TOWARDS TRANSPARENT ZERO- KNOWLEDGE COMPUTATION - BASED ON 10 YEARS - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Kurt Nielsen (Co-founder and CEO Partisia)

TOWARDS TRANSPARENT ZERO- KNOWLEDGE COMPUTATION

• BASED ON 10 YEARS OF COMMERCIAL USE

PROTOCOLS PLATFORMS

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Transparency and scalability

LAN

• Transparent
• Difficult to scale

CLOUD

• Less transparent
• Scalable

Landmark paper “Secure Multiparty Computation Goes Live” from Financial Cryptography 2009

Auctions Key mgt Survey LP Stat ML

BLOCKCHAIN

• More transparent
• Scalable if …

Trust – real or perceived?

MPC Single point of trust No single point of trust Who control the nodes?

• Participant based trust
• Delegated trust

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Partisia group (10 years since first commercial use)

• Established in 2008
• First commercial use
• Market design
• Commercial platform
• Established in 2013
• Key management
• First institutional

investors

• Established in 2018
• Privacy-preserving

statistics

• Established in 2010
• Tailored cloud based

auction solution

• First investors
• Established in 2018
• Zero-knowledge computation on blockchains

New spinout combines ressources

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Market solutions

Auctions

• A protocol with a protocol
• Types: Exchanges, procurement and

interrelated auctions

• Goods: Production contracts, spectrum

rights, electricity, diamonds …

Matching

• Off-exchange matching (dark pool)
• MPC based matching
• On-chain settlement
• Fast and fault-tolerance
• Crosspoint IO with Tora.com

Focusing on market mechanisms for a data-driven economy

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Privacy-preserving analytics

Ex2: Blockchain-based data broker Ex1: Public-private virtual platform

Focusing on privacy-preserving analytics controlled by data owners

H e a l t h c a r e d a t a S

• c

i

• e

c

• n
• m

i c d a t a

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Key management

Focusing on simpler and stronger threshold cryptography

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Transparent privacy

Confidential info on-chain

• Informational secure info on-

chain

• ZK computation on

confidential info on-/off-chain Simpler and stronger wallets

• Stronger and cost-efficient

key management

• ZK computed private key

management More (institutional) investors

• Adding state-of-the-art

financial instruments and trading tools

• ZK computed off-exchange

matching on-/off-chain

1 2 3 Key commercial usages as the starting point

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Blockchain and privacy

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Crypto Currencies Smart Contracts The programmable contracts WEB 3.0 The blockchain computer Privacy measures None Privacy-preserving transactions Privacy-preserving computations Addressing fraud None KYC/AML KYC/AML (standard) Probably more regional auditing requirements

Private Info

Private Info

Private Info

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Towards a complete infrastructure

Distributed ledger

• Robust info about the

ledger

• Practically immutable

consensus about the ledger “Smart contracts”

• Programmable

contracts

• Computational power

Confidentiality

• Private info linked to

the ledger

• Privacy-preserving

computations

Blockchain

• Transparency
• Integrity

ZK computation

• Confidentiality
• Integrity

A more complete infrastructure

• Scalability as

common challenge

No single point of trust

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Two more words …

Blockchain nodes

• Distributed ledger
• One or few large

networks ZK computation nodes

• Confidentility
• Many smaller ad hoc

networks

Setup

• Simple articulation
• Provable secure
• Delegating trust

Execution

• Simple
• Efficient
• Robust

NODES ORCHESTRATION

Automated data-driven economy

• And why we need Privacy Blockchain

More detailed alternatives

• Positions, images, samples,

yours and others …

More individual preferences

• Clickstreams, previous

decisions, yours and others …

Realizing data-driven decision

Incentives Regulation Private information Strategic interaction

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Decentral - Central (The revelation principle)

§ The revelation principle states that for any mechanism, there is another truthful, direct revelation mechanism that:

• Asks agents to report their type directly
• Provides incentives to tell the truth
• Always gives the same outcome as the original mechanism

Old

Old Type 1

“Input 2”

OUTCOME 3 Old New

Impartial trusted third party

Type 1

Old

New

“Input 2”

“Type 1”

OUTCOME 3

Decentral - Central (new infrastructure needed)

Central Decentral

Government failure (informational and incentive problems, etc.) Market failure (market power, externalities, informational problems, etc.)

unregulated competition … auctions … regulation

informational problems solved? (Re-) build trust by strong commitments No single point

• f trust

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Economy of autonomous agents

Positions/type/etc.

Private preferences

(individually controlled)

Data analytics Market design Blockchain+ZK computation

Transport info etc. Positions/type/etc. Positions/type/etc.

Preferences Alternatives

Energy consumption etc. Data from services etc.

Distributed ledger

• Robust info about the

ledger

• Practically immutable

consensus about the ledger “Smart contracts”

• Programmable contracts
• Computational power

Confidentiality

• Private info on/linked to the

ledger

• Privacy-preserving

computations

Non-cooperative games

• Competitive solutions

– Mapping the game – Private/common info Cooperative games

• Binding contracts

– Finding and supporting coalitions – Better that outside

• ptions (sub-coalitions)

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Towards better markets

So delegate trust to whom?

Who control the nodes?

• Participant based trust
• Delegated trust

Many Few Generic use case

PRIVATE PUBLIC

Concluding remarks

• MPC has been used commercially for 10

years

• Exponential improvement has made MPC

more broadly applicable

• Blockchain and MPC

¤

Complementary technologies

¤

Privacy BlockChain – hello world!

• Exciting prospects

¤

Realising the data-driven economy in a privacy- precerving manner

Concluding remarks

Varian – we’re getting there …

``... Hence privacy appears to be a critical problem for computerized purchasing agents. This consideration usually does not arise with purely human participants, since it is generally thought that they can keep their private values secret. Even if current information can be safeguarded, records of past behaviour can be extremely valuable, since historical data can be used to estimate willingness to pay. What should be the technological and social safeguards to deal with this problem?'' (Varian 1995).