WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran An Order of Magnitude study 13 November 2006 Garry B. Dillon Former Leader IAEA Iraq Action Team WAES & ALL THAT
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran An Order of Magnitude study
13 November 2006
Garry B. Dillon Former Leader IAEA Iraq Action Team
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT ANY QUESTIONS? Nonproliferation Policy Education Center The one thing we learn from experience is We don’t learn from experience
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
THE TIME IS LONG GONE WHEN WIDE AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING (WAES) APPROACHING THE SCOPE AND VIGOUR OF WIDE AREA MONITORING IN IRAQ COULD BE IMPOSED ON IRAN.
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT COUNTRY-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING (CWES) IS MOST PROBABLY A NON-STARTER
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO ASSUME IT DESERVES TO BE TECHNICALLY PROVEN
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Clearly it would be preferred if Iran would decide to terminate its enrichment program before it progresses to production-scale
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Option exists for Iran to terminate its enrichment program “with dignity” It could declare its pilot-scale program a success having provided a sound basis for the rapid establishment of a production-scale plant - if necessary Necessity caused by indications of difficulties (political or economic) in the supply of LEU reactor fuel
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
The only available option might be to accept Iran’s enrichment program in exchange for Iran’s active co-operation in the robust implementation of the Additional Protocol
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
If this option is unacceptable then logically, it follows that, even “Strengthened” IAEA Safeguards are not fit for purpose. Time to fold up our tents and go home?
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
IAEA would have the right to conduct: SPECIAL INSPECTIONS (INFCIRC/153) LOCATION SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING OTHER OBJECTIVE MEASURES PLUS
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
OBJECTIVE MEASURES
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Visual Observation Other objective measures as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors Radiation detection & measurement
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Technologies established in Iraq - end 1998 Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
LOW PROFILE Radiation measurement Facility interior / exterior smear sampling Water & Vegetation sampling Aerosol sampling (“fixed” and mobile) Road-vehicle-borne gamma survey Fluorine detection (under consideration)
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Environmental deposition concentrators Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Technologies established in Iraq - end 1998 Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
MORE INTRUSIVE Helicopter-borne gamma survey Fixed-wing-aircraft-borne gamma survey (in development) Neutron survey – all platforms (in development)
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Verification activities under the Additional Protocol – Helicopter gamma survey Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT No! It says NON-destructive! Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Some numbers for 2005 Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre 0.121 .002 negligible DSG 12,310 298 9.63 USA 1,818 61 0.25 UK 94/47 27 0.44 Iraq 570/181 68.7 1.65 Iran GDP
$ Billions
Population
Millions
Area
Million sq. km
Country
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Some more numbers for 2004 Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
$8,333 Notional cost per calendar day in the field $55,116 Notional cost per inspection 14,544 Number of calendar days in the field used in these inspections 2,199 Number of inspections carried out – interim statements – results/conclusions 121.2 DSG budget including voluntary contributions M$
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT DISCLAIMER! Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
The data in the following table are produced simply to illustrate
interpreted to suggest that the exampled network is capable of providing meaningful detection sensitivities.
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
CWES in Iran Table 2a
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
44 Resource requirements (person years) 3 Servicing capacity (units/day – 2 person team) 26 Service visits/year/installation $1,333,000 Equipment & installation cost per year 3 Amortisation period years $10,000 Equipment & installation cost per unit 400 Number of air sampling stations 100 km Detection Range
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
CWES in Iran Table 2b
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
$30,000,000 Total annual cost including deposition sampling $1,610 Notional overall cost per analytical result $41,833 Notional overall cost per air-sampling station $16,733,000 Total annual cost $10,400,000 Total annual analytical costs $1,000 Cost per analysis 10,400 Number of samples collected for analysis/year $5,000,000 Personnel costs including travel & subsistence
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Weighting
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre A detection range less that 100km is verging
Neglecting edge effects, the number of sampling stations varies inversely with the square of the detection range A weighted assessment of where WAES might most usefully be implemented might reduce the number of stations by factor 10
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Opinions
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre CWES is a very expensive concept Environmental sampling is a powerful tool Unfocused CWES is poor value for money Environmental sampling focused by sound intelligence is extremely difficult to defeat
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Opinions
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre “Information” The three most important components of any monitoring strategy are: “Information” and yes,“Information”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
And the difference is?
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Where we came in
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre CWES is an expensive concept Environmental sampling is a powerful tool Unfocused CWES is poor value for money Environmental sampling focused by sound intelligence is extremely difficult to defeat
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Recommendations
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Member States speed up information paths IAEA expert group evaluate WAES in Iran Increase high sensitivity analysis capacity IAEA Board of Governors to address ways
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
In my humble opinion should I ever have one – humble that is
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Persuading Iran to foreswear enrichment / reprocessing is a significant though secondary challenge The primary challenge remains to be the establishment of an international political environment that will remove the compulsion for nations to seek nuclear weapons All WMD are terrorist weapons
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT
Nuclear Weapon Delivery Vehicle
Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre
WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran An Order of Magnitude study
13 November 2006
Garry B. Dillon Former Leader IAEA Iraq Action Team
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center