tradeoffs in infinite games
play

Tradeoffs in Infinite Games Martin Zimmermann Saarland University - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Tradeoffs in Infinite Games Martin Zimmermann Saarland University May 15th, 2018 Scientific Talk in the Habilitation Process Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 1/36 Churchs Synthesis Problem o 1 i 1 . ?


  1. A Parity Game 1 0 2 2 steps 1 0 2 3 steps 1 0 0 2 4 steps · · · 1 0 0 0 2 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 9/36

  2. A Parity Game 1 0 2 Player 0 wins from every vertex, 2 steps but Player 1 can delay between 1 0 2 color 1 and color 2 longer and longer. 3 steps ⇒ undesired behavior. 1 0 0 2 4 steps · · · 1 0 0 0 2 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 9/36

  3. Parity Games go Quantitative During the last two decades, various quantitative variants of parity games have been introduced: Mean-payoff parity games [CHJ05] Finitary parity games [CH06] Energy parity games [CD11] Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 10/36

  4. Parity Games go Quantitative During the last two decades, various quantitative variants of parity games have been introduced: Mean-payoff parity games [CHJ05] Finitary parity games [CH06] Energy parity games [CD11] Finitary parity games are distinguished, as here the quantitative aspect measures the satisfaction of the qualitative one. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 10/36

  5. Parity Games go Quantitative During the last two decades, various quantitative variants of parity games have been introduced: Mean-payoff parity games [CHJ05] Finitary parity games [CH06] Energy parity games [CD11] Window parity games [BHR16] Finitary parity games are distinguished, as here the quantitative aspect measures the satisfaction of the qualitative one. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 10/36

  6. Finitary Parity Games Parity: Almost all odd colors are followed by larger even one. Finitary Parity: There is a bound b such that almost all odd colors are followed by larger even one within b steps. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 11/36

  7. Finitary Parity Games Parity: Almost all odd colors are followed by larger even one. Finitary Parity: There is a bound b such that almost all odd colors are followed by larger even one within b steps. Condition Complexity Memory Pl. 0 Memory Pl. 1 Parity quasi-poly Memoryless Memoryless Finitary Parity PTime Memoryless Infinite Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 11/36

  8. Boundedness vs. Optimization The bound b in the definition of finitary parity games is existentially quantified (and may depend on the play). Corollary If Player 0 wins a finitary parity game G , then a uniform bound b ≤ |G| suffices. A trivial example shows that the upper bound |G| is tight. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 12/36

  9. Boundedness vs. Optimization The bound b in the definition of finitary parity games is existentially quantified (and may depend on the play). Corollary If Player 0 wins a finitary parity game G , then a uniform bound b ≤ |G| suffices. A trivial example shows that the upper bound |G| is tight. Questions 1. Does Player 0 need memory to achieve the optimal bound? 2. Is it harder to compute the optimal bound than checking whether a bound exists? Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 12/36

  10. Chatterjee & Fijalkow 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 13/36

  11. Chatterjee & Fijalkow 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 Player 0 has a unique memoryless winning strategy, which achieves the bound five: from the 1 it takes five steps to the 4. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 13/36

  12. Chatterjee & Fijalkow 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 Player 0 has a unique memoryless winning strategy, which achieves the bound five: from the 1 it takes five steps to the 4. With two memory states, she can achieve the bound four: “answer” a 1 by a 2 and a 3 by a 4. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 13/36

  13. Chatterjee & Fijalkow 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 Player 0 has a unique memoryless winning strategy, which achieves the bound five: from the 1 it takes five steps to the 4. With two memory states, she can achieve the bound four: “answer” a 1 by a 2 and a 3 by a 4. It is trivial to extend this example to d odd colors and d even colors requiring d memory states to play optimally. ⇒ In general, playing optimally requires memory; but how much? Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 13/36

  14. Memory Requirements . . . 0 0 0 . . . 1 3 2 d − 1 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 2 4 2 d . . . 0 0 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 14/36

  15. Memory Requirements d request gadgets with d colors d response gadgets with d colors � �� � � �� � . . . . . . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 15/36

  16. Memory Requirements d request gadgets with d colors d response gadgets with d colors � �� � � �� � . . . . . . Player 0 has winning strategy with cost d 2 + 2 d : answer j -th unique request in j -th response-gadget. ⇒ requires exponential memory (in d ). Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 15/36

  17. Memory Requirements d request gadgets with d colors d response gadgets with d colors � �� � � �� � . . . . . . Player 0 has winning strategy with cost d 2 + 2 d : answer j -th unique request in j -th response-gadget. ⇒ requires exponential memory (in d ). Against a smaller strategy Player 1 can enforce a larger cost, as Player 0 cannot store every sequence of requests. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 15/36

  18. Memory Requirements d request gadgets with d colors d response gadgets with d colors � �� � � �� � . . . . . . Player 0 has winning strategy with cost d 2 + 2 d : answer j -th unique request in j -th response-gadget. ⇒ requires exponential memory (in d ). Against a smaller strategy Player 1 can enforce a larger cost, as Player 0 cannot store every sequence of requests. Theorem (WZ16) For every d > 1 , there exists a finitary parity game G d such that |G d | ∈ O ( d 2 ) and G d has d odd colors, and every optimal strategy for Player 0 has at least size 2 d − 1 . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 15/36

  19. PSPACE-Hardness Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is PSpace -hard: “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 16/36

  20. PSPACE-Hardness Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is PSpace -hard: “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Proof By a reduction from QBF (w.l.o.g. in CNF). Checking the truth of ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) as a two-player game (Player 0 wants to prove truth of ϕ ): Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 16/36

  21. PSPACE-Hardness Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is PSpace -hard: “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Proof By a reduction from QBF (w.l.o.g. in CNF). Checking the truth of ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) as a two-player game (Player 0 wants to prove truth of ϕ ): 1. Player 1 picks truth value for x . 2. Player 0 picks truth value for y . 3. Player 1 picks clause C . 4. Player 0 picks literal ℓ from C . 5. Player 0 wins ⇔ ℓ is picked to be satisfied in step 1 or 2. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 16/36

  22. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  23. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) 0 0 ¬ x x 1 3 0 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  24. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) 0 0 0 0 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  25. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) 0 0 0 0 ψ ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  26. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) ( x ∨ ¬ y ) 0 0 0 0 0 ψ ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  27. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ψ ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  28. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ψ ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  29. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  30. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 y 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  31. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  32. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  33. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) For a well-chosen bound b , a strategy for Player 0 with cost at most b witnesses the truth of ϕ and vice versa. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  34. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) For a well-chosen bound b , a strategy for Player 0 with cost at most b witnesses the truth of ϕ and vice versa. y x x · · · 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 10 � �� � b steps Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  35. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) For a well-chosen bound b , a strategy for Player 0 with cost at most b witnesses the truth of ϕ and vice versa. y x ¬ x · · · 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 � �� � b steps Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  36. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) For a well-chosen bound b , a strategy for Player 0 with cost at most b witnesses the truth of ϕ and vice versa. y ¬ x ¬ x · · · 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 � �� � b steps Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  37. The Reduction ψ � �� � ϕ = ∀ x ∃ y . ( x ∨ ¬ y ) ∧ ( ¬ x ∨ y ) x ( x ∨ ¬ y ) . . . 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ x ψ . . . 0 4 ¬ x y ¬ y x 1 3 5 7 0 10 y . . . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ¬ y . . . 0 8 ( ¬ x ∨ y ) For a well-chosen bound b , a strategy for Player 0 with cost at most b witnesses the truth of ϕ and vice versa. y ¬ x x · · · 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 10 � �� � b steps Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 17/36

  38. PSPACE-Membership Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is in PSpace : “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 18/36

  39. PSPACE-Membership Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is in PSpace : “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Proof Sketch Fix G and b (w.l.o.g. b ≤ |G| ). 1. Construct equivalent parity game G ′ storing the costs of open requests (up to bound b ) and the number of “overflows” (up to bound |G| ) ⇒ |G ′ | ∈ |G| O ( d ) . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 18/36

  40. PSPACE-Membership Lemma (WZ16) The following problem is in PSpace : “Given a finitary parity game G and a bound b ∈ N , does Player 0 have a strategy for G whose cost is at most b?” Proof Sketch Fix G and b (w.l.o.g. b ≤ |G| ). 1. Construct equivalent parity game G ′ storing the costs of open requests (up to bound b ) and the number of “overflows” (up to bound |G| ) ⇒ |G ′ | ∈ |G| O ( d ) . f of G ′ with 2. Define equivalent finite-duration variant G ′ polynomial play-length. 3. G ′ f can be solved on alternating polynomial-time Turing machine. 4. APTime = PSpace concludes the proof. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 18/36

  41. Upper Bounds on Memory Equivalence between finitary parity game G w.r.t. bound b and parity game G ′ yields upper bounds on memory requirements. Corollary Let G be a finitary parity game with costs with d odd colors. If Player 0 has a strategy for G with cost b, then she also has a strategy with cost b and size ( b + 2) d = 2 d log( b +2) . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 19/36

  42. Upper Bounds on Memory Equivalence between finitary parity game G w.r.t. bound b and parity game G ′ yields upper bounds on memory requirements. Corollary Let G be a finitary parity game with costs with d odd colors. If Player 0 has a strategy for G with cost b, then she also has a strategy with cost b and size ( b + 2) d = 2 d log( b +2) . Recall: lower bound 2 d − 1 . The same bounds hold for Player 1. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 19/36

  43. Tradeoffs Theorem (WZ16) Fix some finitary parity game G d as before. For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d there exists a strategy σ i for Player 0 in G d such that σ i has cost d 2 + 3 d − i and size � i − 1 � d � . j =1 j Also, every strategy σ ′ for Player 0 in G d whose cost is at most the cost of σ i has at least the size of σ i . size 1022 1 cost 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 20/36

  44. Generalizations We generalized finitary parity games to finitary parity parity Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 21/36

  45. Generalizations We generalized finitary parity games to parity games with costs (by allowing non-negative weights on the edges) [FZ14] , and parity with costs finitary parity parity Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 21/36

  46. Generalizations We generalized finitary parity games to parity games with costs (by allowing non-negative weights on the edges) [FZ14] , and parity games with weights (by allowing arbitrary weights on the edges) [SWZ18] . parity with weights parity with costs finitary parity parity Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 21/36

  47. Generalizations We generalized finitary parity games to parity games with costs (by allowing non-negative weights on the edges) [FZ14] , and parity games with weights (by allowing arbitrary weights on the edges) [SWZ18] . Boundedness Condition Complexity Memory Pl. 0 Memory Pl. 1 Parity quasi-poly Memoryless Memoryless Finitary Parity PTime Memoryless Infinite Parity w. Costs quasi-poly Memoryless Infinite Parity w. Weights NP ∩ co-NP Exponential Infinite Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 21/36

  48. Generalizations We generalized finitary parity games to parity games with costs (by allowing non-negative weights on the edges) [FZ14] , and parity games with weights (by allowing arbitrary weights on the edges) [SWZ18] . Optimization Condition Complexity Memory Pl. 0 & 1 Finitary Parity PSpace -complete Exponential Parity w. Costs PSpace -complete Exponential Parity w. Weights PSpace -hard ≥ Exponential The results for parity games with costs hold for unary and binary encodings of the weights. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 21/36

  49. Outline 1. Playing Optimally in Variations of Parity Games 2. Playing (Approximatively) Optimally in LTL Games 3. More Tradeoffs 4. Conclusion Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 22/36

  50. Introducing LTL by Examples Atomic propositions r i for requests and g i for grants. 1. Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 23/36

  51. Introducing LTL by Examples Atomic propositions r i for requests and g i for grants. 1. Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) 2. At most one grant at a time: G � i � = j ¬ ( g i ∧ g j ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 23/36

  52. Introducing LTL by Examples Atomic propositions r i for requests and g i for grants. 1. Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) 2. At most one grant at a time: G � i � = j ¬ ( g i ∧ g j ) 3. No spurious grants: � ¬ [ ( ¬ r i U ( ¬ r i ∧ g i )) ] ∧ ¬ [ F ( g i ∧ X ( ¬ r i U ( ¬ r i ∧ g i ))) ] i Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 23/36

  53. Introducing LTL by Examples Atomic propositions r i for requests and g i for grants. 1. Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) 2. At most one grant at a time: G � i � = j ¬ ( g i ∧ g j ) 3. No spurious grants: � ¬ [ ( ¬ r i U ( ¬ r i ∧ g i )) ] ∧ ¬ [ F ( g i ∧ X ( ¬ r i U ( ¬ r i ∧ g i ))) ] i � ≡ [ ( r i R ( r i ∨ ¬ g i )) ] ∧ [ G ( ¬ g i ∨ X ( r i R ( r i ∨ ¬ g i ))) ] i Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 23/36

  54. A Problem with LTL Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) g 0 g 0 g 0 · · · r 0 r 0 r 0 Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 24/36

  55. A Problem with LTL Answer every request: � i G ( r i → F g i ) g 0 g 0 g 0 · · · r 0 r 0 r 0 Problem: LTL is too weak to express timing-constraints: no guarantee when request is granted, only that it is granted eventually Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 24/36

  56. LTL goes Quantitative During the last two decades, various quantitative variants of LTL have been introduced: Parametric LTL [AETP99] PROMPT – LTL [KPV07] Parametric MTL [GTN10] Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 25/36

  57. LTL goes Quantitative During the last two decades, various quantitative variants of LTL have been introduced: Parametric LTL [AETP99] PROMPT – LTL [KPV07] Parametric MTL [GTN10] PROMPT – LTL is distinguished, as all problems for the more general Parametric LTL are reducible to those for PROMPT – LTL . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 25/36

  58. Prompt-LTL Syntax: Add prompt-eventually operator F P . ϕ ::= p | ¬ p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | F P ϕ Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 26/36

  59. Prompt-LTL Syntax: Add prompt-eventually operator F P . ϕ ::= p | ¬ p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | F P ϕ Semantics: Defined with respect to a fixed bound k ∈ N . ϕ ρ ( ρ, n , k ) | = F P ϕ : n n + k Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 26/36

  60. Prompt-LTL Syntax: Add prompt-eventually operator F P . ϕ ::= p | ¬ p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | F P ϕ Semantics: Defined with respect to a fixed bound k ∈ N . ϕ ρ ( ρ, n , k ) | = F P ϕ : n n + k Now: � i G ( r i → F P g i ) Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 26/36

  61. Prompt-LTL Games Label the arena by atomic propositions. Winning condition: PROMPT – LTL formula ϕ . Player 0 wins if there is a uniform bound k and a strategy σ such that every play that is consistent with σ satisfies the winning condition ϕ w.r.t. k . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 27/36

  62. Prompt-LTL Games Label the arena by atomic propositions. Winning condition: PROMPT – LTL formula ϕ . Player 0 wins if there is a uniform bound k and a strategy σ such that every play that is consistent with σ satisfies the winning condition ϕ w.r.t. k . PROMPT – LTL games are not harder than LTL games... Theorem (KPV07) 1. Determining the winner of PROMPT – LTL games is 2ExpTime -complete. 2. If Player 0 wins, then also with a finite-state strategy of size 2 2 | ϕ | and w.r.t. the bound k ϕ = 2 2 | ϕ | . Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 27/36

  63. Prompt-LTL Games Label the arena by atomic propositions. Winning condition: PROMPT – LTL formula ϕ . Player 0 wins if there is a uniform bound k and a strategy σ such that every play that is consistent with σ satisfies the winning condition ϕ w.r.t. k . ...unless you optimize the bound. Theorem (Z11) 1. The PROMPT – LTL game optimization problem can be solved in triply-exponential time. 2. The bound k ϕ is tight in general. Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 27/36

  64. Prompt-LTL Games Label the arena by atomic propositions. Winning condition: PROMPT – LTL formula ϕ . Player 0 wins if there is a uniform bound k and a strategy σ such that every play that is consistent with σ satisfies the winning condition ϕ w.r.t. k . Questions 1. Is the optimization problem harder than the boundedness problem? 2. Can the optimum be approximated? Martin Zimmermann Saarland University Tradeoffs in Infinite Games 27/36

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend