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Thumbscrew for agencies or for individuals? How to reduce unemployment Andrey Launov and Klaus Wlde University of Mainz June 2014 Andrey Launov and Klaus Wlde How to reduce unemployment (University of Mainz) June 2014 1 / 16 1. How to


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Thumbscrew for agencies or for individuals?

How to reduce unemployment Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde

University of Mainz

June 2014

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 1 / 16

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SLIDE 2
  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.1 The role of institutions

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 2 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.1 The role of institutions

Central institutions

Minimum wages, unions, hiring subsidies, labour taxes, unemployment bene…ts (Blau and Kahn, 1999; Nickel and Layard, 1999)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 2 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.1 The role of institutions

Central institutions

Minimum wages, unions, hiring subsidies, labour taxes, unemployment bene…ts (Blau and Kahn, 1999; Nickel and Layard, 1999)

Equilibrium employment e¤ect of institutions

! All of above (Pries and Rogerson, 2005; Yashiv, 2004) ! Experience rating (Cahuc and Malherbet, 2004) ! Minimum wage (Flinn, 2006) ! Union coverage (Boeri and Burda, 2009) ! In-work bene…ts (Immervoll et al., 2007) ! Layo¤ tax & payroll subsidy (L’Haridon and Malherbet, 2009) ! Temporary contracts & …ring costs (Bentolila et al., 2012) ! Unemployment bene…ts (Launov and Wälde, 2013)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 2 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.1 The role of institutions

Central institutions

Minimum wages, unions, hiring subsidies, labour taxes, unemployment bene…ts (Blau and Kahn, 1999; Nickel and Layard, 1999)

Equilibrium employment e¤ect of institutions

! All of above (Pries and Rogerson, 2005; Yashiv, 2004) ! Experience rating (Cahuc and Malherbet, 2004) ! Minimum wage (Flinn, 2006) ! Union coverage (Boeri and Burda, 2009) ! In-work bene…ts (Immervoll et al., 2007) ! Layo¤ tax & payroll subsidy (L’Haridon and Malherbet, 2009) ! Temporary contracts & …ring costs (Bentolila et al., 2012) ! Unemployment bene…ts (Launov and Wälde, 2013)

Public Employment Agency (PEA)?

Largely left aside, although key to reducing coordination frictions (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 2 / 16

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SLIDE 6
  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.2 Evidence on PEA?

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 3 / 16

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SLIDE 7
  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.2 Evidence on PEA?

Equilibrium e¤ects of the Agency

Pissarides (1979), Fougère et al. (2009):

Search through agencies and private search; potential negative e¤ect of more e¤ective agency via discouraging private search

Jung and Kuhn (2014):

Explain the di¤erence between the US and Germany in 80s-90s by the di¤erence in matching e¤ectiveness of PEA (not bene…ts!)

Krebs and Sche¤el (2014):

Matching e¤ectiveness and cost of recessions

Selected aspects:

Counseling (Cahuc & Le Barbanchon, 2010) / Middleman (Yava¸ s, 1994)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 3 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.2 Evidence on PEA?

Equilibrium e¤ects of the Agency

Pissarides (1979), Fougère et al. (2009):

Search through agencies and private search; potential negative e¤ect of more e¤ective agency via discouraging private search

Jung and Kuhn (2014):

Explain the di¤erence between the US and Germany in 80s-90s by the di¤erence in matching e¤ectiveness of PEA (not bene…ts!)

Krebs and Sche¤el (2014):

Matching e¤ectiveness and cost of recessions

Selected aspects:

Counseling (Cahuc & Le Barbanchon, 2010) / Middleman (Yava¸ s, 1994)

E¤ects in reduced-form literature

Holzer (1988), Blau and Robins (1990) and the Followers:

Fairly wide but no link between impact estimates and the change of the equilibrium unemployment rate

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 3 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.3 Our goal and …ndings

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 4 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.3 Our goal and …ndings

Our goal

Analyze the incentive structure and the employment e¤ect of a real-life reform aimed at increasing e¤ectiveness of matching

! Thumbscrew for Agencies

Compare it with a more traditional reform (of unemployment bene…ts)

! Thumbscrew for Unemployed

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 4 / 16

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SLIDE 11
  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.3 Our goal and …ndings

Our goal

Analyze the incentive structure and the employment e¤ect of a real-life reform aimed at increasing e¤ectiveness of matching

! Thumbscrew for Agencies

Compare it with a more traditional reform (of unemployment bene…ts)

! Thumbscrew for Unemployed

Conceptual modelling framework (Launov and Wälde, 2013)

Structurally estimated nonstationary equilibrium matching model with time-varying productivity of PEA and time-varying bene…ts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 4 / 16

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  • 1. How to reduce unemployment?

1.3 Our goal and …ndings

Our goal

Analyze the incentive structure and the employment e¤ect of a real-life reform aimed at increasing e¤ectiveness of matching

! Thumbscrew for Agencies

Compare it with a more traditional reform (of unemployment bene…ts)

! Thumbscrew for Unemployed

Conceptual modelling framework (Launov and Wälde, 2013)

Structurally estimated nonstationary equilibrium matching model with time-varying productivity of PEA and time-varying bene…ts

Our …ndings

The reform of PEA in Germany explains up to 33.8% of the observed post-reform reduction in unemployment Traditional bene…ts and entitlement reductions of a reasonable size explain just 7.7% of the observed unemployment reduction

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 4 / 16

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  • 2. German unemployment and Hartz reforms

2.1 Stylized facts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 5 / 16

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  • 2. German unemployment and Hartz reforms

2.1 Stylized facts

Figure 1 Unemployment rate in Germany in 2001-2008

Jan 01 Jan 03 Jan 05 Jan 07 Jan 09 6 8 10 12 14

Germany (solid)

Jan 01 Jan 03 Jan 05 Jan 07 Jan 09 6 8 10 12 14 12 14 16 18 20

West (dash/left), East (dash-dot/right)

(Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit)

Structural break in 2005 (bene…t reduction: 01.01.2005!) Reduction of 3.91 ppt (equiv. 33.4%) between 2005 and 2008

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 5 / 16

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  • 2. German unemployment and Hartz reforms

2.2 Institutional setting

Hartz I (e¤ective as of 01.01.2003)

Various training and employment-stimulating measures Job market integration of workers over 50 Strengthened sanctions and increased pressure to search Established personnel service agencies as intermediaries between job searchers and employers to coordinate loan work placement

Hartz II (e¤ective as of 01.01.2003)

New rules for Mini-Jobs; introduction of Midi-Jobs New start-up subsidies

Hartz III (e¤ective as of 01.01.2004)

Internal administrative reform of the entire Federal Employment Agency “Job Centers” as a uni…ed address for bene…t claimants

Hartz IV (e¤ective as of 01.01.2005)

Fixed unemployment assistance bene…ts (reduction of bene…ts on average) Reduced entitlement to unemployment insurance bene…ts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 6 / 16

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  • 2. German unemployment and Hartz reforms

2.2 Institutional setting

Hartz I

Various training and employment-stimulating measures Job market integration of workers over 50 Strengthened sanctions and increased pressure to search Established personnel service agencies as intermediaries between job searchers and employers to coordinate loan work placement

Hartz II

New rules for Mini-Jobs; introduction of Midi-Jobs New start-up subsidies

Hartz III

Internal administrative reform of the entire Federal Employment Agency “Job Centers” as a uni…ed address for bene…t claimants

Hartz IV

Fixed unemployment assistance bene…ts (reduction of bene…ts on average) Reduced entitlement to unemployment insurance bene…ts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 7 / 16

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  • 2. German unemployment and Hartz reforms

2.2 Institutional setting

Hartz I

Various training and employment-stimulating measures Job market integration of workers over 50 Strengthened sanctions and increased pressure to search Established personnel service agencies as intermediaries between job searchers and employers to coordinate loan work placement

Hartz II

New rules for Mini-Jobs; introduction of Midi-Jobs New start-up subsidies

Hartz III - Reform of PEA - pure change in matching e¤ectiveness

Internal administrative reform of the entire Federal Employment Agency “Job Centers” as a uni…ed address for bene…t claimants

Hartz IV - Bene…t reform - pure change in bene…ts & entitlement

Fixed unemployment assistance bene…ts (reduction of bene…ts on average) Reduced entitlement to unemployment insurance bene…ts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 7 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Two-state (E and U) Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Two-state (E and U) Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with

Unemployment insurance (bUI ) and assistance (bUA) bene…ts proportional to previous wage (w) with …xed and known time limit (¯ s) on insurance bene…ts b (s) =

  • bUI = ξUI w,

s ¯ s bUA = ξUAw, s > ¯ s, ξUI > ξUA: replacement rates Time-dependent matching e¤ectiveness of the agency for short- (ψUI ) and long-term (ψUA) unemployed ψ (s) =

  • ψUI ,

s ¯ s ψUA, s > ¯ s, ψUI >, =, < ψUA

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Two-state (E and U) Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with

Unemployment insurance (bUI ) and assistance (bUA) bene…ts proportional to previous wage (w) with …xed and known time limit (¯ s) on insurance bene…ts b (s) =

  • bUI = ξUI w,

s ¯ s bUA = ξUAw, s > ¯ s, ξUI > ξUA: replacement rates Time-dependent matching e¤ectiveness of the agency for short- (ψUI ) and long-term (ψUA) unemployed ψ (s) =

  • ψUI ,

s ¯ s ψUA, s > ¯ s, ψUI >, =, < ψUA Endogenous search e¤ort: φ (s)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Two-state (E and U) Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with

Unemployment insurance (bUI ) and assistance (bUA) bene…ts proportional to previous wage (w) with …xed and known time limit (¯ s) on insurance bene…ts b (s) =

  • bUI = ξUI w,

s ¯ s bUA = ξUAw, s > ¯ s, ξUI > ξUA: replacement rates Time-dependent matching e¤ectiveness of the agency for short- (ψUI ) and long-term (ψUA) unemployed ψ (s) =

  • ψUI ,

s ¯ s ψUA, s > ¯ s, ψUI >, =, < ψUA Endogenous search e¤ort: φ (s) Risk-averse workers, ex-ante heterogeneous over

  • bserved individual characteristics

unobserved individual search productivity: χ, χ = f0, 1g

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Two-state (E and U) Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model with

Unemployment insurance (bUI ) and assistance (bUA) bene…ts proportional to previous wage (w) with …xed and known time limit (¯ s) on insurance bene…ts b (s) =

  • bUI = ξUI w,

s ¯ s bUA = ξUAw, s > ¯ s, ξUI > ξUA: replacement rates Time-dependent matching e¤ectiveness of the agency for short- (ψUI ) and long-term (ψUA) unemployed ψ (s) =

  • ψUI ,

s ¯ s ψUA, s > ¯ s, ψUI >, =, < ψUA Endogenous search e¤ort: φ (s) Risk-averse workers, ex-ante heterogeneous over

  • bserved individual characteristics

unobserved individual search productivity: χ, χ = f0, 1g Bayesian learning over own search productivity: p (s) = P(χ = 1; s)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 8 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 9 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Transition rates

U ! E: µ (s) = µ (φ (s) θ, ψ (s) , p (s)) Depends on: tightness θ, search e¤ort φ (s), agency e¤ectiveness ψ (s), and the sub- jective probability of being productive in search p (s) E ! U: λ λ is exogenous

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 9 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Transition rates

U ! E: µ (s) = µ (φ (s) θ, ψ (s) , p (s)) Depends on: tightness θ, search e¤ort φ (s), agency e¤ectiveness ψ (s), and the sub- jective probability of being productive in search p (s) E ! U: λ λ is exogenous

Optimal behaviour

Workers: Maximize value of unemployment by optimally choosing φ (s) given the institutions [ψ (s) and b (s)] Firms: Maximize pro…ts by posting costly vacancies Government: Operates balanced budget to …nance bene…ts

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 9 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.1 Key features

Transition rates

U ! E: µ (s) = µ (φ (s) θ, ψ (s) , p (s)) Depends on: tightness θ, search e¤ort φ (s), agency e¤ectiveness ψ (s), and the sub- jective probability of being productive in search p (s) E ! U: λ λ is exogenous

Optimal behaviour

Workers: Maximize value of unemployment by optimally choosing φ (s) given the institutions [ψ (s) and b (s)] Firms: Maximize pro…ts by posting costly vacancies Government: Operates balanced budget to …nance bene…ts

Equilibrium

Endogenous distribution of unemployment duration (given institutions) Endogenous wage, tightness & unemployment rate (given institutions)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 9 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 10 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Uniform increase in productivity of the agency

Matching rate increases, unemployment goes down unambiguously

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 10 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Uniform increase in productivity of the agency

Matching rate increases, unemployment goes down unambiguously

Heterogeneous increase in productivity of the agency

Ambiguity: Di¤ering increases in productivities of the agency for short- and long-term unemployed can increase the unemployment rate!

0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 4.15 4.2 4.25 4.3 4.35 4.4 4.45 4.5 4.55 4.6 4.65 x 10

4

ψUA (given ψUI = 1) Total hires

Hirings

0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 10.3 10.35 10.4 10.45 10.5 10.55 10.6 10.65 10.7 10.75 ψUA (given ψUI = 1) Unemplyoment rate

Unemployment

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 10 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 11 / 16

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SLIDE 32
  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Where does this paradox come from?

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 11 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Where does this paradox come from? Two opposing in‡uences on the exit () unemployment) rate

Productivity e¤ect

Higher productivity of PEA helps long-term unemployed workers to …nd a job faster: A positive e¤ect

Incentive e¤ect

Anticipating higher future exit rates, short-term unemployed workers put less e¤ort into …nding a job: A negative e¤ect

Sum of both e¤ects determines the direction of change

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 11 / 16

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  • 3. Theory

3.2 Employment e¤ect of a more productive agency

Where does this paradox come from? Two opposing in‡uences on the exit () unemployment) rate

Productivity e¤ect

Higher productivity of PEA helps long-term unemployed workers to …nd a job faster: A positive e¤ect

Incentive e¤ect

Anticipating higher future exit rates, short-term unemployed workers put less e¤ort into …nding a job: A negative e¤ect

Sum of both e¤ects determines the direction of change Place in the existing literature

Complementary to Pissarides (1979) and Fougère et al. (2009)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 11 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.1 Empirical strategy

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 12 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.1 Empirical strategy

Structural estimation

Estimates of structural parameters in the pre-reform steady state from Launov and Wälde (2013)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 12 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.1 Empirical strategy

Structural estimation

Estimates of structural parameters in the pre-reform steady state from Launov and Wälde (2013)

Structural prediction of the productivity increase of PEA

Homogeneous increase of PEA productivity ∑k ¯ µk(ψ)Uk = δ ∑k ¯ µ

kU k ,

δ: external estimate of the increase in matches in the new equilibrium (Klinger & Rothe 2012: δ = 3.5%) Heterogeneous increase of productivities of PEA (paradox arises) ∑k ¯ µk(ψUI )Ushort

k

= δUI ∑k ¯ µ

kUshort k

∑k ¯ µk(ψUA)U long

k

= δUA ∑k ¯ µ

kUlong k

δUI and δUA: external estimates of the increase in matches for short- and long-term unemployed in the new equilibrium (Klinger & Rothe 2012: δUI = 2.1%, δUA = 6.1%)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 12 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.2 The reduction of equilibrium unemployment rate

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 13 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.2 The reduction of equilibrium unemployment rate

Identical impact Di¤ering impact

absolute

  • red. (ppt)

explained

  • red. (%)

absolute

  • red. (ppt)

explained

  • red. (%)

Hartz III 1.98 50.64 % 1.32 33.76 % Hartz IV 0.08 2.05 % Hartz III and IV 2.08 52.94 % 1.62 41.43 % H-IV given H-III 0.10 2.56 % 0.30 7.67 % Importance of the reforms relative to each other / Design issues

Reform of PEA (1.32) is 4-5 times more successful than unemployment bene…t reduction (0.30) Disincentive e¤ect costs 0.66 ppt of not attained reduction Reduction of bene…ts has stronger e¤ect when productivity of agency is high (0.30 vs 0.10)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 13 / 16

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  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.3 Implications of the PEA reform

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 14 / 16

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SLIDE 41
  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.3 Implications of the PEA reform

PEA can be an important source of improving market performance

Social acceptability: Reduction of coordination frictions does not lead to distributional e¤ects, unlike bene…t reduction (poverty, inequality)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 14 / 16

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SLIDE 42
  • 4. The role of public employment agency

4.3 Implications of the PEA reform

PEA can be an important source of improving market performance

Social acceptability: Reduction of coordination frictions does not lead to distributional e¤ects, unlike bene…t reduction (poverty, inequality)

German benchmarks attained by Hartz III (Weise, 2011)

Remodeled an administrative bureaucracy into a service center Restructured work ‡ow: Introduced call centers, reception desks, consultations upon appointment and without interruptions Targets for workload: 150 claimants per case worker, 75 claimants under 25 years of age per case worker (met in 2012 only) Priorities: Priority scheme in processing cases of those over 50

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 14 / 16

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Conclusion

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 15 / 16

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Conclusion

The role of PEA reform

Improved bureaucracy has signi…cant unemployment-reducing potential in a typical welfare state The reform of PEA explains up to 33.8% of the observed post-reform reduction in unemployment

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 15 / 16

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Conclusion

The role of PEA reform

Improved bureaucracy has signi…cant unemployment-reducing potential in a typical welfare state The reform of PEA explains up to 33.8% of the observed post-reform reduction in unemployment

The role of bene…t reform

Traditional unemployment bene…t reform has a weaker e¤ect (7.7% conditional on the prior reform of PEA)

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 15 / 16

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SLIDE 46

Conclusion

The role of PEA reform

Improved bureaucracy has signi…cant unemployment-reducing potential in a typical welfare state The reform of PEA explains up to 33.8% of the observed post-reform reduction in unemployment

The role of bene…t reform

Traditional unemployment bene…t reform has a weaker e¤ect (7.7% conditional on the prior reform of PEA)

How to reduce unemployment?

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 15 / 16

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SLIDE 47

Conclusion

The role of PEA reform

Improved bureaucracy has signi…cant unemployment-reducing potential in a typical welfare state The reform of PEA explains up to 33.8% of the observed post-reform reduction in unemployment

The role of bene…t reform

Traditional unemployment bene…t reform has a weaker e¤ect (7.7% conditional on the prior reform of PEA)

How to reduce unemployment?

Do not focus exclusively on bene…ts Look into reforming bureaucracies!

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 15 / 16

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SLIDE 48

Thank You

Thank You!

Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde (University of Mainz) How to reduce unemployment June 2014 16 / 16