The Role of a Biosecurity The Role of a Biosecurity Summit in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

2014 BWC Meeting of Experts Geneva, August 4-8, 2014

Biosecurity Education Sideline Event

University of Insubria, August 7

The Role of a Biosecurity Summit in Promoting Scientist

BY MAURIZIO MARTELLINI

DIREC TOR, ICIS , UNIVERSITY OF INS UBRIA A ND SEC RETA RY G ENERA L, LA NDA U NETWORK C ENTRO VOLTA , C OM O, ITA LY

The Role of a Biosecurity Summit in Promoting Scientist Engagement and Education

• 1. Changing International Security Landscape

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)

Increasing interest in nuclear

energy for electric energy production and research/industrial/medical/ other civilian applications Potential risks of misuse, sabotage Biosecurity Summit (BSS)

Revolution in the life sciences and

rapid growth of novel developments with multiple uses

Dual-use researches of concern (in

synthetic biology, nano- biotechnology, neural science, etc.)

Potential risks of misuse, sabotage

and theft of radioactive/HEU materials and of facilities worldwide

Growing fears of non-state actors

acquiring nuclear weapon usable materials (like the HEU) and radioactive sources (for radioactive dispersion devices)

Fragmentation of the global

nuclear security architecture synthetic biology, nano- biotechnology, neural science, etc.)

Difficulties to verify compliance

with international obligations

Growing fears of non-state actors

acquiring or developing biological weapons

The end of the Cold War and the rapid revolution in

science and technology have given rise to a range of security challenges and concern which require flexible approaches and systematic action at multiple levels. The biological non-proliferation regime is a case in point in this regard, not least because of its inherent

• 1. Changing International Security Landscape:

Comments and Recommendations

point in this regard, not least because of its inherent limitations including the lack of verification system and adequate international infrastructure to coordinate the global biosecurity efforts. Given tremendous progress made in enhancing nuclear security, it is important to examine the extent to which a Biosecurity Summit (BSS) modeled on the Nuclear Security Summit could serve as a comprehensive framework for effectively addressing and tackling novel biosecurity concerns

• 2. Aims

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)

To promote nuclear concrete security

measures, including the reduction of the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world by moving from a National approach to a voluntary Multilateral system build up on the 2010, 2012 and 2014 NSSs objectives

Biosecurity Summit (BSS)

To strengthen the international

prohibition against biological weapons enshrined in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

To enhance awareness and education

in BioSecurity and Safety (B2S) Multilateral system build up on the 2010, 2012 and 2014 NSSs objectives and achievements

To strengthen the - nuclear security

regime (including not only the NPT) and the role of the IAEA

To prevent non-state actors from

acquiring nuclear weapon usable materials and radioactive sources, and from sabotaging nuclear infrastructures

Enhancing a nuclear security culture

integrated with a nuclear safety perspective in BioSecurity and Safety (B2S)

To prevent non-state actors from

developing or otherwise acquiring biological weapons

• 2. Aims:

Comments and Recommendations

The BSS could serve as an important international

mechanism for consolidating the efforts to ensure that the life sciences are not misused for hostile

• purposes. It could facilitate the coordination of

projects and initiatives and help with better projects and initiatives and help with better channeling resources, evaluating effectiveness and strengthening “Biosecurity Awarness and Biotech (professional) Responsibility”

• 3. Key International Treaties and Agreements

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)

NPT (it does not make

reference to non-state actors, but its 2010 Review Conference seems to signal that the illicit trafficking issue

Biosecurity Summit (BSS)

1925 Geneva Protocol BTWC CWC UNSC Resolution 1540 and its

further extensions

that the illicit trafficking issue must be addressed irrespectively from the nature

• f the cause)

Convention on Nuclear Safety (it

is relevant for a holistic extension of the NSS scope to the safety issue as hinted at the Seoul 2012 NSS)

UNSC Resolution 1540 and its

further extensions further extensions

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

to the Convention on Biological Diversity

WHO IHR 2005

• 3. Key International Treaties and Agreements:

Comments and Recommendations

While those lists are only indicative and not

exhaustive, the limitations of the biological non- proliferation regime are immediately evident. Unlike the NPT or CWC, the BTWC is a relatively weak treaty that lacks verification mechanisms and weak treaty that lacks verification mechanisms and implementing body. In terms of universalisation, 10 countries are yet to ratify the BTWC and another 16 are yet to join the Treaty. By contrast, the NPT has 189 Member States and the CWC has 190

• 4. International Initiatives and Mechanisms of Support

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)

• The Global Partnership Against the Spread of

Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)

• The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoEs)
• Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

Biosecurity Summit (BSS)

The Global Partnership Against the

Spread of Weapons and Materials

• f Mass Destruction (GP)

The EU CBRN Centres of

Excellence (CoEs)

Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

• Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of

Radioactive Sources

• International Convention for the Suppression
• f Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
• Global Initiative to Combact Nuclear

Terrorism (GICNT)

• INTERPOL
• 1540 Committee
• World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)
• International Nuclear Security Education

Network (INSEN)

• IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centres

(NSSCs)

Excellence (CoEs)

INTERPOL 1540 Committee International Federation of

Biosafety Associations (IFBA)

• 4. International Initiatives and Mechanisms of Support:

Comments and Recommendations

There is some overlap between the international politically-

motivated efforts to promote nuclear security and biosecurity. However, it needs to be highlighted that the range of entities involved in promoting nuclear security include a range of non- government body, such as representatives of industry and

• academia. WINS plays a crucial role in engaging the private

sector with nuclear security issues by focusing on capacity building, outreach and developing sustainable professional sector with nuclear security issues by focusing on capacity building, outreach and developing sustainable professional

• competency. The EU CBRN CoEs, NSSCs, INSEN constitute key

mechanisms for promoting nuclear security awareness, training and education at several levels by supporting institutions in developing courses, exchanging training materials and sharing best practices, codes of conduct and lessons learned. By contrast, the engagement of biotechnology industry with biosecurity issues has remained limited. Moreover, many of the initiatives in the area of biosecurity are carried out in an ad-hoc manner through NGOs tasked with specific projects. This in turn creates obstacles to coordination, duplication of efforts and lack of sustainability

• 5. Key International Organizations

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA)

Biosecurity Summit (BSS)

BTWC Implementation

Support Unit (SU)

World Health Organisation World Health Organisation

(WHO)

World Organization for

Animal Health (OIE)

Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO)

• 5. Key International Organizations:

Comments and Recommendations (1)

The IAEA is the principal international organisation tasked with

coordinating and consolidating the efforts in fostering nuclear security

• worldwide. Since 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors prepares and

approves 3-year Nuclear Security Plans outlining milestones and

• bjectives to be met at global level for the purpose of ensuring that

nuclear and radioactive materials are only used for peaceful purposes. The implementation of the Plans is financed through a Nuclear Security Fund to which Member States can contribute on a volunteer basis. By contrast, there is still an urgent need for international leadership in the Fund to which Member States can contribute on a volunteer basis. By contrast, there is still an urgent need for international leadership in the area of biosecurity. The BTWC Implementation Support Unit remains under-staffed and under-funded to fulfil the wide mandate of activities performed by the IAEA or the OPCW. Despite being a critical factor in the efforts to enhance biosecurity, the WHO has mainly focused its attention on natural outbreaks of disease and laboratory biosafety

• measures. Issues related to the hostile misapplication of novel life

science research are still regarded as marginal. It is evident therefore that there is a gap in the area of biosecurity international leadership and the launch of a Biosecurity Summit could be instrumental in consolidating the global efforts to ensure that the life sciences are not misused for hostile purposes.

• 5. Key International Organizations:

Comments and Recommendations (2)

Furthermore, a key tool of the NSS process is the

possibility that a particular group of the participating countries could offer a “gift basket”, which is an extra ad hoc initiative that can serve as a model for a specific collective nuclear security aspect. Therefore, the BSS could establish a similar “gift basket” approach, by could establish a similar “gift basket” approach, by allowing some participating countries to offer extra initiatives that can function as role models for specific biosecurity objectives. In general, the BSS could also

• ffer a platform of discussion on the “Responsible

Science” overall ideas and on how to develop effective “assessment metrics” for the new potential bio- proliferation risks facing the life science in the XXI century.

Thank you for your attention!

• Prof. Maurizio Martellini
• Prof. Maurizio Martellini

Secretary General, Landau Network Centro Volta (LNCV), & Director, Insubria Center on International Security (ICIS), Como, Italy Email: maurizio.martellini@centrovolta.it Phone: +39.031.579820