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Train ined to Kil ill:
Battlefield Part rticipation in in Kurdish Fig ighters
Matthew Cancia ian
Train ined to Kil ill: Battlefield Part rticipation in in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Train ined to Kil ill: Battlefield Part rticipation in in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Train ined to Kil ill: Battlefield Part rticipation in in Kurdish Fig ighters Matthew Cancia ian Can US training improve the battlefield participation of our partners? Combat motivation: the reasons why soldiers under fire believe that
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Can US training improve the battlefield participation of our partners?
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness
Combat motivation: the reasons why soldiers under fire believe that they should continue fighting
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness
Battlefield participation: attempting to defeat the enemy when under fire (vis non-participation by either fleeing or hiding)
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness
Combat effectiveness: the “pound for pound” contribution of each soldier towards achieving victory under enemy fire
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Colonel Trevor Dupuy
“German divisions were 20 percent more effective than US divisions… Nine of the top 10 divisions in World War II were German."
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Cohesion Combat Motivation
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness
How does the experience of combat feed back into battlefield participation?
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness
Modern System Tactics
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Modern- System Tactics
“A tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms”
- Biddle 2006
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Cover and Concealment
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Dis ispersion
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Suppression
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness US Training
Modern System Tactics
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2014 – 2017: Untrained Volunteers, Internally Trained Regulars, and Western Modern-System Training
2014 – 2017: Untrained Volunteers, Internally Trained Regulars, and Western Modern-System Training
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“Today the Barw rwari Bala trib ibe showed up in in our thousands… to show them that we are here and that they will never take Kurdistan.”
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This is not helpful
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Sinjar Mosul Erbil Halabja Kirkuk
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Untrained Internal Coalition
32.9% 31.2% 35.8%
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Hypothesis 1:
Calculations of success will be marginally increased by internal training but dramatically increased by coalition training
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On a scale of zero to ten, how confident are you in your unit’s readiness for combat?
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Untrained Internal Coalition
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Untrained Internal Coalition
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Untrained Internal Coalition
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Regress Training on Confidence No Clustering Regress Training on Confidence Clustering on Bases
Internal Coalition Internal Coalition
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Hypothesis 2:
Coalition training will have a greater positive effect on battlefield participation than internal training
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Untrained Internal Coalition
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Untrained Internal Coalition Modern System Non- Modern System
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Modern System Non- Modern System
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Modern System Non- Modern System 2,283 Peshmerga
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Modern System Non- Modern System 1,739 Peshmerga
Cutting Out Non-Combatants Reduces the Sample to 1,739
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Modern System Non- Modern System 955 Peshmerga
Cutting Out Non-Riflemen Reduces the Sample to 955
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I’ll read a number of statements. Don’t tell me which ones you agree with, just tell me how many.
In combat:
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Control Group Sensitive Group
- There was a lot of noise
- The situation was confusing
- I didn’t fire back but just
waited for it to be over +
I’ll read a number of
- statements. Don’t tell me
which ones you agree with, just tell me how many. In combat:
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Modern System Non- Modern System Non- Modern System Modern System Control Group Sensitive Group
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Non- Modern System Modern System Control Group Sensitive Group
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Non- Modern System Modern System Control Group Sensitive Group
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Non- Modern System Modern System Control Group Sensitive Group
+ ? = + ? =
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Non- Modern System Modern System Control Group Sensitive Group
.169* .028
*: p<.01
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Traditional Argument:
“The source of combat motivation is key – we just need to know what motivates people and we will know both their battlefield participation”
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Combat Motivation Battlefield Participation Combat Effectiveness US Training
Modern System Tactics
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Counter argument #1:
“Training is just changing the source
- f combat motivation – driving
people from ideology to group solidarity or faith in their training”
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Counter argument #2:
“Coalition training is pumping up soldiers to kill, not making them more effective”
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Counter argument #3:
“Coalition training is just proxying for improved equipment or fire support”
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