WELCOME Advanced Introduction to Philosophy Matthias Brinkmann - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

WELCOME

Advanced Introduction to Philosophy Matthias Brinkmann matthias.brinkmann@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

21.08.2015 1

• Ease your way into the MA programme
• Give you some basic knowledge in modern, analytic,

practical philosophy

• Give you a “feel” for that style of philosophy
• Get you started on reading and doing philosophy on your
• wn
• Help you to avoid misconceptions about philosophy

Aims of this Course

21.08.2015 2

Tuesday 23.9. Wednesday 24.9. Thursday 25.9. Friday 26.9. Saturday 27.9.

MORNING Philosophy

GETTIER

Applied Ethics

THOMSON

Metaethics

MACKIE

Philosophy of Science

LAUDAN

Discussion AFTERNOON Normative Inquiry

SINGER

Normative Ethics

HOOKER

Political Philosophy

CANEY

Philosophy of Economics

FRIEDMAN

Wrapping Up

Seminar Structure

21.08.2015 3

• First Part: Interactive Lecture
• ask question at any point you like
• ask any questions you like
• Second Part: Text Discussion
• student presentation if there are volunteers (<10 mins.)
• looking at the text: what‘s happening?
• Sometimes: Various Exercises
• Length: however long it takes (2-2.5h)
• breaks as you want them

Each Session

21.08.2015 4

PHILOSOPHY

Session 1

(1)

Analytic Philosophy

a) Beginnings: Philosophy in the early 1900s b) Example: Russell’s Philosophy of Language c) Analytic Philosophy today d) Diverging Paths: Analytic “versus” Continental

(2)

Tools

a)

Arguments

b) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions c)

Definitions

(3)

Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”

Contents

21.08.2015 6

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

21.08.2015 7

A. Beginnings: Philosophy in the early 1900s B. Russell’s Philosophy of Language C. Analytic Philosophy today D. Diverging Paths: Analytic “versus” Continental

Structure

21.08.2015 8

• Many of the central insights in physics, chemistry,

biology, etc. were developed in the early decades of the 20th century

• Especially: Special relativity (1905), General Relativity

(1916) Effects

• Analytic philosophers were deeply impressed by the

success of the sciences

• Metaphysics and other, “older” styles of philosophy

looked outdated and mysterious

• 1. The Rise of Modern Science

21.08.2015 9

• New developments by Frege and others allowed a

rigorous statement of propositional logic for the first time

• Logicism: reducing mathematics to logic

Effects

• Philosophy gains in clarity
• The new forms of logic provide a new way of analysing
• ld philosophical problems
• 2. The Rise of Modern Logic

21.08.2015 10

• Turning away from metaphysical and epistemological

issues

• A growing interest in ideal languages, and analysing
• rdinary language

Effects

• Philosophy becomes primarily focussed on language
• 3. The Linguistic Turn

21.08.2015 11

A. Beginnings: Philosophy in the early 1900s B. Russell’s Philosophy of Language C. Analytic Philosophy today D. Diverging Paths: Analytic “versus” Continental

Structure

21.08.2015 12

What do words/sentences mean?

• Let us focus on singular terms/names
• “Jakarta”
• “Mark Twain”
• “Winston Churchill”
• A first intuition: words “point towards”/denote their
• bjects, and that’s what they mean
• let’s call this the “simple referential theory of meaning”: the

meaning of a proper name is the thing it refers to

The Problem

21.08.2015 13

• The simple referential theory of meaning runs into difficult

problems:

• 1. The Problem of Apparent Reference to Nonexistents
• 2. The Problem of Negative Existentials
• 3. Frege’s Puzzle about Identity

Problems

21.08.2015 14

• 1. The Problem of Apparent Reference to Nonexistents
• Consider “Sherlock Holmes lived in 221B Baker Street”
• We believe that
• this sentence is meaningful
• according to the referential theory of meaning, it is meaningful

because the names pick out (point to) some individual thing

• but “Sherlock Holmes” fails to pick out anything that exists
• there are no such things as “nonexisting things”

Problems

21.08.2015 15

• 2. The Problem of Negative Existentials
• Consider “Santa Claus does not exist”
• Either “Santa Claus” does not refer, then this sentence is

meaningless again;

• or this sentence would imply that there is Santa Claus

[the thing the sentence points to], but he does not exist— which is a contradiction

Problems

21.08.2015 16

• 3. Frege’s Puzzle about Identity
• Consider “The Morning Star is the Evening Star”
• Both the Morning Star and the Evening Star are Venus
• If words just point to their objects, this would mean that

the current sentence really means “Venus is Venus”

• This would mean that the sentence is trivial, or

uninformative

• But it’s not: it tells us something new

Problems

21.08.2015 17

• Russell: Proper names do not “pick out” a particular entity

in the world, but rather they describe something which might or not might be there

• Imagine I asked “who is Barack Obama?” – you would

answer: “the 44th president of the US, who was born 4 August 1961 in Hawaii ...”

• The answer to “who is Sherlock Holmes” is “the legendary English

detective, who ...”.

Russell on Proper Names

21.08.2015 18

• Russell gives us a logical analysis of definite
• descriptions. Consider

(1) The 44th president of the United States is black.

• In Russell’s analysis, this becomes:

(2a) At least one person is 44th president of the United States, and (2b) At most one person is 44th president of the United States, and (2c) whoever is 44th president of the United States is black.

• Or in logical notation:

(3a) ∃𝑦(𝑄𝑦) (3b) ∀𝑦(𝑄𝑦 → ∀𝑧 𝑦 = 𝑧 ) (3c) ∀𝑦(𝑄𝑦 → 𝐶𝑦)

Russell on Definite Descriptions

21.08.2015 19

(3a) ∃𝑦(𝑄𝑦) (3b) ∀𝑦(𝑄𝑦 → ∀𝑧 𝑦 = 𝑧 ) (3c) ∀𝑦(𝑄𝑦 → 𝐶𝑦)

• These three claims all rely only on variables (𝑦 and 𝑧),

and general properties (𝑄 and 𝐶)

• Reference to particulars has disappeared
• Thus, we no longer “pick out” any particular object

The Trick

21.08.2015 20

• 1. The Problem of Apparent Reference to Nonexistents

(1) Sherlock Holmes lived in 221B Baker Street Sherlock Holmes = the legendary English detective (2a) At least one person is a legendary English detective, (2b) at most one person is a legendary English detective, (2c) whoever is a legendary English detective lives in 221B Baker Street (= if someone is a legendary English detective, they live in 221B Baker Street)

• None of these refers to a concrete person, so we do not

have a problem: (1) is meaningful

• (2a) is false, so (1) is false.

Problems

21.08.2015 21

• 2. The Problem of Negative Existentials

(1) “Santa Claus does not exist” Santa Claus = the man bringing Christmas presents, lives on the North Pole, ... Let’s narrow-scope: (1*) It is not true that: (Santa Claus exists) This translates to (2) It is not true that: [(a) there is at least one man bringing ..., and (b) there is at most one man bringing ..., and (c) whoever brings Christmas presents ... exists]

• (2a) is false, so (2) is true

Problems

21.08.2015 22

• 3. Frege’s Puzzle about Identity

(1) “The Morning Star is the Evening Star” The Morning Star = the star rising in the morning The Evening Star = the star rising in the evening (1*) (The Star rising in the morning) is identical with (The star rising in the evening) This becomes (2) There is a unique star rising in the morning, and that star is identical with the star rising in the evening.

• This is not trivial.

Problems

21.08.2015 23

• Questioning the Obvious
• The importance of being aware of language
• The surface structure of language might differ from its

analysis, its “deep“ structure

• Using logic as a tool to gain greater clarity

Lessons from Russell

21.08.2015 24

A. Beginnings: Philosophy in the early 1900s B. Russell’s Philosophy of Language C. Analytic Philosophy today D. Diverging Paths: Analytic “versus” Continental

Structure

21.08.2015 25

• Little of the content of early analytic philosophy has

survived

• It’s hard to say whether there is anything which we can

clearly identify as “analytic” philosophy today – perhaps the label ceased to be interesting in the early 1970s

(See some of the essays, esp. P. M. S. Hacker’s, in Biletzki, Anat, and Anat Matar, eds. The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes. London: Routledge, 1998.)

Contemporary Analytic Philosophy

21.08.2015 26

• Perhaps the best thing we can say is that analytic

philosophy has survived as a certain style of doing philosophy

• being aware of the limitations and confusions of language
• trying to be clear and explicit in arguments
• being cautious about metaphysical speculation gone wild
• using formal logic as a tool
• looking to the natural sciences for a model of rational discourse

A Style of Doing Philosophy?

21.08.2015 27

A. Beginnings: Philosophy in the early 1900s B. Russell’s Philosophy of Language C. Analytic Philosophy today D. Diverging Paths: Analytic “versus” Continental

Structure

21.08.2015 28

• The program of the mentioned philosophers set them

apart from many other philosophical traditions which developed at the same time, and were less obsessed with language, logic and science

• One can distinguish, in very broad strokes, continental

philosophy from analytic philosophy

• the content and usefulness of these labels are controversial
• the distinction is very vague
• the distinction might even be pernicious (Brian Leiter)
• still, the distinction points to a sociological difference which is alive

to this very day

Diverging Paths

21.08.2015 29

Analytic Philosophy Continental Philosophy

• riginates in the UK/Germany/Austria,

dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world

• riginates in Continental Europe,

especially France takes the sciences as the paradigm for good philosophy pays closer attention to literature and the arts focusses on clarity and exactness in language, often using formal logic is often written in a less rigid way, with little “formal” work authoritative figures: Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Frege, Carnap, etc. authoritative figures: Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gadamer, etc. encompasses all topics, but includes highly abstract, practice-removed philosophical theorising encompasses all topics, but tends to be more focussed on cultural, political, and social issues

• f little influence in other humanities

subjects, but influential in some of the sciences; rarely publicly recognised

• ften dominant in (e.g.) English, cult.

studies departments & public culture more generally

A Comparison

21.08.2015 30

PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS

21.08.2015 31

• 1. Arguments
• 2. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
• 3. Definitions

21.08.2015 32

• A is a necessary condition for B: B → A
• if something B, it must be/is A
• this implies: if something is not-A, it’s not-B
• A is a sufficient condition for B: A → B
• if something is A, it must be/is B
• this implies: if something is not-B, it’s not-A

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

21.08.2015 33

Sufficient Not sufficient Necessary

• Sam is a father > Sam

is a male parent

• It is Saturday or

Sunday > It is the weekend

• Sam is male > Sam is a

father

• The table has four sides >

the table is square Not necessary

• Sam is a father > Sam

is male

• It rains > Earth gets

wet

• John loves Pamela >

Pamela loves John

• Being the smartest

student > Getting the highest grade

Necessary and Sufficient, cont.

21.08.2015 34

Mostly taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions1.htm

Exercise

Decide for each of the following: true or false? 1. x's being less than 20 is a sufficient condition for x's being less than 12. 2. x's being less than 20 is a necessary condition for x's being less than 12. 3. x's having two arms is a sufficient condition for x's being a human being. 4. x's having two arms is a necessary condition for x's being a human being. 5. x's wanting to do a is a sufficient condition for x's doing a. 6. x's wanting to do a is a necessary condition for x's doing a. 7. x's being an equilateral rectangle is a sufficient condition for x's being a square. 8. x's being an equilateral rectangle is a necessary condition for x's being a square.

21.08.2015 35

Taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions2.htm

Exercise

Decide for each whether (a) is necessary or sufficient (or both) for (b) 1. (a) x is blue. (b) x is colored. 2. (a) Alice's daughter is married. (b) Alice is a parent. 3. (a) Mike is driving a car. (b) Mike owns a car. 4. (a) Everybody loves somebody. (b) There is one person who is loved by everyone. 5. (a) All women pay taxes. (b) Anyone who does not pay taxes is not a woman. 6. (a) It is Tuesday or Wednesday. (b) It is Tuesday.

21.08.2015 36

Taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions4.htm

DEFINING AND DEFINITIONS

I recommend, and partially follow, the excellent essay by Norman Swartz, http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/definitions.htm

21.08.2015 37

• 1. Definitions
• 2. Good Definitions
• 3. A Warning About Dictionaries
• 4. When Define?

21.08.2015 38

• An important activity in philosophy is defining words
• “Hespherus” =df “the Evening Star”
• “a priori” =df “non-empirical”

“a priori” =df “non-empirical”

Defining Words

21.08.2015 39

definiendum (what is to be defined) definiens (what is giving the definition)

• Descriptive definition: spell out how a word is commonly

used

• Stipulative definition: introduces a new word, or re-

defines an existing word, in a manner the speaker sees fit

• Explicative definition: a mix of descriptive and stipulative
• definition. Makes an existing word more precise and/or

introduces new elements, while also trying to do justice to existing usage

Kinds of Definitions

21.08.2015 40

• 1. Definitions
• 2. Good Definitions
• 3. A Warning About Dictionaries
• 4. When Define?

21.08.2015 41

• Non-Circularity: the definiens should not contain the

definiendum

• Conservativeness: a definition should not allow us to

deduce new knowledge about facts

• Informativeness: the definition should provide an

advantage in understanding the concept; it should not substitute less clear concepts

• Accounts for Paradigms: central paradigm cases (as

judged by competent speakers) should not be correctly classified

Some Requirements for Good Definitions

21.08.2015 42

Exercise

Are the following good definitions? pain = the opposite of pleasure democracy = the system of government which produces the greatest good for the greatest number justice = equality human being = the only animal on earth capable of rational thought

21.08.2015 43

Exercise

Are the following good arguments? Are we allowed to always follow our self-interest? Self-interest means what‘s in your best interest, in other words, the best thing you can do. So of course it‘s allowed! Is there an external world? “World” is simply the things out there, so it must be external, because external just means “out there”. Is affirmative action just? Justice is giving everyone an equal opportunity. Affirmative action doesn’t do so. Thus, affirmative action by definition is unjust.

21.08.2015 44

• 1. Definitions
• 2. Good Definitions
• 3. A Warning About Dictionaries
• 4. When Define?

21.08.2015 45

• Dictionaries report how words are used
• they are, at best, a guide to actual usage
• the main function of dictionaries is to allow people to understand

each other, and teach new words

• they usually ignore complications and difficulties
• But ...
• philosophers often have technical definitions and understandings of

phrases which differ from how they are commonly used

• dictionary definitions are rarely exact enough
• Rule of thumb: never use (non-specialist) dictionaries

for serious philosophical work

Dictionaries

21.08.2015 46

Exercise

duty = a moral or legal obligation existence = the fact or state of living or having

• bjective reality

reality = the state of things as they actually exist, as

• pposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them

philosophy = the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence, especially when considered as an academic discipline (All examples from oxforddictionaries.com)

21.08.2015 47

Exercise

Justice, in its broadest context, includes both the attainment of that which is just and the philosophical discussion of that which is just. A game is structured playing, usually undertaken for enjoyment and sometimes used as an educational tool. Friendship is a relationship of mutual affection between two or more people. A state is an organized community living under one government. (All examples from english Wikipedia)

21.08.2015 48

• 1. Definitions
• 2. Good Definitions
• 3. A Warning About Dictionaries
• 4. When Define?

21.08.2015 49

• Substantial philosophical problems cannot be “defined

away”: they can merely be made more precise

• We know how to use many words, even without explicit

definitions (“game”)

• You cannot, and should not, define everything!
• Give a definition if
• a concept is central to your argument,
• a concept is vague and confused,
• different philosophers use the concept in different ways

When Give Definitions?

21.08.2015 50

GETTIER, “IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE?”

21.08.2015 51

• What is knowledge? Under what circumstances do we

knowledge?

• Clarifying the Question
• We are not interested in acquaintance-knowledge (“I know Peter”,

“I know Moscow”)

• We are not interested in knowledge-how (“I know how to drive”, “I

know how to peal a potato”)

• We are interested in knowledge-that (“I know that Paris is the

capital of France”, “I know that water is H20”)

• Let’s call the content of a that-clause a proposition, and use the

variable “p” for it

The Problem

21.08.2015 52

• We tackle the question by trying to give necessary and

sufficient conditions for “S knows that p”

• That is, we try to complete the right-hand side of the

sentence S knows that p if and only if (iff) _______ .

• This claim can be split into two logically separate claims:
• Necessary Condition:

If S knows that p, then ________ .

• Sufficient Condition:

If ________ , then S knows that p

The Problem

21.08.2015 53

• Some philosophers have completed the sentence in the

following way: (JTP) S knows that p iff (1) p, and (2) S believes that p, and (3) S is justified in believing that p.

• Exercise: Consider theories which contain only subsets
• f (1), (2), and (3). Would they be good definitions?
• Exercise: Are all of (1)-(3) necessary for knowledge?
• Question: Does Gettier aim to give a definition of

knowledge?

Justified True Belief

21.08.2015 54

• Gettier’s strategy: give counter-examples
• Because (JTP) claims (implicitly) to apply to all actual and possible

cases of knowledge, we only need to find one convincing case which contradicts (JTP)

• There are two ways to show (JTP) to be wrong:
• argue against necessity

there is a case where S knows that p, but where (1)-(3) are not true

• argue against sufficiency

there is a case where (1)-(3) are true, but S does not know p.

• Question: What does Gettier argue?

Arguing Against (JTP)

21.08.2015 55

• S = Smith, p = “The man who will get the job has ten

coins in his pocket”

• The right-hand side of (JTP) is true:
• (1) p.

(Smith, the man who will get the job, has ten coins in his pocket)

• (2) S believes that p.
• (3) S is justified in believing that p.

(Smith believes, and is justified in believing, that (a) Jones will get the job, (b) Jones has ten coins in his pockets, and therefore p.)

• But, Gettier argues, S does not know that p.

Gettier’s Counterexample

21.08.2015 56

• (JTP) is an analysis of knowledge: it tries to break down

the concept into other, simpler components

• (JTP) gives a clear indication of how it could be refuted –

i.e., what kind of counterexamples are needed to show it to be wrong

• Gettier relies on a counterexample – an imagined thought

experiment – to refute (JTP)

• In doing so, Gettier appeals to philosophical intuitions

that we have about

Features of the Argument

21.08.2015 57