Threat Models CS 5431 February 10, 2017 Threat Models Threats - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aug 23, 2023 •110 likes •357 views

Introduction Threat Models CS 5431 February 10, 2017 Threat Models Threats (CS 5430) Inquisitive people, unintentional blunders Hackers driven by technical challenges Disgruntled employees or

Introduction Threat ¡Models CS ¡5431 ¡ February ¡10, ¡2017
Threat ¡Models
Threats ¡(CS ¡5430) • Inquisitive ¡people, ¡unintentional ¡blunders • Hackers driven ¡by ¡technical ¡challenges • Disgruntled ¡employees ¡or ¡customers ¡seeking ¡revenge • Criminals interested ¡in ¡personal ¡financial ¡gain, ¡stealing ¡services, ¡or ¡ industrial ¡espionage • Organized ¡crime ¡with ¡the ¡intent ¡of ¡hiding ¡something ¡or ¡financial ¡gain • Organized ¡terrorist ¡groups ¡attempting ¡to ¡influence ¡policy ¡by ¡isolated ¡ attacks • Foreign ¡espionage ¡agents ¡seeking ¡to ¡exploit ¡information ¡for ¡ economic, ¡political, ¡or ¡military ¡purposes • Tactical ¡countermeasures ¡intended ¡to ¡disrupt ¡specific ¡weapons ¡or ¡ command ¡structures • Multifaceted ¡tactical ¡information ¡warfare ¡applied ¡in ¡a ¡broad ¡ orchestrated ¡manner ¡to ¡disrupt ¡major ¡military ¡missions • Large ¡organized ¡groups ¡or ¡nation ¡states intent ¡on ¡overthrowing ¡a ¡ government
Threats ¡(DoD)
Threats ¡(DoD)
Threat ¡Model ¡= ¡Capabilities • privilege ¡levels
Threat ¡Model ¡= ¡Capabilities • privilege ¡levels • memory ¡access
Heartbleed
Heartbleed
Threat ¡Model ¡= ¡Capabilities • privilege ¡levels • memory ¡access • physical ¡access
Stuxnet
Threat ¡Model ¡= ¡Capabilities • privilege ¡levels • memory ¡access • physical ¡access • key ¡access
FileVault
The ¡iPhone ¡Case
Humans
U.S. ¡Election ¡Hacks
Threat ¡Model ¡= ¡Capabilities • privilege ¡levels • memory ¡access • physical ¡access • key ¡access • network ¡access
Network ¡Adversaries Attacker ¡Properties Membership insider outsider Method active passive Adaptability dynamic static Organization cooperative individual Scope global extended local Motivation malicious rational opportunistic
Pakistani ¡YouTube ¡Outage
Dyn DDoS
Security ¡Goals
Security ¡Goals • "The ¡system ¡shall ¡prevent/detect ¡ action on/to/with ¡ asset ." ¡ • e.g., ¡"The ¡system ¡shall ¡prevent ¡theft ¡of ¡money” • e.g., ¡"The ¡system ¡shall ¡prevent ¡erasure ¡of ¡account ¡balances" ¡ • Specify ¡ what not ¡how • Be ¡specific • Make ¡goals ¡ feasible with ¡respect ¡to ¡threat ¡model

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