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Admissibility in Infinite Games Dietmar Berwanger EPFL, Lausanne STACS , Aachen Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS07 1 / 18 Strategic Interaction Models of reactive systems: zero-sum two-player


  1. Admissibility in Infinite Games Dietmar Berwanger EPFL, Lausanne STACS , Aachen Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 1 / 18

  2. Strategic Interaction Models of reactive systems: zero-sum two-player games: strict competition ▸ optimal behaviour – guarantee a win; ▸ determinacy neutralises rationality. non-zero sum, or n -player games: potential for cooperation ▸ various solution concepts; ▸ how to reason about how other players reason. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 2 / 18

  3. Strategic Interaction Models of reactive systems: zero-sum two-player games: strict competition ▸ optimal behaviour – guarantee a win; ▸ determinacy neutralises rationality. non-zero sum, or n -player games: potential for cooperation ▸ various solution concepts; ▸ how to reason about how other players reason. Understanding of rationality needed – borrow from Game Teory? Yes, but with care. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 2 / 18

  4. Computational agents are special players non-terminating behaviour ▸ open or infinite horizon extensive structure ▸ state transition graphs ▸ inherently sequential preplay commitment no steady state, no extraneous correlation particular payoff structures Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 3 / 18

  5. Program Identify criteria for interactively optimal behaviour for computational agents. adapt deductive solution concepts from noncooperative game theory, preserve automata-theoretic and logical foundations. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 4 / 18

  6. Program Identify criteria for interactively optimal behaviour for computational agents. adapt deductive solution concepts from noncooperative game theory, preserve automata-theoretic and logical foundations. Goals: Describe what to expect from the interaction of rational agents. Prescribe individually rational behaviour. Design mechanisms that promote favourable evolution. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 4 / 18

  7. Te Minimax principle Idea: play strategies that guarantee your security payoff: max s  ∈ S  min s −  ∈ S −  . Problems: ignores that players are rational and aware of each other. ▸ inefficient and unstable solutions. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 5 / 18

  8. Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium: a self-enforcing profile of strategies: Each player, given the strategies of the others, should not have an alternate strategy that he striclty prefers. Problems: Stable state assumption: ▸ the strategies of the others are not given Multiplicity ▸ coordination failure Dynamic inconsistency (in extensive games): ▸ Non-credible threats Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 6 / 18

  9. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Reasoning... Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  10. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Player Row cannot decide between T and B . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  11. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Player Column cannot decide between L and R . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  12. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Player Matrix finds X to be better than Y . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  13. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ All players follow his reasoning, and discard the matrix Y . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  14. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Player Row now finds T to be than B . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  15. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Row discards the row B and Column follows his reasoning. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  16. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Player Column now finds R to be better than L Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  17. Rationality Obliges Strategy s dominates r , if – given the player’s belief - s is not worse than r , against any counter-strategy, and - s is strictly better, against some counter-strategy. Admissibility criterion: avoid dominated strategies Assume common reasoning about admissibility. ▸ iterated elimination ↝ fixed point L R L R + − + + + − + − + − + − T T B + + + − − + B + + + + − − X Y ▸ Te predicted outcome is ( T , R , X ). Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 7 / 18

  18. Infinite Sequential Games ▸ n - players interact to form an infinite path in a graph each player has preferences over outcoming path – may be conciliated Strategies: ω -trees s i (colouring the graph unravelling) – space S i uncountable ▸ perfect information, win-or-lose objectives Particular case: regular games over finite graphs: ( G , ( W i ) i < n ) ⋃ i < n V i , E ) , W i ∈ V ω regular set of paths through G G game graph ( V = ˙ Canonical case: parity games. Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 8 / 18

  19. Weak Dominance – Admissibility Fix strategy subspace Q ⊆ S – frame of reference. A strategy s ∈ S  dominates r ∈ S  on Q  , if u  ( s , t ) ≥ u  ( r , t ) for all t ∈ Q  , and u  ( s , t ) > u  ( r , t ) for some t ∈ Q  . s ∈ S  is admissible w.r.t. Q , if no s ′ ∈ Q  dominates s on Q  . Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 9 / 18

  20. Iterated Admissibility Incorporate admissibility as principle of rationality. Assume common knowledge of rationality – stages: Q i  ∶ = S i Q i α +  ∶ = { s ∈ Q i α ∶ s admissible w.r.t. Q α } Q i λ ∶ = ⋂ α < λ Q i α ▸ Reach deflationary fixed point Q ∞ when Q α = Q α +  . Solution concept: Q i ∞ – iteratively admissible strategies (Strategies s ∈ Q i α are α -admissible.) Dietmar Berwanger (EPFL) Admissibility in Infinite Games STACS’07 10 / 18

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