“Utilit d “Utility and Happiness” pp
Miles Kimball and Bob Willis + Related Empirical Work With
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Utilit Utility and d Happiness pp Miles Kimball and Bob Willis - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Utilit Utility and d Happiness pp Miles Kimball and Bob Willis + Related Empirical Work With Other Coauthors 1 Partial List of Coauthors on Related Empirical Papers Related Empirical Papers What Do You Think Would Make You
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Thi k Y W ld Ch ?” b D i l B j i Ki b ll O i Think You Would Choose?” by Daniel Benjamin, Kimball, Ori Heffetz and Alex Rees-Jones
y pp p g Being Index Based on Stated Preference” by Benjamin, Kimball, Heffetz and Nichole Szembrot
Kimball, Ryan Nunn and Dan Silverman
Fumio Ohtake and Yoshiro Tsutsui
Tsutsui Tsutsui
News” by Kimball, Ohtake, Tsutsui and Yichuan Wang
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Neobenthamite Elation Theory/Price Theory
V l k t d
by their effect on the level
by the effect of news about them on the short-
Mistakes about them on the short run dynamics of happiness Mistakes
the utility function by
the utility function by looking at the shape of happiness y happiness as an important commodity
aversion
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subjective well-being, aggregated with j g, gg g weights based on revealed preference
the aspects
– Can be studied by looking at biometric data h f i l ti it di d f such as facial activity coding and measures of brain activity
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“feeling happy” is measurable. g ppy
A t f H d d t
good or bad news.
rational-expectations innovations to rational-expectations innovations to lifetime utility.
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H i b i t t d i th t
respects the canons of Economics.
– Consistency with revealed preference – Respecting the ordinal vs. cardinal distinction p g – Leaving standard economic methods undisturbed when happiness data are absent pp
– Adding key information when happiness data g y pp are used
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The Happiness Measure on HRS and the
“N thi k b t th t k d th f li h “Now think about the past week and the feelings you have
true for you much of the time this past week: y p
g p y y were happy. (Would you say yes or no)?
(Would you say yes or no?) (Would you say yes or no?)
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(preferences). (p )
she wants cares about and values she wants, cares about and values.
– Well informed – Thoughtful Thoughtful – Not at war with self
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1 P f f H i M l l 1. Preference for Happiness: Many people value happiness, as evidenced by the fact that they will sacrifice other things for the sake of will sacrifice other things for the sake of happiness, but Happiness is not the only thing they care about they care about. (Price Theory of Happiness) 2 News and Happiness: Short run spikes and
dips in happiness signal what people consider good and bad – signal what people consider good and bad news, which in turn signals what they care about
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– which in turn signals what they care about. (Elation Theory of Happiness)
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the word “utility” for both “happiness” in our sense and for something closer to the modern meaning of “utility.”
happiness and utility were the same thing.
“decision utility” and “happiness” in our sense decision utility and happiness in our sense “experienced utility.”
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Choice and SWB in the Children vs. No Children Scenario: Women Only
SWB SWB Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 89% 5% 94% Option 2 2% 3% 6% 92% 8%
Option 1: have kids Option 2: never have kids Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0 388 p value: 0.388 n=161
Choice and SWB over time in the Children vs. No Children Scenario: Women Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 87% 7% 94% Option 2 2% 4% 6% 89% 11%
Option 1: have kids Option 2: never have kids Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0 065 p value: 0.065 n=123
Choice and SWB in the Children vs. No Children Scenario: Men Only
SWB SWB Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 86% 6% 92% Option 2 3% 5% 8% 89% 11%
Option 1: have kids Option 2: never have kids Liddell Exact Test dde act est p-value: 0.388 n=133
Choice and SWB over time in the Children vs. No Children Scenario: Men Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 85% 9% 94% Option 2 3% 3% 6% 88% 12%
Option 1: have kids Option 2: never have kids Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0.146 p n=98
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The income effect on happiness is positive
i i th l i th i increases in the real wage raise the price
secular increases in income + secular secular increases in income + secular increases in the real wage is ambiguous
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1 P ( ti ) d T lk Th
g
Spending time with friends
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Choice and SWB over time in the Easterlin Scenario: Women Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 57% 36% 93% Option 2 0% 7% 7% 57% 43%
Option 1: born when you were Option 2: born 40 years earlier Liddell Exact Test p value: 0 000 p-value: 0.000 n=56
Choice and SWB over time in the Easterlin Scenario: Men Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 61% 31% 93% Option 2 0% 7% 7% 61% 39%
Option 1: born when you were Option 2: born 40 years earlier Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0 000 p value: 0.000 n=54
Abstract: By most objective measures the lives of
y j women in the United States have improved over the past 35 years, yet we show that measures of subjective well- ’ being indicate that women’s happiness has declined both absolutely and relative to male happiness. The paradox of women’s declining relative well being is paradox of women s declining relative well-being is found examining multiple countries, datasets, and measures of subjective well-being, and is pervasive
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j g, p across demographic groups.
have eroded a gender gap in happiness in hi h i th 1970 t i ll which women in the 1970s typically reported higher subjective well-being than did men. These declines have continued and a new gender gap is emerging—one and a new gender gap is emerging
with higher subjective well-being for men. Our findings raise provocative questions Our findings raise provocative questions about the contribution of the women’s t t ’ lf d b t movement to women’s welfare and about the legitimacy of using subjective well-
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being to assess broad social changes.
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Choice and SWB over time in the Women’s Liberation Scenario: Women Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 84% 10% 94% Option 2 2% 3% 6% 87% 13%
Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0.007 Option 1: Women’s Liberation happened Option 2: Women’s Liberation never happened n=163 Option 2: Women s Liberation never happened
Choice and SWB over time in the Women’s Liberation Scenario: Men Only
SWB over time SWB over time Option 1 Option 2 Choice Option 1 61% 29% 90% Option 2 3% 7% 10% 64% 36%
Lidd ll E t T t Liddell Exact Test p-value: 0.000 n=110 Option 1: Women’s Liberation happened Option 2: Women’s Liberation never happened n 110 p pp
interesting evidence in a Psychology g y gy paper “The Dark Side of the American Dream”) Dream ).
goods.
Materialism means higher preferences for
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Elicitations of Willingness to Pay for Happiness: Raw Distributions Raw Distributions
.2 .3 ensity
Depression Treatment
.2 .3 nsity
Time Spent On Meditation
.1 De
f
f r e e f r e e 1 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 2 % 3 3 % 5 % .1 Den m i n s 5 m i n s m i n s 5 m i n s m i n s m i n s 2 h
r s 3 h
r s 4 h
r s 6 h
r s 8 h
r s n
WTP as a Percentage of Income 1 5 3 4 5 6 9 2 h 3 h 4 h 6 h 8 h WTP as a Time Investment 3
Magnetic Stimulation
.1 .2 .3 Density n
f
f r e e f r e e 1 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 2 % 3 3 % 5 % WTP as a Percentage of Income g
Daniel J Benjamin (Cornell) Daniel J. Benjamin (Cornell) Ori Heffetz (Cornell) Mil S Ki b ll (Mi hi ) Miles S. Kimball (Michigan) Alex Rees-Jones (Wharton)
e a e a c subs u o
another would leave an individual indifferent.
– Traditionally: choice data. – Must seek alternatives when choice unobserved
– One alternative: subjective well-being (SWB) data
p p estimated from SWB data reflect (preference- based) MRSs? based) MRSs?
Figure 3: Tradeoff estimates: choice vs. anticipated SWB
Figure 3: Tradeoff estimates: choice vs. anticipated SWB
Daniel J. Benjamin (Cornell) Ori Heffetz (Cornell) Ori Heffetz (Cornell) Miles S. Kimball (Michigan) Nichole Szembrot (Cornell)
USC CESR Seminar USC CESR Seminar November 8, 2013
Key assumption: Stated preference an unbiased measure of true preference.
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1 Aft ti h d thi th t l h d
big effect on happiness right after the event have surprisingly little effect on happiness (Not just surprisingly little effect on happiness. (Not just money.)
i b
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00 s
Impulse Response of Happiness to Widowing With and Without Life Insurance
80 10 esponse 60 8 positive re 40 6 tage of p 20 4 percent 2 50 100 months since widowed
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With Life Insurance Without Life Insurance
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lifetime utility.
If there were a lever to magically undo the damage of Katrina, we would pull it.
True for the harm to others – True for the harm to others. – True for the harm to self, narrowly construed. T if th t t b h d b t – True even if the past cannot be changed but
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F ll d i t l 2 000 i di id l i
RAND ALP
– Two presidential elections: 2008, 2012 – Surveyed them immediately before election, soon ft l ti after election
– Well-being – Political preferences – Beliefs about election outcomes
– Well-being
Fi d t id i f f Ki b ll Willi
Model
– Democrats have gain in happiness Democrats have gain in happiness – Republicans have loss in happiness
g pp driven by interaction of
– Strength and direction of political preferences Amount of suprise – Amount of suprise
– Half-life of emtional reaction approximation 0 65 days – Half-life of emtional reaction approximation 0.65 days
– Stronger reduction in happiness for equivalent g pp q amount of surprise and partisanship if Republican than gain if Democrat
Miles Kimball Fumio Ohtake Miles Kimball, Fumio Ohtake, Yoshiro Tsutsui and Yichuan Wang Wang
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75 O k U i it U d d t 1 5
~30,000 daily observations M diff t f h i
D l h b t d d
deviation D li h b d f k
effects Form happiness factor (1st principal component of
standardized happiness measures)
matter!
Sl tt f h d i d t ti – Sleep matters for hedonic adaptation – More than one “happiness” shock
– Measurement Error can play a large role in typical happiness measurements yp pp – National news matters less than personal news
HAPPY NEWS
Normalized and Weekly Adjusted Log Autocovariances
Cov)
Variable std_factor td
log(C
std_nnews std_pnews std_sleepfac
5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20
l
exponential decay p y
H i N Shock 1 2 3
Stacked Impulse Responses of Each Structural Shock
Happiness News 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Number of Days Number of Days
M d l i b t fit ith 3 h k ith diff t d
rates
– Fastest decaying happiness shock ~50%/day. Fastest decaying happiness shock 50%/day. Slowest around 3%/day
– Big contemporaneous variance, but covariances much smaller – Accounts for ~40% of variance of daily happiness Accounts for 40% of variance of daily happiness, ~60% of variance of daily personal news, and ~30%
Hedonic adaptation is fast
– Nothing after 6 months
Can estimate news innovations through an auto-regression on its own lags R i l d f h i
against current news innovations
Overall Class Friend 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 Teacher Part Time Job Parents/Family
0 3
ness
0.1 0.2 0.3
rdized Happin
0.0
its of Standar
Health Job Seeking Lover 0 1 0.2 0.3
Un
0.0 0.1
4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12
Days in the Future
national news and personal news compare p p
second day second day
News Type Personal National 0.15 0.10
est
0.05 0.00 4 8 12
lead
cognitive processing—much like curiosity.
– Elation: after good news, it pays to
f
– Dismay: after bad news, it pays to
think what you did wrong so you can avoid doing it again
– Curiosity: after news that is neither clearly good nor Curiosity: after news that is neither clearly good nor bad, it pays to learn more for the sake of option value
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1 H i t ti t i f ti f 1. Happiness at time t is a function of
b and the histor of reali ed lifetime tilit
through time t. Holding X fixed, an individual is 2 happier if current expected lifetime utility is of
a preferred future.
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Note about the
vt1 U(X t1,Ht1) Et1vt
lifetime utility innovation:
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t
t vt
1[vt 1 U(X t 1,Ht 1)]
so
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t vt [vt1 U(
t1, t1)]
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t
t, t, t1, )
t t
H
1 t t
H H
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1 t j t j
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Experienced happiness is the sum of two components: p
the output of a household production function (like health, entertainment, or function (like health, entertainment, or nutrition.)
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A th f h i b d ib d i t
preference: preference:
– The fundamentals (state and control variables and
people care about and – The history of which indifference curves for lifetime plans one has been on.
Old b t th f t tt l f
happiness than recent news about the future.
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may dominate people’s perception of happiness.
wants what spikes in happiness signal. g
se, as distinct from what they signal. se, as distinct from what they signal.
long-run happiness that remains even when long-run happiness that remains even when there is no good or bad news.
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Happiness Additively Separable with Elation pp y p Concave in Lifetime Utility Innovations U(X,H)=F(X)+M(X) +α min(ι ι /2) +α0min(ιt, ιt/2) + α1min(ιt-1, ιt-1/2) + …
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Additively Separable Happiness with Elation y p pp Linear in Lifetime Utility Innovations U(X,H)=u(X)+M(X) +α0ιt + α1ιt-1 + …
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combination of lifetime utility innovations to the utility function has no effect on the preferences represented.
adaptation cause no harm to utility maximization.
determinants of baseline mood will cause determinants of baseline mood will cause material harm.
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given news event g
curve of happiness against time (technically curve of happiness against time (technically
discounted by ρ), after correcting for any
change in baseline mood M.
The Cumulative Elation Hypothesis: the size of an innovation in lifetime utility is monotonically related to the resulting monotonically related to the resulting cumulative elation.
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adaptation is slower for larger innovations p g in lifetime utility. 2 Strong Version: Variation in the rate of
hedonic adaptation accounts for most of the variance in cumulative elation when looking at different sizes of innovations to g lifetime utility.
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The main goal of this study was to test the extent to which a The main goal of this study was to test the extent to which a person's happiness is influenced by winning and losing small amounts
Participants in our experiment were sent text messages six times a day for six weeks asking them to rate their happiness on a scale from 0 to 100 (excluding multiples of 5). They were asked to visit th l b f t i t d d i th i t th the lab for a separate experiment, and during the experiment, they flipped a coin and could either win or lose a small amount of money (they believed this to be unrelated to the texting experiment). Before the coin flip participants were randomly assigned the amount of money the coin flip, participants were randomly assigned the amount of money they could win from the coin flip: $125, $25, $5, or $1. Changes in happiness following the coin flip were tracked g pp g p through the subjects’ response to text messages.
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Daniel J. Benjamin (Cornell and USC) Gabriel Carroll (Stanford) Ori Heffetz (Cornell) Miles S Kimball (Michigan) Miles S. Kimball (Michigan) ASSA/ESA Meeting – Political Engineering ASSA/ESA Meeting Political Engineering 4 January 2015
gradient by a constant has no affect on g y the outcome of the mechanism. 2 Responsiveness: With any other shift in
an individual’s reported gradient, the ’ f mechanism’s outcome shifts strictly in a direction preferred according to the new p g reported gradient. (Note: this makes it
in the neighborhood of one’s bliss point.)
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across people p p
mechanism is twice continuously mechanism is twice continuously differentiable.
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Autocratic Outcome = what the mechanism Autocratic Outcome what the mechanism does as a function of a set of preferences if everyone has those same preferences everyone has those same preferences
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preferences of a subset of individuals shift, p , then the change in the outcome of the mechanism is in the span of the autocratic mechanism is in the span of the autocratic
preferences of the subset of individuals preferences of the subset of individuals whose preferences shift.
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As if each individual is choosing from set S the contribution to the outcome that most advances that individual’s interests advances that individual s interests
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Lemma 2: If a mechanism satisfies responsiveness, then the associated p , autocratic mechanism restricted to the unit sphere is invertible sphere is invertible. Lemma 3: Guaranteeing weak local Pareto f f
preferences requires 0 int S. p q Lemma 5: S = -S
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hyperplanes through the origin when going yp p g g g g from gradients to autocratic outcomes
going from gradients to autocratic
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In 2 dimensions, all this gives is symmetry: S = -S
3 o
e s o s e do t
how restrictive this is. Certainly ellipsoids work work.
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2 A stationary point exists
i di ti th t h iti moves in a direction that has a positive dot product with any Pareto improvement (it will typically also move in “redistributive” directions orthogonal to redistributive directions orthogonal to that Pareto improvement)
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– but none found after many simulations y
l ti l b t th d – relatively rare but the do occur – probably tend to favor the status quo on average, which is not necessarily a bad property for acceptance of the mechanism
chosen matters chosen matters
– equivalent to the choice of coordinates
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constrained Pareto optimal given any parameterization of the feasible policy space is promising.
those that matter for tax policy) can be built into the structure of the policy space.
Even though the mechanism can be redistributive, it is consistent with cost-benefit analysis as long as the appropriate financing analysis as long as the appropriate financing mechanisms are built into the policy space.
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