What Can we Expect ? Thomas Breda (PSE-CNRS) Chaire Travail PSE - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

A Comparison with the Loi Travail : What Can we Expect ?

Thomas Breda (PSE-CNRS) Chaire Travail PSE 07/06/2019

Plan

I will focus exclusively on firing costs 1. What do we know on the effects of firing costs?

– In theory – In practice

2. Challenges to draw conclusions from Italy 3. Comparison of French and Italian reforms 4. Two concluding comments:

– De jure employment at will versus ceilings on labor court payments – Family capitalism and job protection

Firing costs and employment

• Lowering firing costs has a direct positive effect on lay offs (!)

– Firms can adjust workforce to business cycles, get rid off workers that do not put enough efforts or do not have adequate skills

• And an indirect positive effect on hiring

– Can requires some degree of sophistication on the firm size: firms are aware of and internalize the future firing cost in their hiring decisions

• What’s the net (equilibrium) effect on employment?

– Theory: ambiguous but more positive if firms are risk averse – Empirical studies point to zero or slightly positive net effects

• Yes, but lowering firing cost on permanent contracts can limit labor market dualism

(coexistence of short-term and permanent contracts)

– Has been observed empirically. Obvious if unprotected permanent contract strictly dominates short-term contract. Not clear otherwise – Brings another question: is market dualism really bad?

Are young unskilled workers locked in short-term contracts or can they use them as a stepping stone for permanent positions? Givord and Wilner (2013) and Couprie and Joutard (2017) provide mixed evidence for France.

From employment to total welfare

What about other outcomes?

• Workers’ well-being and health:

– Job protection may be good if workers are risk-averse (and even increase total welfare, see Bertola 2004) – Small probability of loosing a strongly protected position (possibly with limited future employment prospects) versus larger probability of loosing a job (but with better future employment prospects) – No direct evidence

• Workers’ bargaining power

– Threat of being fired is likely to limit workers’ ability/desire to voice their concerns – This can lower workers’ bargaining power: lower wages, worse working conditions, etc.

• Human capital and training

– Lower incentive for workers to invest in firm-specific human capital when risk of dismissal is higher – Lower incentive for firms to offer training to workers when they can replace them  Interaction with the organization of professionnal training are likely important

• Innovation: some evidence of negative effect (Griffith and Macartney, 2009)
• Productivity: negative effect (Autor, Kerr and Kugler, 2007) possibly driven by workers’ lower

wages or lower level of effort (Martins, 2009)

• Ccl 1 : Many unstudied dimensions and at best limited effects on employment
• Ccl 2 : We are very far from academic consensus on welfare impact of employment protection

From level of firing costs to uncertainty

What is uncertainty regarding firing cost?

• An attempt of definition: there is uncertainty if variations in amounts given in

labor courts reflect arbitrary decisions rather than differences in workers’ prejudice

• Uncertainty defined as such is unfair and lead to economic inefficiencies

(e.g., limit hiring and firings, threaten firm survival unduly)

• Very hard to document uncertainty empirically

– Cahuc, Carcillo and Patault (2019) show that there are differences in amounts given by judges for cases that are quasi-randomly assigned to them – Effect of exposition to uncertainty unknown – Effect of a negative shock (being allocated to a judge that is pro-worker or slower than average) is detrimental to future hiring or survival of small low-performing firms (Cahuc, Carcillo and Patault, 2019 ; Bamieh, 2017)

• Putting a cap on amounts given at labor cost will remove arbitrary negative

shocks but also limit sanctions for firms that have caused a strong prejudice

• 2. Challenges to draw conclusions from Italy
• Lower firing costs only applied to newly hired workers

(« grandfathering »): their effects on firings kick in slowly

• Challenge to separate effects of hiring subsidy and change

in firing costs

– Small firms have only the former while large firms have both

• DinD small versus large firms should cancel out effect of HS…
• But HS tend to be larger for small firms (due to cap)
• And small firms that become large get a change in firing costs for all

workers

– Change in firing costs is applied (and announced) two months after hiring subsidy

• If effect of hiring subsidy is constant over time, the time lag can be

exploited

• But large substitutions across periods for hiring subsidy (delays in late

2014 and anticipation in late 2015)

Source: Boeri and Garibaldi, April 2019

=> Visually, clear effect of hiring subsidy, no effect of lower firing cost

• 3. Comparison of Italian and French reforms

Italy France

Legal settings before the reform Reinstatement in case of unfair dismissal (and salaries paid during trial period) Yes No Average time to get court decision Around 16 months 13 months Legal severance pay Around one fifth of monthly salary per year of tenure (=2 months after 10 years) Average appeal court compensation ? 5 month of salaries + half a month per year of tenure (= 10 months after 10 years) Changes induced by reform Applies only to new hires Yes No Suppress reinstatement and associated cost Yes No Appeal court cap About 2 months per year of tenure and at least 4 months About 1 month per year of tenure and at least one month (= 10 months after 10 years) Reform enacted in March 2015 September 2017 Reform become unconstitutional? Autumn 2018 ?? a few appeal courts did not apply the reform because does not respect ILO convention 158 and European social charter

Long-run trend in France

Tableau : Evolution menusuelle des demandes formées devant les CPH (janvier 2009 à mars 2019 inclus) Source : Ministère de la Justice Champ : France entière

y = -79,763x + 19878 R = 0,7 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 janv.-09 mars-09 mai-09 juil.-09 sept.-09 nov.-09 janv.-10 mars-10 mai-10 juil.-10 sept.-10 nov.-10 janv.-11 mars-11 mai-11 juil.-11 sept.-11 nov.-11 janv.-12 mars-12 mai-12 juil.-12 sept.-12 nov.-12 janv.-13 mars-13 mai-13 juil.-13 sept.-13 nov.-13 janv.-14 mars-14 mai-14 juil.-14 sept.-14 nov.-14 janv.-15 mars-15 mai-15 juil.-15 sept.-15 nov.-15 janv.-16 mars-16 mai-16 juil.-16 sept.-16 nov.-16 janv.-17 mars-17 mai-17 juil.-17 sept.-17 nov.-17 janv.-18 mars-18 mai-18 juil.-18 sept.-18 nov.-18 janv.-19 mars-19

Pic de juin 2013 : en lien avec la Miseen

• euvre de la loi du 1er juin 2008 portant

prescription en matière civile

Septembre 2016, entrée en vigueur du décret du 20 mai 2016 réformant la procédure prud'homale Septembre 2017 - Ordonnance rendant

• bligatoire l'encadrement des indemnités pour

les licenciements sans cause réelle et sérieuse prononcés à partir du 24 septembre 2017

Shorter limitation period to go to court Ordonnances Macron

Monthly evolution of workers going to Labour courts

Becomes more complex to go to court

Source: French Ministry of Justice

Share of workers going to court after being fired

Firing for personal reasons Related court disputes Share going to court

Source: French Ministries of Labor and Justice

Conclusion for France

• Small decrease in expected cost of layoffs

– Not always applied and possibly removed soon – Likely too small in any case to affect employment much (according to existing evaluation)

• Less uncertainty?

– May help small low-performing firms to survive (Cahuc, Carcillo and Patault, 2019) – Effect on workers with large prejudice?

Comment 1 : Employment at will versus ceilings on labor court payments

• Under French (and many other) law, terminations of open-ended

employment contracts are lawful if they are justified by a “real and serious cause”, either economic or personal

– About a third of firings for personal reasons are challenged in labor courts – In about 3/4 of cases, workers win in front of courts – This implies that 20% (0.33*0.75) of firings of personal reasons are judged wrongful: many firms do not respect the law

• 2 possible logical conclusions from these facts:

– The law is too strict, preventing employers to respect it: we should move towards employment at will (like the U.S. in the 19th century) – The law is not respected: we should increase sanctions so that employers respect it more. – But policy response is to lower sanctions for not respecting the law! – This can of course make sense from pure economic point of view, but way of proceeding likely send negative signal to workers/citizens and can have negative country-level consequences (e.g. trust in governments, etc.)

Comment 2: family firms versus legal employment protection

Family Firms = firms owned by a single individual or a family

• Large share of the economy: 30% of 50+ employees firms in the U.S, 55% in

France

• Comparative advantage at offering job security: longer time horizons, can

commit to long-term implicit contracts

– Offer better job security but lower wages – Do not perform worse than other firms

• Family firms as a substitute for legal employment protection (Bennedsen et

al., 2015)

– They offer more job security and perform better in countries in which there is less employment protection – lowering employment protection might help family firms? – Family firms may mitigate the negative effect of low employment protection for risk averse workers