehouse

fixed

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Alternative

Mixing Pika3

Chu81 Sk95

B B

Tis

  • iii FE

cos

D

sfhuff.ie MiX

Any

candidate

Leven

write in

Perm

No voter

ZKP

Summery

Integrity

Basic

secrecy

randomize

F

BB

CD

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Human

Voteable

The

r

X

n

ez Bn

i wed

I I

counted

as cast

  • verlay

dispute

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Scantegrity Different

Backend TEE

t

commitments

c f

Eperio

slides

Internet

Voting

Same

requirements

1

untrusted

platform

coercion

resistance JCT

t

Dus

JCJOS

Jails

Catalano

Jacobsson

WPES

civitas

Principle

Voters have

a

real

credential

to

vote

They

can

also

make up

a

fake

credential

Backend removes

fakes

to

knowing

what

they

are

  • r

who

they

are

f run

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Voter Roster

threshold

Voter A Oa

whee in

voter B

OBIT

Ob

Ib

voter c

do

Co

DencryptsiT

I know

Voter B's

prrvnte.tt

Fb

Ttb Votes

Alice

Eb

true

Bob

Ob

Tteok Alice

Lda

Tteok

slide-10
SLIDE 10

guff

d

e

Roster snuff d

s

cob

Coa

  • r

Are

com

F

fF

T

Bob

Ob

Alice

Eb

EFFI

Plaintext

E quality Tes

Alice

I

Given

a

and b

a

b

Bob I

threshold

decryet

learn

nothing else

a

b

iff

a b

s

iff

at b

r

  • fit

Yemen

Decrypt

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Follow up

Make

it

linear

Selections

ABB 106

d

Aly

MACS

Panic passwords