Using Microbial Forensics to Strengthen Biosecurity and the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Using Microbial Forensics to Strengthen Biosecurity and the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Dana Perkins, PhD 1540 Committee Expert Science Needs for Microbial Forensics: Developing an International Science Roadmap


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Using Microbial Forensics to Strengthen Biosecurity and the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Dana Perkins, PhD 1540 Committee Expert

Science Needs for Microbial Forensics: Developing an International Science Roadmap Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Zagreb, Croatia, 13-16 Oct 2013 13-16 October 2013

Unless otherwise specified, the opinions presented here are those of the presenter and may not necessarily reflect the views of the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts, or the UN Security Council

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  • Microbial forensics (bio-forensics) is an

essential element of a national and international biosecurity infrastructure, as a deterrent and support tool

  • Similar to nuclear forensics, bio-

forensics may be used as a tool to detect, prevent and deter acts of bio- terrorism and illicit trafficking or use of biological materials.

  • The potential applications of bio-

forensics thus may contribute to strengthening biosecurity in the context of resolution 1540 (2004) and to achieving cooperation and synergy among various international security frameworks.

Resolution 1540 (2004) and Microbial Forensics

Biosurveillance Cooperative Bio- Threat Reduction Bio- Consequence Management BW – Elimination

MICROBIAL FORENSICS

COMBATING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS & BIOTERRORISM

Non-Proliferation Counter-Proliferation Consequence Management

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Refrain from providing any form

  • f support to non-State actors

that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical

  • r biological weapons and their

means of delivery Adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws prohibiting activities involving the proliferation

  • f

such weapons and their means of delivery to non-State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well any attempts to engage in such activities, assist or finance them

Legally binding obligations on all States under Resolution 1540 (2004), to:

Implement and enforce appropriate controls

  • ver related materials in order to:

 Account for and secure items in production, use, storage or transport;  Physically protect;  Detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering through effective border controls an law enforcement efforts;  Control the export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and the provision of funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment that would contribute to proliferation;  Penalize violations.

Resolution 1540 (2004): A Response to Threats to International Peace & Security

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  • Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other

unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use

  • Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting

under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution

  • Related materials: materials, equipment and technology

covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery Definitions for the purpose of resolution 1540 (2004)

Visit of 1540 expert at the Volpenpest HAMMER Training and Education Center, 5-7 Feb 2013, Richland, USA US NIH Biosafety and Bicocontainment Training Program- Dana Perkins personal photo

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Illustrative Example

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/29B727532FECBE96C12571860035A6DB?OpenDocument Anthrax Leahy Letter Powder: FBI (public domain) Gruinard Island: Site of British anthrax experiment during World War II Source: http://www.gifte.de/gruinard_island_bild01.htm “Two R-400A bombs photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bearing the markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin…”- http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf Anthrax cultures: CDC/Dr. James Feeley, Public Health Image Library #1165

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“[Security Council] calls upon States to renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non- proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes… [and] promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical w e a p

  • n

s ”

– Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

Security Council Meets on Non-Proliferation of WMDs UN Photo: Eskinder Debebe, 28 April 2004

Non-proliferation Regimes and resolution 1540 (2004) are Mutually Reinforcing

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The 1540 Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is a subsidiary body of the Security Council

The current Group of Experts was established per resolutions 1977 (2011) and 2055 (2012) “to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate…”

1540 Committee Chair (ROK) 1540 Committee Member 1540 Group of Experts Member

“[The Security Council] expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end”- Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

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The 1540 Architecture

UN Security Council

Monitoring & national implementation Assistance

Cooperation with international

  • rganizations, including the Security

Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001)

Transparency & media outreach

1540 Committee

Group of Experts

UN Office for Disarmament Affairs UN Department

  • f Political

Affairs

Regional and sub-regional seminars and workshops

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  • BWC States Parties have called for

“measures for the investigation of alleged use” as part of a “coherent regime to enhance the effectiveness of and improve compliance with the Convention…to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument”- Special Conference

  • f Parties to the BWC, 19-30 Sep 1994,

Final Declaration

  • “The Conference notes that the Secretary-

General’s investigation mechanism, set

  • ut in A/44/561 and endorsed by the

General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons” - Final Document of the Seventh Review Conference, 5-22 Dec 2011.

The use of BW (or CW) would constitute prima facie evidence of a breach of international obligations

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  • “[The Security Council]

decides that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore”- Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013)

The use of BW (or CW) would constitute prima facie evidence of a breach of international obligations

Members of the Security Council vote on resolution 2118 UN Photo/Mark Garten (27 September 2013)

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Lab Reporting Evidence Gathering Transport to Laboratory Lab Testing Site Assessment

BW use / bioterrorism / illicit trafficking

Seize / Secure Nationally-designated laboratories for internationally accepted definitive confirmation (and attribution) ? AND / OR United Nations-designated laboratories ?

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  • The development and improvement of technical bio-forensics methods to detect

illicit trafficking and biological materials outside of regulatory control, and to prevent and respond to biosecurity events, implicitly strengthen the implementation and enforcement of resolution 1540 (2004).

  • While in nuclear forensics the IAEA has a leading role in facilitating the exchange
  • f information and international collaboration as well as providing assistance in

support of law enforcement and assessment of nuclear security vulnerabilities, bio- forensics lacks international leadership.

  • The potential exists for much more widespread and effective cooperation not only

between countries, but also between organizations such as inter alia WHO, OIE, FAO, CWC/OPCW and the BW/ISU.

  • A sustained effort is required to build communities of bio-forensics specialists.
  • Member States, international organizations, National Academies, professional
  • rganizations and academia are essential actors in this effort of developing the

S&T foundation of bio-forensics and raising awareness on the possible synergies among its different applications.

Food for thought

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“Milestones and concrete projects need to be formulated and pursued in order to effectively realize the full potential of WMD Forensics science to contribute to preventing, deterring and responding to WMD proliferation and terrorism threats”

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_02/20110615_WMD-Forensics-Conference-Report.pdf

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Dana Perkins, PhD

1540 Committee Expert United Nations 300 East 42nd St., Suite IN-03074H New York, NY 10017 Tel: +1 (917) 367 6023 (office) E-mail: PerkinsD@un.org

Contact information

Collective e-mail: 1540experts@un.org Website: http://www.un.org/sc/1540