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Usable Encryption
Class Presentation for CMSC 818D Wei Bai
Usable Encryption Class Presentation for CMSC 818D Wei Bai S - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Usable Encryption Class Presentation for CMSC 818D Wei Bai S Application S Hardware Encryption S Web Encryption S Email Encryption OpenPGP S S/MIME S S Online Social Network Public Key Encryption S Encryption/Decryption
Class Presentation for CMSC 818D Wei Bai
S Hardware Encryption S Web Encryption
S Email Encryption
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OpenPGP
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S/MIME S Online Social Network
S Encryption/Decryption S Signing/Verifying
Bob Alice
Design Aspects Encryption UI (Automatic) Encryption and Decryption Key Management Integration
S One of the pioneer works for encryption usability S Objective: Investigate usability in standard UI
design vs security
S A case study of PGP 5.0 through
S Cognitive walkthrough analysis S Lab Study
S 1. Reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to
perform
S 2. Able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks S 3. Don’t make dangerous errors S 4. Comfortable with the interface to continue using it.
S 1. The unmotivated user property S 2. The abstraction property S 3. The lack of feedback property S 4. The barn door property S 5. The weakest link property
S Encrypt/decrypt S Sign/verify S Key generation S Own public key publication S Public key acquiring S Avoid dangerous errors S Reasonable time
S Cognitive walkthrough Analysis
S Wide considerations for more factors S Subjective
S Lab Study
S Limited scope of factor testing S Objective
S Key management Issue
S Visual: sign/verify S Different key types
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RSA for PGP,
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Hellman/DSS for PGP 5.0 S Key server S Errors playing with keys. Irreversible!
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Delete the private key, publicize the private key
S Integrate Eudora with PGP
S Confirmed some points: S What keys to use? How to use them?
S Confused about private/public keys S Use own/counterpart’s keys?
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If reversible? Regret allowed?
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included?
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Learnability: Learn by themselves, or taught by others?
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Closed circle
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Phishing exists
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shorter?
S Objective
S Investigate whether it makes more usable if hiding as many
security details as possible S Method:
S Lab study of Pwm (private webmail) system
S Automatic key management and automatic encryption S Integrate tightly with existing webmail services S Key management by a key escrow
S Advantage:
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Automatic key management
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Users never lose their keys
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Keys ported to new devices automatically S Disadvantage
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Escrow has access to users’ keys
S Task scenario:
S Decrypt an email first S Send an encrypted email S Open a new Gmail session (with Pwm ended)
S Perform well compared to existing webmail tools (w.r.t. SUS
score)
S Performance of Message Protector is, on par with, slightly
higher than Pwm.
S Too transparent design loses trust to some extent S Reconsider manual encryption
S The idea also comes from “Johnny for Facebook” paper.
S Automatic key management by using a third party service?
S Chicken and egg problem! S Tradeoff between usability/security
S Objective:
S Encryption usability for online social networks (OSNs)
S Methods:
S Two lab studies
S Encryption schemes:
S Auto/not auto: encryption button
S Key management:
S Manual: send keys over webmail S Auto: Passwords created at the first time, and then web
browser caches it for further use.
S Auto encryption and auto key management is preferable.
S Manual encryption / manual decryption have higher security
feeling, but lower acceptance S Key (password) recovery capability
S Do/show something makes users assured?
S Auto/not auto: encryption button
S Key management:
S Manual: send keys over webmail
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(chicken and egg problem again?) S Auto: Passwords created at the first time, and then web
browser caches it for further use.
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Password protection? Guessibility for password is much easier than PKI keys.